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Résumé 
 
Cette étude vise à exposer le rôle méthodologique que Martin Heidegger attribue à 
la conscience (Gewissen) dans Être et temps et à faire ressortir les implications de son 
interprétation de « l’appel de la conscience » comme le moyen de produire l’attestation 
(Bezeugung) de l’existence authentique en tant que possibilité du Dasein (ou être-dans-le-
monde). Notre objectif initial est de montrer comment la notion heideggérienne de 
conscience a évolué avant la publication d’Être et temps en 1927 et d’identifier les sources 
qui ont contribué à l’interprétation existentiale de la conscience comme « l’appel du 
souci. » Notre analyse historique révèle notamment que Heidegger n’a jamais décrit la 
conscience comme un « appel » avant sa lecture du livre Das Gewissen (1925) par Hendrik 
G. Stoker, un jeune philosophe sud-africain qui a étudié à Cologne sous la direction de Max 
Scheler. Nous démontrons plus spécifiquement comment l’étude phénoménologique de 
Stoker—qui décrit la conscience comme « l’appel du devoir (Pflichtruf) » provenant de 
l’étincelle divine (synteresis) placée dans l’âme de chaque personne par Dieu—a influencé 
l’élaboration du concept de « l’appel existentiel » chez Heidegger. Mettant l’accent sur le 
rôle méthodologique de la conscience dans Être et temps, nous soulignons aussi 
l’importance des liens entre son concept de la conscience et la notion de « l’indication 
formelle » que Heidegger a mise au cœur de sa « méthode » dans ses cours sur la 
phénoménologie à Freiburg et Marbourg. Alors que de nombreux commentateurs voient 
dans « l’appel de la conscience » une notion solipsiste qui demeure impossible en tant 
qu’expérience, nous proposons un moyen de lever cette difficulté apparente en tentant de 
faire ressortir ce qui est « indiqué formellement » par la notion même de la conscience 
(Gewissen) dans Être et temps. Cette approche nous permet d’affirmer que le concept de 
conscience chez Heidegger renvoie à un phénomène de  « témoignage » qui est 
radicalement différent de la notion traditionnelle de conscientia. Guidé par les principes 
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mêmes de la phénoménologie heideggérienne, nous procédons à une analyse 
« destructrice » de l’histoire du mot allemand Gewissen qui nous révèle que la signification 
originelle de ce mot (établie dans le plus ancien livre préservé dans la langue allemande : le 
Codex Abrogans) était testimonium et non conscientia. À l’origine, Gewissen signifiait en 
effet « attestation »—ce qui est précisément le rôle assigné à la conscience par Heidegger 
dans Être et temps. Sur la base de cette découverte, nous proposons une manière de 
comprendre cette « attestation » comme une expérience possible : l’écoute du « témoignage 
silencieux » du martyr qui permet à Dasein  de reconnaître sa propre possibilité 
d’authenticité. 
 
Mots-clés : Philosophie, Heidegger, Conscience, Gewissen, Existence, Phénoménologie, 
Attestation, Bezeugung, Témoignage, Martyr 
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Abstract 
 
This study aims to exhibit the methodological role that Martin Heidegger assigns to 
conscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time and to reveal the implications of his 
interpretation of the “call of conscience” as the means of producing the attestation 
(Bezeugung) of authentic existence as a possibility of Being-in-the-world (or Dasein). We 
begin by seeking to understand how Heidegger’s notion of conscience evolved prior to the 
1927 publication of Being and Time and to identify the sources which contributed to his 
interpretation of conscience as the “call of care.” Our historical analysis notably reveals 
that Heidegger never once describes conscience as a “call” before reading Das Gewissen 
(1925) by Hendrik G. Stoker, a young South African philosopher who studied under Max 
Scheler’s direction at the University of Cologne. We specifically examine how Stoker’s 
phenomenological study—which describes conscience as the “call-of-duty” issued to each 
human being by the divine “spark” (synteresis) placed in his or her soul by God—
contributed to shaping Heidegger’s account of the “existential call.” Focusing on the 
methodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we analyze Heidegger’s major work 
in light of his early lectures on phenomenology at Freiburg and Marburg. This approach 
confirms the relation between conscience in Being and Time and the concept of “formal 
indication” that Heidegger placed at the heart of his evolving “method” of 
phenomenological investigation. While many commentators have argued that Heidegger’s 
“call of conscience” is solipsistic and impossible to experience, we propose a way of 
reconsidering this apparent impasse by examining what Being and Time itself “formally 
indicates” with regard to conscience. We show that Heidegger’s conscience points to a 
phenomenon of existential “testimony” which is radically different from the traditional 
notion of conscientia. Guided by Heidegger’s “formal indication” of conscience, we 
“destructively” review the history of the German word Gewissen and reveal its original 
meaning to be “testimonium” not “conscientia.” In recognizing that Gewissen originally 
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meant “attestation,” we show how Heidegger’s existential phenomenon of conscience can 
be understood as Dasein’s experience of hearing the “silent testimony” of the martyr.  
 
Keywords: Philosophy, Heidegger, Conscience, Gewissen, Existence, Phenomenology, 
Attestation, Bezeugung, Testimony, Martyr 
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Because we are actually unable to see the phenomena of 
existence today, we no longer experience the 
meaning of conscience and sense of responsibility 
that lies in the historical itself. For the historical is 
not merely something of which we have 
knowledge and about which we write books; 
rather, we ourselves are the historical that we 
ourselves bear and carry as a responsibility. 
 
Weil wir heute die Existenzphänomene nicht eigentlich 
sehen, erfahren wir nicht mehr den Gewissens- un 
Verantwortungssinn, der im Historischen selbst 
liegt, das nicht nur etwas ist, wovon man Kenntnis 
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hat und worüber es Bücher gibt, das wir vielmehr 
selbst sind, an dem wir selbst tragen. 
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Martin Heidegger 
 
From the essay “Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers Psychologie 
der Weltanschauungen” (1920)* 
 
   
 
* GA 9, 33-34. English translation from Heidegger, Martin. "Critical Comments on Jaspers’s Psychology of 
Worldviews."  Trans. Theodore J. Kisiel. Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of his Early Occasional 
Writings, 1910-1927. Eds. Theodore J. Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, [1920] 2007. p. 141. 
   
Introduction 
 
When Martin Heidegger introduces the phenomenon of “conscience (Gewissen)” in 
Being and Time, he places one of the most morally charged and controversial concepts of 
philosophy, ethics and theology at the heart of his existential-ontological project. With this 
choice, Heidegger indicates that the question of the meaning of Being—the fundamental 
question of Being and Time that Heidegger contends has been covered up by tradition—can 
only be raised if the primordial experience of conscience understood as a phenomenon that 
“cannot be defined by morality”1 is salvaged from the ambiguity of the myriad ways in 
which it is “ordinarily” described.2 Indeed, Heidegger interprets conscience as an 
existential “call (Ruf)” that allows one to recognize the error of understanding this “voice” 
as an essentially moral phenomenon, e.g. as an internal “judge” which condemns past 
misdeeds or as a moral guide which urges a person towards what is good. For Heidegger, 
such “ordinary (vulgär)” ways of understanding conscience are only possible on the basis 
of the primordial but generally forgotten phenomenon of the “call” which initiates the 
experience of Dasein’s coming into its world.  
Given the historical importance of conscientia to philosophical and religious 
tradition, Heidegger’s appropriation of the concept of conscience in Being and Time is as 
irreverent as it is radical. In exposing the ambiguity of “moral conscience,” Heidegger 
indicates that his “destruction” of conscientia is possible only because the existential “call 
of conscience (Gewissensruf)” allows Dasein to free itself from the bondage of “common” 
morality and other such “everyday (alltäglich)” concerns. In Being and Time, conscience 
thus serves as both the “attestation (Bezeugung)” of the experience of Dasein’s authentic 
disclosedness and the phenomenological means for exhibiting the ways in which 
“everyday” Dasein absorbs itself in the public concerns of the “they (das Man).” What is 
                                                 
1
 SZ §58, 286 / 332. 
2
 SZ §59, 289 / 335. 
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implied by this dual role that Heidegger assigns to conscience is that the entire existential 
analysis depends upon Dasein’s possible hearing of this “call.” Rescued from the 
“forgetfulness” of tradition by Heidegger’s interpretation, the phenomenon of existential 
conscience proves to be the methodological key for investigating Dasein’s constitutive 
structures and thus for accessing the fundamental question of Being.   
One of the primary objectives of our study is to show how Heidegger’s conscience 
functions as the pivotal concept in Being and Time that brings Dasein into the “there” of 
disclosedness where the question of Being can be raised. More specifically, we seek to 
contribute to the understanding of how this “primordial” phenomenon of the “call of 
conscience” is related to the “method” of formal indication developed in Heidegger’s 
earlier lectures and writings. As we analyze the highly unconventional interpretation of 
conscience that Heidegger proposes, our study will focus squarely on the how of 
experiencing conscience and of producing the required attestation of Dasein’s possible 
authenticity and phenomenal “wholeness.” Given our concern for the methodological 
structure of Being and Time, we will see that conscience—introduced at the critical 
moment of Heidegger’s investigation where the project shifts from the analysis of Dasein 
to the interpretation of time—is positioned as the attesting “experience” which the 
legitimacy of all phenomenological research ultimately depends upon. 
Our examination of conscience in Being and Time also seeks to address the 
difficulties that Heidegger faces in attempting to reveal the meaning of Being through his 
existential analysis of Being-in-the-world. In this regard, we open our study of 
Heideggerian conscience by making two principal assumptions, both of which are found in 
the writings of several leading commentators of Being and Time. Our first assumption is 
that the existential analysis of Being and Time is rendered problematic because the 
“attestation” of conscience promised by Heidegger in §54 is never adequately produced. 
This problem leads to Heidegger’s eventual recognition that Being and Time was—as 
Theodore Kisiel puts it—“a failed project” and that the meaning of Being could not be 
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accessed through the analysis of Dasein’s constitutive structures.3 On this point, we share 
Kisiel’s conviction that the problem of understanding how Being-in-the-world can 
experience its “authenticity” demands that we reconsider Heidegger’s initial “hermeneutic 
breakthrough” in his 1919 “war emergency semester (Kriegsnotsemester)” course at 
Freiburg4 where he insisted on the necessity of positing a “preworldly something (basic 
moment of life as such).”5 We will contend in this thesis that the existential “call of 
conscience” reflects Heidegger’s attempt in Being and Time to indicate how it is possible 
for Dasein to experience its return to such a “basic moment of life.” Significantly for our 
study, this “war emergency semester” marks the first moment in Heidegger’s published 
philosophical work where he makes reference to conscience (Gewissen) as he criticizes the 
traditional notion of conscientia.6 Our second assumption is that Heidegger was greatly 
concerned about the methodology of his “hermeneutical phenomenology” deployed in 
Being and Time even though there is relatively little discussion of methodological issues in 
the text itself, a point that has been made convincingly by Jean-François Courtine and 
Walter Schulz.7 We believe that our understanding of these methodological questions and 
how they relate to the concept of conscience can be advanced by studying the development 
of Heidegger’s phenomenological approach in the years leading up to Being and Time’s 
publication in 1927. In showing how conscience emerged as the pivotal concept in 
Heidegger’s investigation of Dasein, we aim both to identify problems related to 
conscience’s role of “attestation” and to specify the implications of these difficulties for the 
project of Being and Time as a whole, notably with regard to the analysis of “everyday” 
Dasein’s constitutive phenomena in Division One.  
                                                 
3
 Theodore J. Kisiel. The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993). p. 458. 
4
 Ibid. p. 458. 
5
 Ibid. pp. 21-23. Based on the notes taken by Heidegger’s students, the description of the “preworldly” in the 
schema is given as: “Das vorweltliche Etwas (Grundmoment des Lebens überhaupt) Ur-etwas.” 
6
 GA 56/57, 45 / 36-37. 
7
 Cf. Jean-François Courtine. "La cause de la phénoménologie." Heidegger et la phénoménologie. (Paris: J. 
Vrin, 1990). p. 165; Walter Schulz. "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers." 
Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks. ed. Otto Pöggeler. (Königstein: Athenäum, 1984). p. 
101.  
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While our study exposes key problems related to Heidegger’s approach, it also aims 
to open up new ways of thinking about the existential concept of conscience and to allow 
us to envision possible solutions to problems Heidegger left unresolved. In this sense, our 
study recognizes and responds to the widespread claim that the “attestation” proposed in 
Being and Time is insufficient and to the fact that Heidegger abandoned the concept of 
conscience almost immediately after this major work was published. We thus embrace the 
challenge issued by Paul Ricœur when he suggestively asked if the problem of the 
“attestation” of conscience in Being and Time could again be “taken up” where Heidegger 
had “left off.”8 Evidently, this task of identifying alternative ways of understanding the 
existential notion of conscience cannot produce answers that could be regarded as 
“authorized” by Heidegger himself. He provides little explicit guidance in Being and Time 
with regard to the underlying methodology of his existential analysis and does not explain 
in much detail how the “call of conscience” functions within his “method” of interpretive 
phenomenology. As Karen Feldman argues, the originality—and “literary” merit—of Being 
and Time lies in its “profoundly figurative and specifically catachrestic” nature that 
“disturbs” its readers and forces them to participate in the “performance” of Heidegger’s 
existential investigation.9 Rather than delivering objective factual statements or clearly 
communicating his “method,” Heidegger presses his readers to “experience” their own 
dependence on the “call of conscience” as they struggle to make sense of his “unhandy, 
defamiliarizing” descriptions of Dasein’s basic phenomena.10  
While this “disturbing” and “performative” approach is perfectly suited to 
Heidegger’s “radical” project, it significantly complicates any attempt to expose the 
methodological role of conscience in Being and Time and to reveal the problematic aspects 
                                                 
8
 Paul Ricœur. "Emmanuel Lévinas, penseur du témoignage." Lectures 3 : Aux Frontières De La Philosophie. 
(Paris: Seuil, [1989] 1994). p. 95. In French: “[Est-il] possible, à partir [d’une] herméneutique du témoignage, 
de remettre en chantier la problématique du Gewissen, de la conscience morale, de l’injonction, de la 
reprendre au point où Heidegger l’a laissée ?” 
9
 Karen S. Feldman. Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger. (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 2006). p. 80. 
10
 Ibid. p. 80. 
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of Dasein’s “self-attestation” of its possibility of “authentic existence.”11 To complicate our 
investigation further, there are very few references to conscience in Heidegger’s early work 
which document the development of his existential concept of conscience or presage its 
sudden appearance as the pivotal phenomenon of Being and Time. For these reasons, our 
study requires both an attentive review of the early Heideggerian lectures and writings on 
phenomenological method and a deliberate study of the historical sources which inform his 
approach to conscience, including both the few references explicitly provided by Heidegger 
and other sources which reveal themselves to be formally indicated by his existential 
concept.  
Our assessment of the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time reveals 
that this phenomenon must be distinguished from the other supposedly “equiprimordial 
(gleichursprünglich)” phenomena which Heidegger interprets as constitutive of Being-in-
the-world. Both in existential and methodological terms, the entire project of Being and 
Time turns on the success of Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience in producing the 
“attestation” that Dasein is “something for which authentic existence is possible.”12 
Without this “attestation,” the project will not have shown how Dasein can actually be 
“whole”—which is a condition Heidegger considers to be necessary for the success of his 
investigation. As we will see, it is Heidegger’s apparent difficulty in showing how the “call 
of conscience” can be experienced that leads to his abandonment both of the concept of 
conscience itself and of Being and Time’s existential-ontological approach. For our study, 
however, Heidegger’s forsaking of conscience does not lead to a dead end: the formal 
indications provided in Being and Time can be reconsidered with an eye to opening up new 
ways of advancing the existential investigation. In this regard, we must keep in mind that 
the “call of conscience” itself formally indicates a possibility of authentic understanding 
which must be enacted: if Heidegger’s conscience is the “attesting” phenomenon of 
Dasein’s possible authenticity, then it must be possible as an experience of Dasein. Once 
the vital methodological role of conscience in Being and Time has been established and 
                                                 
11
 SZ §54, 267 / 312. 
12
 SZ §54, 267 / 312. 
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clarified, we can explore how the “call of conscience” might be experienced by following 
up on what is formally indicated by conscience and the other key phenomena that 
Heidegger identifies with Dasein’s authentic mode of existence. Our goal in “taking up” 
this search is not to “define” the meaning of Dasein’s conscience but rather to point to a 
way in which Dasein can be understood to enact its authentic “self-testimony.”  
Despite the fact that Heidegger’s “self-attestation” of conscience is problematic and 
that he precipitously abandoned this concept, the “call of conscience” does not have to 
be—and should not be—simply cast aside as a phenomenological concept. Although 
Heidegger’s account of conscience may not convincingly provide the “demonstration” that 
Dasein can find “its source” in its own “state of Being,”13 his interpretation of the 
existential call and its methodological role in Being and Time can be seen to point to 
possible solutions to this problem regarding how conscience can be experienced. When the 
analysis of Dasein is reconsidered with a focus on the role of conscience and Heidegger’s 
method of formal indication, it becomes possible to interpret the “call of conscience” in 
terms of ontical experience. As we will see, the experience of conscience can be understood 
as a form of authentic witnessing which makes Dasein’s disclosedness possible and thus 
provides the basis for all the possible ways in which the world can be understood.  
Main Findings of the Study 
The results of our investigation of Heidegger’s existential conscience hold several 
implications for the phenomenological methodology of Being and Time, for the existential 
analysis of Dasein and for the concept of conscience itself, notably with regard to the 
influences on Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience and to the origin and distinct history 
of the German word Gewissen. Here are some of the key findings that we will develop 
more fully in the course of our study:  
1) The Influence of Hendrik G. Stoker’s Das Gewissen (1925) on Heidegger’s 
Interpretation of Conscience in Being and Time: The single most important influence on 
                                                 
13
 SZ §54, 267 / 312. 
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Heidegger’s existential interpretation of conscience—and indeed one of the most 
significant sources for examining the methodological principles of Being and Time as a 
whole—is discreetly acknowledged in a footnote at the end of §55 in the second chapter of 
Division Two.14 Here, Heidegger comments briefly on a recently published 
phenomenological study of conscience entitled Das Gewissen written by a South African 
scholar named Hendrik G. Stoker and edited by Max Scheler, who had directed Stoker’s 
doctoral work at the University of Cologne.15 As we will see in our review of Heidegger’s 
published texts from 1919-1925, the young German philosopher had only developed a 
“primitive” sketch of conscience prior to the appearance of Stoker’s book: it is only after 
Heidegger has read Das Gewissen that the notion of the “call of conscience” makes its 
decisive appearance in his 1927 work.  
While Heidegger criticizes Das Gewissen for lacking the radical spirit of his own 
existential project, he credits Stoker for making “notable progress as compared with 
previous interpretations of conscience” and observes “many points of agreement” between 
their approaches.16  What Heidegger fails to mention in his footnote—or anywhere else in 
Being and Time—is that Stoker specifically identifies a “source” of the phenomenon of 
conscience during the course of his investigation. Stoker contends that the experience of 
moral conscience—which he describes as the “call-of-duty (Pflichtruf) of conscience” that 
underlies all possible existence—reveals the necessity of an “absolute” power that lights up 
the soul.17 For Stoker, this “absolute source” is synteresis: the much disputed Christian 
notion of the “divine spark” which God places in the soul of each of his creatures in order 
to protect them from evil.18 
                                                 
14
 SZ, Footnote to §55, 272 / 495 (note vi). 
15
 H. G. Stoker. Das Gewissen, Erscheinungsformen und Theorien. (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1925). 
16
 SZ, Footnote to §55, 272 / 495 (note vi). 
17
 Stoker. Das Gewissen. p. 226. 
18
 A wide variety of spellings of synteresis have been used since the term was “adopted” by the Scholastics in 
the middle ages. We will use the spelling “synteresis” in our text for three reasons: 1) This is the form most 
commonly used in German. 2) More specifically, this is the spelling used by Stoker in Das Gewissen, which 
we will examine in great depth and was a key reference for Heidegger as he developed his existential concept 
of conscience. 3) This spelling is the one that is most similar to the Greek word “συντήρησιν (sunteresin)” 
that appears in the commentary of St. Jerome, the source from whom the term was appropriated by the 
 8 
 
 
Despite Heidegger’s censure of Stoker for “blurring the boundaries between 
phenomenology and theology,”19 the South African’s investigation proves significant for 
our investigation of the existential concept of the “call of conscience” in two major ways. 
Firstly, Stoker’s work—published in September 1925 just as Heidegger was completing his 
first draft of the sections on Being-towards-death that precede the chapter on conscience—
informs our study of the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time. Das 
Gewissen represents the first ever attempt to investigate the experience of conscience on 
the basis of phenomenological principles. The timing of Stoker’s publication was 
providential for Heidegger: it provided him with a sophisticated and original study of the 
phenomenon of conscience at the very moment that he was working to develop his own 
existential interpretation. Indeed, Stoker even included in Das Gewissen a detailed, critical 
and patently “destructive” review of the various theories of conscience proposed by poets, 
religious authorities, theologians and philosophers since the pre-Socratic era. Secondly, 
Stoker’s phenomenological study of conscience arrives at the conclusion that the 
“powerful” source that initiates the experience of conscience is synteresis, the “absolute” 
light of God’s spark placed in the soul that allows each individual to recognize the truth. In 
Stoker’s phenomenological interpretation, the “painful” nature of the experience of 
conscience can be explained by the incompatibility of the “relative” nature of the human 
being—as a creature tainted by sin and inconstancy—and the “absolute” purity of God’s 
spirit. Following in the footsteps of Meister Eckhart and Theresa of Avila, Stoker seeks to 
reclaim synteresis from Scholastic casuistry that he believes has sullied the divine source of 
existence by subjugating it to the “terrestrial” notion of conscientia. Clearly, Heidegger 
breaks with Stoker’s investigation both in terms of its method and the significance which it 
assigns to synteresis. As Heidegger writes in his footnote: “Stoker’s monograph differs 
from the existential interpretation…in its approach and accordingly in its results as well.”20 
Nonetheless, it is a deficiency of current scholarship that the influence of Stoker’s study on 
the development of Being and Time has been so widely neglected. Our study emphasizes 
                                                                                                                                                     
Scholastics. Other common spellings, such as “synderesis” or “sinderesis” in Latin and English and 
“syndérèse” in French, will only be used when we refer to or quote from texts where they appear. 
19
 SZ, Footnote to §55, 272 / 495 (note vi). 
20
 SZ, Footnote to §55, 272 / 495 (note vi). 
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the importance of Das Gewissen for Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience and shows 
how Stoker’s “absolute” notion of synteresis—left unmentioned by Heidegger—allows us 
to more clearly understand the fundamental problems facing the German philosopher’s 
existential account of Being-in-the-world’s authentic experience of “attestation.” 
2) Conscience is the Key to Both the “Method” of Formal Indication in Being 
and Time and the Primordial Experience of Dasein’s “Attestation (Bezeugen)”: When 
the text of Being and Time is compared with Heidegger’s earlier lectures on 
phenomenological method, it becomes evident that the analysis of Dasein’s existential 
structures proposed in the work’s Division One represents a “performative” deployment of 
his evolving investigative “procedure” of formal indication.  By specifically emphasizing 
the methodological role of conscience, our study will show that Heidegger’s analysis of 
Being-in-the-world’s constitutive elements requires the possibility of an initial orientation. 
When Heidegger insists at the beginning of §54 that the attestation of authenticity must 
“have its roots in Dasein’s Being,” he reveals that his method of formal indication depends 
upon the identification of a means for initiating—or, more precisely, renewing—Dasein’s 
care for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. While Heidegger’s presentation of conscience 
in Being and Time comes after the preliminary analysis of “everydayness,” his interpretive 
investigation is exposed as having been dependent all along on the possibility of 
authentically caring for one’s own Being: the phenomenon of authentically hearing the 
“call of conscience” thus has been silently effective throughout Division One. As Feldman 
observes, the “call of conscience” plays a “singular performative role” within Being and 
Time that goes well beyond the discussion of the call itself because the work “as a whole 
can be read as a performance of the call…[in that] the call of conscience breaks off 
Dasein’s listening to the they-self (Man-selbst).”21 While Being and Time may be 
considered as a “performance” of conscience, the call cannot be understood merely as the 
content of Heidegger’s text, as if the summons of conscience could somehow be 
“delivered” via theoretical assertions. Instead, the formal indication of the “silent” call 
serves as a reminder that “public” language cannot convey knowledge characterized by 
                                                 
21
 Feldman. Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger. p. 102. 
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“certainty.” In hearing the “call of conscience,” Dasein is invited to experience the essential 
“uncertainty” of its existence: the “silence” of conscience exposes the inauthenticity of 
“everyday” discourse and allows Dasein to “hear” its possibility of coming back into 
authentic disclosedness.  
3) The Original Meaning of the German Word Gewissen is Completely 
Different from the Latin Notion of Conscientia: When we follow up on what Heidegger 
formally indicates with regard to conscience, it becomes clear that his interpretation of 
Gewissen is not just an innovative way of denying both the tradition’s “ordinary (vülgar)” 
understanding of moral conscience and the modern philosophical notion of subjective 
consciousness. Rather, the original meaning and unique history of the German term 
Gewissen reveal that this concept must be distinguished—from the very start—from the 
Latin notion of conscientia, which Heidegger seeks to expose as a perversion of the 
primordial phenomenon of the “call of conscience.” Although Heidegger does not present 
much historical evidence in support of his “radical” interpretation of conscience, our 
investigation takes up this task and shows that the German word Gewissen—unlike 
conscientia—is directly related to the ancient Greek suneidesis, a term derived from the 
verb oida meaning “to have seen.” When we take a closer look at conscientia, we see that 
the Latin word does not emphasize the phenomenon of shared “seeing” conveyed by both 
the Greek and German words, but rather the possessive “cutting apart” of experience into 
“knowledge.” This is confirmed by the meaning of the very different Greek root of the 
Latin word “scientia”: schizo for “to split” or “to cleave.”22 The widespread belief that the 
Latin, Greek and German words are synonymous and share the same original meaning is 
thus exposed as erroneous. 
While scores of philosophers, philologists and theologians in Germany and beyond 
have produced studies of moral conscience and its significance over the centuries, virtually 
no research has focused on the possibility of uncovering an original meaning of the German 
term Gewissen that might be very different from conscientia, the Latin notion that came to 
                                                 
22
 Julius Pokorny. Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. (Bern; München: A. Francke, 1959). pp. 
919-921. 
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dominate Scholastic psychology and whose philosophical legacy includes the emergence of 
the modern concept of “consciousness.” Almost without exception and with few nuances, 
the “historical” account of Gewissen’s origin is faithfully reproduced in study after study: 
according to this “myth,” the meaning of Gewissen was fixed for the first time when it was 
used to translate conscientia by an anonymous glossator of Notker Labeo’s psalmic 
commentaries at the turn of the first millennium. Although Heidegger does not directly 
challenge this standard “history,” his interpretation in Being and Time implies that the 
traditional account of “moral conscience” represents the corruption of a more primordial 
phenomenon of Gewissen.  
Looking back critically on the historical development of the German term, our 
study seeks to reveal that the original meaning of Gewissen corroborates Heidegger’s basic 
insight that the word can be understood to signify a phenomenon that is radically different 
from conscientia. In addition to exposing the fact that the identification of conscientia, 
suneidesis and Gewissen is illegitimate, our research reveals that Gewissen was not even 
among the first Germanic words used to translate suneidesis from the original Greek texts 
of the Pauline letters: in the 4th century manuscript of the Gothic Bible, we find three other 
words used to translate the Greek term for conscience. While none of these words prove to 
be synonymous with Gewissen, all three emphasize the experience of “caring” in ways that 
are related to Heidegger’s existential concept. More significantly, none of these Gothic 
terms express the sense of “possessive” knowing that we find at the heart of Latin 
conscientia.  
Having “destructively” shown that Gewissen and conscientia must be regarded as 
distinct concepts, our investigation of what is formally indicated by Heidegger’s 
interpretation of conscience uncovers an “original” meaning of the German word that is 
directly related to the function of “attestation” that we find in Being and Time. In the 8th 
century Latin-Old High German wordbook known as the Codex Abrogans, which is the 
oldest extant book produced in the German language, we find the word kiuuizzitha 
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translated as testimonium, meaning “witness, evidence, attestation, testimony.”23 Quite 
literally, we find that the earliest extant evidence of the word Gewissen conveys the sense 
of “bearing witness” and producing an “attestation”—the very meaning that Heidegger 
identifies with his existential concept of conscience.  
4) Experiencing Conscience as the Silent “Attestation” of Martyrdom: Despite 
Heidegger’s promise of a “demonstration” of how conscience produces the required 
“attestation” of Dasein’s authenticity in Being and Time, many commentators have 
explicitly raised doubts about whether the Heideggerian “call of conscience” is actually 
possible as an experience of Being-in-the-world. As Hent de Vries claims, the attestation 
produced by Heidegger’s conscience is problematically “made possible by what it makes 
possible,”24 a statement that our analysis of the methodological role of Gewissen initially 
appears to confirm. But while it has been widely remarked that Heidegger’s “call of 
conscience” appears “impossible” on the basis of Heidegger’s existential analysis alone, 
our emphasis on the formally indicative nature of this attestation reveals a possible way out 
of this impasse: having “deconstructed” the traditional equation of Gewissen and 
conscientia, can we conceive of a possible way of experiencing the “original” sense of 
Gewissen as “attestation”?  
In response to this question, we propose that Being-in-the-world can experience 
such authentic “self-testimony” when it hears the “silence (Schweigen)” of the other as 
martyr. In this experience of recognizing the “reticent” martyr as Being-towards-death, 
Dasein has the possibility of “breaking off” its listening to the public “they” and of 
reciprocating the other’s “resoluteness” with regard to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 
Through the experience of martyrdom, we can see how it is possible for Dasein to 
experience the “attestation” of its authentic mode of existence—described by Heidegger as 
“anticipatory resoluteness”—without necessitating recourse to an external “absolute” 
source of conscience, such as God. In this sense, our identification of martyrdom as the 
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 Charlton Thomas Lewis. An Elementary Latin Dictionary. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891). p. 856. 
24
 Hent de Vries. Philosophy and the Turn to Religion. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). p. 
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possible experience of authentic Being-towards-death respects Heidegger’s insistence that 
speculative metaphysical concepts that attempt to ground existence in “certainty” must be 
rejected, e.g. Stoker’s synteresis. Rather than being “protected” or “guarded” by an 
“absolute” or “external” authority such as synteresis, Heidegger’s phenomenon of authentic 
Dasein is completely dependent upon its possible experience of attesting “self-testimony,” 
understood as the “remembering” of one’s responsibility of wanting-to-have-a-conscience. 
The experience of “caring” for one’s authenticity can be enacted through the phenomenon 
of “bearing witness” or “testifying” that is conveyed by the Greek word martus, the root of 
the Christian term “martyr.” The recognition that the “call of conscience” implies an 
experience of “testimony” also informs our study regarding the essential conditions 
required for the enactment of this “attestation.” If the existential “call of conscience” is 
understood as Dasein’s way of experiencing the possibility of martyrdom, this implies that 
any “attestation” of Dasein’s coming into its own authenticity necessitates an encounter 
with a martyred other—an encounter that we can characterize as the basic experience of 
“positive solicitude.” While Heidegger may indicate that “the voice of the friend” is 
something “every Dasein carries with it” from an existential perspective, Dasein’s 
“existentiell” experience of authentic “recollection”—of acknowledging its essence as 
Being-towards-death projected amidst a shared world—depends upon one’s hearing the 
silent “testimony” of the other facing martyrdom.  
Methodology and Itinerary of the Study 
Our investigation of the role of conscience in Being and Time and our exploration 
of what is formally indicated by Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience will proceed as 
follows:  
In Part One, we will consider the evolution of Heidegger’s understanding of 
conscience in his work during the years leading up to the publication of Being and Time in 
order to inform the question of how he came to interpret the “call of conscience” as the 
pivotal concept that provides the attestation of Dasein’s possibility of existing 
authentically. On the surface, this task appears to be a relatively simple one because the 
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term Gewissen only appears on eight occasions in Heidegger’s extant work produced prior 
to his completion of the first full draft of Being and Time; moreover, the most elaborate of 
these early “appearances” of conscience is barely more than one page in length and the 
majority consist of a handful of words or less. Given our focus on the central role of the 
“call of conscience” for the methodology of Being and Time, however, we will undertake a 
painstaking review of each of these remarks on conscience in order to understand the 
progressive development of Heidegger’s interpretation of this phenomenon. As we will see, 
this analysis reveals that Heidegger was concerned with the phenomenon of conscience 
throughout the period from his 1919 “war emergency semester” course at Freiburg to early 
1926 when he submitted the manuscript of Being and Time for typesetting. Notably, his 
remarks on conscience during this period all imply the necessity of distinguishing the 
primordial sense of Gewissen from the Latin notion of conscientia, which Heidegger 
associated with the metaphysical “ought” of “moral conscience” and the emergence of the 
modern notion of “consciousness (Bewusstsein)” as the supposed basis of scientific 
knowledge. Furthermore, we will identify a significant difference between Heidegger’s 
earlier descriptions of conscience and his existential interpretation of the phenomenon in 
Being and Time: in none of the prior “appearances” of conscience in Heidegger’s writings 
and lectures do we find any mention of the phenomenon of “calling” or any description of 
conscience as a “call.”   
In Part Two, we will consider the importance of Heidegger’s reading of Das 
Gewissen, the phenomenological study of conscience written by Stoker which was 
published in the fall of 1925. We will seek to demonstrate that Stoker’s work influenced 
Heidegger’s existential interpretation of the “call of conscience” in at least three significant 
ways. Firstly, we will show how Stoker facilitated Heidegger’s “phenomenological 
destruction” of the traditional concept of conscience by providing the author of Being and 
Time with a “wide-ranging” critique of previous theories of conscience that revealed 
conscientia to be an artificial and excessively “intellectualistic” notion. Secondly, we will 
exhibit how Stoker’s attempt to understand how conscience is experienced leads him to 
speak of the phenomenon as a “call-of-duty (Pflichtruf),” an experience whereby each 
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human is “called” to preserve the purity of his or her relationship with God. While 
Heidegger certainly avoids positing this kind of metaphysical “source” of conscience, we 
will establish a strong parallel between Heidegger’s silent “call of care” and Stoker’s 
account of the “call-of-duty” that summons each person to “preserve” the purity of his or 
her faith but provides no guidance concerning specific “worldly” decisions. Thirdly, we 
will show that Heidegger—despite acknowledging that Stoker’s investigation represents 
great “progress” in the study of conscience—never once mentions the phenomenon which 
Stoker fingers as the key to interpreting conscience: synteresis. Although the decision to 
disregard synteresis can be easily explained by Heidegger’s criticism of Das Gewissen as a 
blend of Schelerian “personalism” with “theology,” we will show that Heidegger’s neglect 
of the central concept in Das Gewissen contributes to concealing the very present problem 
of the “absolute” in Being and Time and its relation to any possible experience of 
“attestation.” Our study will document that one of the first commentators of Being and 
Time to emphasize this problem was Stoker’s editor, Scheler himself, who noted that 
because Dasein is identified as the “source” of its own “attestation,” the “call of 
conscience” must be regarded as tragically solipsistic.  
In Part Three, we will analyze the role of conscience in Being and Time beginning 
with an attentive reading of §§54-60 that together make up the so-called “conscience 
chapter” of Division Two where Heidegger identifies the “call of conscience” as Dasein’s 
means of producing the required “attestation” of its possible authenticity. Keeping in mind 
the methodological focus of our study, we will examine these sections of Being and Time 
page-by-page in order to understand how Heidegger interprets conscience as the 
phenomenon that allows Dasein to be accessed as authentic and whole—even though it 
exists “for the most part” in its “everyday” state of dispersal among the “they.” While our 
review will confirm the pivotal role of conscience for the existential investigation of Being 
and Time, it will also show that the problem of how one experiences the “call of 
conscience” poses a threat to Heidegger’s entire project because the notion of authenticity 
ultimately depends on this “attestation.” At the same time, our analysis will exhibit how 
conscience can be understood as the “initiating” phenomenon of Heidegger’s “method” of 
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formal indication, the innovative approach to phenomenology that Heidegger advocated in 
his courses at Freiburg and Marburg in the years preceding the publication of Being and 
Time. By emphasizing that conscience is itself a formally indicative concept, we will reveal 
how the possibility of experiencing the “call of conscience” is informed by Heidegger’s 
descriptions of the constitutive phenomena which he explicitly associates with Dasein’s 
authentic mode of existence in Being and Time: discourse, truth, solicitude and 
anticipation.  
In Part Four, the final section of our study, we will consider what is formally 
indicated by Heidegger’s notion of conscience itself—more specifically, the German word 
Gewissen—as we continue our search for a possible experience of the “call of conscience” 
that can provide the “attestation” demanded by Heidegger’s existential-ontological project. 
Following the basic principles of Heidegger’s “hermeneutical” approach to 
phenomenological research, we will begin by critically examining the conventional notion 
of conscience as a moral phenomenon whose meaning arose out of the Latin concept of 
conscientia. This initial step of “phenomenological-critical destruction” will show that the 
traditional equation of Gewissen and conscientia represents a historical error: the first 
“translation” of conscientia as Gewissen by an anonymous monk of the Abbey of St. Gall 
circa 1000 obscures the distinct roots and original meaning of the German word. On the 
basis of our research, we will then point to the “original” sense of Gewissen recorded in the 
oldest extant book in the Old High German language, the 8th century Codex Abrogans, 
where it is identified as the translation for the Latin term testimonium. Reflecting on the 
significance of this discovery for Heidegger’s formal indication of the “call of conscience” 
as Dasein’s means of “attestation,” we will attempt to identify a possible existentiell 
experience of Being-in-the-world that fulfills the methodological criteria of the existential-
ontological project while respecting the formal indication of the call as “testimony.” 
Ultimately, we will propose that this possible experience that can awaken Dasein to its 
authentic character as Being-towards-death is the hearing of the other’s “silence” in facing 
martyrdom. 
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1. The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of 
Conscience Prior to Being and Time (1919-1925)  
 
The first task of our study is to examine the evolution of Heidegger’s understanding 
of conscience prior to his introduction of the “call of conscience (Gewissensruf)” as a 
primordial phenomenon of Dasein in Division Two of Being and Time. This task is a vital 
one in order to exhibit how Heidegger came to interpret the meaning of “Gewissen” in a 
manner so radically unlike the traditional notion of conscientia or moral conscience. For 
when Heidegger in §54 of Being and Time assigns conscience the pivotal role of “attesting” 
Dasein’s authenticity “in its existentiell possibility,” he unveils an innovative interpretation 
of conscience that is the result of at least seven years of sustained—yet largely 
unrecognized—philosophical effort to understand the significance of conscience and its 
role for his phenomenological “method.” At first glance, our task appears to be a relatively 
simple one: our research has identified only eight texts25 in which Heidegger refers to 
conscience as a philosophical concept in the seven-year period of 1919-1925 prior to his 
writing of Being and Time.26 Furthermore, very few details regarding his understanding of 
conscience are provided by Heidegger in any of these eight “appearances” of the concept: 
his most elaborate discussion of conscience during this period is barely more than one page 
                                                 
25
 Our review of Heidegger’s use of the term “Gewissen” prior to the publication of Being and Time covers 
the full range of his published texts from this 1919-1925 period (writings, courses, public talks and published 
notes), including material not published in the Gesamtausgabe. However, our review focuses only on the 
occasions where the use of “conscience” by Heidegger is meaningful in a philosophical sense. For this reason, 
our review does not include any incidents of Heidegger using the word “conscience” in a purely “colloquial” 
manner, e.g. his letter of January 24, 1921 to Jaspers where he recounts telling one of his “mediocre” students 
that he would only recommend the student’s proposed doctoral project to Jaspers “if I could represent it with 
a good conscience.” Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence (1920-
1963). trans. Gary E. Aylesworth. (Amherst, MA: Humanity Books, 2003). pp. 25-26. 
26
 Given that Heidegger’s writing of Being and Time was well underway by the beginning of 1926, we will 
not include this year as part of the period covered by our initial review. Cf. Kisiel. The Genesis of Heidegger's 
Being and Time. pp. 480-482. 
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in length27 and most of the remainder consist of a handful of words or less.28 If all we 
needed to produce was a list of Heidegger’s explicit references to conscience prior to Being 
and Time, their paucity would make our task a very easy one. However, what is crucial for 
our investigation is to understand the progressive development of Heidegger’s notion of 
conscience that led up to his interpretation of the existential call that comes both “from me 
and yet from beyond me and over me”29 and is the “source (Ursprung)” of all possible 
experience.30 Given this very specific objective, the dearth of Heideggerian statements 
regarding conscience during this critical period only accentuates the urgency of rigorously 
examining the limited number of texts that are available in order to understand the place of 
this concept in his phenomenological project and to identify the key sources that influenced 
his interpretation of conscience.  
In proceeding with our attentive review of this material in the following pages, we 
will reveal three major points concerning the relation between the development of 
Heidegger’s notion of conscience in the 1919-1925 period and his proposal of the 
existential call in Being and Time. Firstly, our investigation will demonstrate that 
Heidegger had already recognized the potential significance of conscience for his 
phenomenological work at least as early as 1919 when he returned from military service 
after the First World War. We also see that Heidegger remained preoccupied by the 
“conscience” problem right up to the publication of his major work of 1927 despite the fact 
that he generally avoids using the term of “Gewissen” is his early texts and lectures—a 
strategy that was presumably intentional as Heidegger sought to distinguish himself from 
the neo-Kantian school and the “phenomenology of values” espoused by Scheler.31 Despite 
the low number of “reference points” concerning conscience in Heidegger’s early work, 
our analysis of these occurrences will show a steady progression in the young philosopher’s 
                                                 
27
 GA 20, §35, 440-441 / 318-319. The brief section of §35 on “The Phenomenon of Willing to Have a 
Conscience and of Being Guilty” takes up barely more than a single page in GA 20.  
28
 GA 56/57, 45 / 36. In the “War Emergency Semester” course of early 1919, Heidegger’s allusion to 
conscience is limited to the three words “thrust into conscience (ins Gewissen geschoben).” 
29
 SZ §57, 275 / 320. 
30
 SZ §54, 267 / 312. 
31
 Theodore J. Kisiel. Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts. (London; New 
York: Continuum, 2002). p. 212. 
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understanding of the potential methodological importance of conscience and of its place 
among the essential phenomena that constitute Being-in-the-world. By exposing the 
common themes and references that link these various episodes together, we will be able to 
see how Heidegger’s earliest criticism of the traditional concept of conscience (notably as it 
is expressed in the theories of his neo-Kantian contemporaries such as Rickert and 
Windelband) eventually leads to his own “positive” attempts to demonstrate the “essential” 
place of conscience among the basic structures of existence. Secondly, we will show how 
Heidegger’s early remarks on conscience clearly establish the traditional idea of 
conscientia or moral conscience to be an example of philosophy’s failure to respect the 
genuine experience of existence. By Heidegger’s account, the philosophical tradition has 
allowed objective knowledge that can supposedly be possessed to conceal philosophy’s 
original concern for the “how” of existence. As the metaphysical basis of “consciousness,” 
the authority of conscientia—which Heidegger finds reverberating in the Kantian 
“ought”—perverts one’s authentic concern for the “how” of existence and leads philosophy 
into the error of material “certainty” and “scientific standpoints.”32 In this sense, conscience 
is identified from the very beginning in Heidegger’s work as a potentially vital 
methodological means for exposing the artifice of conscientia and for renewing 
philosophy’s concern for the “experiencing of living experience (Erleben des Erlebens)” at 
the “fundamental level of life in and for itself (eine Grundschicht des Lebens an und für 
sich).”33 Thirdly—and most significantly for our investigation—this review will identify 
the essential distinction between Heidegger’s early remarks regarding conscience and its 
interpretation as an existential phenomenon in Being and Time: prior to writing this 
breakthrough work, Heidegger never once relates conscience to the phenomenon of 
“calling.” In his work from 1919-1925, Heidegger demonstrates a growing appreciation for 
conscience as the potential “source” of philosophy’s renewed concern for the “how” of 
existence yet the philosopher remains hampered by his lack of a way to express this “how” 
as a possibility. With his characterization of conscience as a “call” in Being and Time, 
Heidegger for the first time proposes a way of understanding “how” conscience can be 
                                                 
32
 GA 56/57, 11-12 / 9-10. 
33
 GA 56/57, 117 / 89.   
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experienced, an advance which allows him to develop his interpretation of conscience’s 
unique and pivotal role as the “attesting” source of Dasein’s possible authenticity.  
Heidegger’s “Passing Mention” of Conscience During the 1919 “War Emergency 
Semester”: Reprising Windelband’s Reference to Schiller’s Xenien 
The very first appearance of “Gewissen” in Heidegger’s published texts is found in 
the transcript of his University of Freiburg course on “The Idea of Philosophy and the 
Problem of Worldview (Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem)” that 
was given during the special “war emergency semester (Kriegsnotsemester)” held between 
February and April 1919.34 During one of the early lectures of the first part of this course, 
the young Heidegger analyzes the “critical-teleological method” advocated by notable neo-
Kantian scholars,35 focusing specifically on the work of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich 
Rickert, who directed Heidegger’s 1916 habilitation at Freiburg on the categories of Duns 
Scotus. As he calls into question the groundless “presuppositions” of neo-Kantian 
philosophy36 due to its “absolutely blind (absoluter Blindheit)” dependence on an “absolute 
ought (absolutes Sollen),” Heidegger refers to a satirical remark by Schiller where the poet 
mocks Kant and his followers for always having recourse to the mysterious phenomenon of 
“conscience” whenever their unprovable claims are challenged.37 
[Let] us inquire further into the immanent character of the sense of [the 
critical-teleological] method. Supposing the method were clarified to the 
extent of showing that…there is a new kind of lived experience of the ought, 
of the giving of ideals. Does a blind power announce itself in the ought 
experience (‘thrust into conscience’ („ins Gewissen geschoben“)), or does 
this ought give itself as self-certifying (als sich selbst ausweisendes)? If the 
latter, on what basis self-certifying?38  
As Kisiel reports in his Genesis, this first use of the word “conscience” by Heidegger 
merely makes “passing mention” of Schiller’s critique of the Kantian notion of 
                                                 
34
 Kisiel. The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. p. 554. 
35
 GA 56/57, 42 / 34. 
36
 GA 56/57, 47 / 37. 
37
 GA 56/57, 44-45 / 36. 
38
 GA 56/57, 45 / 36-37. 
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conscience.39 The concept of conscience is never mentioned again in the remainder of the 
course.  
This “mere allusion,”40 however, represents a key moment for our study of the 
development of Heidegger’s existential conscience and of the major methodological role 
that it plays in the structure of Being and Time. For one, this comment confirms that when 
the young Heidegger returns from military service at the end of the First World War he is 
already highly skeptical of what he will later call the “ordinary interpretation (vulgäre 
Gewissensauslegung)” of conscience understood as an essentially moral phenomenon and 
related to the “value” content of worldly activity.41 Secondly, this allegation of the possible 
dependence of the “critical-teleological” approach of neo-Kantianism on the “blind power” 
of conscience is shown by Heidegger to be applicable to the “theoretical comportment” of 
philosophical tradition as a whole.42 In other words, Heidegger’s reference to Schiller 
directly implicates the “ought-experience”43 of conscience in what the young lecturer calls 
“the disaster of all previous philosophy.”44 With his “passing mention,” Heidegger fingers 
conscience as the so-called “experience” of the “absolute ought” whose unjustified 
presupposition has led to the “supra-empirical validity (übererfahrungsmäßigen Geltung)” 
and “primordial objectivity (Urgegenständlichkeit)” underlying all traditional science.45 
For Heidegger, the “ought” of conscience is the “foundation stone (Grundstein) of an entire 
system”46 that has resulted in the philosophical “de-vivification” of experience.47 
Heidegger claims this “ought” of conscience must be subjected to a “refutation and radical 
overcoming (Zurückweisen und radikale Überwindung)”48 in order to renew philosophy as 
“the science of absolute honesty” dedicated to accessing the “genuineness of personal life 
                                                 
39
 Kisiel. The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. p. 498.  
40
 Kisiel. Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts. p. 212. 
41
 SZ §59, 289-293 / 335-339. 
42
 GA 56/57, 74 / 59. 
43
 GA 56/57, 46 / 37. 
44
 GA 56/57, 12 / 9. 
45
 GA 56/57, 44-45 / 36. 
46
 GA 56/57, 44-45 / 36. 
47
 GA 56/57, 74 / 59. 
48
 GA 56/57, 49 / 39. 
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as such.”49 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly in light of conscience’s key 
methodological role in Being and Time, the young lecturer opposes to this “blind power” of 
conscience an alternative that is better suited to serve as a “genuine starting-point (echter 
Ansatz)” for “the method of primordial science”50: the possibility of a “self-certifying 
basis” for investigating “lived experience.”51 At the very moment that Heidegger first uses 
the word “conscience” in his philosophical work, he exposes that all philosophy that 
depends on “the ought…remains obscure at its very core” and he points to the necessity of 
an authentic—and radically new—method oriented by the possibility of “self-certifying 
(sich selbst ausweisendes).”52 As we proceed with our investigation of Heidegger’s 
existential interpretation of conscience, we will see that this notion of “self-certifying” 
clearly foreshadows the pivotal methodological role played by the phenomenon of 
conscience in Being and Time: that of providing the “attestation of Dasein’s ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being—an attestation which is (seiende) in Dasein itself.”53  
While Heidegger does not propose a positive interpretation of conscience in his 
early 1919 lecture in Freiburg, his three-word allusion to Schiller’s satirical line on the 
Kantian “ought” reveals how he sees conscience to be implicated in the “corrupted 
philosophy” that he seeks to expose and “renew…by returning to the genuine origins of the 
spirit” and “the vitality of genuine research.”54 As noted above, Heidegger refers to 
Schiller’s line on conscience at the crucial moment in his course when he criticizes the neo-
Kantianism work of Rickert, Windelband and Lotze—a section of the course that he places 
under the heading “Misunderstanding of the Problematic of Primordial Science.”55 In this 
lecture, Heidegger specifically lashes out at Rickert for his “unscientific idle talk” in 
positing the “presupposed…phenomenon of the ought” as the “foundation stone of an 
                                                 
49
 GA 56/57, 220 / 165. 
50
 GA 56/57, 15-16 / 15. 
51
 GA 56/57, 45-46 / 36. 
52
 GA 56/57, 45 / 36-37. 
53
 SZ §60, 295 / 341. 
54
 GA 56/57, 5 / 4-5. 
55
 GA 56/57, 42 / 34. 
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entire system.”56 Significantly, Heidegger’s criticism focuses on Rickert’s discussion of 
conscience in the final section of his major work Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis where the 
renowned neo-Kantian asserts a parallel between the “theoretical concept of the ‘ought’” 
and the “ethical standards” imposed by the “dictates of conscience.”57 In these pages, 
Rickert contends that all knowledge necessitates “a criterion of truth” that must ultimately 
be grounded in the “absolute validity of conscience.”58 Moreover, Rickert adds, any 
attempted contestation of this “absolute validity” contradicts itself because such a denial 
necessarily implies “a criterion of truth” that only conscience can provide; the skeptic 
denying the authoritative “ought” of conscience “thus implicitly recognizes what he is 
fighting against,” Rickert claims.59 Just a few lines after alluding to Schiller’s remark on 
conscience, Heidegger quotes directly from Rickert’s text and then takes a firm stand 
against his habilitation director’s “value-laden and necessarily ought-related” notion of 
“critical-transcendental philosophy”60: 
“Whoever strives after truth subordinates himself to an ought, just like the 
person who fulfils his duty.”61 But is every value given to me as an ought? 
Clearly not. I experience value-relations without the slightest element of the 
ought being given. In the morning I enter the study; the sun lies over the 
books, etc., and I delight in this. Such delight is in no way an ought… There 
is, therefore, a kind of lived experience in which I take delight, in which the 
valuable as such is given. … [The] value ‘is’ not, but rather it ‘values’ in an 
intransitive sense: in being worth-taking (Wertnehmen), ‘it values’ for me, 
for the value-experiencing subject.62 
                                                 
56
 GA 56/57, 44-45 / 36. 
57
 Heinrich Rickert. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Einführung in die Transzendental-Philosophie. 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1915). pp. 439-440. An excerpt from the original text in German: 
“Die absolute Gültigkeit der sittlichen Pflicht ist vom wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt aus anzuzweifeln, ja die 
Stimme des Gewissens, die den ethischen Menschen leitet, können wir nach wie vor so ansehen, als hänge ihr 
Anspruch auf Geltung lediglich vom individuellen Ich ab. Dem intellektuellen Gewissen gegenüber ist 
dagegen solch ein Standpunkt nicht mehr möglich, da auch unser Wissen es als Kriterium der Wahrheit 
braucht, und jeder, der die Ansprüche dieses Gewissens auf absolute Gültigkeit bekämpfen wollte, sich 
zugleich darauf als  Wahrheitskriterium stützen, also implicite anerkennen müßte, was er bekämpft.” 
58
 Ibid. p. 440. 
59
 Ibid. p. 440. 
60
 GA 56/57, 45 / 36. 
61
 This first line is a direct quote of Rickert by Heidegger. Cf. Rickert. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: 
Einführung in die Transzendental-Philosophie. p. 439. 
62
 GA 56/57, 46 / 37. 
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In this same section of his course, Heidegger also takes aim at two essays by 
Windelband wherein the “ought” is described as the validating source for the axioms of 
“critical-teleological philosophy” and linked to the phenomenon of conscience: “Kritische 
oder genetische Methode?”63 and “Normen und Naturgesetze.”64 In his “destructive” 
review of neo-Kantian thinking, Heidegger quotes repeatedly from these essays in order to 
demonstrate how Windelband’s system of “valid” and “true” knowledge is based on the 
presupposition that “truth [is] the goal of all thinking,” which implies that “[truth] in itself 
is validity and as such something valuable.”65 Yet despite expressing his opposition to 
Windelband’s “teleological” system structured according to “norms [that] tell us how we 
ought to think,”66 Heidegger does not specifically discuss the interpretation of moral 
conscience found in “Normen und Naturgesetze” where Windelband identifies the 
phenomenon of conscience as the “psychological power” at the origin of the 
“consciousness of norms within oneself.”67 According to Kisiel, Heidegger’s refusal to 
adopt the traditional term of “moral conscience” at this point reflects an intentional choice 
by the young thinker who wishes to disassociate his philosophy from the normative 
principles of neo-Kantianism with its “ideal goal of universally valid truth.”68 
No doubt for polemic reasons, the early Heidegger will diligently avoid 
sanctioning the term ‘conscience’ for several years. In 1919, he merely 
alludes (GA Bd. 56/57, 45) to Windelband’s reference (II, 111) to a scoffing 
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 Wilhelm Windelband. "Kritische oder genetische Methode?" Präludien: Aussätze und Reden zur 
Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte. 9 ed. vol. 2. (Tübingen: J. C. G. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1883, 1924). pp. 99-
135. 
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 Wilhelm Windelband. "Normen und Naturgesetze." Präludien: Aussätze und Reden zur Philosophie und 
ihrer Geschichte. 9 ed. vol. 2. (Tübingen: J. C. G. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1882, 1924). pp. 59-98. 
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 GA 56/57, 32 / 27. 
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 GA 56/57, 35 / 29. 
67
 Windelband. "Normen und Naturgesetze." p. 80. Our translation. An excerpt from the original text in 
German: “Wenn sich also trotzdem das Bewußtsein der Normen, ohne die empirische Lebensfähigkeit und 
Selbsterhaltungskraft seiner Träger zu steigern, in der historischen Bewegung der Menschheit nicht nur erhält, 
sondern in einzelnen Hinsichten steigert, vertieft und verfeinert, so muß das auf einer direkten und 
selbständigen, von allen Nebenwirkungen unabhängigen Kraft beruhen, welche dem Bewußtsein der Normen 
als solchem innerwohnt, und welche das Gewissen, wenn es erst einmal in Kraft getreten ist, zu einer 
psychologischen Macht erhebt, die als neuer Faktor in die Bewegung des Seelenlebens eintritt.” 
68
 GA 56/57, 38 / 31. 
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remark by Schiller on the Kantian tendency ‘to shove what it cannot prove 
into the conscience.’69  
While Heidegger does not explicitly discuss the notion of conscience so cherished by the 
neo-Kantians, we can see that he enlists Schiller to speak on his behalf. An attentive look at 
Heidegger’s “allusion” to Windelband’s reference to Schiller in “Kritische oder genetische 
Methode?” reveals that the young lecturer’s emphasis on this reference is by no means 
neutral. With his “passing mention” of this reference, Heidegger observes the irony of 
Windelband’s decision to cite Schiller while arguing for the validity of the “critical-
teleological method” based on the unexplained “givenness of the ought 
(Sollensgegebenheit).”70 As Heidegger implies, the satirical meaning of Schiller’s poem is 
evidently discordant with Windelband’s conviction that all thinking requires that “the 
validity of these axioms must be admitted from the outset”—a discordance that 
Windelband recognizes and even explicitly notes in his essay.71 Yet so certain is 
Windelband that conscience is the “validating” source of teleological norms that he 
appropriates “without the slightest discomforture” Schiller’s critical remark rather than 
reflecting on its potential implications for his “critical-teleological method.”72 In the end, 
Windelband states with confidence, no reasonable person “would take offense” that validity 
must be presupposed because all thinking requires the positing of “truth.”73  
In a certain sense, what Schiller said about a particular Kantian doctrine also 
applied to the whole domain of critical philosophy: it pushes what it cannot 
prove “into the conscience.” Theoretical philosophy cannot prove its 
axioms; neither the so-called laws of thought of formal logic, nor the 
fundamental principles of world observation, which are developed from the 
categories, are in any way substantiated through experience; but logic can 
appeal to all: You want truth, remember, so you must recognize the value of 
these norms if your wish is to be granted.74  
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 Kisiel. Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts. p. 212. 
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 GA 56/57, 44 / 35-36. 
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 Windelband. "Kritische oder genetische Methode?" p. 111. Our translation.  
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 GA 56/57, 45 / 36. 
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 Windelband. "Kritische oder genetische Methode?" p. 112. Our translation. 
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 Ibid. p. 111. Our translation. In German: “In gewissem Sinne also gilt es für den ganzen Umfang der 
kritischen Philosophie, was Schiller von einer besonderen Lehre der kantischen gesagt hat: sie schiebt einem, 
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As Roger Hofer observes in his study of neo-Kantian thought, Windelband faithfully 
upholds the traditional notion of the Kantian conscience that Schiller is expressly ridiculing 
in his satirical poem: “Windelband simply propagated the shift of the final justification of 
reason ‘into the conscience,’ as Schiller wrote, because the absolute necessity is itself 
unprovable.”75  
By pointedly emphasizing Windelband’s reference to Schiller, Heidegger indicates 
in his 1919 course that the satirical jab at the Kantian notion of conscience holds much 
more serious consequences for neo-Kantianism—and for “all previous philosophy”76—than 
Windelband appears to have realized. In Heidegger’s mind, this is unsurprising given that 
“the [critical-teleological] method’s advocates do not see at all… its fundamental vacuity 
and ‘bigotry,’”77 allowing them to continue building philosophical systems while remaining 
“absolutely blind to the whole world of problems implied in the phenomenon of the 
ought.”78 
Windelband, whose philosophical writings celebrate Schiller as one of the leading 
figures in the history of German philosophy, is certainly aware of the historical and 
philosophical significance of the verse by the “poet-philosopher” that he cites in his 
essay.79 Entitled “The Philosophers,” Schiller’s poem was printed under his own name for 
the first time in 1803 in the second volume of his collected poems.80 However, the 19 
                                                                                                                                                     
was sie nicht beweisen kann, „ins Gewissen hinein.“ Die theoretische Philosophie kann ihre Axiome nicht 
beweisen; weder die sogenannten Denkgesetze der formalen Logik, noch die Grundsätze aller 
Weltbetrachtung, die sich aus den Kategorien entwickeln, sind irgendwie durch Erfahrung zu begründen; aber 
die Logik kann zu einem jeden sprechen: Du willst Wahrheit, besinne dich, du mußt die Geltung dieser 
Normen anerkennen, wenn dieser Wunsch je erfüllt werden soll.” 
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 Roger Hofer. Gegenstand und Methode: Untersuchungen zur frühen Wissenschaftslehre Emil Lasks. 
(Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1997). p. 131. Our translation. In German: “Windelband aber 
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couplets making up this poem had earlier been published “anonymously” in the 1797 
edition of Schiller’s Musen-Almanach as part of the Xenien,81 a collection of 414 “sportive 
and pungent” epigrams that Schiller had penned in collaboration with the poet Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe and modeled upon the elegiac couplets of the 1st century Latin poet 
Martial.82 The “wild and reckless satire” and “clever impertinence” of the Xenien would 
cause tremendous public outcry and profoundly mark the history of German literature83; by 
the mid-19th century, literary commentator Eduard Boas would dub the controversial affair 
the “Xenienkampf.”84 
As Luther published his Theses in Wittenberg, so Goethe and Schiller 
published their Xenien. No one before had the courage so to confront sacred 
dullness, so to lash all hypocrisy.85 
In the economy of the Xenien, “The Philosophers” marks what Schiller describes as 
one of the “here and there” moments when the “wild satire” of the project was 
“intermixed…with a flash of poetical or philosophical thought.”86 Through his poem, 
Schiller mocks the inability of philosophy to explain the principles of the “real world” and 
closes by deriding the dependence of Kant and his philosophical disciples on the 
“authority” of moral conscience. The 19 couplets tell the story of a philosophy student from 
Jena who has ventured down to hell in search of  “the one needful thing”; upon his arrival, 
he rejoices at finding a circle of philosophers—both living and dead—“in pleno 
                                                 
81
 "Xenien." Musen-Almanach. ed. Friedrich Schiller. (Tübingen: J. G. Costalischen Buchhandlung, 1797). 
82
 Emil Palleske. Schiller's Life and Works. trans. Lady Wallace. (London: Longman, Green, Longman and 
Roberts, 1860). p. 273.  
83
 Ibid. p. 272. 
84
 Eduard Boas. Schiller und Goethe im Xenienkampf. (Stuttgart; Tübingen: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1851). 
85
 This translated line by Boas appears in Lewes’ biography of Goethe. George Henry Lewes. Life of Goethe. 
(London: F.A. Brockhaus, 1864). p. 172. The original German line by Boas appears in the following excerpt: 
“Am 31. Oktober 1517 ward die kirchliche Reformation in Deutschland begonnen; im Oktober 1796 nahm 
die literarische ihren Anfang. Damals schlug Luther seine Thesen zu Wittenberg an, jetzt erschien der 
Schillersche Musenalmanach mit den Xenien. Niemals zuvor hatte Einer den Mut gehabt, alle sanktionierten 
Dummheiten so schonungslos aufzurütteln, die Heuchler so scharf zu geißeln. Unermeßlichen Vorteil zog das 
deutsche Schrifttum aus diesem Ereignis…” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Eduard Boas. Nachträge zu 
Goethe's sämmtlichen Werken. (Leipzig: P. Reclam, 1846). Volume 1. p. 45. 
86
 Thomas Carlyle. The Life of Friedrich Schiller, Comprehending an Examination of his Works. (London: 
Taylor and Hessey, 1825). p. 191. 
 29 
 
 
assembled.”87 Seizing the opportunity to receive counsel from a group including Aristotle, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Leibniz, Fichte, Kant and Hume,88 the student makes his 
request:  
Pupil. 
…So give me (I will not depart hence without it)  
A universally valid principle, — one that will always avail!89  
After receiving unsatisfactory responses from seven of the assembled thinkers, the pupil 
expresses his disappointment and is supplied an eighth answer by an unspecified disciple of 
Kantian moral philosophy, whom Karl Hoffmeister in his 1840 study of Schiller’s work 
identifies as Karl Christian Erhard Schmid, an early advocate of Kant’s critical philosophy 
who in 1793 became a full professor at the University of Jena.90  In the two couplets that 
follow, we find the remark that is referenced by Windelband and Heidegger: 
Eighth Philosopher.  
In the theoretical field, nothing more can be found, 
But the practical principle still holds: Thou canst, so thou shouldst!  
 
Pupil. 
That’s what I thought! When they know of no more sensible an answer, 
They shove the matter right into the conscience.91  
                                                 
87
 The English translation of these lines is loosely based on the version by Edgar A. Bowring that was 
published in the 19th century. Our translation has altered Bowring’s text in order to more accurately reflect 
the philosophical content and “literal meaning” of Schiller’s satirical lines, at the cost of failing to always 
preserve the poetic aspects (i.e. rhyme and meter). From Friedrich Schiller. "The Philosophers." trans. Edgar 
A. Bowring. The Poems of Schiller. 2 ed. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1874). pp. 285-287. The German 
text of the quoted verses as it appears in the first edition of Schiller’s 1797 Musen-Almanach:  
Gut, dass ich euch, ihr Herren, in pleno beysammen hier finde;  
Denn das Eine, was noth, treibt mich herunter zu euch.  
88
 Friedrich Schiller and Karl Hoffmeister. Nachlese zu Schillers Werken nebst Variantensammlung: aus 
seinem Nachlass im Einverständniss und unter Mitwirkung der Familie Schillers. (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 
1840). pp. 198-203. 
89
 From Schiller. "The Philosophers." In German:  
… So gebt mir, ich geh euch nicht eher vom Leibe,  
Einen allgültigen Satz, und der auch allgemein gilt.   
90
 Schiller and Hoffmeister. Nachlese zu Schillers Werken nebst Variantensammlung: aus seinem Nachlass im 
Einverständniss und unter Mitwirkung der Familie Schillers. p. 202.  
91
 Friedrich Schiller. The Poems of Schiller. trans. Edgar A. Bowring. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1874). 
In German: 
Ein Achter. 
Auf theoretischem Feld ist weiter nichts mehr zu finden,  
 30 
 
 
As we have seen, Windelband—sharing the firm conviction expressed by Schiller’s 
caricatured Kantian moralist—is evidently comfortable with the idea of founding his 
“critical-teleological method” on the basis of such an unexplained “ought.” In “Kritische 
oder genetische Methode?”, Windelband plainly announces his basic presupposition: “The 
recognition of axioms is conditioned throughout by a purpose that must be accepted as the 
ideal for our thinking, willing and feeling.”92 Windelband quotes Schiller’s witty line 
simply in order to provide his reader a good chuckle, but in no way does the philosopher 
regard the actual point being made by Schiller as a serious threat to his own theories. As 
Hofer contends, Windelband faithfully clings to the concept of teleology and in so doing 
continues the Kantian tradition passed down by Fichte to the neo-Kantian schools of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries.93 Secure in his conviction regarding the “primacy” of the 
“ought,” Windelband is untroubled by the problem of “how” one experiences conscience 
and so he refuses to doubt the “validity” of what Heidegger describes as the unclarified 
phenomenon of “value-giving.”94 
In reprising this very same reference to Schiller, Heidegger indicates that his 
developing philosophical program is radically opposed to the method advanced by 
Windelband and other neo-Kantians. Indeed, Heidegger’s call for a “rebirth of the genuine 
scientific consciousness and life-contexts” reflects an even more radical reading of 
Schiller’s satirical take on philosophy than what the poet himself could have ever 
intended.95 For Heidegger, the problem posed by the “ought-giving” conscience is not one 
of finding the ultimate “fixed principle” that can be used to reveal the laws of worldly 
reality as Schiller’s character of the pupil believes. Instead, Heidegger’s analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
Aber der praktische Satz gilt doch : Du kannst, denn du sollst ! 
Ich. 
Dacht’ ichs doch ! Wissen sie nichts vernünftiges mehr erwiedern, 
Schieben sies einem geschwind in das Gewissen hinein.  
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“critical-teleological method” reveals that the Kantian “ought” is implicit in all traditional 
philosophical approaches because experience is presupposed as being built out of “value-
laden” substance, whether this be material or spiritual.96 Even at this early stage of his 
philosophical career, Heidegger indicates that a basic misconception regarding “Being”97 
has led philosophy to abandon its task as the “primordial science” of the “unity of genuine 
life itself”98 and to become engaged in what he considers to be a misguided search for 
“universal validity” and permanently settled solutions to the “puzzles of life.”99 The young 
Heidegger contends that the problem of the “ought” is what has blocked off the question of 
“Being”; this question must be brought back to the fore and investigated in a manner that 
respects the non-theoretical nature of genuine “lived experience.”100 For Heidegger, the 
concern for various “worldviews” that motivated the work of his neo-Kantian 
contemporaries must be replaced by a “preliminary explication of the genuine problem,”101 
namely the exhibition of “the original manner of value-giving upon which the ought is 
founded.”102 As Heidegger states:  
The value ‘is’ not, but rather it ‘values’ in an intransitive sense; in being 
worth-taking (Wertnehmen), ‘it values’ for me, for the value-experiencing 
subject. ‘Valuing’ becomes an object only through formalization.103 
For philosophy to live up to its promise as “primordial science,” Heidegger insists on the 
need for a method of investigation that can allow for the return “to the genuine origins of 
the spirit.”104 In exposing the specific errors common to both Windelband and Rickert’s 
approaches, Heidegger aims to show that philosophy is faced with a crucial choice: either it 
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yields before the “blind power” of conscience or it follows up on the “genuine” question of 
how lived experience can be “self-certifying.”105          
In his early 1919 course at Freiburg, Heidegger is evidently far from recognizing 
how the phenomenon of conscience itself might be interpreted as the source of this 
“possibility of a methodological return (methodisch zurückzugehen)” that allows 
philosophy as “primordial science” to “go back to the origin.”106 Heidegger admits that he 
lacks the vocabulary to satisfactorily clarify the “philosophical problematic” of the “lived 
experience of the ought”: as he confesses to his students, “our language is not adequate to 
the new basic type of lived experience involved here.”107 In §7 of Being and Time, 
Heidegger will reprise this warning regarding “language” when he states that “we lack not 
only most of the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’” to adequately describe the 
methodology of phenomenological investigation.108 While he never overcomes this 
intractable problem of language, Heidegger nonetheless will unveil in Being and Time a 
new way of expressing the possibility of “self-certifying” that he raised in early 1919. With 
his existential interpretation of conscience in §54, Heidegger reveals that the “self-
certifying” of the “new basic type of lived experience”109 that he emphasized in the “war 
emergency semester” must be taken up by searching for an “attestation” of Dasein’s 
“authentic potentiality-for-Being” that has “its roots in Dasein’s Being” as the “call of 
conscience.”110  
Conscience in the “Critical Comments on Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews” 
(September 1920) 
Heidegger’s first use of the term “Gewissen” to positively express his own 
philosophical approach is found in his aborted book review of Karl Jaspers’s 1919 
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publication entitled Psychology of Worldviews. Completed by the end of September 
1920,111 Heidegger’s “treatise” on Jaspers’s work112 introduces the concept of conscience 
as being essentially related to the problem of historicality, i.e. the question of how “the full, 
concrete, and historically factic self [becomes] accessible in its historically concrete 
experience of itself (historisch konkreten Eigenerfahrung).”113 At the very start of his 
essay, Heidegger makes it clear that a proper critique of Jaspers’s work cannot be 
accomplished without first defining “the how of such a philosophical critique” and he 
suggestively—if quite enigmatically—associates the undefined phenomenon of conscience 
with this preliminary methodological task.114 What is crucial, Heidegger insists, is that we 
examine “the proper tendency of Jaspers’s work in its basic bearing and attitude” in order 
to reveal its “basic motives,” its “approach to the task,” and the “methodological means” 
that are employed.115 This is only possible, Heidegger states, if we avoid judging Jaspers’s 
study on the psychology of worldviews according to “established criteria”; we must first 
take up the task of “destruction” and expose the prejudice of all “finished and securely 
grounded philosophy” and of “any fixed ideal of scientific method,” including the notion of 
“truth’s absolute validity.”116  
Such measures are put out of play because our critical comments are 
oriented toward sharpening the conscience (diese Anmerkungen gerade das 
Gewissen dafür schärfen möchten) to the need for radical questioning that 
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returns to the place of origin where meaning is first generated in the “history 
of spirit/mind” in its proper sense, which is a return to the original motives 
or motives of origin (Ursprungsmotiven) operative in first establishing such 
philosophical ideals of knowledge. … We are convinced that such a 
sharpening of the conscience cannot be achieved or even initiated in a 
genuine way by the “invention” of a “new” philosophical program. Rather, it 
has to be actualized quite concretely by way of a destruction (Destruktion 
des Überlieferten) aimed directly at what has been handed down to us in the 
tradition of intellectual history.117 
While he does not clarify the meaning of his new concept of conscience, Heidegger points 
to this “conscience-sharpening” as an “essential characteristic” of the destructive method of 
“explication” which reveals the bias of “traditional” philosophy and its “theoretical” 
approach. The actualizing of “radical” philosophical critique—which Heidegger identifies 
as “phenomenological critique in its most proper sense”—implies “an appropriation that 
repeatedly renews itself by way of destruction.”118 Even though Heidegger neither explains 
how conscience plays this role nor shows how this “sharpening” of conscience can be 
actualized, his introductory comments clearly establish that conscience is being assigned a 
key methodological role as the means for renewing philosophy’s “sense of originality (Sinn 
von Ursprünglichkeit).”119  
[Freedom] from presuppositions [is attained] only in a factically and 
historically oriented self-critique (faktisch historisch orientierter 
Eigenkritik). The unceasing effort to attain freedom from presuppositions is 
precisely what constitutes that freedom. … [What] is required in 
philosophizing is a properly articulated contestation (Auseinandersetzung) 
that dismantles and therefore lays open the history that we ourselves “are.” 
In the end, the way to the matters themselves is this detour through history 
and the understanding that actualizes it.120 
Near the end of his essay, Heidegger again takes up the concept of conscience as he 
explicitly identifies its role in the experienced “phenomenon of actualization history 
(vollzugsgeschichtliches Phänomen)” through which temporality is understood genuinely 
                                                 
117
 GA 9, 3 / 118. 
118
 GA 9, 4 / 119. 
119
 GA 9, 5 / 119. 
120
 GA 9, 5 / 119. 
 35 
 
 
according to “the self’s anxious concern (Bekümmerung) about itself.”121 On this basis, 
Heidegger contrasts the “essentially concerned manner of actualizing experience” with the 
“temporal schemata” of “objective-historical observation” that sees time as something that 
can be “objectively classified” according to its status in terms of  “past, present and 
future.”122 What Heidegger calls conscience is defined as the “historically driven concern 
for the self as such” through an “actualization [that] does not take place just ‘once and for 
all’ in a momentary or isolated way, but rather time and again in a constant renewal of 
concern.”123 In this regard, Heidegger specifically distinguishes his “conscience” from the 
“conscientia” of philosophical tradition:  
[“Conscience”] is here understood as the actualization of conscience and 
thus not merely a matter of occasionally having a conscience about 
something (conscientia). Conscience in its basic sense is a historically 
charged way of experiencing one’s self (Wie des Selbsterfahrens) (the 
history of this “concept” has to be examined in conjunction with the problem 
of existence, which is not just an academic problem, even if it is already here 
a pressing academic problem). In indicating this conjunction of meaning 
between the sense of historical experience and the sense of the phenomenon 
of conscience, we are not expanding the concept of the historical but rather 
returning our understanding of it back to the proper source of its sense.124 
Heidegger criticizes the modern scientific movement for having lost contact with the 
authentic sense of the historical that finds its vital roots in the “unschematic sense of 
concern that is concerned with actualizing the experience [of life] in its how” and not in the 
artifice of “objective historical knowledge” where experience is approached as “an object 
of knowledge and curiosity.”125 He also hints at the tragedy of those such as Nietzsche who 
reject “objectivity” but remain blind to the positive “phenomenon of existence” that is 
disclosed by the destructive explication of tradition, leading them to condemn “history” and 
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“conscience” in the same breath. For Heidegger, such skeptics fail to recognize how the 
primordial phenomenon of conscience—which must be radically distinguished from the 
traditional conscientia with its concern for worldly and moral knowledge—can produce the 
“constant renewal” of the “actualization of experience [in] its fundamentally historical 
sense.”126 In concluding his comments on conscience in the Jaspers review, Heidegger 
remarks:  
Because we are actually unable to see the phenomena of existence today, we 
no longer experience the meaning of conscience (Gewissen) and sense of 
responsibility that lies in the historical itself. For the historical is not merely 
something of which we have knowledge and about which we write books; 
rather, we ourselves are the historical that we ourselves bear and carry as a 
responsibility.127  
In this, the very earliest of his interpretations of conscience, Heidegger reveals that this 
“fundamental” phenomenon—which represents the “historically charged way of 
experiencing one’s self”— is the fundamental “source” of all possible experience, i.e. it is 
the disclosing “source” of the “phenomenon of existence” itself.128 Even the dominant way 
of experiencing the historical “almost exclusively [as] something objective, an object of 
knowledge and curiosity,” is shown by Heidegger to depend upon the “hidden source” of 
conscience: the rise of the “objective tradition” reflects the “tendency of [concrete and 
factic life experience] to fall away” from its responsibility to actualize conscience and to 
constantly renew “the self’s anxious concern about itself.”129 Due to this obscuring 
tendency, Heidegger observes that we fail to recognize that conscience is our only 
“source” of experience; through the efficacy of “objective tradition,” “even the motives for 
returning to the historical through our own history [become] inactive and hidden.”130 
 While Heidegger strongly emphasizes the urgent need to examine the relation 
between conscience and existence, he quickly moves on to his concluding remarks and 
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does not again mention the term conscience in the remainder of this essay. Despite having 
identified the explication of this relation as “the most crucial task (die entscheidende 
Aufgabe) in the entire complex of problems pertaining to the phenomena of existence,” 
Heidegger never follows through on this insight by providing the implicitly promised 
explication of the “how” of experiencing this “constant renewal of concern.”131 Indeed, his 
account seems to indicate that the “fundamental sense” of the “actualization of conscience” 
is something that cannot be recovered: given the overwhelming tendency of “factic life 
experience” to “fall away” into “objective kinds of significance,” the “hidden source” of 
conscience seems destined to remain essentially “inactive and hidden.”132 Although 
Heidegger subsequently states that the process of destruction can expose the “bias built into 
tradition,” he does not reveal how one can begin this “destruction” if the “objectifying” 
tradition has completely distorted this “fundamental sense” of conscience and even 
extinguished the “motives” that would make possible such a return.133  
Remarkably, this “crucial task” concerning the relation of conscience and existence 
is not taken up again in Heidegger’s published lectures and writings for almost three years 
following his completion of this review of Jaspers’s work in September 1920. Arguably, 
Heidegger could not provide anything more than a primitive account of the “historically 
charged way of experiencing one’s self” at this point because he had not yet refined his 
methodological approach for conducting a phenomenological investigation of existence and 
its constitutive phenomena.134 Despite these limitations, Heidegger’s suggestive description 
of conscience at this early stage of his work—notably his explicit opposition of the 
“historically driven concern for the self as such” to the traditional conscientia’s 
“[occasional] having a conscience about something”135—is rich with implications both for 
the development of the phenomenological method as it is deployed in Being and Time and 
for the pivotal role played by conscience in this major work.  
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Conscience in the Lecture on “The Concept of Time” for the Marburg Theological 
Faculty (July 1924) 
Heidegger’s first public indication that the concept of conscience will perform a key 
role in his phenomenological investigation of existence is recorded in the text of his lecture 
entitled “The Concept of Time” that was given on July 25, 1924136 at the University of 
Marburg under the auspices of the faculty of theology. Near the conclusion of his lecture, 
which according to Kisiel and Sheehan caused “a minor sensation” in German intellectual 
circles due to its “‘existentialist’ flair,”137 Heidegger introduced conscience as a 
phenomenon related to the essential “historicality” of what he called “Dasein” and 
characterizes as “Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein).”138 The sole appearance of the 
word “conscience” in this short lecture is found in the following excerpt:  
The study of history that thrives in the present only sees history as 
irrecuperable activity and busyness: what once went on. The examination of 
what was going on is inexhaustible. It gets lost in its material. Because this 
history and temporality of the present does not get at the past at all, it merely 
has another present. A past remains closed off from a present so long as such 
a present, Dasein, is not itself historical. Dasein, however, is in itself 
historical in so far as it is its possibility. In being futural Dasein is its past; it 
comes back to it in the how. The manner [how] of coming back to it is, 
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among other things, conscience. Only the how is repeatable. A past—
experienced as authentic historicity—is anything but “dead and gone.” It is 
something to which I can return again and again.139 
Essentially, the meaning of conscience that is conveyed by Heidegger here is consistent 
with his previous use of the word in the review of Jaspers’s book: conscience is related to 
the “coming back” that defines the experience of historicality if it is authentically 
understood. However, the notion of conscience presented here is not identical with 
Heidegger’s earlier commentary. In this public talk about “time,” Heidegger integrates his 
notion of conscience into his new notion of “Dasein,” the term that has now replaced the 
word “self” that he used previously. Furthermore, Heidegger specifies that “conscience” is 
just one possible way “among others” that could allow for the past to be repeated in the 
authentic experience of time. With regard to the “how” of experiencing this coming back 
and the specific role of conscience, Heidegger offers no further explanation and he does not 
mention any of the “other ways” that might allow Dasein to experience the “coming back” 
of genuine historicality. Once again, the young Heidegger drops the term of conscience 
immediately after raising it and does not develop his interpretation of the phenomenon in 
any depth at this point.  
Conscience in the Abandoned Review of the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence 
(November 1924) 
The first explicit parallel in Heidegger’s work between his early treatment of 
conscience and the subsequent existential interpretation found in Being and Time appears in 
a lengthy essay that he completed in November 1924 under the working title “The Concept 
of Time (Comments on the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence).” For the first time, we see 
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Vorbei. Sie ist etwas, worauf ich immer wieder zurückkommen kann.”  
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Heidegger in this text identifying the phenomenon of “willing-to-have-a-conscience 
(Gewissen-haben-wollen)”140 as an essential characteristic of Dasein and assigning it a 
specific place among the basic elements that make up the “wholeness” of Being-in-the-
world. Initially intended as a book review of the recently published correspondence 
between Wilhelm Dilthey and Paul Yorck von Wartenburg,141 this essay marks Heidegger’s 
earliest attempt to explicitly “position” his notion of conscience within the increasingly 
elaborate constitutive structures of his phenomenon of Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger’s 
discussion of his own philosophical concepts in this text was so detailed that the supposed 
“book review” bloated into a complex four-part essay of which only the first—and 
shortest—section focused on the Dilthey-Yorck letters. As Kisiel reports, the “review” 
article was never published in the Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft 
und Geistesgeschichte as planned largely because the text had grown into a “fundamental 
statement about Heidegger’s own work” that was “more than double its originally 
estimated length”; instead, it would serve as “the very first draft of Being and Time” and 
major sections of this essay would be inserted verbatim into his major 1927 work.142  
Heidegger’s comments on conscience in this November 1924 essay appear in its 
third and most substantial chapter entitled “Dasein and Temporality,”143 which Heidegger 
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this 1924 essay Heidegger quotes from a letter by Yorck to Dilthey that discusses the phenomenon of 
conscience. In this letter, Yorck criticizes the “radical externalization” expressed in the notion of “the so-
called public conscience” and argues that the authentic historicality of a nation or community can only result 
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Truth is never an element. To dissolve elemental public opinion, and, as far as possible, to make possible the 
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opens with a lengthy note commenting on the relation between this text and his July 1925 
talk before Marburg’s faculty of theology that shared the same title. In this note, Heidegger 
recalls that at Marburg he had posed the question “What is time?” in a broad manner out of 
respect for his audience of theologians concerned with questions regarding “access to God, 
faith and the relationship to eternity.”144 As he begins the third section of this essay, 
Heidegger promises that his investigation of Dasein’s temporality will now be approached 
in a purely “philosophical” manner and will avoid having recourse to any kind of divine 
absolute; more specifically, his investigation will only consider the possibility of 
understanding time through time itself. Having “focused” his investigation in this manner, 
Heidegger adopts a strategy that provides an early glimpse of the themes that will orient the 
two opening chapters of Being and Time’s Division Two on Being-towards-death and 
conscience. Given that his study of Dasein is intended to provide access to the question of 
the meaning of Being, Heidegger holds that the legitimacy of his attempted interpretation 
requires an explanation of how the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world can be understood 
as a whole.  
[How] is this entity to be perceived as a sufficient basis for this analysis in 
terms of an adequately guiding wholeness, as long as it has not come to its 
end? Only if it is what it can be is it accessible as a whole. Only in its Being-
towards-the-end is it fully there. But in its Being-finished, however, it 
simply no longer is.145 
                                                                                                                                                     
moulding of individuality in seeing and looking, would be a pedagogical task for the state. Then, instead of a 
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To explain this constant wholeness of Being-towards-the-end, Heidegger points to 
Dasein’s experience of death and insists that a “genuine” understanding of this 
phenomenon is only possible if we avoid thinking of “death” as something that “is.” As 
Heidegger contends, Dasein’s death is neither “a moment that completes the design of the 
whole” nor “a collapse of the sequence of related experiences and events”146; such notions 
presuppose that Dasein’s Being is a form of material presence. Although much less 
intricate than the account of Dasein’s death found in Being and Time, this early description 
places the same emphasis on the importance of understanding death as a constant and 
essential “possibility” of Being-in-the-world:  
“Death” does not exist. Death is in each case mine. Dasein is in each case its 
own death. Dasein means Potentiality-for-Being. Death is the most extreme 
possibility of Dasein. In its explicated mode of Being, Dasein is in each case 
its most extreme possibility.147 
For Heidegger, this “extreme possibility” of Dasein’s own death delivers the only 
“certainty” of existence and provides the authentic, primordial basis of factical experience. 
However, he immediately recalls his earlier observations presented in the second section of 
the essay concerning Dasein’s tendency to fall into the “objectivizing” way of 
understanding the world and its own Being. This tendency causes Dasein to become blind 
to the genuine “certainty” of its “most extreme possibility” and leads to the mistaken 
consideration of death as yet another “event” whose significance is determined according to 
the “ways of the world.”  
Once again, Heidegger finds himself faced with the problem of explaining the 
“how” that could allow Dasein—blind to the fact that it has fallen into the objective ways 
of the world—to return to a genuine understanding of existence in terms of its ownmost 
and ultimate possibility. In this November 1924 essay, Heidegger makes the case that 
Dasein is faced with a constant choice—a choice that revolves around whether one chooses 
to be concerned or to not be concerned with this very question of “how.” It is in this regard 
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that Heidegger introduces the phenomenon of conscience: to be concerned with the 
question of the “how” of one’s existence is expressed as “willing-to-have-a-conscience,” 
which he also describes in terms of “Being-willing-to-be-responsible-for-itself (Sich-selbst-
verantwortlich-sein-wollens).”148 At this point, Heidegger conveys the concept of 
conscience strictly in terms of the will. When Dasein allows the “world” to determine its 
possibilities, it chooses “not to choose” and becomes absorbed in the habitual concern for 
worldly things as dictated by tradition. On the other hand, Dasein can choose to be 
“willing-to-have-a-conscience” and thereby free itself from concern for the objective 
“what” in order to return to the “how” that discloses its genuine possibilities.  
Dasein can choose to be in the “how” of “willing-to-be-responsible-for-
itself.” … In facticity, Dasein is constituted equally by this Being-possible as 
choosing its “how” and by Being-falling.  By concernfully getting absorbed 
in the environmental-world, the with-world and the self-world that make up 
Being-in, the “how” is forgotten. In so far as the concern that is falling (das 
verfallende Besorgen) is a way of Being, this can also be described as a 
falling “how.” [In this case,] the “how” takes the form of a habit, a routine of 
always looking concernfully at the “what.” Terminologically, the “how” 
simply means Being-in-the-world, in so far as it is determined through 
“willing-to-have-a-conscience.”149 
As Heidegger makes clear, the choice of “willing-to-have-a-conscience” is neither  
permanent nor absolute: Dasein cannot “avoid” its tendency to fall into concern for the 
“what.” Nonetheless, Heidegger sees Dasein to be revealing an authentic understanding of 
its own Being—and its temporality—when it chooses to be “willing-to-have-a-conscience” 
and concernfully focuses on its “how.” Indeed, the “falling” of Dasein as it exists in 
objective concern for “worldly things” can only occur because it is “falling away” from its 
self-responsibility of “willing-to-have-a-conscience.” Since any legitimate questioning of 
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Dasein’s “how” necessarily implies concern for its wholeness, Heidegger sees the choice of 
“willing-to-have-a-conscience” reflected in Dasein’s anticipatory resoluteness in the face of 
its ownmost “extreme possibility” of death, the indefinite but certain possibility of its 
impending “non-existence.” In choosing to be “willing-to-have-a-conscience,” Dasein 
reveals the specious nature of the “objective” time of tradition that values the “passing” 
present only because it produces the certain “knowledge” of past events: Dasein must fall 
into the “forgetting” of its ultimate possibility before the past can be mistakenly accorded 
“priority” over the future.  
When Being-past is revealed in this way, we see that Dasein is already at 
every moment in the possibility of anticipating its most extreme Potentiality-
for-Being, it is in every moment in the possibility of choosing between being 
“conscience-having” and being “conscience-less.” … However, since Dasein 
is characterized by falling, it has the tendency to understand itself primarily 
in terms of the world and to determine its “actions” exclusively in terms of 
the world. In such dwelling in the world, one can forget oneself, i.e. can be 
“conscience-less.” However, such a Dasein has not actually chosen 
resoluteness understood as discovering anticipation; instead, it has allowed 
itself to be determined by that wherein it finds itself.150 
For the first time, Heidegger also establishes here a link between the “choosing” of 
“wanting-to-have-a-conscience” and the essential guilt of Dasein: even in making the 
choice to be “conscience-having,” Being-in-the-world recognizes that it is essentially 
characterized by its tendency to “fall” into worldly concerns and that the “choice” of 
“wanting-to-have-a-conscience” cannot be permanently sustained. In the “how” of 
genuinely anticipating its most extreme possibility, Dasein’s resoluteness is inherently 
colored by the guilt of its being unable to assume full responsibility for itself. While 
Heidegger hints at the possibility of developing an “anticipatory” counter-habit to “falling,” 
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he nonetheless insists that Dasein is inevitably dependent on the “world” in which it finds 
itself.  
In resoluteness, the thus revealed “past” of anticipating Dasein, if it 
understands itself, cannot be considered a worldly object. Rather, 
resoluteness allows Dasein itself to become guilty for “not-having-chosen.” 
In becoming guilty and remaining guilty, anticipating Dasein is its Being-
past.151 
While resoluteness exposes Dasein to its “guilt,” it also implies that one “resolves” upon a 
concrete possibility that necessarily involves being plunged back into objective “worldly” 
interests; the return to genuine anticipation must be actualized again and again through 
Dasein’s willful “choosing” of “wanting-to-have-a-conscience.”  
With his remark concerning the relation between decisive action and the essential 
guilt of “conscience-less” existence, Heidegger provides evidence that his emerging notion 
of conscience as the source of disclosedness has been steadily developing at least since his 
encounter in 1920 with Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews (and quite possibly since his 
earlier studies of Nietzsche as a student of Rickert152). For with his characterization of 
Dasein’s “conscience-less” activity, Heidegger alludes for the first time in his published 
works to Goethe’s widely quoted maxim concerning the fundamentally “conscience-less” 
nature of all human “activity”—a maxim that Jaspers references repeatedly in his book as 
we discuss below. Five months after completing this essay, Heidegger will acknowledge 
this reference more explicitly in the Kassel lectures of April 1925153 and will reprise it in 
both his 1925 summer semester course at Marburg154 and in §60 of Being and Time.155 It is 
worth noting that when we review the line by Goethe as it appears in his compiled Maxims 
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and Reflections, we see that Heidegger refers only to the first half of the poet’s “statement” 
concerning conscience and that the point expressed by Heidegger evidently clashes with 
Goethe’s apparent valorization of “beholding.” As Goethe writes: 
He who acts is always without conscience; no one has conscience except he 
who beholds.156  
Significantly for our investigation, Jaspers makes reference to Goethe’s maxim three 
different times in his Psychology of Worldviews157 and on all three occasions he truncates 
the text by leaving out the conclusion in exactly the same manner as we have seen in 
Heidegger’s later references. By “editing” the Goethean quote in this way, Jaspers betrays 
his desire to emphasize the “conscience-less” nature of all forms of decisive action while 
avoiding any discussion of the potentially positive character of attentive “beholding.” On 
its own, this truncating of Goethe’s line would not demonstrate the direct link between 
Heidegger’s use of the reference and his knowledge of the Jaspersian reading of it. 
However, what we find in Psychology of Worldviews is that Jaspers explicitly uses the 
quote to illustrate the relation between “responsibility,” “inevitable guilt” and decisive 
action, the same themes that Heidegger links to conscience for the first time in this 1924 
essay and upon which he will structure his existential concept of conscience in Being and 
Time.158 In the Psychology of Worldviews, Jaspers writes: 
Every action has...unintended consequences. Even if one follows the finest 
standards, every action is unavoidably accompanied by the subjective 
experience of guilt. As Goethe saw: Anyone who acts is without conscience. 
When calculation is insufficient [for determining all consequences of an 
action], decision is only possible for the unscrupulous agent or for one who 
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can carry the burden of this “responsibility”; that is, for one who can take on 
and wants to take on this inevitable guilt.159 
Further illuminating our understanding of the sources related to Heidegger’s 
development of the concept of conscience, the reference to the Goethean maxim by Jaspers 
also sheds a new light on the importance of Nietzsche’s writings for Heidegger as he 
struggles to interpret the meaning of conscience and determine its function as an essential 
phenomenon of Dasein.  For as soon as Jaspers introduces Goethe’s words in Psychology of 
Worldviews, he refers immediately to Nietzsche, praising the 19th century thinker for 
having “aptly characterized” the “fear” of those who prefer to “accept fatalism” and 
“shuffle off their responsibility” rather than “accepting the guilt” and “assuming the risk 
and the consequences” related to the pursuit of their own goals.160 As we will see in the 
following chapter, Heidegger explicitly acknowledges Nietzsche in §55 of Being and Time 
as one of the sources that he considered while developing his concept of conscience as an 
existential phenomenon.161 Furthermore, in conducting an investigation of the “existential 
source” of Dasein’s historicality in §76, Heidegger refers specifically to Nietzsche’s 1874 
essay entitled “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (Vom Nutzen und 
Nachteil der Historie für das Leben),” where Nietzsche “unequivocally and penetratingly” 
recognized that “one’s life is historical in the roots of its Being, and that therefore, as 
factically existing, one has in each case made one’s decision for authentic or inauthentic 
historicality.”162 Confirming the significance of the Goethean maxim to Heidegger’s 
approach to conscience, this essay—the sole Nietzschean text mentioned by name in Being 
and Time—marks the only moment in all of Nietzsche’s collected writings where this 
maxim is quoted and explicitly attributed to Goethe. Nietzsche writes:   
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The unhistorical is like an atmosphere within which alone life can germinate 
and with the destruction of which it must vanish. … All [the] valuations [of 
the unhistorical man] are altered and disvalued; there are so many things he 
is no longer capable of evaluating at all because he can hardly feel them 
anymore: he asks himself why he was for so long the fool of the phrases and 
opinions of others; he is amazed that his memory revolves unwearyingly in a 
circle and yet is too weak and weary to take even a single leap out of this 
circle. It is the condition in which one is the least capable of being just; 
narrow-minded, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings, 
one is a little vortex of life in a dead sea of darkness and oblivion: and yet 
this condition—unhistorical, anti-historical through and through—is the 
womb not only of the unjust but of every just deed too; and no painter will 
paint his picture, no general achieve his victory, no people attain its freedom 
without having first desired and striven for it in an unhistorical condition 
such as that described. As he who acts is, in Goethe’s words, always without 
a conscience, so is he also always without knowledge; he forgets most things 
so as to do one thing, he is unjust towards what lies behind him, and he 
recognizes the rights only of that which is now to come into being and no 
other rights whatever.163 
With this utterly “destructive” account of conscience, Nietzsche represents both an 
inspirational source and a formidable opponent for Heidegger as he attempts to determine 
the genuine significance of conscience. On the one hand, Heidegger recognizes the parallel 
between his phenomenological project and Nietzsche’s violent charge against moral 
conscience and the tradition-bound concept of history. Although more concerned with 
“existence” than “life” per se, Heidegger is evidently sympathetic to Nietzsche’s claim that 
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“[we need history] for the sake of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from 
life and action, let alone for the purpose of extenuating the self-seeking life and the 
cowardly and bad act.”164 On the other hand, the Nietzschean endeavor lacks the concern 
shown by Heidegger for the possibility of interpreting the phenomenon of conscience 
positively as the “source” of experiencing Being and as the means of accessing history 
authentically. For Nietzsche, the “conscience-less” state represents a glorious ideal and 
defines the ground from “which every great historical event” has arisen; theoretically, such 
“conscience-less” existence can “raise” an individual to a “suprahistorical vantage 
point.”165 For Heidegger, such a theory—no matter how “destructive”—betrays its 
dependence on the “objective” concepts that it claims to reject: this is expressed clearly 
when Heidegger states that one can only be “without conscience” if one has fallen away 
from the authentic experience of conscience. In developing his “phenomenological” 
method of investigating existence, Heidegger turns to conscience specifically in order to 
exhibit the “how” of existence—a “how” that in Heidegger’s work will increasingly be 
seen to revolve around Dasein’s experience of “willing-to-have-a-conscience.” 
While this “how” remains quite nebulous at the conclusion of his November 1924 
essay, Heidegger has made it clear that the choosing of conscience is essential for any 
understanding of existence and that this “primordial” experience—if it can be exhibited in 
its “how”—represents the exclusive way of accessing the essence of time.  
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Vol. 1, Part 2, §1, p. 254. 
 50 
 
 
Heidegger’s Equating of Conscience with Aristotle’s Concept of Phronesis in his 1924-
1925 Winter Semester Course at Marburg 
The most unusual—and exotic—of Heidegger’s handful of brief remarks on 
conscience leading up to the completion of Being and Time is found in the reconstructed 
text of Heidegger’s course entitled Plato’s Sophist that was given at the University of 
Marburg during the 1924-1925 winter semester and published in 1992 as volume 19 of the 
Gesamtausgabe. In this course, Heidegger sought to interpret Plato’s “research into Being” 
through the lens of Aristotle’s lessons on the question of truth (aletheuein), particularly 
those found in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. In the course of his survey of the 
various modes of aletheuein described by Aristotle, Heidegger establishes a remarkable 
connection between the concept of conscience and the Greek notion of practical wisdom: 
phronesis. The transcript of Heidegger’s lecture where the term “conscience” appears 
reads:   
[It] is to be noted that aletheuein, as it exists in doxa, in mathesis, and in 
episteme, has a peculiar character of fallenness. What I experience, notice, or 
have learned, I can forget; in this possibility, aletheuein is subject to lethe 
(where the stem of the verb lanthanein lies hidden)—what is disclosed can 
sink back into concealment. The ability to become forgotten is a specific 
possibility of that aletheuein which has the character of theorein. For the 
hexis meta logou is a hexis of aletheuein into which Dasein places itself 
explicitly. In the case of phronesis things are different. This is manifest in 
the fact that I can experience, notice, and learn what has already been 
experienced, noted, and learned, whereas phronesis is in each case new. 
Hence there is no lethe in relation to phronesis: semeion d’oti lethe tes men 
toiautes hexeos estin, phroneseos d’ouk estin (b28ff.). As regards phronesis, 
there is no possibility of falling into forgetting. Certainly the explication 
which Aristotle gives here is very meager. But it is nevertheless clear from 
the context that we would not be going too far in our interpretation by saying 
that Aristotle has here come across the phenomenon of conscience. 
Phronesis is nothing other than conscience set into motion, making an action 
transparent. Conscience cannot be forgotten. But it is quite possible that 
what is disclosed by conscience can be distorted and allowed to be 
ineffective through hedone and lupe, through the passions. Conscience 
announces itself again and again. (Aber es ist doch aus dem Zusammenhang 
deutlich, daß man in der Interpretation nicht zu weit geht, wenn man sagt, 
daß Aristoteles hier auf das Phänomen des Gewissens gestoßen ist. Die 
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phronesis is nichts anderes als das in Bewegung gesetze Gewissen, das eine 
Handlung durchsichtig macht. Das Gewissen kann man nicht vergessen. 
Wohl aber kann man das, was das Gewissen aufdeckt, durch hedone und 
lupe, durch Leidenschaften, verstellen und unwirksam werden lassen. Die 
Gewissen meldet sich immer wieder.) Hence because phronesis does not 
possess the possibility of lethe, it is not a mode of aletheuein which one 
could call theoretical knowledge. Therefore phronesis is out of the question 
as the arete of episteme or of techne.166 
Taking issue with Aristotle’s ultimate decision to prioritize the knowledge of sophia over 
phronesis as the highest mode of aletheuein, Heidegger infers that phronesis—which he 
equates with the experience of conscience—serves as the authentic mode of all lived 
experience. According to Heidegger, the “object” of phronesis is Dasein itself; it is the 
caring for one’s existence that is the source of any possible experience of Being. In contrast 
with this existential experience, the speculative seeing that founds sophia results in the 
false impression that one possesses “certain” knowledge, according to Heidegger. Sophia is 
fundamentally dependent on the theoretical outlook that allows Dasein to accept the 
apparent “reality” of worldly objects and to accumulate “knowledge,” thereby covering up 
the authentic experience of existence. 
What Heidegger previously called the “actualization history” of the self is lost to 
Dasein when it falls into its “inherent tendency to cover itself over.”167 Against this 
tendency, the phronesis that Heidegger identifies with conscience struggles to keep Dasein 
transparent to itself. In the case of the practical sensing of phronesis, all experience of the 
world arises authentically and transparently through a constantly recalled “caring” for what 
is disclosed. Characteristic of the phronesis is that actualization can never be ultimately 
accomplished; here again Heidegger reminds us that one’s “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” 
must be ever renewed. He writes: “[Phronesis], as soon as it is achieved, is involved in a 
constant struggle against a tendency to cover over residing at the heart of Dasein (einem 
ständigen Kampf gegenüber der Verdeckungstendenz, die im Dasein selbst liegt). … Here, 
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in Dasein itself, is precisely where the risk to, and the resistance against, phronesis lies.”168 
As Dasein’s mode of “truthfully” experiencing the world, Heidegger’s phronesis is thus a 
constant recalling that existence can never be grounded in or reduced to “certainty.” 
Conscience is the remembering of Dasein’s most profound “truth”: its essential uncertainty. 
As the “source” of the experience of disclosedness, conscience—here described by 
Heidegger as the experiencing of phronesis—is essential to the struggle to keep one’s 
ownmost “truth” revealed, a struggle that must counter the essential tendency of Dasein to 
bury itself in the “substance” of worldly concerns.  
Of all the many commentaries regarding Heidegger’s linking of phronesis and 
conscience, it is Gadamer’s testimony that is most valuable to our investigation because his 
first-hand account conveys the impact of Heidegger’s words on his listeners. In his essay 
entitled “The Marburg Theology,” Gadamer recounts that: 
…I met Heidegger in 1923—still in Freiburg—and took part in a seminar on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.169 We were studying the analysis of 
phronesis. Heidegger showed us with reference to Aristotle’s text that all 
techne contained an internal limit: Its knowledge never entails a complete 
disclosure because the work that it knew how to produce is released into the 
uncertainty of a use that was not at one’s disposal (eines unverfügbaren 
Gebrauchs). And then, as a topic for discussion, he presented the distinction 
that separated all knowledge—especially that of mere doxa—from 
phronesis: lethe tes men toiautes hexeos estin, phroneseos de ouk estin (1140 
b 29). As we groped for an interpretation of phronesis, uncertain about the 
sentence and completely unfamiliar with the Greek concepts, Heidegger 
explained curtly, “That is the conscience!” This is not the place to reduce the 
pedagogical exaggeration contained in this claim to its appropriate 
dimensions, and even less the place to point out the logical and ontological 
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weight that Aristotle’s analysis of phronesis in fact carries. But what 
Heidegger found in this, which was also what fascinated him so with 
Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s idea of the Good and with Aristotle’s concept 
of practical knowledge, is clear today: Here a type of knowing (an eidos 
gnoseos) is described that admits of no reference to a final objectivity in the 
sense of a science—a knowing in the concrete situation of existence. Indeed, 
could Aristotle perhaps have helped to overcome the ontological prejudices 
of the Greek concept of the Logos, which Heidegger later interpreted 
temporally as being present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) and presentness 
(Anwesenheit)? This violent appropriation of the Aristotelian text for use 
with his own questions reminds one of how the call of the conscience in 
Being and Time is what first makes the “Dasein in human things” visible in 
its ontological and temporal event-structure.170  
While he recognizes that Heidegger’s rhetoric may have distorted Aristotle’s notion of 
phronesis, Gadamer nonetheless highlights the novelty of Heidegger’s argument that the 
“forgotten” relationship between phronesis and conscience can be considered as evidence 
of how traditional ontology has covered up the primordial truth of experience. Furthermore, 
Gadamer explicitly makes the connection between Heidegger’s discovery of conscience in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the subsequent deployment of the “call of conscience” 
as the “source” of Dasein’s disclosedness in Being and Time. In this sense, Gadamer’s 
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report indicates how the Heideggerian concept of conscience emerges as the primordial 
phenomenon of Being-in-the-world that represents the “source” of all possible experience 
and promises to open up a way of access to Dasein’s authentic temporality.   
At the same time, Gadamer implies that Heidegger’s identification of phronesis 
with conscience does violence to the Aristotelian attempt to contrast phronesis with sophia 
as modes of aletheuein. While he never takes up the task of correcting Heidegger’s 
“pedagogical exaggeration,” Gadamer confirms with his remarks that the interpretation of 
conscience conveyed in the young professor’s lecture on phronesis remained very 
rudimentary at this point. By Gadamer’s account, the basic insight that Heidegger extracts 
from the Nicomachean Ethics will be fully developed only in Being and Time with the 
interpretation of the existential “call of conscience.” Most notably, Heidegger in his lecture 
on Aristotle makes no reference to a “call” and does not raise the methodological question 
of “attestation.” In this sense, Gadamer’s remarks highlight the great distance that separates 
Heidegger’s “violent appropriation” of phronesis in this lecture from the more substantially 
developed notion of the “attesting” conscience that appears in 1927.   
Conscience in Heidegger’s Kassel Lectures (April 1925) 
Heidegger provides another brief description of his evolving notion of conscience 
during the week of April 16-21, 1925 at Kassel, where the young professor had been 
invited by the local Society for Arts and Science (Kurhessischen Gesellschaft für Kunst und 
Wissenschaft) to conduct a series of lectures on his philosophical work.171 While the 
transcript of these lectures produced by his student Walter Bröcker does not reveal any 
substantial new insights regarding the “how” of experiencing conscience, the text confirms 
that Heidegger’s recognition of the primordial role of conscience for his phenomenological 
method is becoming increasingly concrete.172 Most importantly for our study, Heidegger 
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here indicates that conscience is vital to understanding the distinction between his work and 
the phenomenology practiced by others, specifically Max Scheler, whom he also criticizes 
for having presupposed the Kantian “absolute ought” as the basis of all experience.173 It is 
in this context that Heidegger now very explicitly refers to Goethe’s maxim as he illustrates 
the essentially “conscience-less” nature of human action: for Heidegger, this interpretation 
reveals the illegitimacy of the Kantian “ought” and all theories of “value” constructed upon 
it.174   
Having tightened up the description of his phenomenological approach for the 
audience of non-academics at Kassel, Heidegger even more forcefully designates 
conscience as the source of “resoluteness” that provides the basis for any disclosing of the 
world. Noting that Dasein can be accessed as a whole phenomenon only through the 
authentic understanding of its own death, the young professor asks:  
Is there an authentic way of standing before this impending death that is not 
defined by publicity, but is rather a way in which Dasein stands before itself 
as in each instance in a manner that is individual, ownmost, and mine?175 
Heidegger’s answer confirms the link between resoluteness and the choosing of “wanting-
to-have-a-conscience” as he establishes that the only “way” of Dasein’s coming into an 
authentic understanding of its existence is through “choosing responsibility for oneself.”  
To have chosen to choose means to be resolved. Thus, running forward 
anticipatorily means choosing; to have chosen means to be resolved—not to 
die, but to live. This choosing and this being resolved is the choice of 
responsibility for itself that Dasein takes on, and consists in my making 
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myself responsible through my action in each instance of my acting. 
Choosing responsibility for oneself means choosing one’s conscience as a 
possibility that the human being properly and authentically is. 
Phenomenology’s error (Scheler) lies in its misunderstanding of the properly 
anthropological structure of Kantian ethics. Kant saw that the basic sense of 
Dasein is possibility, i.e., to be possibility itself and to be able to seize it. But 
to choose conscience at once means to become guilty. “He who acts is 
always without conscience” (Goethe). Every action implies guilt. For the 
possibilities of action are limited in comparison to the demands of 
conscience, so that every action that is accomplished produces conflicts. To 
choose self-responsibility is thus to become guilty in an absolute sense. I am 
guilty, if I am at all, whenever I act.176 
While Heidegger does not expand on the distinction between his notion of 
conscience and “phenomenology’s error” concerning the Kantian “ought,” this critical 
comment in the Kassel lectures provides the first sign in Heidegger’s work that Scheler 
represents a key figure in his ongoing—if still largely unexpressed—attempt to develop an 
original interpretation of conscience that successfully demonstrates “how” Dasein can 
come back to itself in anticipatory resoluteness. As we will see, the influence of Scheler—
both directly and, perhaps even more impactfully, indirectly—will play a major role in 
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Heidegger’s interpretive breakthrough regarding the existential “call of conscience” which 
will be proposed in Being and Time.  
Conscience in Heidegger’s 1925 Summer Semester Course at Marburg (History of the 
Concept of Time: Prolegomena) 
The first indication of the pivotal methodological role that conscience will play in 
Being and Time comes in the concluding hours of Heidegger’s course at the University of 
Marburg in the summer semester of 1925. Described by Kisiel as the “intermediate” draft 
of Being and Time, this course (published as volume 20 of the Gesamtausgabe under the 
title History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of History and 
Nature) begins to flesh out the method for approaching the question of Being through the 
investigation of Dasein and provides the basic outline of what will become the analysis of 
Dasein’s equiprimordial phenomena in Being and Time’s Division One. Most importantly 
for our study of conscience, the course ends with its final two hours on July 30 and 31 
being devoted to “the topics of death and conscience” where Heidegger went “beyond his 
prepared manuscript.”177   
Heidegger’s introduction of conscience at the very end of this course is striking 
because this phenomenon—never mentioned previously in Heidegger’s lectures during the 
semester—is suddenly proposed as the key to accomplishing both the “task of the 
fundamental analysis of Dasein” and the “elaboration of the question of being itself.”178 In 
this final appearance of conscience in his work prior to Being and Time, Heidegger clearly 
establishes the fact that his embryonic concept of conscience is the only conduit that can 
lead Dasein back to the possibility of authentically experiencing time. Prior to unveiling the 
concept of conscience in this course, Heidegger presents a much more complete analysis of 
death as the phenomenon that reveals the wholeness of Dasein and culminates with the 
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problem of how this authentic wholeness—“this constant and utmost possibility of myself 
(diese ständige, äußerste Möglichkeit meiner selbst)”179—can be experienced. In 
Heidegger’s hurried conclusion to this Prolegomena course, conscience is introduced as the 
methodological bridge between death and time, the latter of which is described as “the 
being in which Dasein can be its totality (das Sein, in dem Dasein seine Ganzheit sein 
kann).”180 The “bridging” concept of conscience is vital for Heidegger’s developing 
existential schema because the authentic understanding of death is precisely what Dasein 
essentially tends to evade through its “absorption in…the public arena of Being-with-one-
another…[where] death is an established everyday encounter.”181 Given that any genuine 
approach to the question of time requires that Dasein recognize that it is essentially “sum 
moribundus,” Heidegger’s project must secure a means of accessing Dasein’s authentic 
understanding of itself.182 In other words, any continued progress of Heidegger’s 
ontological project requires exhibiting the possibility of a return to one’s “ownmost being 
(mein eigenstes Sein),” i.e. to what Heidegger calls the transparency of the fact that “I 
myself am this possibility, where death is my death.”183  
To be sure, Heidegger’s bluntly powerful description of conscience in the 
Prolegomena course lacks the refinement of the presentation in Being and Time where this 
phenomenon is explicitly assigned the methodological function of “attesting” the actual 
possibility of authentic disclosedness. In Being and Time, as we will see, conscience both 
completes the existential analytic by confirming Dasein’s totality as Being-towards-death 
and provides a way to access the question of temporality by summoning Dasein to the 
“situation” or authentic moment of resoluteness. Nevertheless, it is already clear in these 
closing paragraphs of the transcript of Heidegger’s final lecture during the summer of 1925 
that the phenomenon of “willing to have a conscience (Gewissenhabenwollen)” provides 
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the exclusive means for Dasein to become aware of its “utmost possibility of death.”184 In 
the very last lines of his analysis of death that lead into his comments on conscience, 
Heidegger notes that his project requires a way of overcoming Being-in-the-world’s 
essential characteristic of falling so that Dasein can be made accessible in its wholeness. 
The utmost possibility of death as the being of Dasein, in which it is wholly 
by and of itself, has to be seized in Dasein itself. But insofar as Dasein is in 
everydayness, that means that it must be called back from this everydayness 
to the utmost possibility of the ‘I am.’ Dasein’s running forward toward 
death at every moment means Dasein’s drawing back from the Everyone by 
way of a self-choosing.185  
 As this final lecture of July 31, 1925 draws to a close, Heidegger proposes a solution that 
enables Dasein to experience such an “authentic self-choosing (Sich-selbst-wählen)” so that 
it can seize the “indefiniteness of death (Unbestimmtheit des Todes)” as “a possibility for 
every moment (als Möglichkeit für jeden Augenblick).”186  
[In] running forward toward its death Dasein can make itself responsible in 
an absolute sense. It ‘can’ choose the presupposition of being of itself, that 
is, it can choose itself. What is chosen in this choice is nothing other than 
willing to have conscience. … [Insofar] as the issue in Dasein is to choose 
itself in understanding the full transparency of Dasein as a whole, there is 
only this one possibility of forerunning toward death, in order to choose 
Dasein not for the next two days but to choose it in its very being. 
Forerunning is the choice of willing to have conscience.187 
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While Heidegger does not indicate its importance as clearly here as in Being and 
Time, the phenomenon of conscience is described in the Prolegomena course as Dasein’s 
“only” means of achieving authentic understanding and accessing “the time which we 
ourselves are.”188 Heidegger notably insists that conscience reveals to Dasein that it has 
failed to remain transparent to itself and therefore is essentially “guilty.” The phenomenon 
of conscience enables Dasein to break out of its absorption in “everydayness” by revealing 
the nullity of this public realm. Given Dasein’s essential tendency to fall, however, the 
authentic state of “willing to have a conscience” is anything but permanent. Turning once 
again to Goethe, Heidegger remarks:   
But he who acts, as Goethe already said, is always without conscience. … 
As an active Being-with with others, Dasein is eo ipso guilty, even when—
and precisely when—it does not know that it is injuring another or 
destroying him in his Dasein. With the choice of willing to have conscience, 
I have at the same time chosen to have become guilty.189  
At this eleventh hour of his Prolegomena course, Heidegger springs from his 
remarks on conscience to his closing comments on time and Being. By disclosing both 
Dasein’s guilt and its anticipatory possibilities, the act of “willing to have a conscience” 
reveals the authentic concept of time that defines existence in all its possible modes, 
authentic or inauthentic.  
Being guilty…is the being of my ownmost having been. The being of 
having-been is the past, such that in such a being I am nothing but the future 
of Dasein and with it its past. The being, in which Dasein can be its 
wholeness authentically as being-ahead-of-itself, is time. Not “time is” but 
“Dasein qua time temporalizes its being.” Time is not something which is 
found outside somewhere as a framework for world events. Time is even 
less something which whirs away inside in consciousness. It is rather that 
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which makes possible the being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-
in, that is, which makes possible the being of care.190  
Reversing the traditional schema of existence structured by the “reality” of nature and its 
“categories,” the phenomenon of conscience reveals the absolute dependence of the spatio-
temporal realm on the authentic historicality of Dasein as resolute Being-towards-death. 
Nature is to be understood according to the phenomenological understanding of time as 
experienced by Dasein, not vice versa. As Heidegger states in the last words of his course: 
“The movements of nature which we define spatio-temporally…are encountered ‘in’ the 
time which we ourselves are („in“ die Zeit, die wir selbst sind).”191 With regard to the key 
role that Heidegger assigns to conscience, this recognition that “we ourselves are” time is 
possible only on the basis of our willing to be self-responsible and aware of our essential 
guilt.  
Heidegger’s Conscience Prior to Being and Time: Choosing Resoluteness Without 
Being Called 
Before considering how Heidegger’s conscience “suddenly” appears in a much 
more developed form in Being and Time, let us close our review of these earlier 
appearances of the concept with a remarkable observation: prior to Heidegger’s completion 
of the manuscript of Being and Time, conscience is never once described as a “call” or 
explicitly related to the act of “calling.” Virtually every time Heidegger refers to 
conscience before Being and Time, the phenomenon is related to the force of one’s “will,” 
i.e. it is associated with some kind of judgment-like choosing. To describe his concept, 
Heidegger appears trapped in the vocabulary of the volitional ego: conscience is expressed 
in terms of the self’s willing, wanting, choosing, remembering, making transparent and 
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repeating the “moment of resolution.” Even though Heidegger states his intention to 
overthrow the traditional conscientia as the basis of philosophical certainty and 
consciousnss, his attempts to describe the existential concept of conscience prior to Being 
and Time seem stifled by the Scholastic heritage that regards conscience principally as a 
psychological object. Lacking the radicality of his existential call in Being and Time, 
Heidegger’s earlier interpretations of conscience continue to confine the phenomenon to its 
“traditional” role as a faculty or habit of the willful subject.  
Upon the conclusion of the summer semester of 1925, Heidegger reportedly left 
Marburg and headed to “his modest mountain hut in Todtnauberg” to write; during that 
month of August, Heidegger worked continuously on what he then referred to as his 
“Time” article, a text which was mushrooming out of his unpublished 1924 essay on the 
published correspondence between Dilthey and Yorck.192 On August 24, 1925, Heidegger 
wrote from Todtnauberg to his student Löwith: “Thank you for your [postcard]. It came 
across my ‘writing desk’ just as I was bringing the chapter on death in my ‘Time’ to 
‘termination.’”193 At that moment, Heidegger would have found himself facing the problem 
of how to more satisfactorily express his primordial idea of conscience. By this point, the 
young professor had established that conscience represented a crucial concept for his 
ontological project but his insights regarding this phenomenon remained crude and 
incomplete, as revealed by the rough sketch he proposed in his final lecture of the summer 
semester at Marburg. Yet without a coherent interpretation of conscience, his ontological 
project was evidently unviable: Heidegger needed a way to justifiably explain how Dasein 
could come back to a transparent understanding of its authentic possibilities. Without a 
solution to this problem, the question of Being would remain essentially blocked off.  
When he introduces the phenomenon of conscience in Being and Time less than two 
years later, the emphasis and the language used are vastly different than what Heidegger 
had sketched out previously:  
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If we analyze conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call (Ruf). 
Calling is a mode of discourse. The call of conscience has the character of 
an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-
self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty. 
(Der Gewissensruf hat den Charakter des Anrufs des Daseins auf sein 
eigenstes Selbstseinkönnen und das in der Weise des Aufrufs zum eigensten 
Schuldigsein.)194 
As Kisiel observes:  
Only in Being and Time does conscience receive its functional sense of ‘call’ 
to absolute responsibility in the only thoroughgoing development of [the] 
basic triad [of conscience-guilt-resolve].195  
While our chronological review of his texts has revealed Heidegger’s growing attentiveness 
to conscience, there is nothing that presages the importance of this concept—and its 
significant development as a “call”—that will be found in Being and Time. Where did this 
idea of the “call” come from? How did Heidegger come to “hear” conscience as a “call”?  
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2. The Impact of Stoker’s Das Gewissen (1925) on 
Heidegger’s Interpretation of Conscience  
 
 
On September 30, 1925, the Friedrich Cohen publishing house of Bonn stamped its 
copyright on the text of a doctoral dissertation by one of Max Scheler’s students, a young 
South African named Hendrik Gerhardus Stoker.196 Although our study has not been able 
to establish precisely when Heidegger put his hands on this work or when he began writing 
his significantly expanded and altered interpretation of conscience after the conclusion of 
his Prolegomena course at Marburg,197 the publication of Das Gewissen marks a major—
yet widely ignored—moment for the development of what would become Being and Time. 
With the appearance of Stoker’s work, Heidegger was suddenly supplied with the first-ever 
“phenomenological” study of the experience of conscience: a detailed 280-page 
investigation complete with a “quasi-surgical (gleichsam chirurgische)”198 historical review 
of the concept that explains how the phenomenon became obscured by artificial “theories” 
and “abstract thinking.”199 At this key moment in the development of Being and Time, 
Heidegger fortuitously found himself furnished by Stoker with a propædeutic guide to the 
phenomenon of conscience specifically aimed at clearing up the ambiguity produced by 
centuries of theoretical philosophizing in order to retrieve the “true” essence of the 
experience of conscience. Despite the fact that Heidegger will complain that Stoker’s 
“phenomenological” approach to conscience remains insufficiently radical,200 the 
investigation proposed in Das Gewissen nonetheless provided the German thinker with key 
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insights that facilitated his interpretation of conscience as the complex phenomenon which 
attests to Dasein’s possibility of authentic existence through its reciprocal acts of calling 
itself and wanting to hear this call.  
In addition to the explicit comments on Stoker found in Heidegger’s footnote to §55 
of Being and Time,201 the influence of Das Gewissen on the Heideggerian interpretation of 
conscience can be detected in the methodological approach deployed in order to investigate 
Dasein’s existential phenomena. When we examine the contrast between Heidegger’s 
earlier descriptions of conscience and what appears in Being and Time, we find—as we will 
establish below—evident signs that Heidegger’s more elaborate interpretation of 
conscience benefited from Stoker’s prior experimentation with a phenomenological 
approach to the concept. There can be no doubt that Stoker’s study represented something 
very new for the phenomenological movement: Stoker himself admits to having been 
surprised that he was “forced” to completely alter the course of his project in mid-stream 
after he realized that an “intellectualistic and relativistic” approach to conscience was 
inappropriate and that an alternative method was required for the examination of this 
peculiar phenomenon.202 Explaining the methodological problem he faced, Stoker describes 
the need to transgress the conventional limits of “strictly formal research” and to produce 
both a “detailed phenomenological study” and “a historical-critical study” in order to 
access the “core” of conscience.203 In this sense, the approach adopted by Stoker in his 
innovative study of conscience closely resembles Heidegger’s “destructive” method in 
Being and Time and provides a model for how conscience can be examined 
phenomenologically. Moreover, the Stokerian study winds up demonstrating how the 
phenomenon of conscience can be understood as the very basis of a person’s existence—a 
demonstration that we also find in the Heideggerian interpretation of Dasein’s existential 
conscience in Being and Time. 
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Remarkably, Stoker’s book is the only source that Heidegger acknowledges in 
Being and Time as even having anything in common with his own interpretation of 
conscience. Although Heidegger provides a list of secondary readings on conscience in his 
footnote to page 272 in the second chapter of Division Two, Stoker’s work is the sole 
reference that he explicitly recognizes as having influenced his own interpretation of the 
phenomenon.204 In typically Heideggerian fashion, his acknowledgement of the great merit 
of Stoker’s investigation is outweighed by his criticism of this work and his final 
determination that Das Gewissen lacks the required radicality of his own approach. But 
whatever the limitations of Stoker’s theologically inspired approach to phenomenology, 
Das Gewissen provides our investigation of conscience in Being and Time with direct 
evidence of how and maybe why Heidegger came to interpret the much disputed notion of 
conscience as the attesting “source” in his existential analysis of Dasein. Indeed, Stoker’s 
work furnishes us—as it did Heidegger—with a comprehensive historical review of the 
evolving sense of conscience from the dawn of Christianity to the 20th century (a review 
which covers each and every one of the sources mentioned in Heidegger’s analysis of 
conscience in Being and Time, as well as dozens of others) and it contributes to explaining 
how Heidegger came to propose his “radical” interpretation of the phenomenon. Given the 
phenomenological orientation of Stoker’s work, Das Gewissen discloses remarkable clues 
that help us to establish the importance of Heidegger’s understanding of conscience for the 
development and deployment of his own innovative “method” of phenomenology in Being 
and Time.  
Furthermore—and arguably most importantly for our investigation—our 
examination of Stoker’s work reveals that the most vital concept in Das Gewissen is utterly 
absent from Being and Time: nowhere in Heidegger’s work do we find any mention of 
synteresis, a fundamental concept of Western moral philosophy which plays a role in 
virtually all Christian theories of conscience that have been proposed since the Middle 
Ages. In Das Gewissen, Stoker concludes that synteresis—described as the “spark” placed 
in the soul by God that allows one to distinguish good from evil—is more important for a 
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phenomenological understanding of conscience than the Scholastic idea of conscientia. Yet 
remarkably, despite the importance of synteresis for Stoker’s phenomenological study and 
for the historical development of conscience as a philosophical concept, Heidegger never 
even alludes to synteresis in his analysis of conscience in Being and Time (nor does he do 
so in any of his other philosophical texts). This neglect of synteresis by Heidegger is even 
more confounding given his theological roots and his great interest in the Scholastic period, 
the historical era in which the concept of synteresis emerged as one of the central topics of 
theology and morality. Indeed, the modern understanding of conscience as a faculty of the 
human mind arose out of the Scholastic debate regarding the interaction of human 
conscientia and divine synteresis, the latter being described by many medieval 
commentators as the exclusive source of absolute certainty concerning good and evil. As 
we will see, one of the clearest examples of Stoker’s influence on Being and Time is seen in 
the way that Heidegger was able to extract his existential concept of conscience without 
first conducting an extensive historical review of conscience of his own. With his 
detailed—if quite condensed—account of the evolution of conscience theories since the 
days of ancient Greece, Stoker had adequately completed this task for Heidegger, allowing 
the German thinker to avoid even mentioning the key concept of synteresis in Being and 
Time.  
Given that it is the only indication that Heidegger provides in Being and Time 
concerning the sources for his interpretation of conscience, let us immediately review 
Heidegger’s footnote to §55 where he ranks Stoker’s 1925 study as the most pertinent of 
the various “interpretations of conscience” that have been proposed up to that point: 
Besides the interpretations of conscience which we find in Kant, Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, one should notice M. Kähler’s Das Gewissen, 
erster geschichtlicher Teil (1878) and his article in the Realenzyklopädie für 
Protestantische Theologie und Kirche. See too A. Ritschl’s ‘Über das 
Gewissen’ (1876), reprinted in his Gesammelte Aufsätze, Neue Folge (1896), 
pp. 177 ff. See finally H. G. Stoker’s monograph, Das Gewissen, which has 
recently appeared in Schriften zur Philosophie und Soziologie, vol. II (1925), 
under the editorship of Max Scheler. This is a wide-ranging investigation; it 
brings to light a rich multiplicity of conscience-phenomena, characterizes 
critically the different possible ways of treating this phenomenon itself, and 
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lists some further literature, though as regard the history of the concept of 
conscience, this list is not complete. Stoker’s monograph differs from the 
existential interpretation we have given above in its approach and 
accordingly in its results as well, regardless of many points of agreement. 
Stoker underestimates from the outset the hermeneutical conditions for a 
‘description’ of ‘conscience as something which subsists objectively and 
actually’ (p. 3). This leads to blurring the boundaries between 
phenomenology and theology, with damage to both. As regard the 
anthropological foundation of this investigation, in which the personalism of 
Scheler has been taken over, cf. Section 10 of the present treatise, H. 47 ff. 
All the same, Stoker’s monograph signifies notable progress as compared 
with previous interpretations of conscience, though more by its 
comprehensive treatment of the conscience-phenomena and their 
ramifications than by exhibiting the ontological roots of the phenomenon 
itself.205 
As is evident from Heidegger’s acknowledgement in this footnote, Stoker’s unique 
phenomenological study of conscience provided the author of Being and Time with the 
richest insights with regard to his own existential analysis of Dasein. As Heidegger 
observes, Stoker’s approach to conscience is exceptionally broad in scope: the investigation 
of Das Gewissen attempts to explore a wide range of ways in which the experience of 
conscience has been described, as opposed to identifying a set of “authoritative” moral 
theories and then attempting to determine which one of these selected “metaphysical 
systems” best accounts for the phenomenon of moral conscience. In seeking to avoid the 
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constraints of any single pre-determined theological or ethical perspective, Stoker aims 
with his pioneering study to disclose a phenomenological understanding of conscience that 
is free from historical distortion: his goal is to identify the necessary conditions and 
structures underlying all moral experience.  
Ironically, it is Heidegger’s criticism of the incompleteness of Stoker’s analyses of 
earlier theories of conscience that highlights the dependence of Being and Time on the 
historical review found in Das Gewissen. Every single one of the other sources mentioned 
by Heidegger in his interpretation of conscience are considered explicitly—and in much 
greater depth—in the course of Stoker’s study. Furthermore, all of these other sources fall 
into the category of what Heidegger calls “naïve” or “ordinary” interpretations of 
conscience since they treat conscience primarily as an object that can be scientifically 
investigated and placed into a theological or philosophical system. Standing apart from all 
the other sources mentioned by Heidegger, Stoker alone attempts to approach conscience 
first by eliminating the ambiguity caused by theoretical speculation and then by seeking to 
retrieve the original phenomenon that has been lost.206  
2.1. Evidence of Stoker’s Influence on Being and Time  
The importance of Stoker’s Das Gewissen for the development of the Heideggerian 
concept of conscience can be seen in three specific ways that contribute to shaping the 
structure, methodology and content of Being and Time. First of all, Heidegger appears to 
rely on the “destructive” historical review provided in Das Gewissen to reject virtually all 
the previous theories of conscience that have been proposed by philosophers, theologians 
and scientists throughout history. In this sense, Stoker’s review of conscience theories has 
already done the heavy lifting to clear the way for Heidegger’s innovative—and 
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unprecedented—interpretation of conscience that is radically liberated from any moral 
considerations. Secondly, Stoker supplies Heidegger with a novel approach to investigating 
conscience that seeks to liberate the phenomenon from the theoretical speculation that has 
marked its history. While less hostile to modern science—particularly psychology—than 
Heidegger with his radical ontological investigation, Stoker provides the young German 
thinker with a methodological prototype that aims to determine the essential conditions of 
the “how” of the conscience experience—conditions that will also apply to any attempt to 
understand the “how” of Dasein’s disclosedness. Thirdly, Stoker’s recovery of the 
Christian notion of synteresis can be seen to help explain how Heidegger’s concept 
suddenly emerges as the “call of conscience” in Being and Time. Despite Heidegger’s 
silence concerning synteresis, the significant development of the Heideggerian conscience 
as the “call [that] comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me” reflects a response 
to Stoker’s basic insights with regard to the essential relation between the self and the 
absolute light of God’s spirit that illuminates the human soul.207  
Stoker’s “Accidental” Adoption of the Phenomenological Method 
While Stoker does report that the “psychological” understanding of conscience is 
“unfortunately…usually subordinated to the philosophical” one, he doesn’t advocate the 
adoption of any specific point of view of conscience as the correct way to understand the 
phenomenon.208 Rather, Stoker states in his preface that his investigation led him to realize 
the wrong-headedness of proceeding with a study of conscience based on a pre-established 
hypothesis in the spirit of traditional science:  
At first it was my view that the intellectualistic or relativistic view of 
conscience was the right one, but I found [in conducting the research] that I 
was forced to pursue a detailed, phenomenological study of the phenomenon 
of conscience followed by a historical-critical study of theories of 
conscience in order to understand the deepest emotional core of conscience. 
My further research showed that a strictly formal approach, through which 
the conscience has usually been determined, for example as an act of reason, 
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intuition, judgment, impulse, will, urge and the like, cannot grasp the 
conscience phenomenon in its deepest sense and understand it in its unity 
and uniqueness.209  
While Heidegger justifiably distinguishes his phenomenological approach from that 
espoused by Stoker, the author of Being and Time nonetheless acknowledges the originality 
of the latter’s comprehensive assessment of conscience based on how the phenomenon has 
appeared in the light of a “rich multiplicity” of historical perspectives. Stoker’s approach 
opens up the study of conscience to an analysis of the conditions required for any possible 
experience of the phenomenon, i.e. it opens the door to the existential analysis of 
conscience proposed by Heidegger. As Stoker writes:  
After all the history-bound, relative and random conditions were peeled off, 
the core of conscience appeared as a supra-biological fact… One cannot see 
more clearly that the conscience is embedded in and thus representative of 
the concrete fullness of life.210   
Stoker thus aims to protect his approach from being dominated by a “specific” 
interpretation of conscience so that he can seek out “conscience as a genuine and unique 
group of symptoms in its true depth.”211 For Stoker, this attempt at a phenomenological 
interpretation requires rejecting the authority of “religious conscience” or of any moral 
ideology: only after clearing away all distortions of dogma can one proceed to search for 
“substantive material” proof of the phenomenon “using only objective, rational 
facts…[regarding where, when and how] the conscience stirs.”212  
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As Scheler comments in the “Editor’s Foreword” to Das Gewissen, Stoker’s work 
represents a high point for the philosophical analysis of conscience because it avoids the 
“unilateralism” of great ethical systems and novel psychological interpretations (e.g., 
Nietzsche and Freud) while not dismissing any of these sources. Indeed, Scheler’s only 
major complaint—expressed in very direct terms in his brief comments—is that Stoker 
concludes by advocating a religiously-oriented interpretation and doesn’t incorporate an 
even broader range of insights regarding conscience, notably the latest results of work in 
the fields of developmental psychology and sociology. Despite his reservations, Scheler 
praises Stoker for recognizing that conscience is “surrounded on all sides” by “the 
psychological, the onto- and phylogenetical, the metaphysical and religious-
philosophical…even the patho-psychological…”213 In Scheler’s eyes, Stoker breaks 
through the historical ambiguity concerning the phenomenon and “distinguishes the most 
basic elements of experience” from “all arbitrary rational interpretations” of conscience; 
Scheler ultimately congratulates his student for having successfully exposed the “vital 
nerve center (Lebensnerv)” of conscience.214  
In his criticism of Stoker in the footnote to §55, Heidegger takes aim as much at 
Scheler as at the young author of Das Gewissen himself for failing to consider that the 
ontological question must lead any proper phenomenological investigation. By proceeding 
immediately “with the objective reality of the experienced ‘conscience’ as a starting point 
(die objective Wirklichkeit, das wirklich erlebte „Gewissen“ als Ausgangspunkt zu 
nehmen),” Stoker would betray his insensitivity to the radical question of the “ontological 
roots” of conscience—the question upon which the very possibility of Dasein coming into 
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disclosedness ultimately depends.215 Heidegger feels that Stoker falls into a “values-based” 
understanding of existence due to the influence of Scheler’s personalistic value-ethics and 
that, as a result, the Stokerian interpretation of conscience fails to question the fundamental 
conditions for any possible experiencing of conscience in the first place.216 Unattuned to 
the ontological questions that drive Heidegger, Stoker is primarily concerned with 
overcoming the limitations of religious doctrine in his research of conscience: the very 
decision to step beyond the domain of theology was already a radical step for Stoker, as can 
be seen in his “defense” of the choice to consider conscience as a moral phenomenon rather 
than as a religious one:  
While it may seem that the “religious conscience” perhaps conveys the 
“more subtle,” “more sensitive,” “purer,” “deeper,” or “more appropriate” 
sense in terms of the nature of conscience, this work focuses mainly on the 
so-called “moral conscience” because what is most difficult is to distinguish 
the conscience as a moral phenomenon from other moral phenomena. Only 
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conscience. Scheler insists that his attempt to establish a material value-ethics is more “scientific” than his 
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holländisch-burischen Calvinismus prädisponierte ohne Zweifel den Verfasser in hohem Maße für die 
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den die Religionsgeschichte an den Namen Calvins knüpft. Eine diskrete Färbung dieser Art und Form eines 
ebenso herben und souveränen, als in den inneren individuellen Mächten des Gemütes fast ausschließlich 
gottgebundenen Lebens- und Weltgefühls liegt auch über den Untersuchungen des Verfassers. Wie immer 
man wertend stehe zu diesem gewaltigen historischen Lebenskreise - für eine Untersuchung der 
Gewissensphänomene ist er sicherlich eine günstige Disposition. Freilich ist in ebenderselben Tatsache 
vielleicht auch mancherlei Grenze gegründet, die der Untersuchung des Verfassers nach der Überzeugung des 
Herausgebers zukommt. Trotz seiner streng wissenschaftlichen Haltung unterschätzt der Verfasser unseres 
Erachtens ebensosehr den sozialen als den evolutiven Faktor, der dem Gewissen - auch wenn man von dem 
Inhalt und objektiven Wert seiner sog. „Aussagen“ absieht - zukommt; er überschätzt ebendamit vielleicht 
auch die Konstanz und die Eindeutigkeit seiner geschichtlichen Erscheinung und würdigt jene Gruppe von 
moralischen Gefühls - und Wertblinden nicht genügend, denen das Gewissen wirklich und ernsthaft 
vollständig zu fehlen scheint.” 
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this definition can give us the conscience in its peculiar and unique 
character.217 
 For Heidegger, conscience remains a groundless object at the conclusion of Stoker’s study 
despite its many merits precisely because the author equates “objective reality” with “truth” 
that can be obtained by simply “looking to what is offered in the phenomenon itself.”218 
The assumption that the essence of conscience can be extracted through some “pure” mode 
of observation and description only perpetuates the historical neglect of the question of 
Being that Heidegger wishes to correct.  
Stoker’s “Quasi-Surgical” Investigation of Conscience 
Despite his reservations regarding Das Gewissen, Heidegger relies heavily on the 
groundwork accomplished by Stoker in his investigation—benefiting from what the South 
African describes as the “quasi-surgical work” that must be done to “slice through the 
ambiguity and confusion” that has transformed conscience into a semantic “labyrinth” 
(Vieldeutigkeitslabyrinth).219 Unwittingly anticipating the importance of his study for 
Heidegger’s project, Stoker notes that it is only at the conclusion of this preliminary work 
that the “problem [of proposing an interpretation of the phenomenon of conscience can] 
even be advanced.”220 While Stoker’s objectives and methods for phenomenologically 
investigating conscience in Das Gewissen are certainly different from Heidegger’s in Being 
and Time, both thinkers approach conscience out of a common concern for the genuinely 
historical and both identify this phenomenon in their respective works as the “source” that 
provides the access required in order to raise fundamental philosophical questions 
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concerning existence itself. While Stoker believes that conscience can reveal how all 
human experience is necessarily shaped by moral understanding, Heidegger holds that 
conscience—understood as a “pre-moral” existential phenomenon—is the primordial 
“source” of disclosedness upon which all experience depends. Rather than rejecting 
conscience due to its ambiguity as a historical concept, both Stoker and Heidegger share 
the conviction that this great confusion betrays the fact that something vital about this 
phenomenon is being hidden from view. As Heidegger notes, “all this might only mislead 
us into dismissing this phenomenon if the very ‘doubtfulness’ of this fact—or of the way in 
which it has been interpreted—did not prove that here a primordial phenomenon of Dasein 
lies before us.”221 Heidegger’s words echo the sentiment expressed by Stoker who decries 
the way conscience has been commonly dismissed as an object of scientific study due to 
the ambiguity surrounding the concept. As Stoker writes:  
Conscience is neither a common nor superficial phenomenon. Rather, it 
touches the deepest core of our person… It is not a vague, incomprehensible, 
unperceived or mystical experience, but rather a concrete, individual, 
intense, strong and clear phenomenon that presents itself to us.222 
Stoker’s phenomenological project is specifically motivated by his desire to salvage the 
experience of conscience from the ambiguity that has resulted from its misunderstanding—
especially in its forms of the “guilty” or regretful conscience—by philosophical and 
theological theorists promoting speculative doctrines.  
For Stoker, the key to achieving semantic clarity is to constantly keep in mind that 
“the ‘essence,’ the ‘shape,’ the ‘complex unity,’ the ‘structural unity’” of the phenomenon 
must “be examined as a ‘whole’ (als „Ganzheit“ untersucht werden müssen).”223 In this 
regard, Stoker claims his study is aligned with the work done by a wide range of 
progressive psychological and phenomenological researchers, among whom he names 
                                                 
221
 SZ §54, 268 / 313. 
222
 Stoker. Das Gewissen. pp. 1-2. In German: “Es ist kein alltägliches Phänomen, kein oberflächliches, es 
berührt den tiefsten Kern unserer Person... Es ist kein vages, unbemerkbares oder mystisch unfaßbares 
Erlebnis, nein, konkret, individuell, persönlich, intensiv, kräftig und deutlich regt sich dieses Phänomen in 
uns.” 
223
 Ibid. p. 2. 
 76 
 
 
Wertheiners, Kohler, Koffka, Freud, McDougall, Scheler, Buytendijcks and Pfänder.224 By 
keeping the focus on conscience as a “whole” phenomenon, Stoker confidently believes 
that the historical deterioration of the concept can be reversed. At any event, he rejects the 
argument that conscience should be eliminated from scientific discourse because its 
signification has become too ambiguous or complex; if the phenomenon’s meaning has 
become unclear due to the accumulation of misconceived theories, Stoker demands that 
science correct this travesty rather than turn away from the problem, especially given the 
urgent need in war-ravaged Europe for improved ways of treating the “conscience-plagued 
(Gewissensgeplagten)” who suffer from “overwhelming” if “enigmatic” mental anguish 
and pain.225  
In taking up Stoker’s study, Heidegger commits himself to employing the same 
initial strategy as that proposed by the South African scholar when it comes to conscience: 
the solution to this enigma requires a demonstration of how this phenomenon can be 
experienced in its “wholeness.” To achieve this objective, the ambiguity caused by 
theoretical manipulation and linguistic abuse must be revealed and “cut away” so as to 
obtain a proper understanding of the phenomenon. While he critiques Stoker’s naïveté in 
assuming that the “personal experience” of moral conscience can provide direct access to 
the phenomenon, Heidegger nonetheless adopts a similar strategy as he seeks the attestation 
of Dasein’s authentic wholeness: both Heidegger and Stoker share the conviction that the 
“core” of conscience can be accessed by retrieving the experience of the “whole” 
phenomenon. Common to both their approaches is the belief that a properly 
“phenomenological” study can expose the confused and contradictory notions of 
conscience that abound both in “everyday” language and in the vocabularies of various 
theoretical domains; once this task is accomplished, the revealed “wholeness” of 
conscience will become accessible to study.  
As Heidegger makes clear in his brief remarks on Stoker’s work, he considers this 
phenomenological task to be much more complex and radically “existential” than what 
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Stoker proposes in Das Gewissen’s investigation of “moral conscience.” Heidegger 
contends that Stoker—by leaving fundamentally unquestioned the validity of “direct” 
experience—simply takes up Scheler’s theories concerning ethical values and then 
investigates conscience on this basis. Heidegger thus believes that Stoker remains trapped 
in the ontological tradition, even if his rigorous study indeed surpasses all previous 
attempts to interpret conscience “theoretically” or “thematically.” In pursuing the 
“wholeness” of conscience, Heidegger seeks primarily to find evidence for the “possibility” 
of existence rather than a confirmation of the characteristics of conscience as an essentially 
moral experience. Through a proper interpretation of conscience’s “overwhelming” and 
“inescapable” nature, Heidegger sees a way to build on Stoker’s initial insights in order to 
show how Dasein can be retrieved from its dispersal in material concerns and grasped as an 
authentic whole. This possibility of retrieving the “whole” of Dasein promises to ground 
the ontological project by establishing the experience of conscience as the phenomenon that 
provides access to—and the necessary attestation of—the existential structures of Being-in-
the-world. In Heidegger’s recuperation of the phenomenological investigation initiated by 
Stoker, the fundamental role of conscience for the existential analysis of Dasein in Being 
and Time is confirmed: Heidegger’s methodology turns on the recovery of conscience as a 
“whole” phenomenon. 
Stoker’s “Preparatory” Review of Conscience Theories: Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche 
Although factually correct, Heidegger’s remark that Stoker’s review of “the history 
of the concept of conscience…is not complete” downplays the dependence of Being and 
Time on the extensive research contained in Das Gewissen, especially since the former does 
not propose any “further literature” that could fill the identified void.226 As it stands, 
Heidegger’s single footnote to §55 is all that is provided in Being and Time in terms of 
explicit references related to the development of his existential “call of conscience.” Even 
in this footnote, the remarks are limited to the recognition of Stoker’s “notable progress” 
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and the list of the names of seven other thinkers: Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, 
Kähler, Ritschl and Scheler.227 As we will see, Heidegger clears the way for his own 
phenomenological interpretation of conscience by subjecting the theories of all these 
philosophers to “destruction” in order to show how they “miss the phenomenon [of genuine 
conscience] and…conceal it.”228 For Heidegger, these concepts stand together as classic 
examples of “anthropological, psychological, and theological theories of 
conscience…based upon” the “everyday understanding of conscience.”229 The only partial 
exception to Heidegger’s proscription of other studies of conscience is Stoker’s “wide-
ranging investigation,” an investigation that serves as the basis for Heidegger’s own 
destruction of “ordinary conscience.” That being said, Heidegger minimizes the importance 
of the “many points of agreement” he shares with Stoker and arrives at the conclusion that 
the South African’s description of conscience represents yet another manifestation of the 
“ordinary” understanding of the phenomenon that is criticized in Being and Time.230  
Given that Stoker himself adopts a “destructive” approach in undertaking his 
historical analysis of conscience, he is arguably subjected in Being and Time to poetic 
justice following the Christian proverb: “Live by the sword, die by the sword.”231 In Das 
Gewissen, Stoker condemns the conscience theories that developed in philosophy and 
sapped the “rich and originally emotional color and vibrancy (ursprünglich emotionelle 
Färbung und Vibration) of the phenomenon” of conscience in order to “one-sidedly 
emphasize the knowledge-aspect (Wissensaspekt).”232 While Stoker shows how the 
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phenomenon of conscience was subjected to the speculation of ancient Greek philosophers 
and later appropriated by early Christians, he considers the Scholastic period to be the most 
significant historical period for the emergence of modern theories concerning conscience 
and consciousness. For Stoker, the medieval era marks the moment when divine synteresis 
was fatefully related to moral knowledge and ultimately subordinated to human 
conscientia. In analyzing the conscience experience, the Scholastics came to distinguish 
God’s spirit from the human mind and grasped these two concepts as objects that they 
associated with synteresis and conscientia, respectively. In Stoker’s estimation, this 
analytical approach tragically obscured the fundamental experience of conscience itself. By 
splitting the “whole” emotional experience of conscience into separate entities, 
Scholasticism led to philosophy’s prioritizing of the self’s “moral consciousness” over the 
divine source of this experience, resulting in the “intellectualized” corruption of the 
original phenomenon. For Stoker, the legacy of this “perversion” of conscience is seen in 
the multiplicity and ambiguity of ethical systems and theories that have been proposed 
since the Middle Ages, most particularly in the modern era.  
While the South African may be slightly less disparaging of previous theories of 
conscience than Heidegger, all of the philosophical sources mentioned in the footnote to 
§55 of Being and Time are also criticized by Stoker in Das Gewissen for having contributed 
to the deterioration of a proper understanding of the “true” experience of conscience. As 
Stoker writes:  
If we open up the works of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche to see 
what each of these thinkers mean by conscience, then we immediately 
realize two things: a) we are dealing with a system, and b) in this system, 
conscience is assigned a specific position within the whole structure of 
system. It is not conscience but the system that is primary. Through the 
tyranny of the system, the fact of conscience is subjugated by the ideological 
schema. The conscience does indeed still have a very important and central 
place in this edifice, but it now appears to us in a totally new, unfamiliar, 
completely artificial and unnatural costume. Instinctively, one wonders if 
these thinkers really intend to describe conscience; the impression cannot be 
suppressed that conscience seems to defy their systems. The full, concrete 
reality of conscience that is such a vibrant, powerful and profound 
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experience finds itself somehow stunted and crippled when it is tied down 
by the one-sided, unnatural, mechanized and inauthentic system.233   
In his detailed analyses of these and other philosophical systems, Stoker points out how the 
phenomenon of authentic conscience can nevertheless be detected underneath the 
dominating theoretical structures. Approaching these theories in a fashion similar to that 
later advocated by Heidegger, Stoker seeks to reveal how the “true” experience of 
conscience is necessary as the a priori basis of all such theoretical interpretations regarding 
the nature of morality, even if this basis goes unacknowledged. For example, Stoker decries 
how Kant diminishes his own “inspired, visionary and concrete” understanding of 
conscience as the inescapable and “terrible voice” in order to prioritize the “sharply 
analytic, critical-theoretical” concept of the categorical imperative.234 Making the same 
point that Heidegger repeats in Being and Time, Stoker disapproves of Kant’s assigning 
conscience the task of presiding over the moral “court” in each person’s soul and passing 
judgment on specific acts.  
Similarly, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Hegel are scolded by Stoker for failing to 
preserve the priority of the conscience experience as the fundamental means of moral 
orientation. In Stoker’s mind, Schopenhauer remains blinded by “strict determinism” in 
describing conscience as accumulated self-knowledge that gradually increases with one’s 
experience of life and serves to restrain the destructive will.235 Here again we see Stoker 
providing Heidegger with material that the latter will utilize in his interpretation of 
conscience in Being and Time. For example, Heidegger glosses two quotes from 
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Schopenhauer’s On the Basis of Morality that are already highlighted by Stoker in Das 
Gewissen: 1) the description of conscience as a “register of deeds” that determines one’s 
“moral” essence236 and 2) the satirical “recipe” of conscience that Schopenhauer proposes 
in criticizing the popular understanding of the phenomenon.237 On numerous occasions in 
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 Ibid. p. 35. Stoker critically refers to the following remarks by Schopenhauer: “Therefore how could guilt 
and merit lie anywhere else than in what we are? Conscience is the acquaintance with ourselves which 
becomes ever more complete; it is the register of deeds that becomes more and more filled up.” Arthur 
Schopenhauer. On the Basis of Morality. trans. E. F. J. Payne. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). §20, p. 
196. In German: “Wie sollte also nicht in dem, was wir find, Schuld und Verdienst liegen? – Die immer 
vollständiger werdende Bekanntschaft mit uns selbst, das immer mehr sich füllende Protokoll der Thaten ist 
das Gewissen.” Arthur Schopenhauer. "Der Grundlage der Moral." Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik: 
behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften. (Frankfurt am Main: Johannes Christian Hermannsche 
Buchhandlung, 1840, 1841). §20, p. 260. In §59 of Being and Time, Heidegger refers repeatedly to the error 
of the “ordinary understanding” of conscience in terms of “debt” or as something that can be “managed and 
reckoned up,” “balanced off in an orderly manner,” made “available and calculable” and “subsumed under 
the idea of a business procedure that can be regulated.” SZ §55, 289, 293-294 / 336, 340. 
237
 Stoker. Das Gewissen. p. 36. Stoker quotes in full Schopenhauer’s “recipe” and also includes his quip 
about “the Englishman” alluded to by Heidegger in Being and Time: “Many a man would be astonished if he 
saw how his conscience, which seems to him such an imposing affair, is really made up. It probably consists 
of one-fifth fear of men, one-fifth fear of the gods, one-fifth prejudice, one-fifth vanity, and one-fifth habit; so 
that he is essentially no better than the Englishman who said quite frankly, ‘I cannot afford to keep a 
conscience.’” Schopenhauer. On the Basis of Morality. §13, p. 127. In German: “Mancher würde sich 
wundern, wenn er sähe, woraus sein Gewissen, das ihm ganz stattlich vorkommt, eigentlich zusammengesetzt 
ist: etwa aus einem Fünftel Menschenfurcht, einem Fünftel Deisidämonie, einem Fünftel Vorurteil, einem 
Fünftel Eitelkeit und einem Fünftel Gewohnheit: so daß er im Grunde nicht besser ist als jener Engländer, der 
geradezu sagte: I cannot afford to keep a conscience (ein Gewissen zu halten ist für mich zu kostspielig).” 
Schopenhauer. "Der Grundlage der Moral." §13, p. 196. The “Englishman” in question is the British cleric 
and philosopher William Paley, 1743-1805, an influential proponent of utilitarianism and author of the 
widely-read Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785). In the midst of the “subscription 
controversy” of 1772 in England, Paley—who taught philosophy at Christ’s College (University of 
Cambridge) before becoming Archdeacon of Carlisle—reportedly responded “I cannot afford to keep a 
conscience” when asked to sign the “Feathers Tavern” petition to the British Parliament calling for the 
relaxation of the terms of subscription to the state’s “39 Articles of Religion,” this despite having 
anonymously published a tract favoring increased religious freedom. D. S. Wayland. "Biographical Sketch of 
William Paley." The Works of William Paley, D.D. vol. 1. (London: George Cowie and Co., 1837). pp. xi-xii. 
In the section of Schopenhauer’s essay conveying his “Skeptical View” of ethics, the German philosopher 
also scathingly observes that physical property is the “central point in human life on which life’s energy and 
activity mainly turn.” Schopenhauer. On the Basis of Morality. p. 123. Near the beginning of §55 of Being 
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IV. XXV (1805). p. 511. 
 82 
 
 
Das Gewissen, Stoker also criticizes Nietzsche for privileging the development of a 
theoretical system over a properly phenomenological approach that respects the “true” 
experience of conscience. For Stoker, Nietzsche’s theory proposed in On the Genealogy of 
Morals that the guilty conscience arose as the evolutionary product of mankind’s fear of 
punishment fails to respect the original source of conscience and inverses the “actual” 
situation. Where Nietzsche sees moral conscience and fear of God as being imposed on the 
individual through the rise of civilization with its “cruel religious rites” and its “harsh 
criminal laws,”238 Stoker insists that conscience itself is the original experience through 
which the individual’s existence is disclosed by the “illuminating” light of God. For Stoker, 
this personal relationship between God and each individual provides the basic sense of 
direction for one’s involvement with others in the world. Stoker holds that the “revenge 
impulse” and the “experience of debt” emphasized by Nietzsche are secondary experiences 
that surface only after one has become involved in worldly affairs; in stark contrast to such 
“external” notions, the “primary experience of an evil conscience” is the internal 
recognition of evil that exists within the person.239 Compared to Stoker’s comments on the 
three philosophers mentioned above, his assessment of the Hegelian understanding of 
conscience is significantly less developed yet ultimately just as severe. Rather than 
rejecting Hegel’s approach to conscience outright, Stoker initially lauds the German idealist 
for comprehending that “the genuine conscience…is absolutely certain about its 
content.”240 Stoker then contrasts Hegel’s interpretation of conscience with what he 
considers the most vital element of the phenomenological concept of conscience: the 
absolute source of synteresis. According to Stoker, Hegel should have recognized the 
relation between his “absolute conscience” and the “spark” of God’s love: consciousness 
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can only arise out of the “painful” experience of fallible human judgment coming into 
contact with the divine “absolute.” In Hegel’s “absolute moment” that founds human 
consciousness, Stoker sees Hegel reifying the “point of contact” between existence and its 
divine source rather than according priority to the experiencing of this contact; for this 
reason, Stoker considers the Hegelian opus as a tragic example of how philosophical 
systems have denied the “objective truth” of conscience.241 As Stoker argues, even those 
theorists like Hegel and Kant who describe conscience in the most vivid terms and 
celebrate its philosophical importance fail to respect the legitimate priority of the 
phenomenon as they advance their respective doctrines. Using language similar to that 
found in Heidegger’s work, Stoker takes aim at all advocates of “pure” ideologies—
whether they be realists or idealists—and holds that the root phenomenon of conscience 
must be rediscovered by identifying the conditions necessary for its being experienced. For 
Stoker, only an appropriately phenomenological approach can recover the “truth” of 
conscience and subsequently allow for the development of a scientific understanding of 
morality.  
2.2. Synteresis as the Key to Stoker’s “Call-of-Duty” of Conscience 
Given their mutual conviction that the wholeness of conscience must be accessed, it 
is strange that Heidegger—who admits to sharing many “points of agreement” with his 
contemporary—leaves completely unsaid what Stoker determines to be the most basic and 
absolutely necessary element for the unity of conscience: the concept of synteresis, which 
Stoker calls the “unspoiled spark in man” and describes as the source of the “absolute 
moment” of conscience.242 Before proceeding with our study of how Stoker’s interpretation 
of synteresis may have influenced the development of Heidegger’s concept of conscience, 
let us first consider how Stoker presents synteresis in Das Gewissen. At numerous points in 
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his work, Stoker makes explicit that he believes the phenomenon of conscience finds its 
origin in synteresis and not in conscientia, as has been widely claimed in both the 
theological and philosophical traditions. This conviction explains to a large extent Stoker’s 
call for a “destructive” approach that must eliminate the accumulated layers of speculation 
about conscience in order to yield the true and “whole” phenomenon. Stoker most 
emphatically rejects the work of the Scholastics who find the essence of conscience in the 
“relative moment of conscientia” that applies the “law of God” to “specific cases” of moral 
choice: this promotion of human judgment above the divine “guardian” and “keeper” of 
each soul demonstrates, in Stoker’s view, that the authentic understanding of conscience 
has been lost.243 In resistance to this error, Stoker declares that synteresis “is ultimately the 
condition of conscientia [and] is much closer to being the experience of ‘genuine 
conscience’ than conscientia itself,” the latter characterized by what he calls its “heartless 
syllogistic applicatio.”244 Stoker reiterates and builds upon this statement in the concluding 
chapter of his study: 
[Synteresis] recognizes God’s law, drives us to good and holds us away from 
evil. It is the unspoiled spark in man, which remains in him even after his 
fall in Paradise… Synteresis is absolutely infallible; conscientia is fallible 
and relative. Yet [for in the Patristic and Scholastic doctrine] it is only this—
conscientia as act—that is for them conscience par excellence. Strange; 
because for us synteresis is infinitely closer to the true conscience than 
conscientia.245  
Stoker argues that the Scholastic intellectualization of conscience exemplifies the tendency 
of humankind to elevate the faculty of thinking above the fundamental “value-feeling” and 
the loving “impulse towards good” that is the “source” of existence found within the 
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soul.246 For Stoker, conscience properly understood is the experience of “seeing” existence 
illuminated by this inner light that marks each living soul as a creation of God. According 
to Stoker, all forms of theoretical understanding of conscience would corrupt this basic 
experience of dependence and lead to the devaluation of morality as the basis of existence. 
In this regard, it is not only Scholastic dogma that has failed to respect the authority of 
synteresis: Stoker contends that virtually all historical concepts of conscience fail to respect 
the experience of the phenomenon because they prioritize the rational aspect of morality 
over divine law.  
By Stoker’s account, his phenomenologically obtained proof of God’s authority 
differs from moral theorizing because each individual must constantly renew the basis of 
this experience by heeding the “call-of-duty (Pflichtruf)” of conscience.247 While God’s 
authority may be absolute, the individual’s personal relationship with God that is 
experienced through conscience must be constantly actualized by heeding the “call-of-
duty” and carefully preserving the “wholeness” of this phenomenon:   
If man were absolutely good, then there would be no such requirement [to 
examine oneself and seek to refine one’s sensitivity to the evil within 
oneself]. But since he is also evil, since he is what he should not be, here 
man is called to face a demand, an objectively established duty, that he 
lovingly surrender to the cleansing of his heart and character. Of course, it is 
conscience from which all duties arise and that transcends any duty, so 
conscience-constancy remains the absolute limit for all objective calls-to-
duty. There is no conscience-duty, but only a duty of conscience-constancy; 
obeying this call-of-duty (Pflichtruf) out of love (and not out of a sense of 
obligation) is the highest moral act of self-education in man.248 
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Contesting the traditional notion that conscience is a psychological faculty, Stoker 
considers that his analysis of the experience of conscience has produced phenomenological 
proof that all existence is disclosed by the light of “God’s spark” and necessarily imbued 
with moral principles. Much like Heidegger with his existential interpretation of 
conscience, Stoker emphasizes the individual’s responsibility to respond to the “call-of-
duty” as the unique way of caring for the “wholeness” and “inner purity” of his or her soul, 
notwithstanding the fact that the South African’s work lacks the ontological orientation of 
Being and Time. Stoker shares Heidegger’s conviction that “objective knowledge” spawned 
through theoretical detachment represents a dangerous illusion that inhibits one’s ability to 
“see every time anew”; in Stoker’s mind, the “intuitive insight” of the “true conscience” is 
superior to such knowledge because the former has “the advantage that it is alive, real, 
concrete and direct.”249  
Stoker’s Analogy of the “Intersecting” Perspectives 
 In the concluding chapter of Das Gewissen, Stoker provides a religious analogy to 
advance his argument that the traditional view of conscience misses the “whole” 
phenomenon because the dependence of existence on the light of synteresis has been 
neglected. Stoker holds that the primordial intentionality of experiencing one’s relationship 
with God—the interactive event that reveals all moral principles—cannot be reduced to a 
simple act of judgment in conscientia. To demonstrate this, Stoker describes how a church 
located on a mountainside can be seen from two different perspectives. “From below,” the 
church tower seems to point toward the mountain’s peak, toward the sky, “up toward 
God”—according to Stoker, this is the perspective of the believer who understands that 
God must be obeyed and worshipped.250 However, there is also the perspective “from 
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above”: a person perched at the mountain’s summit sees the church on the slope below 
“against the background of a small town at the foot of the mountain” and understands that 
“the church is there to lead people to God” who will judge them.251 According to Stoker’s 
interpretation of this analogy, the true phenomenon of conscience is the “intersection” of 
these two perspectives: it is the “between” where “‘from below’ and ‘from above’” co-
exist.252 Interpreting the meaning of his analogy, Stoker describes the phenomenon of 
conscience as follows: 
It is the meeting place between God and man, like the church is, but in 
conscience it is where guilt-ridden man faces God. It is the experience of 
divine revelation in contact with God. Conscience reveals God as both just, 
merciful and gracious in judging the faults of man (as seen from below) and 
as the rescuer, custodian and Aegis of man through God’s fatherly love and 
concern (as seen from above). Medieval philosophy approached conscience 
not from the “lower” but only from the “top” position, on the basis of their 
religious attitudes and dogmas...253 
Stoker sees the philosophical tradition transforming conscience into a superior faculty of 
human judgment and forgetting the necessity of a protecting God; by Stoker’s account, the 
validity of any act of judgment depends upon a source of divine guidance that can orient 
conscience. For Stoker, the phenomenon of conscience proves that the soul of each person 
is illuminated by the absolutely infallible light of God. Indeed, this light is what reveals that 
                                                                                                                                                     
Beispiel: Wenn ich unten an einem Berg stehe und gegen den Hang des Berges eine Kirche sehe, dann zeigt 
der Kirchturm sowie der ganze Berg immer höher, nach oben, nach Gott: die Kirche ist da, um Gott zu 
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Hang des Berges unter mir, auf dem Hintergrunde eines Städtchens am Fuße des Berges, dann sagt das Bild 
mir: die Kirche ist da des Menschen wegen, um die Menschen zu Gott zu führen. So auch stellt das Wesen 
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warnen. Im Gewissen schneiden sich die beiden Blickrichtungen „von oben nach unten“ und „von unten nach 
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sowie die Rettung, Verwahrung und Behütung des Menschen durch Gottes väterliche Liebe und Sorge (von 
oben gesehen). Die mittelalterliche Philosophie ging nicht von dem „unteren“, sondern von dem „oberen“ 
Standpunkte aus auf Grund ihrer religiösen Einstellungen und Dogmen...”  
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all human knowledge is relative and uncertain, tainted by the inconstancy of conscientia. 
The divine spirit within the “breast of each man” exposes one to the guilt of having failed 
to respect God’s law in the pursuit of worldly interests. In this sense, the pain of conscience 
is both a punishment for having failed to preserve one’s purity and a loving personal 
reminder from the Creator that one’s “wholeness” can be recovered: the experienced pain 
can serve as a positive “warning” to stop “falling” and to seek salvation.254 
Stoker on the Synteresisfrage: Saint Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel’s Vision 
While Heidegger himself notes that his study of conscience has much in common 
with Stoker’s investigation, the South African’s  emphasis on synteresis is one of the 
strongest examples of how the theological emphasis of Das Gewissen is incompatible with 
the existential interpretation proposed in Being and Time. Before elaborating on the 
specific differences between their approaches, however, let us first examine how Stoker 
comes to regard the concept of synteresis as the key to understanding the phenomenon of 
conscience in a quite different manner than that seen in the philosophical or theological 
traditions. Indeed, what is most significant to our study is that Stoker introduces synteresis 
specifically in the process of conducting his “destructive” historical review of the ways in 
which conscience has been understood. In this sense, his attempt to recover the authentic 
phenomenon behind the term of synteresis is remarkably similar to Heidegger’s method of 
phenomenological investigation in Being and Time. Notably, Stoker does not open his 
historical review with the traditional notion of conscience at all but rather with the 
neglected concept of synteresis. Indeed, Stoker’s first objective is to expose tradition’s 
fundamental error of having privileged conscientia to the detriment of synteresis. After 
analyzing how theoretical approaches led to the contamination of conscience, Stoker 
concludes that the “true” experience of conscience depends primarily on synteresis and that 
any proper study of morality must begin by acknowledging the existential priority of each 
soul’s contact with the spirit of God.   
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As has been the case with virtually all terms used to convey the phenomenon of 
conscience, the meaning and origin of the Latin word “synteresis” has proven to be a 
source of great controversy. During the period of the 19th and early 20th centuries alone, 
dozens of theological and philological studies were devoted to the debate regarding how 
the word “synteresis” emerged in the Middle Ages as the central concept that served to 
orient all Scholastic discourse concerning conscience. While many matters related to this 
debate remain unsettled, the majority of scholars concur that the first appearance of the 
term is found in the manuscripts of Saint Jerome’s commentary on the vision of Ezekiel in 
the Old Testament.255 In this commentary, Saint Jerome criticizes those who—under the 
influence of Greek philosophy—seek to understand Ezekiel’s vision according to the model 
of Plato’s tripartite soul. Jerome writes: 
Most people interpret the man, the lion and the ox as the rational, emotional 
and appetitive parts of the soul, following Plato’s division, who calls them 
the logikon and thumikon and epithumetikon, locating reason in the brain, 
emotion in the gall-bladder and appetite in the liver. And they posit a fourth 
part which is above and beyond these three, and which the Greeks call 
sunteresin (συντήρησιν): that spark of conscience which was not even 
extinguished in the breast of Cain after he was turned out of Paradise, and by 
which we discern that we sin, when we are overcome by pleasures or frenzy 
and meanwhile are misled by an imitation of reason. They reckon that this is, 
strictly speaking, the eagle, which is not mixed up with the other three, but 
corrects them when they go wrong, and of which we read in Scripture as the 
spirit ‘which intercedes for us with ineffable groaning’ (Romans 8:26). ‘For 
no one knows what a man is really like, except the spirit which is in him’ (I 
Corinthians 2:11). And, writing to the Thessalonians, Paul also entreats for it 
to be kept sound together with soul and body (I Thessalonians 5:23). 
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However, we also see that this conscience is cast down in some people, who 
have neither shame nor insight regarding their offences, and loses its place, 
as is written in the book of Proverbs: ‘When the wicked man reaches the 
depths of sin, he doesn’t care a damn.’ (Proverbs 18:3). So they deserve to 
be told: ‘You have acquired the face of a prostitute, you refuse to blush’ 
(Jeremiah 3:3).256 
Although “συντήρησιν (sunteresin)” is what appears in the preserved scribal manuscript of 
this text, there has been considerable debate as to whether Saint Jerome actually used this 
unusual word when he wrote his commentary or whether “sunteresin” is actually a 
transcription error that should have read “συνείδησις (suneidesis).” Most theologians hold 
the belief that Saint Jerome actually used the word “suneidesis”—the original Greek word 
for conscience—and that this word was mistakenly copied as “sunteresin” by an 
anonymous scribe.257  
The hypothesis that “sunteresin” should read “suneidesis” was greatly advanced at 
the close of the close of the 19th century by the theologian Friedrich Nitzsch. In 1898 and 
1899, he published two influential articles in the Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte arguing 
that Saint Jerome did not write “sunteresin” and documenting how a number of early 
Church manuscripts (notably the 4th or 5th century Codex Veronensis and the 8th or 9th 
century Codex Laurensis) contained a wide variety of spellings of the Greek “suneidesis” 
due to transcription errors.258 The French theologian De Blic followed up with a study of 
more than 20 additional manuscripts he found to be consistent with Nitzsch’s study and that 
he claimed as proof of “the incontestable correctness of the suneidesis reading (les droits 
incontestables de la leçon suneidesis).”259  
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However, this hypothesis of a transcription error is opposed by many others, most 
notably Josef Hebing who in 1922 contributed a major article to the Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch on the historical evolution of the meaning of conscientia.260 Researchers in this 
opposing camp insist that Saint Jerome did write the word “sunteresin,” a word springing 
from the Greek verb “συντηρέω (suntereo)” meaning “to preserve, guard, protect” someone 
or something from perishing or being lost.261 While there are very few appearances of the 
verb “suntereo” in the New Testament, these do arguably support the case that this 
meaning of “preserving” fits with the interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision reported by Saint 
Jerome. For example, the verb appears in the Gospel of Luke when Mary hears the reports 
of the shepherds who were visited by the Angel of God and informed that a Savior had 
been born. Using the word “συνετήρει (sunterei),” Luke 2:18-19 describes Mary as having 
received this divine message differently than all the others who heard it.  
18 kai pantes oi akousantes ethaumasan peri ton lalethenton hupo ton 
poimenon pros autous. 19 he de Mariam panta suneterei ta remata tauta 
sumballousa en te kardia autos.262   
18 And all that heard, wondered; and at those things that were told them by 
the shepherds. 19 But Mary kept all these words, pondering them in her 
heart.263 
Two other usages of the verb in the New Testament (Matthew 9:17, Luke 5:38) relate to 
Christ’s analogy of preserving “new wine in new bottles,” conveying the message that 
God’s word must be properly received through the experience of personal renewal and 
preserved in “pure faith.”264 While these references do not relate the verb “suntereo” to any 
notion of moral oversight by God, Hebing and many others—including Stoker—contend 
that this sense of preservation and protection is precisely what Saint Jerome meant when he 
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reported that Ezekiel’s eagle had been interpreted by some as the symbol for what appears 
in the text as “sunteresin.”  
This attempt at proving that Saint Jerome was personally responsible for the 
emergence of synteresis as a central term for the concept of conscience has been 
vehemently condemned by those sharing Nitzsch’s position. Consider the later assessment 
of the Irish theologian M. B. Crowe with regard to the “sharp controversy…mainly in 
Germany” concerning synteresis: “[In] quite recent years…the study of the manuscript 
tradition of Jerome’s Commentary finally demolished the case for the authenticity of 
synderesis [which was] already seriously undermined.”265 For one, the backers of Nitzsch’s 
position observe that the word never emerged in any of the numerous texts on conscience 
written in the centuries preceding its Scholastic “resurrection” in the late 12th century and 
early 13th century.266 Despite the great importance of conscience for many thinkers 
including Saint Augustine and the writers of the school of Anselme de Laon who wrote 
during the span of more than six centuries between Saint Jerome’s death and the 
“reappearance” of synteresis, the term does not appear a single time in any extant texts 
from this period. Whenever the idea of God’s spirit within each person is discussed in these 
texts, we find the Latin expression “scintilla conscientiae” used instead. 
In addition to the argument that little textual evidence exists to confirm that Saint 
Jerome meant to introduce the new conscience term of synteresis, several theological 
commentators also express doubt that he would have even been able to invent such a 
notion. For example, Kries contends that Saint Jerome’s comment regarding those who 
“follow Plato” is an attack directed at Origen and his attempt to interpret the Bible through 
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the prism of Greek philosophy.267 While Jerome intended to criticize those who interpreted 
Ezekiel’s eagle using Platonic notions, the ultimate legacy of his commentary is that it 
actually perpetuated Origen’s interpretation and led to the adoption of synteresis by the 
Scholastics. As Kries reports:  
[In] a blunder of remarkable proportions, the fact that in this passage Jerome 
was reporting not his own view but that of those who follow the “foolish 
wisdom of the philosophers” was overlooked, presumably because the 
passage from Jerome had been incorporated into the glossae without the 
warning that preceded it in the original Commentary. The masters were thus 
left with the mistaken impression that the interpretation recorded by Jerome 
was held by Jerome himself, and he was now frequently enlisted in support 
of the very teaching that he had criticized. It is no small irony that Jerome, a 
great and sometimes vehement critic of Origen, passed on to the medieval 
period an account of his adversary’s theory of conscience under the authority 
of his own illustrious name.268 
For his part, De Blic rejects the hypothesis that Saint Jerome could have intended to 
introduce a new concept of conscience because early Christianity was unconcerned by the 
psychological questions that led to the later emergence of synteresis as the necessary 
complement to conscientia in the Middle Ages.269 De Blic criticizes Hebing for wasting “a 
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 The passage where Origen comments upon the “four faces” in Ezekiel’s vision is found in §16 of his First 
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considerable amount of erudition to bring out the role played by the idea of conservatio 
(equivalent to sunteresis) in the morality of antiquity” in order to prove that Saint Jerome 
was responsible for introducing the notion of synteresis.270  
According to Hebing, the word sunteresis responds very well to the function 
symbolized by the eagle: to preserve, like a dependable guide, the 
equilibrium of the other faculties. But this interpretation too readily glosses 
over the fact that these notions were incompatible in Jerome’s cultural 
milieu; the term is nothing more than an erroneous and random variation, 
due to the negligence of a scribe.271  
Praising De Blic’s evidence as conclusive, Åke Petzäll proclaims:  
Saint Jerome didn’t introduce a new and dubious term when he spoke of the 
eagle. He was too good a linguist and too little a philosopher to have done 
so !272 
Important for our study of Heideggerian conscience is the fact that Stoker sides with 
Hebing and challenges this general consensus that emerged as a result of the theologian 
Nitzsch’s groundbreaking study. For Stoker, it is unlikely that synteresis is the product of 
scribal “inadvertence” and he refuses to consider the word as a mere “synonym” for 
“suneidesis.” Rejecting Nitzsch’s theory that the “metamorphosis of the word [is] a bit too 
forced” and “artificial,” Stoker argues that “what makes more sense is the view of 
those…who see συντήρησις (sunteresis) going back to [the verb] συντηρεῖν (sunterein, for 
watching, preserving).”273 While he concedes that it is difficult to explain how Saint 
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Jerome came to use the word “sunteresin,” Stoker contends that the burden of proof lies 
with those who wish to deny the Doctor’s authority and not vice versa. Since the “internal 
evidence shows that the common conscience has nothing to do with an eagle,” Stoker holds 
that Nitzsch and his camp have failed to produce the proof required to validate their 
claim.274 Furthermore, Stoker insists that the few appearances of the term in the Gospels—
“which were of course well known to Jerome”—fit perfectly with the Doctor’s discussion 
of the term; for Stoker, it is the commentary of Saint Jerome that presents us with the 
“synteresis as conscience; precisely as the guardian, the protector of the divine laws within 
us, which are symbolized by the eagle.”275  
Beyond the “internal” or semantic justification for the use of “sunteresin” by 
Jerome, Stoker believes that the philological dispute over how the term first appeared in the 
scribal manuscripts of the Doctor’s commentary is of minor importance compared to the 
phenomenological significance of the word. Despite the fact that “we do not know exactly 
how the word synteresis originated…[and] received its moral character,” the term 
communicates an essential distinction between an individual’s intellectual judgment and 
the “spark of conscience, the spirit that remained in man even after Adam left Paradise.”276 
As Stoker emphasizes, the lesson found in Jerome’s text is that synteresis “[stands] above 
                                                                                                                                                     
lassen, welches Wort schon in der häufigeren Wurzel und Grundform des τηρεῖν, τηριτικός bei den 
klassischen griechischen Schriftstellern zu finden ist, in der doppelten Bedeutung: a) des genauen 
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the [mental, appetitive and emotional] faculties [of humans], not mixing with them but 
correcting their mistakes” and allowing for the “perception that we sin.”277  
While not unconcerned with the question of Saint Jerome’s authority, Stoker 
nonetheless insists that it is the Scholastic period—and not when the term was first 
recorded—that represents the vital historical moment for explaining how Western 
civilization lost touch with the genuine experience of conscience. Indeed, Stoker regards 
the unparalleled concern demonstrated by early Christians for the purity of their faith as the 
strongest evidence that the authentic phenomenon has been lost; his study seeks to strip 
away the misguided theoretical approaches to conscience specifically in order to recover 
this fundamental experience of the “call” to self-preservation through “pure faith” that all 
morality depends upon. Stoker contends that when the word synteresis was adopted in 
medieval times, the Schoolmen were not primarily concerned with the experience of faith 
but had instead become obsessed with a philosophical puzzle: how to fit the knowledge of 
God’s laws within the system of “Aristotelian psychology.” After centuries of neglect, the 
concept of synteresis “reemerged” in the Middle Ages only to find itself subjected to a 
debate regarding its “function” within the “practical intellect” and its relation to 
conscientia.278  
Stoker’s Review of Synteresis and Conscientia in the Scholastic Period 
Despite the potential value of such an exercise, we will not here analyze Stoker’s 
brief review of the evolution of what he calls the “Synteresisfrage” during the Scholastic 
period.279 This for two reasons: for one, Stoker’s review is superficial compared to several 
much more complete theological studies of this question conducted before and after, most 
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notably the major work of Odom Lottin who documented and analyzed in great detail the 
evolution of both conscientia and synteresis in hundreds of preserved manuscripts from the 
12th and 13th centuries.280 As Heidegger’s footnote to §55 in Being and Time suggests, the 
reader seeking a “complete” review of what has been written on moral conscience 
throughout history will not be satisfied with Stoker’s study alone. Secondly, our study of 
Stoker’s influence on the Heideggerian concept of conscience is informed less by how 
Stoker viewed each of the medieval texts that he discussed than by how the South African’s 
specifically phenomenological approach to conscience resulted in his own innovative 
interpretation of synteresis. 
The major conviction that Stoker shares with virtually all 19th and 20th century 
commentators of the medieval recovery of synteresis is that, regardless of what the “true” 
origin of the word might be, the concept is vital to any understanding of how the 
Scholastics came to interpret conscience. While scholars such as De Blic, Petzäll and Kries 
may reject Stoker’s claim that synteresis “is and remains a patristic heirloom (ein 
patristisches Erbstück),”281 they all recognize that the concept represented a major and 
unavoidable problem for medieval thinkers seeking a foundation for morality that could 
satisfy both Church doctrine and the philosophical “laws of reason.” The perceived urgency 
of this problem is revealed by the sheer volume of the debate over synteresis in the 12th 
and 13th centuries: the advocates of rationalism were determined to produce a satisfactory 
solution to the question of how to understand the presence and function of God’s spirit in 
the human soul. Analyzing Saint Jerome’s critique of Origen in the commentary on 
Ezekiel’s vision, Kries observes that the Origenist interpretation of conscience thus 
represented a difficult challenge for those attempting to develop the Church’s philosophical 
doctrine in the medieval period:  
Origen bequeathed to Christianity a sophisticated anthropology in which the 
Pauline conscience is elevated far beyond soul and achieves an extraordinary 
independence from soul, however Platonic and tripartite the latter may or 
may not be. It was with this Origenist notion of a conscience transcending 
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soul that the medieval Scholastics studied by Lottin would have to contend, 
and the medieval Aristotelians did not find it particularly easy to force 
Origen’s idea into their Peripatetic anthropology.282 
De Blic agrees with Kries on this point but emphasizes that the fate of synteresis in the 
medieval period was ultimately determined by the emphasis of the Schoolmen on the 
rigorous definition of concepts, which prioritized intellectual precision over lived 
experience. The intellectualization of synteresis described by De Blic is what Stoker 
believes to be responsible for the loss of the authentic phenomenon of conscience and the 
debasing of the believer’s personal contact with God: 
In the end, from the point of view of philology and doctrinal history, the 
Scholastic notion of synteresis is an accident. But some accidents can be 
positive ones, at least in certain ways. And there is no doubt that by helping 
to distinguish fallible moral judgments from truly universal ones, the 
concept of synteresis contributed significantly to giving to Latin 
Scholasticism’s doctrine of conscience the rigor and precision that had been 
sought for in vain everywhere else.283   
Following De Blic, Petzäll concludes that:  
…synteresis owes its birth to a misadventure, but once created it was found 
to fit perfectly with a notion that was in search of a name. And this name 
arrived at just the right moment.284   
While Petzäll dismisses the arguments of those like Stoker who contend that synteresis was 
introduced by Saint Jerome, both scholars wholeheartedly agree that the sustained efforts of 
the Scholastics to fit synteresis into various doctrinal systems contributed to the 
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fragmentation of conscience and the loss of its “wholeness” as a concept, which is the 
primary problem that both Stoker and Heidegger’s investigations seek to remedy.285  
For Stoker, the medieval studies of conscience fail to respect the absolute 
superiority of synteresis that is conveyed by the two analogies found in Saint Jerome’s text: 
those of the eagle tasked with guarding one’s purity and of the illuminating spark placed 
within the soul by God. Despite the fact that they praise synteresis as the highest spiritual 
force known to mankind, the earliest commentators of the scintilla conscientiae such as 
Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus nevertheless conceptualize the divine spirit in a 
manner clearly intended to accommodate human reason. In their collective effort to grasp 
the relationship between mind and the spirit of God, the Scholastics argued over the 
psychological status of synteresis in a sustained “dispute as to whether synteresis is a 
‘habit,’ an ‘actus’ or a ‘potentia.’”286 For example, Alexander of Hales considered 
synteresis as “an enduring, steady, certain habit” and conscientia as a “‘potentia,’ which is 
changeable and fallible” while Albertus Magnus contended that synteresis is only a 
“potentia” urging towards good which requires the habit of “conscientia” in order for the 
urge to be completed.287 Noting his agreement with the theologian Friedrich Jodl, Stoker 
names Thomas Aquinas as Scholasticism’s “key authority” for the identification of 
synteresis with “practical reason as the manifestation of natural moral law.”288 For Stoker, 
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the result of all this “investigative hair-splitting” in the Middle Ages was that the absolute 
authority of synteresis became reduced to a mere syllogistic premise; conscience was 
formulaically understood as the end result of conscientia’s judgment regarding the 
application of the moral laws of synteresis to specific cases.289 By Stoker’s account, what 
phenomenologically reveals itself as the fundamental source of moral knowledge thus 
became transformed into an object of casuistry. As Stoker reports:  
By trying in its doctrine of conscience both to preserve the eternal, infallible, 
absolute moment and also to fully recognize the empirical, erring, relative 
moment, Scholasticism established a quite artificial conscience theory. It 
could not keep these two moments combined together, so they developed 
either in the direction of casuistry or of mysticism.290  
While Stoker concludes that the “objective reality of the phenomenon” of conscience was 
lost in the work of the Scholastics, he adds that neither conscientia nor synteresis “hits 
upon the true conscience, which arises after the ‘applicatio.’”291 For Stoker, conscience is 
the oppressive sensation of inner condemnation for acts already performed and the 
subsequent wanting to regain one’s moral purity: it arises out of the person’s contact with 
the absolute purity of synteresis. Stoker rules that the Scholastic heritage has cut Western 
civilization off from the experience of mankind’s contact with the absolute good of the 
divine. For Stoker, the “spark of conscience” was snuffed out by the rationalistic dissection 
of the phenomenon of conscience:  
With a host of ingenious concepts, they have given us a structure that is 
overly determined by concepts and conceptual terms and not determined 
enough by the objective reality of the phenomenon. The sharp conceptual 
thinking [of the Scholastics] splits, fragments and takes the life out of what it 
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analyzes, and so we receive from these thinkers not a description of the 
specific, real phenomenon but something mechanical, abstract, unreal.292 
Saving the Spark of Synteresis from Scholastic Casuistry 
What then is Stoker’s understanding of synteresis and how does it inform his 
phenomenological concept of conscience that was evidently influential for Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the existential call? By Stoker’s account, synteresis is the illuminating 
source within each person’s soul that allows for the recognition of evil in one’s thoughts 
and actions. Through his destructive review of the history of conscience theories and his 
analysis of conscience as it is experienced psychologically, Stoker establishes that the 
phenomenon of conscience—distinct from but dependent upon synteresis itself—is the 
subject’s experience of personal contact with this absolute light that exists “in the breast of 
each man”: conscience is the intense, inescapable pain of regret or inner condemnation 
when one’s thoughts or actions are exposed as evil by synteresis.  
The first and most essential aspect of Stoker’s interpretation of conscience is that 
the phenomenon arises only in response to past acts or thoughts. With its absolute 
knowledge of good, synteresis serves to protect and preserve the soul but does so 
indirectly: the actual experience of one’s relationship with this divine guardian within the 
soul is experienced uniquely as a result of sin. Conscience is essentially the experience of 
painful guilt for one’s having already failed to remain pure.  
By Stoker’s account, synteresis is not the only necessary element for conscience 
because the intensity and meaning of this contact with God’s spirit depends upon one’s 
willingness to accept its authority: one must obey the “call-of-duty” of conscience to 
genuinely experience one’s guilt as a sinner. While Stoker retrieves from the Scholastic 
debates the position stated in Saint Jerome’s commentary that the spark of synteresis is 
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impossible to extinguish, he fully recognizes the essentially relative and fallible nature of 
the individual’s “experiencing” of conscience. Unlike the absolute light of synteresis, the 
experience of conscience by the individual is dependent on the quality of his or her faith: 
any “knowledge” produced by one’s contact with this light can only be relative and fallible 
because it is distorted by the impurities of one’s faith. While the sinner cannot completely 
avoid this painful contact with synteresis, Stoker holds that the soul can become numb to 
this experience and—through the perversion of individual judgment—come to misrepresent 
the true significance of this pain. While such a person still feels the pain of conscience 
when synteresis exposes one’s past action or thought as evil, Stoker notes human judgment 
in its most depraved state can deny that this pain is related to one’s immoral conduct and 
instead seek to blame something or someone else for one’s “mental” anguish.  
Here we see the reason for Stoker’s strong insistence that psychological research 
must be given a greater role in the study of conscience: to advance moral understanding 
and promote good in the world, Stoker contends that objective psychological data must be 
produced to counterbalance theological and philosophical dogmas that have concealed the 
role of synteresis. For example, Stoker proposes that practitioners of clinical psychology 
should investigate the relationship between the mind and synteresis in order to harvest 
insights into pathologies. He holds that such “objective” approaches promise to reveal the 
principles necessary in order to reinforce moral behavior and to confirm the necessity of 
faith and submission to God’s authority. Given the incompatibility of such proposals with 
the existential project of Being and Time, and with objective science itself, it is clear why 
Heidegger derided Stoker’s “underestimation” of the ontological problem and criticized his 
blending together of theological and phenomenological notions.   
Conscience and the Development of Morality 
While Stoker regards the phenomenon of conscience as essentially related to past 
acts and thoughts, his interpretation of synteresis also reveals how conscience contributes 
to promoting moral good in the future. While conscience can only be perceived as painful 
remorse over what has already been done, this inescapable experience is universal to all of 
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mankind. Every person exists in a necessarily imperfect and fallen state due to the very 
nature of the human condition: in Stoker’s opinion, it is impossible for a person to be free 
of guilt and thus everyone experiences the pain of conscience. According to Stoker, this 
pain results from the friction of our soul’s impurities coming into contact with the pure 
spirit that God placed within us. Memory is essentially shaped by conscience: this lingering 
pain of essential guilt—which Stoker observes has been poetically described as the 
“murmuring” voice of conscience—reverberates in the mind and constantly calls each 
person to preserve the purity of his or her soul so as to keep the overwhelming pain of 
conscience from flaring up anew.  
As does Heidegger, Stoker vehemently rejects any notion that conscience would 
provide actual guidance with regard to specific moral questions encountered by an 
individual going about his or her activities in the world. The remembering that arises from 
the painful experience of conscience is not a source of information regarding how to make 
moral decisions but rather an unavoidable reminder of the authority of synteresis and of the 
consequences that follow moral error. Characterizing conscience in a way that Heidegger 
will replicate in Being and Time, Stoker asserts that no moral knowledge concerning future 
acts can be derived from the experience of conscience or obtained directly from God’s 
spark placed in the soul. All that can be learned from conscience is that the person must 
constantly submit oneself to the authority of synteresis by heeding God’s “call-of-duty.” 
Specific moral choices remain entirely the responsibility of the individual: Stoker makes it 
explicitly clear that one can neither “ask” God to choose on one’s behalf nor succeed in 
“willing” oneself free of conscience. The painful, overwhelming regret of recognizing 
one’s incompatibility with God’s pure love is inevitable. As Stoker writes:  
[The] voice is heard again and again and again, claiming the whole 
person…the will is definitely powerless against the conscience. … The 
power of the will is limited to the peripheral layers of experience, in that 
which lives on the surface of mental life. When the conscience intervenes, it 
 104 
 
 
suddenly bursts forth from the deepest layers of love, and against this love 
the will is powerless.293  
Concretely, the best that each person can do is to attempt to learn the painful lessons of 
conscience and to lovingly care for the purity of his or her faith. (Alternatively, Stoker 
advises that in moments of moral doubt one can also look to recognized “authorities,” such 
as the “highest of the religious people” who can “see more profoundly and objectively” 
when considering moral questions.294) What is clear to Stoker is that conscience itself 
issues no “command” regarding the execution of any specific action; it only offers a 
powerful reminder that we have failed to live according to God’s laws and that our purity 
has been lost. To overcome the pain of conscience, one must faithfully seek God’s grace 
for having fallen and accept the authority of the divine guardian who punishes us from 
within.  
While honoring God cannot in itself guarantee one’s moral rectitude, Stoker argues 
that it represents the only hope for anyone who aspires to receive God’s grace and wishes 
to improve his or her moral conduct. Whereas Heidegger will describe conscience as the 
silent call that summons Dasein to return from its inauthentic dispersal in worldly affairs, 
Stoker’s conscience is the painful experience of remorse that rebukes sinners for past 
transgressions and serves as a constant reminder of God’s concern for the purity of his 
creatures’ souls. Stoker’s conscience is the stinging point of contact between fallible, 
mortal humanity and the pure authority of God. 
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2.3. Heidegger’s Criticism of Stoker’s Approach to Conscience 
Despite considering Stoker’s work to be a positive development in the philosophical 
study of conscience, Heidegger expressly remarks that the South African “underestimates 
from the outset the hermeneutical conditions for a ‘description’ of ‘conscience as 
something which subsists objectively and actually.’”295 While he recognizes that many 
elements of his own approach are also found in Stoker’s work, Heidegger insists more 
forcefully on the differences that separate their two projects; ultimately, the German thinker 
conflates the Stokerian notion of conscience with the “ordinary interpretation of 
conscience” that he subjects to destructive analysis.296  
Nevertheless, it is Heidegger’s explicit and implicit criticisms of Das Gewissen that 
ironically provide, as we will attempt to show, the most solid evidence of Stoker’s 
influence on the existential concept of conscience and the phenomenological method of 
Being and Time. This can be seen by examining the three principal arguments conveyed in 
Heidegger’s critical assessment of Das Gewissen, namely 1) that Stoker’s investigation of 
conscience is basically dependent on the “personalism” developed by his doctoral 
supervisor, Max Scheler, 2) that Stoker’s concept of conscience is inauthentic because the 
South African fails to respect the “hermeneutical conditions” vital to the existential-
ontological project of Being and Time, and 3) that Stoker fails to break free of theological 
dogma and is guilty of “blurring the boundaries between phenomenology and theology, 
with damage to both.” In examining these three arguments, our study will indicate how 
Stoker’s investigation of conscience—most notably his “unexpected discovery” that 
conscience can only be recovered by adopting a phenomenological approach—may have 
influenced the methodology and interpretation of conscience we find proposed in Being 
and Time.  
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a) Stoker’s Alleged Dependence Upon Scheler 
In comparison to his brief acknowledgement of Stoker’s work in a single footnote 
to §55, Heidegger’s assessment of the phenomenological work of Max Scheler is granted a 
much more prominent place in the main text of Being and Time. In the course of his 
analysis of Dasein, Heidegger specifically addresses two major Schelerian concepts that are 
related directly to the existential-ontological project of Being and Time: 1) Scheler’s 
phenomenological “interpretation of personality,” and 2) his theory of reality.  
Conceding that the investigation of Dasein resembles Scheler’s “personalist” 
approach in some respects, Heidegger commends Scheler for the way he “emphasizes 
personal Being explicitly as such” in his phenomenological work and thereby contrasts “the 
specific Being of acts…with anything ‘psychical.’”297 In the years leading up to the 
publication of Being and Time, Heidegger had indeed demonstrated a great interest for 
Scheler’s advances concerning the understanding of the “being of the person (Sein der 
Person)” and of “acts themselves.”298 During his 1925 summer semester course at 
Marburg, Heidegger noted that Scheler “has made the furthest advances to date” with 
regard to the question of “the connection of the psychic with corporeality”299 and affirmed 
that Scheler “wants nothing to do with the specifically rationalistic orientation of Husserl,” 
a stance that Heidegger himself was personally adopting more and more publicly.300 Of 
course, Heidegger wasn’t simply validating the Schelerian approach; indeed, he criticized 
Scheler’s “personalism” as severely as any of the other philosophical approaches that he 
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subjected to “destruction.” Despite the fact that Scheler had made “some essential progress 
(wesentliche Fortschritt)” with regard to questions “defined within generally traditional 
horizons (allgemeine traditionellen Horizonten),”301 Heidegger determined that his 
contemporary “basically does not take us any further” with his investigation of 
intentionality focused on the individual person and its performative acts.302 While his 
approach appears promising, Scheler would fail to meaningfully advance matters in 
Heidegger’s eyes because he neither answers nor even properly poses the fundamental 
question of the meaning of Being. As Heidegger tells his students in Marburg:  
[When] we positively ask [of Scheler], how then does the Being of acts get 
defined and what is the Being of the person, the Being of lived experience 
and the unity of such experiences, the only thing left to be said is: Acts get 
performed and the person is the performer (Akte werden vollzogen, und die 
Person ist der Aktvollzieher). On the mode of being of the act-performance 
and the mode of Being of the performer of the act, silence reigns. (Über die 
Seinsart des Aktvollzuges und die Seinsart des Aktvollziehers herrscht 
Schweigen.) … [When] we ask fundamentally about the structure intended 
for Being and about the conceptuality in terms of which this Being is 
questioned, we find that the inquiry comes to a halt in these two vague 
determinations, performance and performer (in diesen vagen Bestimmungen 
Vollzug und Vollzieher stehen).303 
Scheler’s inability to directly confront the question of Being is also blamed by 
Heidegger for the “ontological indefiniteness of [the] foundations” that support his theory 
of reality, a theory that Heidegger claims has been borrowed from Dilthey.304 While 
Heidegger accepts that “reality is never primarily given in thinking and apprehending 
(Denken und Erfassen),” he rejects the Schelerian thesis that the “Being of objects is given 
immediately only in the way it is related to drive and will (in der Trieb- und 
Willensbezogenheit unmittelbar gegeben).”305 Having failed to recognize the problem of 
the Being of “disclosedness (Erschlossenheit),” Scheler would allow his personalism to fall 
into a form of subjectivism where the performer of acts is “understood in the Kantian sense 
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as Being-present-at-hand.”306 As Heidegger emphasizes in Being and Time: “The 
experiencing of resistance—that is, the discovery of what is resistant to one’s endeavours—
is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world (auf dem Grunde 
der Erschlossenheit von Welt).”307 Here Heidegger builds upon the assessment he shared 
with his students at Marburg in July 1925:  
[The] phenomenon of resistance is not the original phenomenon. Rather, 
resistance in its turn again can only be understood in terms of 
meaningfulness. The authentic correlation of world and Dasein (if we can 
speak here of a correlation at all, which it is not in my opinion) is not that of 
impulse and resistance or, as in Scheler, will and resistance, but rather care 
and meaningfulness. This correlation is the basic structure of life, a structure 
which I also call facticity.308   
While he more than hints that Scheler’s approach represents a surpassing of the Husserlian 
model of intentionality, Heidegger nonetheless proclaims that Scheler has failed to break 
out of the “horizons of inquiry…[of] traditional philosophy”309 and has left “the existential-
ontological foundations of the phenomenon of the act…still obscure.”310  
In his footnote to §55 regarding previous theories of conscience, Heidegger 
explicitly ties Stoker’s fate to that of Scheler when he concludes that the South African has 
obediently adopted the basic principles of Scheler’s “personalism” and applied them to 
conscience. In just four short lines, Heidegger hands down his devastating judgment that 
Stoker—like Scheler—has fallen into the fallacy of “objective” and “actual” subsistence: 
the “phenomenology” deployed by Stoker is contaminated with presuppositions concerning 
“objectivity” and naïvely built on an “anthropological foundation” borrowed from 
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Scheler.311 Heidegger’s assessment of Stoker here recalls his disparaging comments 
expressed two years earlier in Marburg regarding the “biological orientation” of Scheler, 
wherein Heidegger condemned Scheler’s “reverse procedure” of relying upon observations 
of “primitive life forms down to single-celled animals (primitiven Lebewesen bis zu 
einzelligen Tieren hinunter)” in order to explain the givenness of the world to the human 
person.312 In criticizing Stoker for “taking up” Scheler’s project, Heidegger essentially 
repeats in condensed form the same complaints that he had earlier directed at Scheler: 
while Stoker is praised for having produced a “wide-ranging” study that “signifies notable 
progress as compared with previous interpretations,” Heidegger condemns him for failing 
to recognize the need to exhibit “the ontological roots of the phenomenon itself.”313 
Scheler’s student, like his master, would remain blind to the ontological presuppositions of 
the philosophical tradition and thus perpetuate this bias in his work, according to 
Heidegger.  
But is Heidegger’s strategy of dismissing Stoker’s study of conscience by linking 
him to Scheler legitimate, let alone fair? There are at least two reasons indicating that this 
might not be the case:  
First of all, the sustained interest that Heidegger bears for Scheler’s work during the 
period when he developed the ideas contained in Being and Time appears to speak more 
loudly than any explicit criticism of Scheler contained in the book’s pages. While 
Heidegger correctly states that his existential-ontological project is radically different from 
Scheler’s “personalism,” the young professor arguably downplays the similarities between 
the thematic content—as well as some of the results—of their respective projects. To 
provide just one such example, one only needs to compare Heidegger’s description of 
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Dasein “loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated” by choosing “its 
hero” with Scheler’s remarks in 1925 on the importance of the “hero” for “true culture.”314 
In this lecture published under the title “The Forms of Knowledge and Culture”—a text that 
Heidegger specifically refers to in his Prolegomena course of 1925315—Scheler states:  
One does not “choose” such a model. One is captivated by it because it 
seduces, invites, and attracts us imperceptibly. National heroes, exemplary 
members of our profession, moral and artistic models, finally, the rare 
example which this world has witnessed of the purest and highest human 
culture itself, the very small number of saints, of pure and complete 
persons—these are our steppingstones and also the trailmakers. They explain 
and clarify the individual’s own purpose. … The spiritual person in man is 
an individual, unique self-concentration of the divine spirit. For this reason, 
heroes do not require imitation or blind submission, as is so often advocated 
in our Germany that yearns for authority. Heroes are only precursors, 
enabling us to hear the calling of our particular person. They are the dawn 
in the sunny day of our individual conscience and principle.316 
Evidently, the phenomenological interpretations of existence proposed by Heidegger and 
Scheler are not identical; indeed, they appear largely incompatible. At the same time, much 
is shared by the two thinkers in terms of their concern for both philosophical and 
theological questions and their attempts at phenomenological innovation. As seen in texts 
drafted by both Heidegger and Scheler during the period from 1925 until Scheler’s death in 
1928, the two men recognized the importance of each other’s contributions and were 
remarkably attentive to the evolution of the other’s ways of thinking. Heidegger finds in 
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Scheler not just another target to be criticized, but a like-minded investigator who is 
concerned with “fundamental phenomenological considerations which go beyond the 
special domain of ethics (grundsätzlich phänomenologischen Betrachtungen, die über das 
besondere Gebiet der Ethik hinausgehen)”317 and whose work has eclipsed the Husserlian 
quest to secure “consciousness (Bewußtsein)…[as] the possible object of an absolute 
science (möglicher Gegenstand einer absoluten Wissenschaft).”318 Notwithstanding his 
many reservations about the Schelerian approach to phenomenology, Heidegger shows 
more concern for the developing ideas of Scheler than for those of any other contemporary 
source mentioned either in his Prolegomena course or in Being and Time.  
During one of his lectures during the summer of 1925, Heidegger confirms his 
attentive reading of Scheler’s work when he suspiciously responds to a footnote that 
appeared in the published transcript of the University of Cologne professor’s address to the 
Lessing Institute of Berlin on January 17, 1925. This lengthy footnote by Scheler begins: 
For seven years I have been proposing the following ideas in my lectures, as 
a basis for my theory of knowledge. Consciousness (a translation of con-
scientia) is only one form of knowledge. There also exists preconscious, 
ecstatic knowledge (therefore, knowledge is, in no way, a function of 
“consciousness”). Knowledge itself is, however, an ontological relationship. 
The circumstantial presence of what is can simultaneously be in mente and 
extra mentem, but existence is always extra mentem. Furthermore, the fact 
that we possess existence as such is not at all based on intellectual factors 
(whether perception or thought), but solely on the resistance of what is, 
originally experienced only in the act of striving and in the dynamic factors 
of attention.319 
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Scheler goes on in this footnote to criticize Nicolai Hartmann’s ontological theory of 
knowledge for ignoring the “will-directed” nature of existence and to condemn all forms of 
“idealism of consciousness (Bewußtseinidealismus)” for perpetuating “the false 
assumption…that existence and the circumstance of things, as related to the intellect 
(perception, thought, memory) are inseparable from each other.”320 In response to 
Scheler’s claim concerning the chronology of his theory of “will-directed” existence, 
Heidegger remarks to his students that: 
Scheler here has a special need to note the time when he first presented this 
[“voluntative” theory of existence]. In this regard I want to stress that I also 
have proposed this theory already for seven years.321 
Thanks to Heidegger’s attempt to explicitly counter Scheler’s retroactive claim, we have 
solid evidence that Heidegger would have first become aware of Stoker’s research on the 
phenomenon of conscience no later than the summer of 1925 and—as we will show 
below—would have been anticipating the publication of Das Gewissen that September. For 
in an earlier footnote to this same text published by Scheler in June 1925, the director of 
Stoker’s doctoral work specifically mentions the upcoming publication of Das Gewissen 
that fall, providing advance publicity for a work he describes as an “excellent study” on 
conscience “edited by myself.”322 For all his criticism of the Schelerian “anthropological” 
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approach to phenomenology, Heidegger is evidently inspired by and vigilant of Scheler’s 
work right down to the footnotes of his contemporary’s most recently published lectures, as 
we see confirmed by Heidegger’s reading of this new book by Scheler’s foreign graduate 
student within a few months, if not weeks, of its being printed. In this light, should we 
perhaps take with a grain of salt Heidegger’s criticism of Stoker’s work on the grounds that 
it is supposedly based on Schelerian principles? Even if Stoker was guilty of having “taken 
over” Scheler’s personalism in Das Gewissen—which, as we will see, he clearly is not—is 
it possible that Heidegger is more indebted to both Scheler and Stoker than the overt 
criticisms found in Being and Time might lead us to believe?  
In any case, Heidegger’s assessment that Stoker submissively adopted his master’s 
“anthropological” principles in conducting his investigation of conscience disregards the 
fact that Stoker’s approach is fundamentally different from—and ultimately irreconcilable 
with—what Scheler advocates. At a superficial level, Heidegger could no doubt make a 
case for several similarities between Scheler’s work and the Stokerian analysis of 
conscience. For one, Stoker refers to Scheler in Das Gewissen almost twice as many times 
as he does to any other single thinker.323 Stoker notably uses Scheler’s work as his foil for 
demonstrating the problems of the Kantian categorical imperative and devotes two distinct 
sections of his text to relatively uncritical descriptions of Schelerian theories related to 
conscience, notably those involving the concepts of value-perception and sympathy. It 
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bears remembering, however, that Scheler was both the director of the visiting South 
African’s doctoral studies at the University of Cologne and the editor of the published 
version of Das Gewissen, which was printed by Bonn’s Friedrich Cohen publishing house 
as the second volume of Scheler’s series entitled “Schriften zur Philosophie und 
Soziologie.” Under these circumstances, Stoker’s decisions to prominently feature 
Scheler’s work in his review of the historical development of the concept of conscience and 
to avoid any direct criticism of Schelerian notions seem quite understandable. In any case, 
the mere inclusion of Scheler’s concepts in Das Gewissen—no matter how extensively 
presented—cannot be considered as proof that Stoker simply adopted the same theoretical 
principles proposed by his master. To justify such a conclusion, one would have to show 
that Stoker’s investigation both remains faithful to these principles and produces results 
that are consistent with them, which is evidently not the case in Das Gewissen. 
One doesn’t have to look far in Das Gewissen itself for evidence undermining this 
allegation made by Heidegger. Ironically, this evidence comes directly from the pen of the 
person most concerned by the question: Scheler himself. In his “Editor’s Foreword” to 
Stoker’s work, Scheler distances himself from Stoker with regard to the conclusions of the 
young South African’s study. Despite taking obvious pride in the work of his student, 
whom he commends for having “excellent command of the methods”324 of 
phenomenological analysis and for producing a “detailed and deeply penetrating treatment 
of the problem”325 of conscience, Scheler balks at Stoker’s elevation of a specifically 
religious conception of conscience described in absolute terms, observing that his student’s 
Afrikkaner roots make him “predisposed” to view conscience in terms of the “purity, rigor, 
power and depth…of the religious-Christian heroism” personified by Calvin.326 While 
respectful—and perhaps even admirative—of his student’s strong religious convictions, 
Scheler affirms that Stoker should have paid more heed to the differences in how 
conscience has been understood, e.g. in different nations and cultures, in different social 
environments, in different historical situations. In Scheler’s opinion, Stoker fails to 
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recognize the full importance of the “social and evolutionary” factors of conscience 
because his personal religious beliefs have tainted his study and interfered with his “strictly 
scientific attitude.”327 By failing to preserve the formalism of his investigation, Stoker 
“falls short” of the universality demanded by Scheler in conducting his own 
phenomenological work: rather than upholding the universal “person” and the full range of 
possible experiences of conscience, Stoker allowed his study to be skewed by his own 
specific cultural outlook, leading to his “overestimating the constancy and the uniqueness 
of the historical appearance (überschätzt…die Konstanz und die Eindeutigkeit seiner 
geschichtlichen Erscheinung)” of conscience.328 While Scheler recognizes that the 
“disregarding of the content [of conscience] and the objective value of its so-called 
‘information’” is critical to phenomenological analysis, he insists that a “truly complete” 
study of conscience would have placed greater emphasis on the “person” and 
“psychological observation.”329  
Scheler identifies very explicitly what he believes Stoker emphasized too much in 
Das Gewissen: the metaphysical and religious aspects of conscience. As a result, Scheler 
contends that Stoker’s belief in an absolute source of conscience—understood in manifestly 
theistic terms—somewhat spoils the work’s phenomenological spirit. While he closes his 
remarks by saluting Das Gewissen as a “significant milestone” and is largely 
congratulatory toward Stoker in his comments, Scheler evidently disapproves of his 
student’s inchoate approach to phenomenology and notes that a “vast” amount of research 
remains to be done.330 While Heidegger may claim that Scheler’s “personalism” is the 
theoretical foundation of Das Gewissen, the “Editor’s Foreword” that appears in the very 
first pages of Stoker’s book itself shows that Scheler strongly disagrees with this 
assessment. What we read is a clear message from Scheler that—despite Stoker’s laudable 
effort to salvage the genuine meaning of conscience—his student has not quite lived up to 
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the professional standards that are to be expected of any phenomenological investigation of 
the “person.”  
b) Heidegger’s Destruction of Stoker’s “Vülgar” Conscience  
 Keeping in mind our focus on Heidegger’s criticism of Stoker, let us 
consider the moment in §59 of Being and Time where the “existential interpretation of 
conscience” is contrasted with “the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted.”331 In this key 
section, Heidegger struggles with the problem of showing how his existential interpretation 
of conscience as a silent call from Dasein to itself is ontically possible. As Heidegger states 
in no uncertain terms, producing evidence of such a possibility is a basic requirement of his 
idea of phenomenological investigation. In this sense, §59 represents a decisive 
methodological requirement, but perhaps also a trap that Heidegger has laid for himself. To 
respect the radical difference between his project and the forgetfulness of philosophical 
tradition, Heidegger must—and successfully does—maintain the absolute distinction 
between his interpretation of conscience and the ordinary ones that have been previously 
formulated. However, if Heidegger’s destruction of ordinary conscience also eliminates any 
possibility of experiencing the authentic phenomenon, then he remains confronted with the 
same methodological problem that has haunted his existential project from the very start: 
how can one actually experience existence authentically?  
Heidegger’s destruction of this indefinite “target” of the “ordinary” (vülgar) 
interpretation of conscience—a conglomerate of all the previous ways in which conscience 
has been understood (evidently including what Stoker proposes)—leaves the existential 
conscience of Dasein alienated from the “everyday” world. However, such an existential 
conscience appears impossible because Heidegger appears to have denied it any way of 
being experienced. To resolve this problem, he must either produce such an attestation via 
an alternative experience of conscience which is completely unrelated to the “ordinary” 
interpretation or he must identify a positive element in his “destruction” of moral 
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conscience which can allow for an authentic possibility of experiencing conscience to be 
salvaged. Given this problematic situation, our examination of the relation between 
Heidegger’s destruction of ordinary conscience in §59 and his criticism of the Stokerian 
interpretation in Das Gewissen takes on new significance. Is there a possibility of an 
authentic experience of the existential conscience which Heidegger might have passed over 
in his destruction of all previous interpretations? Is it possible that Stoker’s work—
apparently so influential for the development of Heidegger’s own concept of conscience—
might reveal an alternative to the “ordinary conscience” which can provide the “attestation” 
required in Being and Time?  
Let us review the four specific objections to Heidegger’s existential concept of 
conscience that are discussed in §59 in light of our concern for Stoker’s interpretation of 
synteresis and its possible influence on Being and Time:  
The first potential objection to his interpretation of conscience that Heidegger 
considers is the claim “that the function of conscience is essentially critical.”332 To counter 
this objection, Heidegger argues that anyone who claims that conscience must be critical 
expects it to deliver information regarding practical affairs. For Heidegger, this “everyday” 
expectation arises out of our tendency to “[subsume existence] under the idea of a business 
procedure that can be regulated.”333 While Heidegger concedes that conscience “discloses 
nothing which could be either positive or negative” in terms of worldly things, this is 
precisely because “what it has in view is a Being which is ontologically quite different—
namely, existence (Existenz)... [It] gives us that which in the existential sense in the ‘most 
positive’ of all.”334  
While Heidegger’s response to this first potential “objection” does effectively 
“destroy” the notion of “ordinary conscience,” it does not apply to our reading of Stoker’s 
interpretation proposed in Das Gewissen. While Stoker does consider “everyday” 
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interpretations of conscience in his study, he concludes that the phenomenon of conscience 
cannot be explained in terms of the content of specific acts or judgments. Noting that 
“[much] of what is usually meant by ‘conscience’ has nothing to do with it,”335 Stoker 
describes conscience as a content-free “personal renewal”336 that arises through one’s 
awareness that God’s absolute love is incompatible with evil. The only “message” of 
conscience is that “I am guilty” of not being able to preserve this absolute purity; the 
“guilt” conveyed by Stoker’s conscience is seen to color all possible experience and in this 
sense closely resembles the existential notion of guilt found in Being and Time.337 For 
Stoker, conscience itself offers no specific direction to the “conscience-plagued 
(Gewissensgeplagten)”: the individual suffering from such anguish has no alternative for 
resolving this inner conflict other than to renew his or her personal relationship with God. 
With regard to this first “objection,” any advocate of what Heidegger calls “ordinary 
conscience” would regard both Stoker’s and Heidegger’s interpretations of conscience as 
equally “negative” due to their silence concerning all specific worldly questions.  
The second objection to his interpretation of conscience that Heidegger considers is 
the argument “that conscience always speaks in a way that is relative to some definite deed 
which has been performed or willed.”338 In his response to this objection, Heidegger 
contests any form of thinking that would reduce conscience to the recognition of “bad” 
deeds as though they were “‘facts’…which are present-at-hand (vorhandene).”339 To 
support his position, Heidegger alludes to Schopenhauer’s analogy of filling in the “register 
of deeds” of conscience, an analogy that Stoker had pointedly criticized in Das Gewissen. 
Heidegger adopts the position already laid out by Stoker when the former scoffs that it 
“would be as if Dasein were a ‘household’ whose indebtednesses (Verschuldungen) simply 
needed to be balanced off in an orderly manner so that the self may stand ‘by’ as a 
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disinterested spectator while these experiences run their course.”340 Like Heidegger, Stoker 
refutes the “common” notion that conscience condemns specific acts and believes, rather, 
that it simply “reveals…the real personal evil in us.”341 For this reason, Stoker holds that 
conscience cannot provide “guidance” with regard to the moral “content” of a given 
situation: “How and when this [evil] has come upon us, [conscience] tells us as much and 
as little as a corporeal disease symptom tells us about its source.”342 While Heidegger’s 
response to this second objection exposes the inauthenticity of “ordinary conscience,” the 
Stokerian concept cannot be discarded on these grounds: not only is Stoker’s notion 
incompatible with the “ordinary conscience” in this regard, it actually appears quite similar 
to what Heidegger proposes.  
The third potential objection to his “call of conscience” that Heidegger considers is 
the claim “that when the ‘voice’ is experienced, it is never so radically related to Dasein’s 
Being” as the existential call proposed in Being and Time.343 Heidegger’s strategy for 
responding to this objection is to accept it without reservation. In his mind, it is precisely 
because the philosophical tradition has devalued the phenomenon of existential guilt that 
“the everyday experience of conscience (alltägliche Gewissenserfahrung) has no 
acquaintance with anything like getting summoned to Being-guilty (Aufgerufenwerden zum 
Schuldigsein).”344 Heidegger explicitly points to Kantian morality with its emphasis on 
obeying laws and to Scheler’s theory of value as prime examples of how the “call of 
conscience” gets mediated and transformed into “an arbiter and admonisher, with whom 
Dasein reckons and pleads its cause.”345 To understand how this response might be applied 
to Stoker’s conscience, let us look more closely at Heidegger’s remarks regarding 
Schelerian value ethics. Heidegger writes:  
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Even the theory of value, whether it is regarded formally or materially, has 
as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a ‘metaphysic of morals’—that 
is, an ontology of Dasein and existence. Dasein is regarded as an entity with 
which one might concern oneself, whether this “concern” has the sense of 
‘actualizing values’ or of satisfying a norm.346 
This rebuttal to the third objection would apply to Stoker only if Heidegger’s claim that 
Stoker had simply “taken up” Scheler’s “personalism” and assumed the validity of his 
theory of universal “values,”347 but we have already demonstrated that this is not the case. 
While Stoker may have been influenced by Scheler in many ways, it is evident that the 
South African scholar’s phenomenon of conscience must be distinguished from any “theory 
of values”—including the one proposed by Scheler—and that Stoker’s approach is 
irreconcilable with any “metaphysics” that would attempt to understand conscience as a 
theoretical object. To be clear, it is evident that Stoker does present an interpretation of 
conscience inspired by religious concepts, most explicitly in his comments regarding the 
primordiality of the personal relationship between each person and God. On these grounds, 
it could be easily argued that the religious orientation of Stoker’s interpretation results in 
Das Gewissen becoming tainted by theological tradition and metaphysical dogma—and we 
will consider such implications below. But for the moment let us remain focused strictly on 
Heidegger’s third proposed “objection” and how it relates to the Stokerian concept of 
conscience. Here Heidegger is arguing that “ordinary conscience” is “never so radically 
related to Dasein’s Being” and fails to disclose the individual’s essence of “Being-
guilty.”348 Once again, Stoker’s conscience with its emphasis on the personal disclosure of 
one’s essential guilt proves to be incompatible with such an “ordinary interpretation” of the 
phenomenon and actually appears to be quite similar to the Heideggerian concept in this 
regard.  
The fourth and final potential “objection” to his existential conscience that 
Heidegger considers is the claim “that our [existential] interpretation takes no account of 
the basic forms of the phenomenon—‘evil’ conscience and ‘good,’ that which ‘reproves’ 
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and that which ‘warns’ (dem „bösen“ und „guten“, dem „rügenden“ und „warnenden“ 
Gewissen).”349 Of the four potential “objections” considered by Heidegger, this last one is 
the most comprehensive and multi-faceted—and also appears to be the most problematic 
for Stoker’s notion of conscience. In Heidegger’s case, the task of defending his existential 
concept of conscience from such an argument is simplified by the fact that his “radical” 
approach is intentionally designed to distinguish existential phenomena from common 
“everyday” notions, including “moral” obligations. Whereas “ordinary conscience” is 
concerned with the accumulation of guilt tied to past acts, Heidegger proposes that 
conscience is not the mere remembering of “evil” things but a recalling of one’s essence as 
fundamentally guilty—it “calls [one] forth to Being-guilty, as something to be seized upon 
in one’s own existence… [It] points forward as it calls one back into one’s thrownness (es 
eher vorweisend in die Geworfenheit zurückruft).”350 Since the existential conscience he 
proposes is radically separated from any kind of concern for worldly activities and material 
“indebtedness,” Heidegger can disregard notions such as “evil,” “good,” “reproving,” and 
“warning”; his “phenomenon of the summons” cannot be characterized by such “moral” 
terms.351  
In Stoker’s case, the Heideggerian destruction of this fourth “objection” seems to 
hold much more significant implications than any of the previous ones that are considered 
in Being and Time. At face value, it seems that Stoker’s interpretation of conscience must 
be classified among the “basic forms” of “ordinary conscience” that Heidegger describes: 
Stoker’s book is replete with detailed phenomenological analyses of such “ordinary” 
manifestations of conscience and with critical reviews of theories related to them. 
However, a closer inspection of Heidegger’s argument regarding these forms of “ordinary 
conscience” reveals that Stoker’s notion cannot be lumped in with the theories of those who 
insist that the “stirring of conscience [is something] which follows after”352 a sinful act 
based on the presupposition that time is an “interconnected sequence of successive 
                                                 
349
 SZ §59, 290 / 336. 
350
 SZ §59, 291 / 337. 
351
 SZ §59, 292 / 338. 
352
 SZ §59, 290 / 337. 
 122 
 
 
experiences.”353 Running through Heidegger’s series of claims regarding the inauthentic 
notion of time upon which “ordinary conscience” is founded, it becomes clear that they do 
not apply to Stoker’s notion of the phenomenon. While Stoker’s study does emphasize 
one’s regret for past acts, his understanding of this regret is not limited to any specific 
worldly act or any isolated moment of “worldly” time. Stoker’s notion of “evil” is 
existential: the regret conveyed by conscience arises out of the recognition that mankind is 
essentially “impure” and thus fundamentally “guilty,” making it impossible for the spark of 
God’s light to illuminate the “whole” of each person. Notwithstanding the evidently 
religious character of Stoker’s interpretation, his concept of “evil” is something that is 
essential to each soul and, in this sense, closely parallels the Heideggerian notions of 
“inauthenticity” and “falling.”  
The difference between Stoker’s notion of “evil” and the notion of “evil 
conscience” subjected to destruction in Being and Time is highlighted by Heidegger 
himself when he rhetorically asks whether the “[ordinary] interpretation of the ‘evil’ 
conscience’…goes only half way?”354 This question appears to be virtually inspired by 
Stoker’s claim in Das Gewissen that the “true” phenomenon of conscience is neither the 
relative judgment of conscientia nor the absolute purity of divine synteresis but rather the 
“between,” the “meeting place,” the “intersection of two directions.”355 Stoker states that to 
recognize this “truth” of “guilt-ridden man” experiencing one’s contact with the “justice, 
mercy, grace and…fatherly love and concern” of God requires that we overcome the one-
sidedness of the “theoretical” mindset.356 For Stoker, “true conscience is not subsumed in a 
knowledge as such, whether discursive or intuitive in nature” because—while the “ontic 
experience” of conscience may produce “knowledge”—this information is derived from the 
existential phenomenon and cannot be considered “the essence of conscience.”357 Upon 
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completing his review of numerous conscience theories, Stoker ultimately rejects both the 
notions of a “good” and a “bad” conscience, just as Heidegger will in Being and Time.  
In one of the most explicit cases where we see Stoker taking his distance from 
Scheler, the young South African diplomatically points out the problematic nature of 
Scheler’s explanation that the perception of having a “good” conscience is actually the 
“experienced lack of a ‘guilty conscience,’”358 an idea that Heidegger condemns in Being 
and Time.359 In a manner consistent with Heidegger’s existential interpretation despite its 
religious tone, Stoker proposes that conscience can only propose a “road to recovery and 
healing” that allows the “conscience-plagued [to] see his guilt…[and recognize] that gap 
separating” the individual from the purity of God’s love.360 In Heidegger’s account, the 
“warning” conscience “seems, of course, to come closest to the phenomenon of the 
summons,” but he dismisses this “agreement [as] just an illusion (diese 
Zusammenstimmung ist doch nur Schein)” because the warning relates to a “deed which 
has been willed, from which it seeks to preserve us.”361 In other words, the “ordinary” 
notion of this warning involves a looking back on the content of what has been willed 
rather than a “calling forth” to one’s own Being-guilty where authentic possibilities are 
disclosed. Rather than warning the individual about “bad” things, Stoker’s conscience 
reminds each individual to recognize God’s authority and to respond lovingly to this “call-
of-duty” through faith. While Heidegger certainly breaks with Stoker concerning the divine 
source of conscience, it is Stoker who actually precedes the author of Being and Time in 
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rejecting the inauthentic “reckoning” of the so-called “ordinary conscience” and in 
revealing the “existential” priority of one’s “call-of-duty.”  
If we assume that these four proposed objections raised by Heidegger encompass 
the full scope of what he labels as the “ordinary conscience,” then our analysis has 
demonstrated that Stoker’s interpretation—which is incompatible with the “ordinary 
conscience” on all four counts—cannot simply be conflated with the others and included 
under this heading. Heidegger’s criticism of the “ordinary conscience” in §59 actually 
reinforces the fact that Stoker’s concept of conscience must be distinguished from 
Schelerian personalism and value ethics. In reviewing Heidegger’s dismissal of the 
existential merits of Stoker’s approach, the first two basic criticisms that the German 
philosopher makes of Das Gewissen have proven to be illegitimate. Let us now consider 
the third and final criticism of Stoker’s approach that Heidegger proposes explicitly in the 
remarks on Das Gewissen contained in his footnote to §55.  
c) Heidegger’s Criticism that Stoker Blends Phenomenology with Theology  
The most devastating critique of Stoker’s work in Being and Time is delivered in 
two short lines of the footnote to §55 where Heidegger asserts that Stoker’s approach 
negligently blends together phenomenology and theology. There is no denying that Stoker 
is guilty of this “offense”: Stoker builds his entire phenomenological interpretation on the 
basis of religious concepts and thereby falls well short of the radicality demanded by 
Heidegger. For the German thinker, the concoction of phenomenology and theology found 
in Das Gewissen can be traced back to Stoker’s naïve belief that conscience can be grasped 
“as something which subsists objectively and actually.”362 Heidegger sees Stoker 
presuming—much like the neo-Kantians with their “critical-teleological method”—that the 
“objective” and “true” conscience can be accessed directly in experience simply by 
adopting the proper mindset, a sort of pure phenomenological “seeing” that somehow 
avoids distortions and distractions caused by the accumulation of traditional theories. To 
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understand the grounds for Heidegger’s criticism, consider these remarks taken from 
Stoker’s introduction to Das Gewissen:  
If one dares under such circumstances [regarding the ambiguity of various 
definitions of conscience] to look into this problem, one must look to what is 
presented in the phenomenon itself as a starting point, not to the theories, not 
to the history of the problem, but to the objective reality of the experienced 
“conscience,” and to let only the objective reality of the truth have the last 
word. What works is not the presenting of abstract thoughts or theories, but 
the objectively subsisting real conscience, which will be described in depth 
as we try to understand its meaning.363    
In the light of the basic principles laid out in Being and Time, Heidegger here identifies an 
evident incompatibility between his existential-ontological project and Stoker’s proposed 
approach for “phenomenologically” investigating conscience. Another example of the 
apparent incompatibility of their approaches is found in Stoker’s claim that one of the key 
causes of the “labyrinthine ambiguity” surrounding conscience is that psychology has not 
asserted itself against the speculative chaos of philosophical and theological theories.364 
Stoker notably expresses hope that the crisis of European culture in the aftermath of the 
First World War will lead to “new interest for deeper underlying problems and…that soon 
psychology will give the ‘conscience’ the attention it deserves.”365 When such a defense of 
psychological research is combined with Stoker’s statement regarding “phenomenological” 
description and his reliance on religious concepts such as synteresis, it is difficult to 
counter Heidegger’s claim that some “boundaries” have indeed been “blurred” by the 
author of Das Gewissen. 
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While Heidegger appears to deliver a “decisive” blow against Stoker’s 
phenomenological method, our concern for Stoker’s influence on Heidegger’s analysis of 
Dasein in Being and Time remains legitimate—indeed, the question of this influence only 
becomes more problematic. If Das Gewissen suffers from “blurred boundaries” as it 
explains the source of conscience, how does Heidegger propose to investigate existence 
without presupposing an absolute source in his own work? Evidently recognizing the 
urgency of this problem, Heidegger promises in §54 to show how Dasein’s authentic mode 
of existence can be attested as an existentiell possibility without having recourse to a 
“power” external to Dasein. In remarking that Stoker does damage to both phenomenology 
and theology through his “blurring” of the two, Heidegger suggests a question that is vital 
to our study of Das Gewissen’s impact on Being and Time: how can this “blurring” be 
avoided?  
As noted above, Stoker explicitly states that his adoption of the “phenomenological 
method” was accidental: he took up this phenomenological approach only after realizing 
that his initial “intellectualistic” and theoretically oriented approach was inappropriate for a 
study of conscience. The signs of this improvisation are seen in Das Gewissen’s exotic 
methodological blend of deconstructive historical analysis, “objective” description of 
psychological states, and earnest—yet highly debatable—interpretations of religious 
concepts. In this sense, Stoker’s work on conscience exemplifies the challenge of 
innovating a philosophical approach in defiance of theoretical conventions and thereby 
recalls Heidegger’s own concession at the end of §7 of Being and Time: 
With regard to the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the 
analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in 
which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For 
the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 
‘grammar.’ (Für die letztgenannte Aufgabe fehlen nicht nur meist die Worte, 
sondern vor allem die „Grammatik“.)366 
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Given that Stoker was less attuned to the question of “hermeneutical conditions” than was 
Heidegger,367 it can be argued that Das Gewissen suffers even more severely from this lack 
of “grammar”: Stoker’s accidental discovery that the study of conscience required a 
phenomenological approach leads to flagrant inconsistencies as he veers from one 
interpretive mode to the next. At certain points in Das Gewissen, Stoker appears to regard 
“phenomenology” as a special form of psychology that oversees the facts of emotional 
experience and documents the “objective reality” of God’s spirit revealed to each person; at 
others, Stoker proposes a patently existential interpretation of conscience in order to 
overcome the “metaphysical problems” revealed by his analysis. This existential aspect of 
Stoker’s work shows itself to be closely aligned with—but certainly not identical to—the 
Heideggerian notion of conscience; at the very least, it confirms that the Stokerian concept 
cannot be equated with the “ordinary conscience” that Heidegger submits to “destructive” 
analysis in Being and Time.  
Despite the advances found in Stoker’s work, Heidegger justly criticizes the South 
African’s “blurred” notion of conscience as being fundamentally incompatible with his 
own concept of phenomenological investigation: it would be impossible to filter out the 
theological bias from the text of Das Gewissen in order to extract a “pure” existential 
concept of the sort proposed by Heidegger. While the South African focuses his study on 
the “so-called ‘moral conscience’” rather than the “religious” phenomenon, his 
“phenomenological” investigation proceeds on the basis of essentially religious—and 
specifically Christian—concepts. As Scheler notes with disapproval in his “Editor’s 
Foreword,” Stoker “overemphasizes the constancy” of conscience because he 
inappropriately favors “theistic metaphysical beliefs” and fails to adequately consider other 
ways of understanding the phenomenon, e.g. in terms of developmental psychology and 
sociology.368 If one attempted to remove the theological content from Das Gewissen, all 
that would remain of Stoker’s study would be his review of previous conscience theories 
and his aborted attempt to phenomenologically “describe” one’s experience of the “guilty 
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conscience.” Purged of all discussion of synteresis, Stoker’s Das Gewissen would be 
reduced to less than half its original length: the entire concluding chapter and the work’s 
most original insights (proposed in the section entitled “The Evolution of Conscience”) 
would be lost. Ironically, Heidegger’s decision not to acknowledge the most central 
concept in Stoker’s interpretation of conscience—the Christian notion of synteresis—
contributes to concealing the greatest difficulty facing his own concept of conscience: the 
fact that his existential interpretation also struggles with the problem of showing how it is 
ontically possible for Dasein to experience itself as a whole. Rather than attempting to 
“purify” Stoker’s phenomenology of synteresis to make it more “compatible” with 
Heidegger’s project, let us instead focus on how Stoker actually goes about his 
“phenomenological” investigation in Das Gewissen and produces the “blurring” so 
disparaged by Heidegger. For our study, what is most significant is the striking parallel 
between Stoker’s phenomenological approach to essentially theological notions and 
Heidegger’s proposed methodology for accessing the question of Being through the 
analysis of Dasein. 
Immediately after Stoker demands in his book’s introduction that we “look only to 
[the objective reality] offered in the phenomenon itself,”369 he calls a halt to the entire 
enterprise because a vital preliminary task must be accomplished before “the problem can 
even be advanced.”370 It is here that Stoker insists on the necessity of the “quasi-surgical 
work” to extract the “word and concept” of conscience from the “great ambiguity and 
confusion.”371 In other words, Stoker’s phenomenological investigation of conscience 
begins with a preliminary “destructive” step that consists of dispersing the “cosmopolitan 
assembly” of the history-burdened concept of conscience in order to determine how its 
original meaning can be accessed.372  
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Stoker’s opening move in Das Gewissen parallels the one made by Heidegger in his 
analysis of Dasein and its “everyday” world: the phenomenon being investigated must first 
be freed from the obscuring strata of inauthentic assertions that have covered it up. Stoker 
does not launch headfirst into a description of the experience of conscience based on 
perception or intuition; instead, he demands that the “ordinary” theories of conscience 
proposed by tradition be peeled away so that its legitimate “bloodline” can be established 
(“…wer nach seinem Blut zum Gewissensreich gehört”).373 Rather than accepting the 
authority of any given theory of conscience, Stoker—much like Heidegger—seeks to clear 
the way to access the phenomenon in order to then pose the question: “What is the 
conscience in its essence? (Was ist das Gewissen seinem Wesen nach?)”374 While Stoker’s 
question lacks the “radicality” of the Heideggerian project’s attempt to access the meaning 
of Being, it is remarkable that Stoker determines that conscience necessitates his 
improvising of a “phenomenological” investigation. As Stoker explains, the phenomenon 
of conscience itself discloses the genuine way for its own investigation and interpretation.  
2.4. “Disease Symptoms” (Krankheitserscheinungen) in Das Gewissen and 
Being and Time 
A shared analogy that is featured prominently in both Stoker’s Das Gewissen and 
Heidegger’s Being and Time allows us to directly compare their respective approaches to 
phenomenological investigation and to confirm Stoker’s influence on the Heideggerian 
concept of conscience: the analogy of disease symptoms (Krankheitserscheinungen). 
Heidegger uses this analogy in both his Prolegomena course375 and in Being and Time to 
illustrate the meaning of the term “phenomenology.”376 For his part, Stoker relies even 
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more heavily on the metaphor of “symptoms of life-threatening substances in the body” in 
the section of Das Gewissen that appears under the heading “Metaphysical Problems.”377  
Discussing the “primordial” meaning of the term “phenomenology,” Heidegger 
presents his students in Marburg during the summer semester of 1925 with the example of 
“symptoms” of disease (Krankheitserscheinungen) to explain how “appearances 
(Erscheinungen)” can be understood as “occurrences (Vorkommnisse) which refer back to 
other occurrences from which we can infer something else which does not make an 
appearance.”378 In using the word “Krankheitserscheinungen,” Heidegger metaphorically 
associated his concept of phenomenology with a medical term that emerged in the late 19th 
century and was most commonly used in the field of psychiatric pathology. 
“Krankheitserscheinungen” served, for example, as a central concept of the pioneering 
psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin at the turn of the century as he described the physical 
afflictions of patients suffering from schizophrenia, paranoia and dementia. As Kraepelin 
wrote in his reference work on psychiatry published in 1899: “Besides the psychic disorder 
there are also in the physical domain a series of disease symptoms 
(Krankheitserscheinungen) to record, whose exact relations to the fundamental malady are 
not yet proved in all points.”379 For his part, Sigmund Freud, whose work is included in 
Stoker’s review of conscience theories but not mentioned in Being and Time, celebrates his 
“analytical method of psychotherapy” as the only means of discovering “the origins and 
context of disease symptoms (Krankheitserscheinungen)” suffered by hysterics.380  
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After the outbreak of the First World War, the term took on a new and broader 
significance due to the advent of “shell-shock” or “War-Shock,” as the condition was called 
by British medical officer Montague D. Eder in his 1917 book on the diagnosis and 
treatment of war-related “psycho-neuroses.”381 The Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, 
for example, published a text in 1915 entitled “Hysterosomatische 
Krankheitserscheinungen bei der Kriegshysterie” on the motor disorders observed in 
German soldiers being treated for acute anxiety following combat.382 Reflecting the rising 
collective awareness of the Great War’s terrible social and cultural consequences, the term 
was appropriated by social scientists and philosophers documenting the wider range of 
“disease symptoms” suffered by the German nation and European culture as a whole. 
Replicating the clinical evaluation of shell-shocked soldiers, these thinkers sought to locate 
the source of the “evil” disease in the hope of proposing a remedy for Western civilization. 
One of the first German philosophers to publicly make this metaphorical link between the 
horrors of war and the symptoms of disease was the director of Stoker’s dissertation, Max 
Scheler. Speaking to an assembly in Vienna in the fall of 1917, Scheler shockingly pointed 
out the ongoing war’s “positive” impact:  
That the War has uncovered and exposed this inner mendacity, this lying 
sham of European cultural community, long corroded with the poisons of 
nationalism, subjectivism, relativism, capitalism—that the hidden wounds of 
Europe’s soul have broken out in nauseating, eye-offending, evil-smelling 
but healing suppuration—for that thanks be even to this war! Here the War 
is not the cause of the disease but the diagnostic physician and analyst of the 
European soul.383 
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Perhaps desiring to connect his ontological project with the growing concern for 
Germany’s  “spiritual health” during a time of cultural “crisis,” Heidegger uses the 
metaphor of Krankheitserscheinungen in the summer of 1925 specifically to emphasize that 
any “appearance” is always accompanied by a phenomenon that does not show itself.384 
When he reprises this analogy in Being and Time, Heidegger uses it to convey the 
derivative nature of such an “appearance.” For Heidegger, the secondary nature of the 
“appearance (Erscheinung)” is exemplified by medical symptoms that can be clinically 
observed and that “indicate (indizieren)” an underlying disease: the phenomenon of the 
disease remains unseen but “announces itself (Sich-melden)” through the appearing of 
symptoms.385 Heidegger ties this analogy of disease symptoms to his account of the 
“reference-relationship” between what “appears” and what is indicated by this 
“appearance.”386 In an appearance, the phenomenon “announces itself” but “does not show 
itself.”387  
While Heidegger’s take on “disease symptoms” is primarily intended to explain the 
distinction between phenomenon and “appearance,” it also helps to convey the difference 
between these notions and the concept of “semblance (Schein)” as well. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger insists that the concept of the phenomenon must be “understood from the 
beginning as that which shows itself in itself,” echoing his presentation during the summer 
semester of 1925.388 Thus the phenomenon can either show itself or not show itself. When 
it shows itself, however, it can do so in two ways: 1) by manifestly “[showing] itself in 
itself,”389 which Heidegger calls the “primordial signification” of phenomenon,390 or 2) by 
“[showing] itself as something which in itself it is not...[which] is what we call ‘seeming’ 
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(Scheinen).”391 For Heidegger, “semblance” is a “privative modification” of the 
phenomenon that necessitates “a pretension of showing itself—that is, of being a 
phenomenon.”392 The fundamental difference between “semblance” and “appearance” lies 
in the dissimilar nature of the “not” related to each concept. Heidegger states the “not-
showing-itself” of appearing—of indicating representatively or mediating—is “by no 
means to be confused with the privative ‘not’ which we used in defining the structure of 
semblance.”393 Heidegger continues by stating that “[what] appears does not show itself” 
and thus does not pretend to be a phenomenon; appearing is instead an indicating and 
therefore “can never seem.”394 In his Prolegomena course, Heidegger’s cursory explanation 
of how “appearance” is to be distinguished from “semblance” does not go any further than 
this absolute separation that he also initially proposes in Being and Time. As he tells his 
students in 1925, his simple review of the concepts described above “should suffice” in 
order to clarify the meaning of the “first component part of the term ‘phenomenology.’”395  
Heidegger’s Revised Analogy of “Disease Symptoms” in Being and Time 
In Being and Time, however, Heidegger goes on to make a small but significant 
modification to his earlier interpretation of semblance which he had presented before the 
publication of Stoker’s study in September 1925. When we compare the transcript of his 
Prolegomena course and the finalized text of Being and Time, we can see how this change 
implies a response to Stoker’s use of the metaphor of “disease symptoms” to explain his 
phenomenological approach to conscience. Rather than maintaining an absolute distinction 
between “appearance” and “semblance,” Heidegger subtly adds a new possibility for 
understanding this relationship which he again expresses metaphorically in terms of disease 
symptoms: 
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In so far as a phenomenon is constitutive for ‘appearance’ in the 
signification of announcing itself through something which shows itself, 
though such a phenomenon can privatively take the variant form of 
semblance, appearance too can become mere semblance. In a certain kind of 
light someone can look as if his cheeks were flushed with red; and the 
redness which shows itself can be taken as an announcement of the Being-
present-at-hand of a fever, which in turn indicates some disturbance in the 
organism.396 
With this new take on the disease symptoms metaphor, Heidegger supplements his initial 
description of “appearance” with a specific physiological symptom that is originally used 
by Stoker to “explain” the phenomenon of conscience: changes in skin color.397  
In Stoker’s text, the metaphor of disease symptoms serves to show how the “true” 
experience of conscience proves to be both “supernatural” and “supernormal” when 
compared to observable “symptoms” in the fields of biology and sociology, respectively.398 
In a way that reveals what Heidegger protests as the “blurring” of phenomenology with 
theology in Das Gewissen, Stoker deploys the metaphor of disease symptoms not in order 
to explain his phenomenological method but to convey the necessity of the relationship 
between the conscience-plagued person and God, the relationship that enables each person 
to truly “see themselves” by recognizing the evil that exists within. For Stoker, conscience 
represents a metaphysical problem because it must be shown how the pain of the 
“conscience-stricken” indicates the “presence” of evil; in other words, Stoker aims to 
demonstrate how conscience is able to reliably detect “true evil.” For Stoker, the 
recognition that conscience depends on the authority of God means that the “guilty 
conscience” itself is not the genuine phenomenon: “true” conscience is rather the 
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experience of hearing the “call-of-duty” and remembering one’s personal responsibility to 
obey synteresis. In Stoker’s metaphor, the pain of conscience is the “disease symptom” 
revealed to us by the caring spirit that guards the human soul from evil. 
Analyzing this “symptom” of “guilty conscience,” Stoker finds in the experience of 
conscience a unity of three moments that make up its phenomenal whole:  
Firstly, as noted above, the experience of conscience “reveals the presence of…the 
real personal evil in us.”399 This evil is indicated to the individual when it comes into 
contact with the absolute good of God: even though we are unable to grasp this “absolute 
knowledge,” the painful experience of evil coming into contact with the divine initiates an 
inner state of crisis (Krise). Stoker describes this “warning” function of conscience by 
comparing three pieces of equipment: a compass, a pressure valve and a seismograph.400 A 
compass is unlike conscience because it provides its user with specific information 
concerning direction. Since a pressure valve only reacts to a defined “quantity” of pressure 
that is considered unsafe, it is also unlike conscience because this would imply there is a 
certain level of evil that can be “tolerated.” For Stoker, the most suitable metaphor is that of 
the seismograph: this instrument constantly monitors the level of seismic activity but does 
not provide precise information regarding its source or its effects. As with a seismograph, 
the warning of conscience is delivered in absolute form and cannot be considered a 
command: it is rather a simple indication that implies an inner threat. As Stoker notes, we 
“know” as little about the origin of the evil within us from our experience of conscience as 
we know about the ultimate source of a disease from the symptoms observed in our body.  
The second moment of Stoker’s conscience experience is one of crisis because the 
warning has revealed an inner conflict within the person. The pain of conscience indicates 
that the “indigenous forces” of the soul—the “healing life forces” of “spiritual love” placed 
in the soul by God—have refused to allow the foreign “enemy” to conquer this “sovereign” 
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territory.401 While the intensity of conscience pain fluctuates depending on the level of evil 
threatening the soul, Stoker insists that “guilt” is felt constantly because the soul is 
essentially impure and must “regretfully” heal itself. For Stoker, it is only the granting of 
ultimate forgiveness by God that can complete this “healing” process.  
The third and final moment of conscience is the indicating of a “way” to recovery: 
for Stoker, this is the “way” of religious experience that brings the soul into unity with 
God. This “way” can be characterized in both negative and positive terms: negatively, it 
shows that the person is necessarily separated from God’s absolute goodness; positively, it 
reveals that the believer can combat the evil within his or her soul through faith and 
repentance. As Stoker notes, this “way” to recovery is the ultimate meaning of conscience: 
the “disease symptom” of one’s “guilty conscience” is a “call-of-duty (Pflichtruf),” a call to 
“healing” that seeks “to preserve the person” through faith.402  
However different in its basic motivations, Stoker’s approach to the 
phenomenological investigation of conscience evidently resembles in many ways the 
Heideggerian interpretation of this phenomenon found in Being and Time. Notwithstanding 
his insistence that God is the necessary source of all existence, Stoker is just as concerned 
as Heidegger is with the need for exhibiting the “how” of experiencing conscience and for 
identifying the conditions of this experience. Similar to what Heidegger claims in Being 
and Time, Stoker insists that this phenomenon must be brought to “show itself in itself” 
because it cannot be properly understood in terms of “observable content.” Although the 
text of Das Gewissen was certainly influenced by its editor, Stoker confirms his 
independence from Scheler by resisting any attempt to establish a value-based ethical 
system on the basis of conscience: the South African is much less concerned with Scheler’s 
notion of value than with his own goal of exhibiting the basic conditions necessary for 
morality, which he reveals to also be the conditions of existence itself.  
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For Stoker, the first condition of existence is the “love” of God that necessarily 
animates experience: existence “begins” with the reception of this love by a “person” 
whose world is lit up by this divine force. The only possible “way” of existing authentically 
for Stoker’s person is the humble response of repentance. This act requires that one break 
free of all “evil” worldly interests that interfere with one’s responsibility to God. The 
“phenomenological” understanding of existence advocated by Stoker is essentially 
determined by one’s guilt for having eclipsed God’s light: while no person can replicate the 
“absolute” purity of the divine spark in one’s soul, one can seek to cherish it, to preserve it 
and to seek repentance for having fallen into evil. For Stoker, one’s seeing the “way” 
disclosed by conscience requires that one recognize that God’s light is what discloses the 
world. The only “certainty” that is revealed to Stoker’s person by conscience is the “fact” 
of one’s essential impurity: it is the experience of an indefinite and content-free “warning.” 
Due to the relative nature of all human knowledge, any notion that this contact with God 
would provide guidance about worldly affairs is necessarily a fallacious “seeming.” Stoker, 
however, does not share Heidegger’s reticence with regard to identifying the ultimate 
authority of the “source” phenomenon itself: for him, the metaphysical source is the 
“absolute” and “eternal” authority of God’s spirit in man. The human response to this 
absolute, in turn, is not the “knowledge” of conscientia but rather the choice to obey or 
disobey one’s “call-of-duty,” the personal call to faith. The distinction between the 
Stokerian “absolute” and the Heideggerian “call of conscience” can be seen clearly by 
contrasting Stoker’s example of skin color as a metaphoric “disease symptom” with 
Heidegger’s revised take on this same metaphor that we find in §7 of Being and Time.   
Stoker’s “Absolute” Symptom: The “Skin Color” of Death 
At the conclusion of his analysis of the “guilty conscience,” Stoker provides the 
example of changes in skin color to illustrate how the “supernatural” phenomenon of 
conscience differs from other types of experience. To explain how conscience is 
incomparable with any condition that can be “doubted,” Stoker expands on the analogy of 
disease symptoms by noting that the color of one’s complexion is often used as a clue of 
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one’s emotional state or as a sign of one’s relative level of health or illness. To visualize 
this, he compares two examples of face color—the “healthy red” of a fresh-faced teenager 
versus the “anemic pallor” of a sick patient—and notes that there are “innumerable 
intermediate colors” between these extremes.403 According to Stoker, this first “superficial” 
level of comparison between face colors tells us nothing about the “true” phenomenon of 
conscience: unlike such “relative” phenomena, conscience can only be understood in terms 
of absolute contrast.  
This metaphor of “complexion” can only be applied to conscience by introducing 
the phenomenon of death, Stoker claims. Just as the conscience experience emerges out of 
the absolute conflict between good and evil, the meaning of bodily symptoms as a 
metaphor for conscience is ultimately dependent on the possible threat to one’s life. 
Disease symptoms only have meaning, Stoker argues, if these symptoms are anchored by 
an “absolute” phenomenon which lies beyond the limits of the intermediate range and 
orients this meaning. With the phenomenon of death, Stoker observes, we have “in this last 
color a completely new tone and new meaning (in dieser letzten Farbe einen gänzlich 
neuen Ton und neuen Sinn)”: something that is essential to the meaning of all life but 
fundamentally alien and opposed to any state of “living.”404 As Stoker explains, his analogy 
cannot be interpreted literally in terms of the actual “colors” of the faces of a living person 
and a corpse; instead, what this metaphor expresses is that the “color” of a lifeless face 
must be recognized as being absolutely “stained” by death.405 The “color” of death is the 
“ultimate color” that contrasts absolutely with all other “colors” of human life.  
Stoker applies this analogy to the confrontation of absolute good and evil indicated 
by the suffering of the “conscience-plagued.” The “disease symptoms” of conscience 
indicate both the presence of pure evil and pure love inside the person; the individual is at 
once punished for his faults and called to assume responsibility for preserving the light of 
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absolutely good that has been placed within his soul by God. For Stoker, the “true” 
phenomenon of conscience is the concernful warning powered by God’s pure love—the 
“call-of-duty”—that seeks to preserve the person’s unity through the act of repentance. 
Observing that the “ontological bond between mother and child” is the cause of “the 
mother’s love for her child,” Stoker claims that the “true” conscience finds its source in the 
“ontological relationship between the living and the Creator.”406 Hearing the “call-of-duty” 
and experiencing “true” conscience allows one to become aware of this ontological 
relationship, i.e. one must come to recognize one’s essential “guilt” in order to then seek 
God’s forgiveness.  
The Certainty of Stoker’s Conscience  
The consequences of Stoker’s “blending together” of phenomenology and theology 
are most evident at the conclusion of Das Gewissen, where the author again takes up his 
analogy of face color and disease symptoms in order to speculate on the possibility of a 
“fundamental unity” between death and evil. Stoker writes:  
We found a powerful analogy between face color (in relationship to other 
face colors) and the conscience experience of real evil (in relationship to 
other moral phenomena), which is also founded in ontic phenomena, namely 
in “death” and in “evil” (in “sin”). Does this analogy have an even deeper 
inner meaning and value? Both phenomena, “death” and “evil,” are 
catastrophic in nature and have an undesirable metaphysical nature; they 
break down and destroy the norms and ideals of self-obligation. Both are 
absolutely negative. I think it would be possible to work out an identity 
between the two that is very deep. Do these ontic phenomena in their 
deepest origins exist only side-by-side? Or do they ultimately make up a real 
fundamental unity?407 
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Here in Das Gewissen’s closing pages, we see Stoker abandoning the principles of his 
improvised “phenomenological” method that had earlier so closely paralleled Heidegger’s 
existential investigation with its emphasis on the disclosing role of conscience. While his 
initial investigation of the experience of conscience had shown how the “person” is 
projected into a “super-biological” conflict,408 Stoker ends his study with a return to the 
traditional approach of metaphysical speculation, going so far as to claim that conscience 
offers “proof” that “eternal life” is possible.409 As he describes the implications of this 
possible link between death and evil, Stoker declares that he is willing to accept 
responsibility for what is revealed by “such a dogmatic thesis”:   
If one establishes (with these dogmas) that a real association and unity 
between death and wickedness (sin) somehow exists…then we can say that 
the conscience, by its nature, crosses over the vital mortality of man and 
demands its “super-vital” immortality. An analogous “mortality”-
phenomenon that shows us the nature of conscience in that it expresses the 
complete overcoming of the evil impulse within us can be very well grasped 
symbolically in the expression of the Christian religion: “The death of the 
old self in us.”410  
While Stoker’s phenomenological approach initially aims to expose the “true” phenomenon 
of conscience, the clearing away of all the previous theories presents Stoker with “fresh 
ground” upon which he can construct anew. If Heidegger and Stoker at times seem to 
proceed along parallel paths in the course of their respective investigations, this ends 
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definitively with Stoker’s “regression” back into speculative metaphysics at the close of 
Das Gewissen.  
Stoker’s allusion to Paul’s “death of the old self” in defense of his “dogmatic” 
interpretation is particularly telling of the distinction that must be made between the 
approaches of Stoker and Heidegger, as the latter had interpreted the Pauline message very 
differently in one of his earliest courses on phenomenological method during the 1920-21 
winter semester at Freiburg. Even in these early lectures, which are not characterized by the 
more brazen radicality of his “existential” period, the young Heidegger advocated a 
phenomenological approach to interpretation that aims to counter the speculative tendency 
exemplified by Stoker’s remarks on conscience and immortality. Beginning his lecture on 
Paul’s letter to the Galatians, Heidegger warns his students that the objectives of 
phenomenological research must remain strictly limited ones:  
[We] do not intend to give a dogmatic or theological-exegetical 
interpretation, nor a historical study…[of Paul’s letter to the Galatians], but 
only guidance for phenomenological understanding. Characteristic of the 
phenomenological-religious understanding is gaining an advance 
understanding for an original way of access (für einen ursprünglichen Weg 
des Zugangs). … The theological method falls out of the framework of our 
study. Only with phenomenological understanding, a new way for theology 
is opened up. The formal indication (formale Anzeige) renounces the last 
understanding that can only be given in genuine religious experience; it 
intends only to open an access to the New Testament.411 
In his analysis of Paul’s letters, Heidegger reads the apostle’s proclamations with an 
eye to the “way” of the Christian life experience—understood in an evidently existential 
sense—and not for the content regarding moral commands, specific forms of conduct and 
speculation about God’s nature. While Paul plainly discussed questions of “law,” the 
phenomenological reading proposed by Heidegger is more concerned with the basic 
comportment of the believer: the “how” of experiencing “Christian hope (der christlichen 
Hoffnung).”412 The Heideggerian interpretation of Paul’s message is irreconcilable with 
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Stoker’s hypothesis that the possibility of eternal life can be “proven” by the experience of 
conscience. For Heidegger, the situation of Paul’s believer is anything but certain: faith is 
never assured. The torment of doubt is constant and the “remembering” of God’s word 
must be constantly renewed. If they understand God’s “call” authentically, those “who are 
called (die Berufenen)”413 regard immortality to be a very secondary matter: “true” faith is 
tested not in the afterlife but in the actualized experience of awaiting parousia, coping with 
existence marked by uncertainty and violent oppression.414 The factical “truth” of enacted 
living—teeming with turmoil and doubt—is what Heidegger seeks to exhibit through his 
phenomenological method:  
The phenomenological explication does not aim at isolated contents, and 
only and primarily at them; rather, it aims at the relations (Bezüge) and 
enactments (Vollzüge), which are readable off the content (in each 
temporally conditioned form). However, these relations and enactments are, 
in turn, not to be elevated in an a priori perpetual armamentarium; rather, 
they are to grasp the sense from the appropriation of one’s own factical 
existence! (von der Aneignung der eigenen faktischen Existenz!)415 
Heidegger further emphasizes this existential aspect as he attempts to access the 
question of Being in Being and Time. Dismissing all proofs of God as the cause of 
existence, Heidegger seeks to recover the “wholeness” of Dasein which provides the basis 
of all possible religious experience, including the “death of the old man” described by Paul. 
For Heidegger, what is so damaging about the “blurring” in Das Gewissen is that it reveals 
that Stoker had forgotten the believer’s essential state of uncertainty. In Heidegger’s eyes, 
Stoker ultimately betrayed the phenomenological method by taking his study of conscience 
to the threshold of an authentic understanding of the “call of conscience” only to retreat in 
search of metaphysical “certainty.” Determined to “prove” the immortality of the soul, 
Stoker concludes by instrumentalizing conscience in the name of theoretical “certainty” 
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and thus neglects the penitent sinner’s experience of utter “strife (Kampf)” and 
“insecurity.”416 
In light of his critical remarks on Das Gewissen, Heidegger’s reference to the 
metaphor of face color in §7 of Being and Time highlights how his phenomenological 
approach rejects the theological speculation proposed by Stoker. By modifying his earlier 
take on disease symptoms, Heidegger acknowledges yet another level of complexity that 
his own method of phenomenological interpretation must overcome. Previously, Heidegger 
had only observed that a phenomenon tends to not show itself (in the case of “appearance”) 
or to show itself as something it is not (in the case of “semblance”). Now, Heidegger adds 
the specific possibility that phenomenological interpretation can also be mislead by 
appearances with the character of “mere semblance,” leading to a search for the 
phenomenon where it is not to be found.  
Using the example of bad lighting that alters “face color” and can lead to a mistaken 
diagnosis, Heidegger takes his distance from Stoker’s confidence in the certainty of 
conscience as a gauge of evil. For Heidegger, no observed “symptom” can provide 
certainty to the existential interpretation—not even the “color of death” or the “taint of 
evil” proposed by Stoker.417 As implied in Heidegger’s footnote to §55, Stoker falls prey to 
the traditional tendency to produce artificial foundations for existence that cover up the 
phenomenon, falsely giving to “everyday” experience the appearance of present-at-hand 
substantiality. Since he had not recognized the radicality of the existential problem, Stoker 
slipped back—according to Heidegger—into the illusion of metaphysics and failed to 
access the authentic phenomenon of conscience.  
Scheler’s Critique of the Heideggerian Call as Solipsistic 
When we take into account the theological concepts that Stoker’s phenomenological 
approach is built upon, Heidegger certainly appears justified in observing that his project 
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differs from Das Gewissen “in its approach and accordingly in its results as well.”418 
Despite the clear parallels between the two investigations and Stoker’s evident influence on 
Being and Time, the dogmatic positions taken by Stoker at the conclusion of his study 
confirm Heidegger’s assessment that their projects are irreconcilable. While he may 
misidentify Stoker’s approach in Das Gewissen with Scheler’s personalism, Heidegger 
accurately distinguishes the aims of his own existential-ontological investigation of Dasein 
from the theological motivations which underlie the study of conscience proposed by 
Stoker. All methodological similarities and common themes aside, the essence of 
conscience is understood in vastly different ways by the two men.  
As we have shown, this is seen most clearly in the fact that Heidegger’s account 
does not contain a single mention of synteresis—the primary concept proposed by Stoker 
for interpreting the experience of conscience. Utterly ignoring the notion of God’s spark 
placed in the soul, Heidegger instead proposes a “call of conscience” that brings Dasein 
back to its ownmost possibility in resoluteness. In Being and Time, Heidegger firmly 
asserts that his conscience is neither the moral conscience nor the religious conscience, 
both of which he claims are derivatives of the existential phenomenon he seeks to 
elucidate. While this prioritizing of the existential does not negate the possibility of moral 
or religious ways of experiencing the phenomenon, the “call of conscience” as interpreted 
by Heidegger is resolutely a-theistic.  
While Heidegger may rightfully argue that his project is radically different from 
Stoker’s investigation of conscience, this radicality forces him to take up an urgent problem 
for his own project: absent an “external” authority such as God, Heidegger’s investigation 
must reveal how Dasein can find the source of its authenticity within itself. If the positing 
of a metaphysical solution is disallowed from the start, how can the authentic disclosedness 
of Dasein be attested as an existentiell possibility? This fundamental problem is raised 
repeatedly by Heidegger as he nears the conclusion of his existential analysis and remains 
unsolved when he criticizes Stoker’s study in §55.  
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In Scheler’s posthumously published notes on Being and Time, we see that the 
editor of Das Gewissen was skeptical with regard to the “success” of Heidegger’s attempt 
at producing this attestation. If the “call of conscience” cannot fulfill its fundamental role 
of showing how Dasein can exist authentically, then Scheler concludes that the 
Heideggerian project must be regarded as essentially “solipsistic”:  
[What] I reject in Heidegger is the solipsism of existence, which he takes as 
his point of departure. It represents a pure reversal of the Cartesian “cogito 
ergo sum” into a “sum ergo cogito.” But even in Heidegger there persists the 
fundamental error of Descartes, namely, that that which, in the order to the 
being of entities, is in fact the farthest off of all (one’s own ego; and 
basically this also holds in Heidegger’s own doctrine of Dasein’s “loss of the 
world”) is held to be given as primary. What is Dasein and “Being-in-the-
world” supposed to mean? Here he introduces the word “world” which is not 
only very ambiguous (and world is actually not primarily given; according to 
Kant it is in fact only an “idea” of the progress of the understanding) but also 
pregnant with the whole theistic theology of the past, because world 
possesses a definite meaning only in opposition to “God.” Furthermore what 
does it mean for the solus ipse that its kind of being is Dasein and that 
Dasein is “Being-in-the-world”? Here the “in” is not supposed to mean 
anything like “enclosed.” According to Heidegger “world” itself precedes in 
Being all spatiality and temporality. Here “Being-in” is supposed to mean 
something like “Being caught up in something” or “Being involved in 
something.” Can this idea have any meaning at all unless the “solus ipse” 
also experiences itself as independent from the world—something 
Heidegger cannot admit? Aren’t these the gloomy old theologoumena of 
Calvinist origin (cf. also “thrownness”), which are here translated into an 
apparently pure ontological language?419 
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Denying Heidegger’s claim to radicality, Scheler finds Being and Time to be dependent on 
the same kinds of presuppositions that his young German contemporary wishes to expose 
as inauthentic.  
Beyond the question of whether Heidegger’s destructive approach succeeds in 
revealing “reality” as illusory or not, what Scheler emphasizes here echoes Heidegger’s 
own concerns regarding the role of conscience: how can Dasein’s conscience attest to the 
possibility of authentic disclosedness if it is impossible to conceive of “Being-in-the-world” 
participating authentically in the “world”? While Scheler does not specifically criticize 
Heidegger’s notion of conscience, his charge of “solipsism” undermines Heidegger’s claim 
in Being and Time “that Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom the 
appeal is made.”420 While Heidegger may deny “God” as the source of existence, Scheler 
considers Being and Time just as dependent on theological tradition because it represents a 
“negative image” of the same dogmatic structures. Interestingly, Scheler links Heidegger’s 
existential concept of “thrownness” with the “gloomy” Calvinist worldview, recalling his 
earlier criticism of Stoker’s investigation for its excessive reliance upon a single “historical 
appearance” of conscience as exemplified by the person of Calvin.421 Regarding the 
“experience” of conscience, Heidegger and Stoker thus propose mirror images of each 
other’s concepts of conscience when considered in the light of Scheler’s comments: where 
Stoker’s “call-of-duty” echoes inside God’s creatures due to the presence of synteresis, 
Heidegger’s “call of conscience” from Dasein to itself means nothing without “God” 
because existence is essentially defined as being “God”-less. Scheler refuses to accept the 
Heideggerian notion of a “Being-in-the-world” that can find in itself the conditions for the 
possibility of its own existence. Where Heidegger “hears” a summons that comes “from me 
and yet from beyond me and over me,” Scheler insists that thinking about existence must 
also be shown to be possible as the experience of Dasein in the world: the “beyond me and 
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over me” must also be “from the world and through the world.”422 What Scheler’s 
comments imply is that absent such a demonstration, the primordial “source” of 
Heidegger’s authentic existence is reduced to a solipsistic call: Dasein can only call itself if 
it is a phantasmic Being-without-a-world. 
Stoker’s Divine Authority of Conscience  
Whatever its defects, Stoker’s approach to conscience proposed a clear—if 
dogmatic—way to conceive the phenomenological beginning. According to Stoker’s 
account of conscience, intentionality is understood in the movements of caring and faith: 
authentic existence arises out of one’s obedient response to God’s “call-of-duty.” All 
experiencing of the world is possible only through one’s seeing the reflected light of 
synteresis, the divine spark placed in the soul. The intentional movement of Stoker’s person 
“out” to the world cannot occur without this illuminating synteresis: worldly “reality” is 
disclosed exclusively by its light.  
Stoker regards faith as the personal response that is necessary for all genuine 
actualizing of experience: while faith can become deteriorated, existence is possible only 
through the “receiving” of the light of synteresis. Even in its most primitive and degenerate 
forms, experience is an act of “sensing” and “seeing” God’s light because for Stoker the 
world is disclosed exclusively in the shadowy contrasts of good and evil. The relative 
quality or “depth” of one’s experience of existence depends upon the purity of one’s 
“faith.” For example, those who regard conscience as a pathology or who cling to inferior 
beliefs regarding God (Stoker provides “pantheism, deism and atheism” as examples of 
such beliefs423) experience reality superficially, while those who acknowledge God’s love 
as the “ultimate meaning” of conscience are able to experience reality in “its full depth.”424 
The field of “absolute consciousness” that provides the metaphysical basis for Husserlian 
intentionality is replaced in Stoker’s account by an initial movement of “pure giving” that 
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is explicitly attributed to God. When the “true” source of “moral conscience” is revealed 
through faith, the believer recognizes that the world is shaped by his or her personal 
relationship with God: the “way” to return to unity with God requires hearing the “call-of-
duty,” cherishing the divine gift of synteresis, and repenting for our sins as they are 
revealed by the pain of conscience.  
In “discovering” this absolute source of existence, Stoker recognizes that his project 
has exposed a number of “metaphysical problems,” ranging from the problem of theodicy 
to the question of eternal life.425 Reflecting this fact, significant portions of Das Gewissen 
are devoted to such theological questions and their investigation is what leads to Stoker’s 
sudden abandonment of his “phenomenological” approach to conscience as a “personal 
experience.” In the book’s concluding pages, Stoker adopts an increasingly “metaphysical” 
approach to moral questions related to conscience and explicitly concedes that his study has 
entered into “dogmatic” territory.426 But while Stoker’s study may ultimately veer away 
from phenomenological principles, his interpretation of synteresis “solves” the problem 
that Heidegger must confront in Being and Time regarding the possibility of conscience as 
an experience of Dasein. By claiming synteresis as the source of his conscience 
phenomenon, Stoker effectively enlists God as the ultimate authority for his “call-of-duty” 
and thereby avoids the necessity of undertaking the Heideggerian search for Dasein’s “self-
attestation.”  
Pentecost Monday 1926: The First Glimpse of Heidegger’s “Call of Conscience” 
In Heidegger’s published texts, we find only one indication prior to Being and 
Time’s publication in April 1927 of the solution which he will adopt to overcome the 
problematic question of the “source” of conscience. In his talk of Pentecost Monday 1926 
before the Academic Association of Marburg427—slightly less than a year before Being and 
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Time was printed—Heidegger proposes that “Dasein has the intrinsic possibility of being 
called by itself through conscience.”428 Unlike the earlier Heideggerian texts which we 
reviewed in Part One of our study, this document cannot be classified within what we 
identified as the “pre-Being and Time” period of 1919-1925 because Heidegger’s talk to 
this intimate group of Marburg intellectuals and students took place after Heidegger had 
completed the working manuscript of Being and Time through the end of §76.429 When he 
gives this talk, Heidegger has already finished drafting his much more detailed 
interpretations of Dasein’s key authentic phenomena of Being-towards-death and 
conscience that are proposed for the first time in Being and Time. By this point, he has thus 
both read Stoker’s Das Gewissen and integrated its content into his own work on 
conscience. Given that the manuscript of Being and Time is now virtually complete, 
Heidegger’s unprecedented remarks on conscience at this Marburg gathering of May 24, 
1926 provide what we can consider to be the first glimpse of the “call of conscience” which 
appears in Being and Time.  
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Although this short talk on “truth” contains only a few lines on conscience, these 
indicate that Heidegger has found a new way of expressing the “how” of Dasein’s 
experience of coming into “resoluteness”: Dasein is “summoned to its proper Being” by the 
“inner voice of conscience (innere Stimme des Gewissens).”430 This “silent” and “inner 
voice” is the way Dasein calls itself to the “resolute openness…[of] willingness to have a 
conscience (Entschlossenheit zu Gewissen-haben-wollen).”431 Although Heidegger does not 
emphasize the methodological importance of this “source” of authentic existence as he does 
in Being and Time, we see for the first time that the “voice of conscience”—explicitly 
described in terms of “calling” and “summoning”—is what provides the “unique” means 
whereby Dasein can experience itself authentically and access “its proper Being.”432 With 
this phenomenon of the “inner voice,” Heidegger indicates a way for accessing the “how” 
of Dasein’s experience without relying on an external authority: “conscience” allows 
Dasein to come into “resolute openness” through “action.”433 In this sense, Heidegger 
indicates how the “voice” provides access to the “basic constitution of Dasein,” understood 
explicitly as its “existential” constitution rather than the “psychic” one that is prioritized by 
the tradition with its notion of conscientia. Although Heidegger does not specifically point 
out the methodological implications of this “voice” to his Marburg audience, it is only 
through Dasein’s hearing of this “voice” that the ontological question of “the proper Being 
of Dasein” can be raised.434 As Heidegger states: 
The way of Dasein is to discover. Likewise, one’s own Dasein is not 
discovered through psychoanalysis and psychic sleuthing, but through the 
way of Being in which it itself resides, through action. Dasein is situated in 
action. Acting involves resolute openness toward something. Such an 
openness is the basic mode in which I find myself. Resolute openness 
toward what? Such an openness does not say what I am, in which it recounts 
something about my psychic constitution. It is rather related to a willingness 
to have a conscience, the resoluteness to not allow the conscience to be 
distorted, which would make it impossible for conscience to disclose Dasein 
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itself. This inner voice of conscience is what properly discloses Dasein to 
me, to the extent that I am intimately with myself. This unique way of 
uncovering and disclosing that lies in conscience and prescribes for me the 
temporally particular possibility of my Being, this mode of resolute 
openness has the character of keeping silent. The voice of conscience speaks 
in silence. Every other mode of uncovering expresses itself, becomes logos, 
comes to words and language. The basic constitution of Dasein has the 
intrinsic possibility of being called by itself through conscience and 
summoned to its proper Being. The resolve of willing to have a conscience, 
the conscience itself, is therefore the proper Being of Dasein. Truth proper is 
the conscience because Dasein itself is in the truth.435 
Radically distinguishing his conscience from the tradition’s conscientia, Heidegger 
indicates that the “silence” of this “voice” eliminates the distortion caused by “words and 
language”; for Heidegger, the “silence” of conscience represents the only “mode of 
uncovering” that allows Dasein to experience itself authentically without falling into to the 
illusion that it possesses “certain knowledge” regarding the “objective” and “external” 
world.436 As a sort of antidote to the “distorting” effect of logos, the “silent summoning” of 
conscience discloses the “proper truth” of Dasein by calling it to the possibility of 
resoluteness in the face of existence’s uncertainty.437 In Heidegger’s talk of Pentecost 
Monday 1926, the theologically-inspired “call of duty” of divine authority to the individual 
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that Stoker describes in Das Gewissen438 is transformed into the “intrinsic possibility” of 
Dasein’s “being called by itself” through its own silence.439 
With this identification of a “source” of existence that avoids the need to posit an 
external “absolute,” Heidegger reveals the “voice of conscience” to be the “unique way of 
[authentic] uncovering and disclosing” that makes possible his proposed investigation of 
Being.440 Although he does not explicitly mention the methodological significance of this 
discovery, this phenomenon of the “silent call” that eliminates all distortion caused by 
logos will prove to be the pivotal concept of Being and Time: this “summons” is the 
exclusive means for coming into “resolute openness” and exhibiting Dasein’s “authentic 
structures.” Conscience not only “reveals” the constitutive phenomena of Dasein and 
provides access to the question of authentic temporality, it also fulfils the essential 
methodological role of attesting to Dasein’s authentic existence as mode of existence which 
can be experienced by Being-in-the-world. What Heidegger describes on Pentecost 
Monday 1926 as the “intrinsic possibility of being called by itself”441 will prove in Being 
and Time to be the essential “attestation” of Dasein’s “authentic potentiality-for-Being,” 
which he will reveal to have “its roots in Dasein’s Being” without requiring recourse to an 
absolute or external power.442  
Observing publicly for the first time that conscience should be regarded as a “call” 
or “summons,” Heidegger in his May 24, 1926 address takes an initial step toward 
proposing a solution to the question he raised during the 1919 “war emergency semester”: 
how existence can be experienced as “self-certifying”?443 Where Heidegger had earlier 
emphasized the need to identify the “basis” of this “self-certifying,”444 he now places the 
focus on the phenomenological interpretation of “resolute openness” which is constituted 
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by Dasein’s both calling “itself through conscience” and wanting “to have a conscience.”445 
With his notion of conscience understood as a “summoning call,” Heidegger indicates a 
source within Dasein itself that makes possible the “self-certifying” at the heart of his 
evolving phenomenological approach.  
As the excerpt from his Marburg lecture above shows, Heidegger does not highlight 
the vital methodological function of conscience in this presentation to the Marburg 
Academic Association in the spring of 1926. This text on “truth” is focused more on the 
themes of Being and Time’s §44 where he deconstructs the traditional “concept of truth as 
agreement” between “objective” statements and “real” facts.446 Nonetheless, these few lines 
included just prior to the conclusion of his talk make it clear that Heidegger has recognized 
and found a new way to express the essential role of conscience as Dasein’s means of 
coming into resoluteness. To access its “mode of resolute openness,” Dasein must be 
“summoned” to itself by conscience.447 What remains to be shown—as Heidegger will state 
explicitly in Being and Time—is how conscience can provide the “attestation” that this 
possibility of resoluteness can actually be experienced by Being-in-the-world?448 Rather 
than attempting to construct a “basis” for the “self-certification” that had concerned him 
previously,449 Heidegger is now searching for the “attestation” that Dasein can exist 
authentically and as a “whole”450: how can Dasein as Being-in-the-world “situated in action 
(liegt im Handeln)” at once silently call itself and be reached by this silent call?451 
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3. The Pivotal Role of the “Call of Conscience” in Being 
and Time  
3.1. Analyzing Heidegger’s Interpretation of Conscience (§§ 54-60) 
When Heidegger introduces the phenomenon of conscience in §54 of Being and 
Time, his investigation of Dasein’s existential structures is facing a critical problem: his 
project has still not shown how the phenomenon of Dasein can be accessed in its possibility 
of authenticity or as a whole. In the preceding existential analysis of Division One, 
Heidegger revealed the basic phenomena constitutive of Dasein and described its 
“everyday” mode of existence. Heidegger has also shown how Dasein’s “wholeness” can 
be understood in existential terms through his interpretation of Being-towards-death. Yet 
despite these “successes,” Heidegger recognizes that his investigation has not yet lived up 
to the standard that he himself established at the very start:  
The fact that an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is ontologically 
possible for Dasein, signifies nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical 
potentiality-for-Being has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself. … [We] 
must investigate whether to any extent and in any way Dasein gives 
testimony, from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, as to a possible 
authenticity of its existence, so that it not only makes known that in an 
existentiell manner such authenticity is possible, but demands this of 
itself.452  
As Jean-François Courtine observes in his article “Voice of Conscience and Call of Being”: 
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[Heidegger] must still show how this own Being-able-to-be belongs to 
Dasein as ontic possibility, phenomenally avowed. The question of Being-
whole proper to Dasein must be brought back to the phenomenal ground 
which alone may serve as touchstone, if one wants to limit oneself to the 
“possible property of its Being, as it is attested by Dasein itself.”453 
In this section of our investigation, we will examine how Heidegger interprets conscience 
in Being and Time as the phenomenon that provides an attestation of Dasein’s possibility of 
authenticity. Building on our foregoing review of the evolution of Heidegger’s 
understanding of conscience prior to 1927 and of his encounter with Stoker’s 
groundbreaking study, our analysis will focus on the new way in which Heidegger 
interprets conscience as a call to Dasein that comes from itself. Heidegger’s interpretation 
of this “call of conscience” as the attesting source of Dasein’s “authentic existence” is 
intended both to complete his interpretation of Dasein’s existential structures and to explain 
how his investigation obtains “access” to Being-in-the-world as a phenomenal whole. As 
the attestation of Dasein’s possibility of authentic understanding, the “call of conscience” is 
revealed as the primordial phenomenon upon which the methodology of Being and Time is 
based: conscience orients Dasein so it can “see through” the ambiguity of “everyday” 
existence and “come back” to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.  
Our examination of conscience in Being and Time will proceed as follows: 1) We 
will review the context related to Heidegger’s introduction of this new concept of the “call 
of conscience” and the need for it as an “attestation” of Dasein’s possibility of authentic 
existence. 2) We will conduct a section-by-section analysis of the second chapter of 
Division Two (§§54-60) in order to exhibit the key concepts related to Heidegger’s 
interpretation of conscience. 3) Recognizing Heidegger’s concern that the problem of 
“attestation” threatens to derail the entire project of Being and Time, we will focus our 
attention on the methodological implications of the apparently “insufficient” attestation of 
conscience.454 In so doing, we will establish that conscience plays a vital methodological 
role as the initiating call that brings Dasein into authentic disclosedness and is closely 
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related to Heidegger’s “method” of formal indication, which he elsewhere describes as 
“indispensable for an ultimate understanding” of Being and Time.455 4) We will attempt to 
identify “clues” in Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience that “indicatively” reveal a way 
to overcome the problem of attestation in Being and Time. By reconsidering the 
relationship of Heidegger’s conscience with the phenomena of discourse, truth, solicitude 
and anticipation, we will seek to uncover an “existentiell possibility” of the “call of 
conscience” that provides the attestation of Dasein’s “authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-
whole.”456 
The Context of Heidegger’s Introduction of Conscience in Being and Time 
The problem of Dasein’s wholeness is one that preoccupies Heidegger throughout 
Being and Time and explains why his degree of satisfaction with the progress of his 
investigation is so volatile. At the very beginning of his work, Heidegger sets a requirement 
for his existential study of Dasein: the wholeness of the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world 
must be preserved. As he declares in his introduction to Being and Time, this represents an 
inviolable principle of his existential-ontological approach: 
In the interpretation of Dasein, [its fundamental structure] is something ‘a 
priori’; it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole 
(sondern eine ursprünglich unde ständig ganze Struktur). It affords us, 
however, various ways of looking at the items which are constitutive for it. 
The whole of this structure always comes first; but if we keep this constantly 
in view, these items, as phenomena, will be made to stand out.457 
With this principle established, Heidegger makes clear that his existential analysis will seek 
to expose the constitutive elements of Being-in-the-world in order to question the meaning 
of its very Being as a whole phenomenon. In the “preparatory” phase of Division One, 
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Heidegger thus pursues a series of investigations of Dasein’s basic state in “everydayness” 
and how it encounters entities and other Daseins within the world. 
These initial investigations lead up to Heidegger’s first attempt to interpret the 
structural totality of “everyday” Being-in-the-world through the phenomenon that he calls 
“falling (Verfallen).” Heidegger describes “falling” as the “basic kind of Being” which 
belongs to Dasein in its most common ways of experiencing the world: in this mode of 
existence, Dasein’s authentic care for its own individual possibilities is transformed into 
concern for the “events” and “things” of the public world of the “they.”458 As a result, 
Dasein hides from itself—indeed, it utterly loses itself—by anonymously following the 
crowd and existing according to ways in which the world is publicly interpreted. Through 
his analysis, Heidegger shows how the interconnected phenomena of idle talk, curiosity and 
ambiguity characterize Dasein’s state of “falling” wherein it is “completely fascinated by 
the ‘world’…and the ‘they.’”459 With his interpretation of “falling,” Heidegger affirms that 
a certain “phenomenal totality” of the “essential ontological structure of Dasein itself” has 
been satisfactorily obtained.460 Notwithstanding that the exhibition of Dasein remains 
incomplete and that Heidegger recognizes the need for an analysis of authentic existence, 
his conclusion at the end of §38 is unequivocal:  
The leading question of this chapter has been about the Being of the “there.” 
Our theme has been the ontological constitution of the disclosedness which 
essentially belongs to Dasein. … [With] this analysis, the whole existential 
constitution of Dasein has been laid bare in its principal features, and we 
have obtained the phenomenal ground for a ‘comprehensive’ interpretation 
of Dasein’s Being as care.461 
Yet after this “success” at the end of §38, Heidegger’s level of satisfaction with the 
progress of his project appears to slip dramatically. By the end of his interpretation of truth 
in §44, Heidegger concedes that his grasp of Dasein’s wholeness seems to have fallen well 
below the standard that he initially set for his phenomenological approach, i.e. in terms of 
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what Heidegger described in §7 as the “species of exhibiting and explicating…demanded 
by this research.”462 The last three sentences of Division One reveal that his analysis, at 
least to this point of the investigation, has not satisfied the basic criterion of preserving 
Dasein’s wholeness:  
But is the phenomenon of care one in which the most primordial existential-
ontological state of Dasein is disclosed? And has the structural manifoldness 
which lies in this phenomenon, presented us with the most primordial 
totality of factical Dasein’s Being? Has our investigation up to this point 
ever brought Dasein into view as a whole?463 
While his efforts in Division One have allowed Heidegger to interpret the 
phenomenon of care as the Being of Dasein, this “breakthrough” appears to have been 
achieved at an excessively high cost: the interpretative work has advanced without 
preserving Dasein as a “whole” phenomenon. This implies that none of the “insights” 
obtained thus far have been attested as possible in “existentiell” terms. In other words, 
Heidegger has not shown how these constitutive phenomena of Dasein can possibly be 
experienced by Being-in-the-world as an actual and “whole” phenomenon.  
In Division Two’s opening chapter on death (§§45-53), Heidegger indicates the 
urgency of finding a way to bring Dasein’s wholeness back into view. As he explains, the 
discovery of care as the Being of Dasein makes the wholeness of this phenomenon 
problematic because the “‘ahead-of-itself (Sichvorweg),’ as an item in the structure of care, 
tells us unambiguously that in Dasein there is always something still outstanding.”464 The 
legitimacy of Heidegger’s project can therefore only be preserved by showing how care, 
with its problematic nature of “Being-ahead-of-itself,” can be understood as the 
phenomenal basis of Dasein’s “wholeness.” As Heidegger states at the opening of Division 
Two: “The inadequacy of the hermeneutical situation from which the preceding analysis of 
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Dasein has arisen, must be surmounted.”465 Heidegger thus opens his study of death on a 
cautionary note: the investigation must proceed in constant awareness that the most 
common interpretations of death are inauthentic. Having already identified the inauthentic 
structures of Dasein, Heidegger now seeks to conceive an “end” of Being-in-the-world that 
reflects the existential nature of his project.  
Keeping constantly in view the existential constitution of Dasein already set 
forth, we must try to decide how inappropriate to Dasein ontologically are 
those conceptions of end and totality which first thrust themselves to the 
fore…466 
The existential understanding of death must guard against the typical worldly sense of 
“end” in terms of spatio-temporality or some other such present-at-hand conception. The 
end of Dasein cannot be observed or calculated in the same way as worldly objects can be 
measured or evaluated. For Heidegger, totality is not a quantitative notion that can be 
understood in terms of stopping or finishing. The existential “end” means complete 
annihilation, something that is “impossible” in one’s “everyday” experience of the world. 
The essence of “Being-a-whole” is the unavoidable fact of one’s own impossibility: the 
certainty of each individual Dasein’s own death.467 
To authentically understand Dasein’s death involves breaking away from the 
domination of “everyday,” worldly understandings of space and time. The end of Dasein is 
not the completed assembly of a collection of parts, or a minute-by-minute, second-by-
second countdown towards a moment of extinction that can be prepared for. Rather, 
Dasein’s Being is characterized by “a constant ‘lack of totality’ which finds an end with 
death.”468 Dasein’s existence is determined by the “not-yet” of its eventual annihilation, the 
final impossibility of its existence that stands before it in the future. Dasein is the “not-yet” 
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of its impending end. As Heidegger specifies, death cannot be defined ontologically as 
“lack-of-togetherness…[or] being-missing as still-outstanding” founded upon a sum.469 
That which makes up the ‘lack of totality’ in Dasein, the constant “ahead-of-
itself,” is neither something still outstanding in a summative togetherness, 
nor something which has not yet become accessible. It is a “not-yet” which 
any Dasein, as the entity which is, has to be.470  
In its life, Dasein is “running its course” and its totality is reached when this “course” 
comes to an end at death. This ending, however, is not based on “a ‘continuing’ piecing-on 
of entities” or reaching a specified “finish line” that can be measured and marked off.471 
Dasein’s experience of death is rather that of Being-towards-death, the anticipation of that 
which lies ahead and exposes Dasein to its coming annihilation in the here and now. In “its 
course,” Dasein moves towards this death but cannot “see it coming” because there is 
nothing to see coming. Death is the abyss that lies beyond the fog of Dasein’s existence.  
Just as the whole of Dasein is not obtained by collecting its parts, death cannot be 
understood as its fulfillment or its perfect state. The common remark that so-and-so “lived 
life to the fullest” is an example of such a misunderstanding: Dasein is not provided with a 
list of authentic possibilities that it checks off and hands in on judgment day, according to 
Heidegger.  
With its death, has [Dasein] necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? 
Rather, are not these precisely what gets taken away from Dasein? … The 
“ending” which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify 
Dasein’s Being-at-an-end (Zu-Ende-sein), but a Being-towards-the-end (Sein 
zum Ende) of this entity.472 
The experience of death for Dasein is not the end itself but rather the coming-towards-the-
end. With its end, Dasein is extinguished; deprived of life, it has no possibility of Being 
and is no longer called to itself by conscience. It is in Being-towards-death—Being-
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towards this annihilation of its Being and the end of all its possibilities—that Dasein 
experiences the “wholeness” that is its constant truth.  
Nonetheless, Dasein can blind itself and ignore the authentic truth of its finite 
existence. In such dereliction, Dasein refuses to acknowledge its Being-towards-death and 
seeks shelter among the “they” rather than accepting to face of its ownmost certainty. In 
dissimulating itself in the public world, Dasein dodges the true anticipatory sense of death 
by attending only to what concerns it in the present.  
In the publicness with which we are with one another in our everyday 
manner, death is ‘known’ as a mishap which is constantly occurring… The 
“they” has already stowed away an interpretation for this event. It talks of it 
in a ‘fugitive’ manner…as if to say, “One of these days one will die too, in 
the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us.” … In such talking, death 
is understood as an indefinite something which, above all, …is proximally 
not yet present-at-hand for oneself, and is therefore no threat.473 
In “everydayness,” Dasein numbs itself in the comforting discourse of the “they” that offers 
“constant tranquillization about death.”474 Death becomes an anonymous “actuality” that 
occurs in the world. The talk of the “they” about death is “ambiguous,” so by joining in this 
conversation Dasein is able to conceal from itself the fact that death is “the distinctive 
potentiality-for-Being which belongs to Dasein’s ownmost self.”475 Dasein even covers up 
the authentic possibilities of others who are approaching death, e.g. in seeking to reassure 
the terminally ill that they are getting better and will “soon return to the tranquillized 
everydayness of the world of his concern.”476 For the “they,” the “dying of others” 
represents a “social inconvenience, if not even a downright tactlessness” on the part of the 
dying.477   
In Heidegger’s analysis, the phenomenon of Being-towards-death provides the basis 
for Dasein’s freedom when it authentically assumes its responsibility to care for its Being. 
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In freeing itself for anxiety (Angst), Dasein recognizes itself as Being-towards-death and 
emerges from the anonymity of the “they” where it has avoided its ownmost possibility.  
[In authenticity, Dasein is brought] face to face with the possibility of being 
itself…in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has 
been released from the illusions of the “they,” and which is factical, certain 
of itself, and anxious.478 
One of the essential characteristics of Dasein’s disclosedness is the anticipation 
(Vorlaufen) of its totality in death. Exhibiting the priority of the existential interpretation 
for his ontological project, Heidegger argues that any “actualizing” of death implies the 
possibility of one’s demise, which he has shown to be impossible. Such “actualizing” 
would “deprive [Dasein] of the very ground for an existing Being-towards-death (den 
Boden für ein existierendes Sein zum Tode).”479 In the existential interpretation, what 
Dasein “actualizes” is not death itself but Being-towards-death as one’s ownmost 
possibility that is anticipated in terms of authentic care.  
Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of that 
entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. … Anticipation turns out to 
be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost 
potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, the possibility of authentic 
existence.480 
In becoming “free for one’s own death” through anticipation, Dasein resists being buffeted 
about by the “they” and understands that its ownmost possibility is essentially related to its 
impending end.481  
Since anticipation of the possibility which is not to be outstripped discloses 
also all the possibilities which lie ahead of that possibility, this anticipation 
includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance in an 
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existentiell manner; that is to say, it includes the possibility of existing as a 
whole potentiality-for-Being.482 
Concluding the chapter on death, Heidegger explicitly states that his existential 
interpretation of Being-towards-death remains an unattested concept at this point of his 
project. To live up to his own phenomenological standards, Heidegger must show how this 
phenomenon of Being-towards-death is both existentially necessarily and ontically 
possible. As Heidegger writes: 
Does Dasein ever factically throw itself into such a Being-towards-death? 
Does Dasein demand, even by reason of its ownmost Being, an authentic 
potentiality-for-Being determined by anticipation?...The question of 
Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole and of its existential constitution still 
hangs in mid-air. It can be put on a phenomenal basis which will stand the 
test only if it can cling to a possible authenticity of its Being which is 
attested by Dasein itself (wenn sie sich an eine vom Dasein selbst bezeugte 
mögliche Eigentlichkeit seines Seins halten kann).483 
Conscience and the Problem of Attestation (§54) 
In is precisely in this context and to answer this decisive question that Heidegger 
introduces his existential concept of conscience in §54 of Being and Time. Its very specific 
objective is to show how Dasein’s authenticity can “be attested in its existentiell possibility 
by Dasein itself.”484 To allow his investigation to access Dasein as a “whole” phenomenon, 
Heidegger devotes himself to this task of providing an “attestation (Bezeugung)” of “an 
authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein (eigentliches Seinkönnen des Daseins).”485 As 
evidenced by the title of §54, “The Problem of How an Authentic Existentiell Possibility is 
Attested,” Heidegger explicitly recognizes that the producing of this “attestation” is indeed 
problematic. Thus far in Being and Time, the existential interpretation of Being-in-the-
world has not shown how it is possible for Dasein in “falling” to escape the clutches of the 
public “they” that rules “everyday” existence. What his foregoing analysis has emphasized 
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is Dasein’s essential tendency to blend into the anonymous “they’ in order to avoid having 
to decide for itself. In §54, Heidegger states that he must show how Dasein can counter this 
tendency so that it can authentically come into “disclosedness” and achieve a “transparent” 
understanding of itself and its involvement in the world. Ironically, it is the presupposition 
of such “authentic” understanding that has allowed for Dasein’s existential structures to be 
revealed in Heidegger’s preceding analysis of “everyday” existence: all along, his analysis 
has advanced on the basis of an “authentic” understanding of the phenomena that have been 
uncovered. Thus the legitimacy of Heidegger’s entire project depends upon the success of 
this “attestation”: the mandatory “wholeness” of Dasein demands that the authentic mode 
of existence—the equiprimordial “flipside” of “everydayness”—be shown to be possible 
for Being-in-the-world.  
Furthermore, Heidegger insists that this “attestation” must respect another 
fundamental principle of his approach to phenomenology: in exhibiting the constitutive 
phenomena that are essential to Being-in-the-world, there must be no speculative recourse 
to an external source in order to explain how existence is possible. As seen in his rejection 
of Stokerian conscience “powered” by divine “synteresis,” Heidegger closes the door to 
any notion of an absolute authority in his ontological investigation. Dasein’s Being must be 
explained exclusively in terms of the phenomena revealed as constitutive for it. In 
Heidegger’s words, this “attestation” of the authentic mode of existence must “have its 
roots (ihre Wurzel) in Dasein’s Being.”486 The “attestation” must be produced “by Dasein 
itself (von diesem selbst)” and must “be such that we can find it (selbst sich finden)” 
because we—as the investigators following Heidegger’s phenomenological indications—
exist in the basic state of Being that we are analyzing.487 For Heidegger, this “attestation” is 
neither a simple validation of the existential interpretation of Dasein nor a theoretical 
confirmation of the “wholeness” of Dasein as a phenomenon. It is rather the revealing of 
“an authentic potentiality-for-Being-one’s-self” that Dasein can only come to understand by 
recognizing the possibility of authentic “selfhood (Selbstheit)…as a way of existing (Weise 
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zu existieren), and therefore not as an entity present-at-hand.”488 The success of Being and 
Time’s interpretation of Dasein requires that Heidegger be able to show how Dasein can 
shed its identity as “they-self (Man-selbst)” and experience the “existentiell modification of 
the ‘they’” that allows for the possibility of “authentic Being-one’s-self.”489 Emphasizing 
the fact that Being and Time itself represents a performance of this modification, Heidegger 
promises that his investigation will “include a demonstration that in Dasein’s state of Being 
[this attestation] has its source.”490  
In describing this “attestation,” Heidegger insists that his investigation does not 
seek to reveal a “new” Dasein that eliminates inauthentic “everydayness” from existence. 
Instead, this modification is described as a reversal of Dasein’s tendency to lose itself in the 
“they” where all “possibilities of Being” are stripped from Dasein and “already…decided 
upon.”491 As a result of this reversal, Dasein comes into the possibility of “making up for 
not choosing” by “deciding for a potentiality-for-Being…from one’s own self.”492 In order 
to actualize this “making up,” Dasein must open itself up to the possibility of authenticity 
by “bringing itself back (Sichzurückholen)” from the “they”;493 according to Heidegger, 
this return is possible because Dasein is constantly called back to itself. As he states: 
[Because] Dasein is lost in the “they” (in das Man verloren ist), it must first 
find itself (sich zuvor finden). In order to find itself at all, it must be ‘shown’ 
to itself in its possible authenticity (in seiner möglichen Eigentlichkeit 
„gezeigt“ werden). In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a 
potentiality-for-Being-its-self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. 
(Das Dasein bedarf der Bezeugung eines Selbstseinkönnens, das es der 
Möglichkeit nach je schon ist.)494 
In response to this need, Heidegger introduces his existential concept of conscience and 
assigns it the pivotal role of attesting the possibility of Dasein’s authentic existence. For 
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Heidegger, the phenomenon of conscience not only serves to demonstrate Dasein’s 
authentic potentiality-for-Being as a possibility but also represents the basic source of 
authentic disclosedness upon which Being and Time is structured.  
In the following interpretation we shall claim that this potentiality is attested 
by that which, in Dasein’s everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us 
as the “voice of conscience (Stimme des Gewissens)”.495 
Displaying his awareness of the controversial history of conscience as a 
philosophical and theological concept, Heidegger immediately acknowledges the fact that 
“conscience has been disputed, that its function as a higher court for Dasein’s existence has 
been variously assessed, and that ‘what conscience says’ has been interpreted in manifold 
ways.”496 Highlighting this ambiguity, he claims the “doubtfulness” surrounding 
conscience serves to “prove (bewiese) that here a primordial phenomenon of Dasein lies 
before us.”497 We will later consider some problems concerning Heidegger’s interpretation 
of conscience, but we can immediately observe that the ambiguous nature of the “everyday 
interpretation” of conscience appears insufficient as “proof” of the primordiality of this 
phenomenon. The mere fact that conscience is controversial does not mean that it is 
existentially essential to Dasein’s Being. For now, however, let us simply take note of this 
potential problem and continue with our review of how Heidegger interprets conscience.  
The first step of Heidegger’s investigation requires that conscience be “[traced] 
back to its existential foundations and structures and [be made] visible as a phenomenon of 
Dasein” based on what has been revealed by the foregoing analyses of Dasein’s 
constitutive phenomena.498 In other words, his interpretation of conscience must faithfully 
reflect the principle that all “everyday,” “present-at-hand” and theoretical conceptions be 
rejected from the start. All forms of recourse to “any description and classification of 
experiences of conscience” or “any biological ‘explanation’” are denied, as is “any 
employment of this phenomenon for proofs of God or for establishing an ‘immediate’ 
                                                 
495
 SZ §54, 268 / 313. 
496
 SZ §54, 268 / 313. 
497
 SZ §54, 268 / 313. 
498
 SZ §54, 268-269 / 313. 
 167 
 
 
consciousness of God.”499 Heidegger’s restrictions are intended to protect the phenomenon 
of conscience from the prejudice of tradition with its ceaseless demands for “inductive 
empirical proof” of the “voice” of conscience. This insistence “rests upon an ontological 
perversion of phenomenon” and a failure to recognize that conscience is different “from 
what is environmentally present-at-hand,” according to Heidegger.500 
While the existential phenomenon of conscience reveals no “content,” Heidegger 
nonetheless insists that it “gives us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses.”501 Conscience 
is an essentially positive form of discourse even if it provides no “worldly” information. 
By characterizing [conscience] formally in this way, we find ourselves 
enjoined to take it back into the disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness, 
as a basic state of that entity which we ourselves are, is constituted by state-
of-mind, understanding, falling and discourse (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, 
Verfallen und Rede).502  
Heidegger thus identifies conscience with the constitutive phenomenon of discourse but 
accords it a very special function. As the “attesting” phenomenon that both “gives us 
‘something’ to understand” and allows Dasein to “first find itself,” conscience makes 
possible Dasein’s return to itself: authentic disclosedness is based upon one’s hearing of the 
“call of conscience.” As Heidegger states: “If we analyze conscience more penetratingly, it 
is revealed as a call (Ruf)”: this “mode of discourse”503 is an “appeal (Anrufs)” that calls 
Dasein to “its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-self.”504 It is more specifically a 
“summoning [of Dasein] (Aufrufs) to its ownmost Being-guilty”505 because conscience calls 
Dasein out from the anonymous crowd and back to the possibility of “making up for not 
choosing.”506  
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Freely conceding that his existential conscience “is necessarily a far cry from 
everyday ontical common sense,” Heidegger holds that this disclosing “call of conscience” 
is what provides the “ontological foundations” of all “everyday” notions concerning the 
“voice” of conscience.507 He claims that conscience reveals to Dasein that it must “bring 
itself back” from the “they” in order to understand authentically. The “calling” of 
conscience that allows Dasein to “find itself” implies a corresponding “hearing” that allows 
Dasein to “understand” this primordial appeal. The traditional concern for “proofs and 
counterproofs” of this “voice” illustrate for Heidegger how the ordinary theories of 
conscience fail to recognize what the conscience gives us to understand.508  
To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Our 
understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a 
conscience (Gewissenhabenwollen). But in this phenomenon lies that 
existentiell choosing which we seek—the choosing to choose a kind of 
Being-one’s-self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call 
resoluteness (Entschlossenheit).509 
In Heidegger’s proposed schema, conscience serves as an attestation of the possible 
experience of authenticity by showing how Dasein can “bring itself back” and decide “for 
an authentic potentiality-for-Being.”510 The “call of conscience” does not “contain” the 
content of authentic experience. Rather, it provides the attestation of the possibility of 
Dasein’s authenticity: the call is the means whereby Dasein can come into “resoluteness” 
and thus assume responsibility for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Conscience attests 
Dasein’s authenticity because it makes possible the moment of “resoluteness” in which 
Dasein comes back to “authentic Being-one’s-self.” Dasein’s authenticity cannot be 
“found” in the call alone because this phenomenon also demands Dasein’s “hearing” of this 
call. Authenticity is attested in the “whole” phenomenon of “wanting to have a 
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conscience,” which means choosing to be brought back to the “kind of Being-one’s-self 
which…we call ‘resoluteness.’”511 
Conscience as a Mode of Discourse (§55) 
The first task that Heidegger tackles in his attempt to show how conscience serves 
to attest Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being is to explain how this phenomenon 
“belongs within the range (Umkreis) of those existential phenomena which constitute the 
Being of the ‘there’ as disclosedness (das Sein des Da als Erschlossenheit konstituieren),” 
namely the “universal structures of state-of-mind, understanding, discourse and falling.”512 
In other words, Heidegger aims to show why conscience must necessarily be “added” as 
one of Dasein’s basic phenomena and how it “fits” with the structures that have already 
been exhibited by his investigation. Immediately, however, he makes it clear that 
conscience is not simply an “example” or “a special ‘case’ of Dasein’s disclosure (einen 
besonderen „Fall“ von Erschließung des Daseins).”513 Conscience must be interpreted as 
the disclosing source that makes possible Dasein’s authentic understanding of its Being. As 
Heidegger states:  
[Our] interpretation of conscience not only will carry further our earlier 
analysis of the disclosedness of the “there,” but it will also grasp it more 
primordially with regard to Dasein’s authentic Being (sondern 
ursprünglicher fassen im Hinblick auf das eigentliche Sein des Daseins).514 
Heidegger here recognizes that his not-yet-completed interpretation of Dasein 
remains inadequate for explaining the phenomenon of disclosedness. As it stands, 
Heidegger has only shown how Dasein “fails to hear (überhört) its own self” because it has 
become lost “in the publicness and idle talk of the ‘they.’”515 To correct this situation, he 
holds that the interpretation of conscience must now provide the means for explaining how 
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Dasein can emerge from the hypnotic state wherein one’s attention is devoted solely to the 
“they.” 
This listening-away must get broken off; in other words, the possibility of 
another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein 
itself. The possibility of its thus getting broken off lies in its being appealed 
to without mediation.516 
The solution that Heidegger proposes in order to explain this possibility is the “calling” of 
conscience. By his account, this call “arouses another kind of hearing…in every way 
opposite” to Dasein’s usual fascination with the “ambiguity,” “hubbub,” and “newness” of 
the “they-world.”517  
Heidegger insists that this existential call delivers no explicit or fixed message: it 
neither delivers a “ ‘picture,’ like the Kantian representation of the conscience as a court of 
justice,” nor does it involve a “[vocal] utterance…[of] a ‘voice’ of conscience (eine 
„Stimme“ des Gewissens).”518 All such examples of the “everyday interpretation” of 
conscience illustrate how the phenomenon is commonly misunderstood in an assertive 
sense.  
When ‘delusions’ arise in the conscience, they do so not because the call has 
committed some oversight (has mis-called), but only because the call gets 
heard in such a way that instead of becoming authentically understood, it 
gets drawn by the they-self into a soliloquy in which causes get pleaded, and 
it becomes perverted in its tendency to disclose.519 
Echoing his remarks from earlier in Being and Time regarding the inadequate vocabulary 
and grammar of his phenomenological project,520 Heidegger concedes that his phenomenon 
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of conscience must not be confused with the literal notion of a vocal call: the “call of 
conscience” cannot be “[traced] back to some psychical faculty such as understanding, will, 
or feeling, or…some sort of mixture of these.”521 To drive home this point, he includes at 
the close of §55 the footnote we have previously analyzed regarding the various theories of 
conscience that have been advanced by Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, as well 
as Kähler, Ritschl, Stoker and Scheler. Heidegger faults all these thinkers for the 
“ontologico-anthropological inadequacy of [their respective] free-floating framework[s] of 
psychical faculties or personal actions all duly classified.”522 
For Heidegger, conscience is a more primordial “mode of discourse”: it is the 
existential phenomenon that makes authentic disclosedness possible. Conscience delivers to 
Dasein the only kind of unambiguous “giving-to-understand” that can enable it to “hear” 
authentically and thereby find itself.523  
In the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum 
of a push—of an abrupt arousal. The call is from afar unto afar. It reaches 
him who wants to be brought back.524 
Conscience as the Summoning Call to “Lost” Dasein (§56) 
To explain the existential phenomenon of the “call of conscience,” Heidegger states 
that his first priority is to interpret how conscience functions as the unique mode of 
authentic discourse that allows for Dasein’s “listening-away” to be interrupted.  
[We] shall not obtain an ontologically adequate interpretation of the 
conscience until it can be made plain not only who is called by the call but 
also who does the calling, how the one to whom the appeal is made is related 
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to the one who calls, and how this ‘relationship’ must be taken ontologically 
as a way in which these are interconnected in their Being. 525 
Noting that discourse is most commonly understood as a kind of “utterance” that is 
communicated through language, Heidegger aims to show how his notion of the “call of 
conscience” conveys “information” in a very different way. He claims that unlike the 
public phenomenon of assertive communication, the existential call is an unmediated form 
of discourse that arises in Dasein itself. Heidegger holds that the “giving to understand” of 
conscience is not to be understood as “content,” as if the call communicated a direct and 
explicit “message.” As Ricoeur explains, Heidegger’s “conscience says nothing: no racket, 
not even a message, just a silent call.”526 Indeed, the power of the call is found precisely in 
the fact that “[conscience] discloses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent (im 
Modus des Schweigens).”527 This silence supercedes the communicative chatter of the 
“they” and makes possible a different mode of hearing. The “what is talked about” that is 
conveyed by the call relates strictly to the call itself: it “informs” Dasein that it is being 
appealed to by itself.  
Let us consider how Heidegger responds to three basic questions he raises regarding 
what is disclosed by the call: 1) who is called by the call, 2) what the call says, and 3) who 
is the one who calls.  
Firstly, what the call “gives us to understand” is the basic fact that an appeal is 
being made to “Dasein itself.” While Heidegger admits that this “target” seems “indefinite” 
and “vague,” he insists that this call is the basis of any possible experience of Dasein.528 
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[It] is essential to Dasein that along with the disclosedness of its world it has 
been disclosed to itself, so that it always understands itself. The call reaches 
Dasein in this understanding of itself which it always has, and which is 
concernful in an everyday, average manner. The call reaches the they-self of 
concernful Being with others.529 
Quite simply, the call finds Dasein where it has become lost: in the ambiguity of what has 
been publicly interpreted. 
Secondly, the call informs Dasein about itself in the sense that the appeal indicates 
“to what one is called.”530 When it reaches Dasein lost in the “they,” conscience actually 
“passes over” the “they” and appeals to “only the self of the they-self.”531 In so doing, the 
call brings Dasein to its “own self” and “pushes [the ‘they’] into insignificance 
(Bedeutungslosigkeit).”532 Heidegger observes that conscience “asserts nothing, gives no 
information about world-events, has nothing to tell” when considered from the standpoint 
of “everydayness.”533 But to Dasein itself, this call is experienced as a startling summons. 
[What] the call discloses is unequivocal (trotzdem eindeutig), even though it 
may undergo a different interpretation in the individual Dasein in 
accordance with its own possibilities of understanding. While the content of 
the call is seemingly indefinite, the direction it takes (Einschlagsrichtung) is 
a sure one… The call does not require us to search gropingly for him to 
whom it appeals, nor does it require any sign by which we can recognize that 
he is or is not the one who is meant.534  
In summoning Dasein’s “own self,” the “call of conscience” does not “put up for ‘trial’ the 
self to which the appeal is made.”535 Rather, conscience reveals to Dasein the fact that it 
has “lost” itself and that it must return to an authentic understanding of its Being; 
conscience blocks out the chatter about public things and “calls Dasein forth (and 
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‘forward’) into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being-its-self.”536 
Dasein’s Call of Care to Itself (§57) 
Heidegger devotes §57 to the third question concerning the identity of the caller, a 
question that is particularly difficult because the “caller maintains itself in conspicuous 
indefiniteness (auffallenden Unbestimmtheit)” and resists interrogation.537 When 
considered according to “the manner of the world,” Heidegger notes that this “peculiar 
indefiniteness” leads to the mistaken conclusion that the caller is “nobody” or “nothing.”538 
But seen existentially, the “aloofness” of the caller and the “impossibility of making [its 
identity] more definite…are distinctive for it in a positive way (eine positive 
Auszeichnung)” because they reveal that “the caller is solely absorbed in summoning us to 
something…[and] is heard only as such (nur as solcher gehört).”539 When the caller 
“refuses to answer” any “worldly” question about its identity,540 this actually confirms its 
identity: “In conscience Dasein calls itself (Das Dasein ruft im Gewissen sich selbst).”541 
Recognizing that this answer alone is inadequate, Heidegger clarifies that when Dasein is 
summoned by the call from the “they-world,” it is “its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-
self [that] functions as the caller.”542 In other words, the caller is the Dasein’s “authentic 
self.” Heidegger continues:  
[The] call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned 
nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ 
calls („Es“ ruft), against our expectations and even against our will. On the 
other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is 
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with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and 
over me (Der Ruf kommt aus mir und doch über mich).543  
The indefiniteness of the caller, an indefiniteness that Heidegger emphasizes by 
“describing” the caller as “it,” reflects Dasein’s nature as a “thrown” entity for whom the 
“why” of its existence is utterly unknowable.544 In this sense, the caller of conscience must 
not be understood either as “something present-at-hand within-the-world” or as a “free-
floating self-projection (freischwebendes Sichentwerfen)” whose existence can be attributed 
to its own “power.”545 When Dasein understands itself authentically, it understands what 
conscience discloses to it: “the fact ‘that it is, and that it has to be something with a 
potentiality-for-Being as the entity which it is.’”546 The indefinite caller of conscience is 
authentic Dasein that seeks to find itself by calling out to the Being-in-the-world who is 
always “listening away.” The caller is “anxious with anxiety (Angst) about its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being” and summons Being-in-the-world to find itself “in the very depths 
of its uncanniness (im Grunde seiner Unheimlichkeit).”547  
In its “who,” the caller is definable in a ‘worldly’ way by nothing at all. The 
caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as 
the “not-at-home”—the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the “nothing” of the world (das 
nackte „Daß“ im Nichts der Welt). The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday 
they-self; it is something like an alien voice (eine fremde Stimme). What 
could be more alien to the “they,” lost in the manifold ‘world’ of its concern, 
than the self which has been individualized down to itself in uncanniness 
and been thrown into the “nothing”?548 
This experience of coming “face to face” with its thrownness is precisely what Dasein in 
“everydayness” seeks to avoid when it forfeits the possibility of making its own decisions 
and blends in with the “they.” When Dasein “flees to the relief which comes with the 
supposed freedom of the they-self,” it closes itself off to this authentic understanding of its 
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thrownness.549 Indeed, Heidegger claims many common examples of the “ordinary 
interpretation” of conscience confirm this tendency to avoid having to “face” one’s own 
conscience, e.g. identifying an authority behind the experience of conscience, such as God, 
or determining a “biological” cause for it.550 For Heidegger, such explanations exemplify 
the tradition’s  
…unexpressed but ontologically dogmatic guiding thesis that what is (in 
other words, anything so factual as the call) must be present-at-hand, and 
that what does not let itself be objectively demonstrated as present-at-hand, 
just is not at all.551   
Countering “everyday” Dasein’s desperate flight into publicness, conscience 
ceaselessly appeals in its “uncanny mode of keeping silent” and makes possible a return to 
authentic self-understanding.552   
Uncanniness is the basic kind of Being-in-the-world, even though in an 
everyday way it has been covered up. Out of the depths of this kind of 
Being, Dasein itself, as conscience, calls. The ‘it calls me’ is a distinctive 
kind of discourse for Dasein. The call whose mood has been attuned by 
anxiety is what makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to project 
itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The call of conscience, 
existentially understood, makes known for the first time what we have 
hitherto merely contended: that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to 
the lostness in which it has forgotten itself (die Unheimlichkeit setzt dem 
Dasein nach und bedroht seine selbstvergessene Verlorenheit).553    
It is on these grounds that Heidegger claims that conscience “manifests itself as the call of 
care (Das Gewissen offenbart sich als Ruf der Sorge).”554 The phenomenon of care 
accounts for how Dasein can act both as the caller and the called: the appeal is made out of 
care for the authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein lost in the “everyday” concerns of 
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the “they.” Through the phenomenon of conscience, Dasein is “summoned out of [its] 
falling by the appeal.”555 As Heidegger concludes:  
The call of conscience—that is, conscience itself—has its ontological 
possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care.556 
In the closing moments of §57, Heidegger reminds his readers that the principal task 
of his interpretation of conscience remains outstanding: what still must be produced is a 
way “of making the conscience intelligible as an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being (Bezeugung seines eigensten Seinkönnens).”557 The identification of 
conscience as the “call of care” has “merely…[traced] back conscience as a phenomenon of 
Dasein to the ontological constitution of that entity.”558 While this may represent only a 
preparatory phase of his interpretation of conscience, Heidegger contends that it has 
nonetheless significantly advanced his project by revealing conscience to be a “mode of 
discourse” and by identifying the existential structures constitutive of “the full experience 
of conscience (das volle Gewissenserlebnis).”559 Most importantly, Heidegger has shown 
that conscience as calling implies an authentic form of “hearing” that is essential in order 
for Dasein to be able to understand the phenomenon. This discovery, however, means that 
the interpretation of how conscience provides an attestation of Dasein’s authentic way of 
Being cannot be undertaken without first investigating “the character of [this authentic] 
hearing.”560 In other words, the authentic way of hearing the “call of conscience” must be 
exhibited and explained before the search for an attestation of conscience can proceed. As 
Heidegger states:  
[Only] by analyzing the way the appeal is understood can one be led to 
discuss explicitly what the call gives one to understand (was der Ruf zu 
verstehen gibt).561  
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Being-Guilty and the Reticent Hearing of Conscience (§58) 
Having illustrated how Dasein is called by conscience, Heidegger now seeks to 
show how Dasein can come to authentically understand this appeal. Thus, Heidegger must 
explain the essence of and the necessary conditions for this alternative “kind of hearing” 
that allows Dasein to understand the summons of conscience and to break off its “listening-
away” to the “they.” To orient his investigation, Heidegger poses two basic questions: 
[What] is it that is essentially implied when the appeal is understood 
authentically? What is it that has been essentially given us to understand in 
the call at any particular time, even if factically it has not always been 
understood?562  
In response to these questions, Heidegger recalls that no “worldly” content or “information 
about events” is conveyed by the call.563 Rather, “the call gives us a potentiality-for-Being 
to understand”; opposed to anything “ideal and universal,” it discloses a potentiality-for-
Being that is radically “individualized and which belongs to that particular Dasein.”564 The 
discursive call discloses to Dasein by “[calling] us back” to the uncanniness of our 
thrownness “in calling us forth” to our ownmost potentiality-for-Being.565  
While he insists that “what the call says” is not “universal,” Heidegger claims that 
there is something common to the full range of “ordinary” ways of understanding 
conscience: they all refer to Dasein’s status as “guilty” or “not guilty.”566 For Heidegger, 
this provides an important clue for his existential investigation.  
 [What] we generally hear or fail to hear in any experience of 
conscience…[is] that the call either addresses Dasein as “guilty (schuldig),” 
or, as in the case when the conscience gives warning, refers to a possible 
“guilty,” or affirms, as a “good” conscience, that one is “conscious of no 
guilt”? Whatever the ways in which conscience is experienced or 
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interpreted, all our experiences “agree” on this “guilty.” If only it were not 
defined in such wholly different ways!567 
While he will deem all of these “ordinary” ways of interpreting conscience to be 
inauthentic in §59, Heidegger here recognizes that what they share in common indicates 
that Dasein’s “idea of guilt (Schuld) [must be drawn] from the Interpretation of its own 
Being.”568 As Heidegger states:  
[The] question of the existential meaning of what has been called in the 
call…must first be conceptualized if we are to understand what the call of 
“guilty” means, and why and how it becomes perverted in its signification 
by the everyday way of interpreting it.569 
Heidegger finds the basis of this conceptualization in “the character of the ‘not’” that is 
essential to the idea of guilt; understood authentically, this “not” is grasped exclusively in 
terms of “the way Dasein is—namely, existing.”570  
Hence we define the formally existential idea of “guilty” as “Being-the-basis 
for a Being which has been defined by a ‘not’”—that is to say, as “Being-
the-basis of a nullity.”571 
In contrast with this existential idea of guilt, the “everyday” notions that Heidegger 
examines, e.g. “owing,” “having debts,” “being responsible for,” “making oneself 
punishable,” being “laden with moral guilt,”572 etc., share the basic error that this “not” can 
be understood in a “present-at-hand or generally accepted” way.573 According to 
Heidegger, the notion of “moral guilt” distorts the original phenomenon by attracting 
Dasein’s attention to its concern for worldly affairs. For Heidegger, Dasein’s existential 
Being-guilty is unrelated to any debt, obligation or “ought” that can be calculated and 
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balanced off. As Jean Greisch observes, Heidegger even rejects any connection between 
Being-guilty and the “theological concept of ‘original sin,’” except for the fact that the 
former is the “condition of the ontological possibility” of the latter.574 Dasein is not guilty 
because it “lacks” something or must make retribution for something, as if this guilt could 
be corrected. Heidegger contends such misunderstandings regarding the essence of 
Dasein’s guilt reflect the error of applying the accounting standards of the “presence-at-
hand” to the understanding of existence, thereby distorting the existential phenomenon 
revealed by Heidegger’s investigation. In other words, these inauthentic interpretations 
understand the “not” of Dasein’s guilt in terms of a “lack, as the not-Being-present-at-hand 
of something which ought to be.”575 With his existential interpretation of guilt, Heidegger 
eliminates from consideration any notion that Dasein could possibly be “lacking in some 
manner.”576  
The “not” of existential guilt is not something that can be corrected or accounted 
for, Heidegger insists. Guilt is rather an essential characteristic of Dasein because it “has 
been thrown (geworfenes)” into existence and “brought into its ‘there,’ but not of its own 
accord”; Dasein exists as a “thrown” entity that “can never get [its] basis into its power.”577 
At the same time, Dasein is essentially responsible for its throwness: “as existing, Dasein 
must take over Being-a-basis…[and] be its own thrown basis.”578 
[As] this entity to which it has been…delivered over, it is, in its existing, the 
basis of its potentiality-for-Being. Although it has not laid that basis itself, it 
reposes in the weight of it… In being a basis—that is, in existing as 
thrown—Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent 
before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus “Being-a-basis” 
means never to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up. 
This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of “thrownness.” It itself, 
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being a basis, is a nullity of itself. (Dieses Nicht gehört zum existenzialen 
Sinn der Geworfenheit. Grundseiend ist es selbst eine Nichtigkeit seiner 
selbst.)579  
Recognizing the existential significance of this “not” is essential to grasping the 
nature of Dasein’s Being as care. When Dasein exists, it exists as an entity that cares for its 
possibilities of Being as something thrown into the world and projected “in one possibility 
or another.”580 While Dasein can experience existence authentically or inauthentically, it 
cannot be anything other than what it is: a thrown entity. In other words, Dasein must exist 
as the “Being-a-basis” of a basis which it cannot choose and has no power to create or alter. 
As Heidegger states, Dasein can only project “itself upon possibilities into which it has 
been thrown.”581 When it comes to the Being-a-basis of its existence, Dasein has no choice. 
Dasein’s ability to choose is “limited” to “choosing” the way in which it understands its 
existence, either out of concern for the worldly interests of the “they” or in authentically 
caring for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Furthermore, because Dasein is essentially 
lost in the “they,” even the choice of returning to the authentic disclosedness of one’s 
potentiality-for-Being is only possible because we are constantly called by conscience—
“against our expectations and even against our will.”582 
When Dasein understands authentically, it “[becomes] free for the call” because it is 
able to “[hear] the appeal correctly” and to recognize “its ownmost possibility of existence”;  
hearing the call means that Dasein understands its essential nature as Being-guilty and “has 
chosen itself.”583  
Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, 
which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having-a-conscience as 
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Being-free for one’s ownmost Being-guilty. “Understanding the appeal” 
means “wanting to have a conscience.”584 
It is this disclosing of Dasein’s “most primordial potentiality-for-Being as Being-guilty” 
that reveals conscience to be “an attestation which belongs to Dasein’s Being.”585 For 
while the call communicates no definite content, Heidegger claims that it does disclose 
something positive to Dasein about its own Being. Indeed, what conscience discloses 
makes possible Dasein’s authentic mode of existing whereby it is brought “face to face 
with its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”586 
At the conclusion of §58, Heidegger appears to be close to delivering on his 
promise to provide a way of attesting Dasein’s authentic mode of existence. However, he 
concedes that his exhibition of how Dasein is able to authentically understand the “call of 
conscience” might have neglected one of the basic principles of his phenomenological 
method of investigation: that all existential phenomena must be shown to be possible in 
ontical experience. Reflecting on this, Heidegger acknowledges the apparent impossibility 
of reconciling his interpretations of conscience and guilt with the common ways in which 
these concepts are understood in “everyday” experience. 
But now that we have exhibited a potentiality-for-Being which is attested in 
Dasein itself, a preliminary question arises: can we claim sufficient 
evidential weight for the way we have exhibited this, as long as the 
embarrassment of our interpreting the conscience in a one-sided manner by 
tracing it back to Dasein’s constitution while hastily passing over all the 
familiar findings of the ordinary interpretation of conscience, is one that is 
still undiminished? Is, then, the phenomenon of conscience, as it ‘actually’ 
is, still recognizable at all in the interpretation we have given?587  
Heidegger here seems to soften his earlier stance in §57 when he had argued “that the 
ordinary ontical way of understanding conscience [must not] be recognized as the first 
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court of appeal for an ontological interpretation.”588 While he does not retract this previous 
statement, Heidegger now appears to recognize that the investigation has been advanced to 
a point where this apparent incoherence with worldly experience must be addressed. The 
legitimacy of the project of Being and Time demands that the attestation Heidegger is 
seeking be shown to conform to the phenomenological standards that he has set for himself. 
Recognizing the urgency of this problem, Heidegger announces that “[we] must explicitly 
demonstrate the connection between the results of our ontological analysis and the 
everyday ways in which the conscience is experienced.”589  
Heidegger’s Existential Conscience vs. “Ordinary Interpretations” (§59) 
Heidegger begins §59 on a pessimistic note as he takes up the question of this 
apparent incoherence. He concedes that his interpretations of conscience as the “call of 
care” and of “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” as “the way in which the appeal is 
understood” are radically unlike anything one would associate with the “ordinary” ways of 
describing the conscience.590 As Heidegger reports: 
These two definitions cannot be brought into harmony at once with the 
ordinary interpretation of conscience. Indeed they seem to be in direct 
conflict with it.591  
Rather than abandoning his interpretation of conscience, however, Heidegger reacts to this 
apparent conflict by adopting a more strident tone. He asks: 
But must the ontological interpretation agree with the ordinary interpretation 
at all? Should not the latter be, in principle, ontologically suspect?592  
At this point, Heidegger completely alters the strategy of his approach to the ontical 
evidence related to the phenomenon of conscience. Instead of regarding this incoherence as 
necessarily problematic, he claims that the “ordinary interpretation” of conscience actually 
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provides proof that the “falling and concealment” characteristic of “everydayness” are what 
lead to the common “misunderstanding” of the call.593 Jean Greisch argues that this 
strategic shift at the beginning of §59 reveals Heidegger’s reluctance to examine how the 
“positive” content of the “ordinary experience of conscience” might be related to his 
existential interpretation: 
Heidegger, once again taking cover behind the alibi of the purely ontological 
orientation of his existential analysis, seems to me to be trying to avoid this 
possible confrontation [between his existential conscience and the “ordinary 
experience”], even if he enumerates a certain number of “essential 
problems” that it is impossible to avoid.594  
Given Heidegger’s stated objective of revealing how conscience provides the 
attestation of Dasein’s authentic mode of existence, one would have expected that 
Heidegger would produce positive evidence of how Being-in-the-world can actualize the 
experience of the existential phenomenon. This is certainly what seems to be promised at 
the close of §58 when Heidegger demands a “way of access” that “explicitly 
[demonstrates] the connection between the results of our ontological analysis and the 
everyday ways in which the conscience is experienced,” as we have seen.595 Instead, 
Heidegger reverses course in §59 and implies that Dasein’s “ordinary kind of Being” 
represents an inappropriate “ontological horizon” for interpreting the authentic 
phenomenon of conscience.596  
Notwithstanding the “reorientation” of his analysis, Heidegger insists that his 
investigation must proceed with the analysis of the “everyday understanding of conscience 
and…the anthropological, psychological, and theological theories of conscience which 
have been based upon it.”597 He reassures his readers that “even the ordinary experience of 
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conscience must somehow—pre-ontologically—reach this phenomenon.”598 His 
subsequent analysis will show, however, that the existential conscience is radically 
different from all these theories: indeed, these “ordinary” notions show how Dasein’s way 
of hearing the “call of conscience” is “perverted” by the “they-self.”599 All the traditional 
ways of describing the experience of conscience obscure Dasein’s “authentic truth” and 
distort the authentic care for one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being; they reveal how the 
public “they” reorients Dasein’s care for its own possibilities to other worldly entities and 
interests “with which one can concern oneself.”600 So while Heidegger insists that his 
investigation “has no right to disregard the everyday understanding of conscience,” his 
approach to all “ordinary” ways of understanding conscience is thoroughly destructive.601 
While this destruction is certainly positive for Heidegger’s disclosing of the existential 
phenomena characteristic of Dasein, it proves problematic here at the pivotal point in Being 
and Time where Heidegger must produce an “existentiell attestation” of how conscience is 
ontically possible as an experience of Being-in-the-world. Given Heidegger’s strategic shift 
at the beginning of §59, it is clear that his review of the “ordinary interpretations” of 
conscience will not lead to such an attestation because they “become intelligible” only 
when they are examined against the “existential analysis…[of] the phenomenon of 
conscience in its ontological roots.”602 Before proceeding with his analysis of how his 
existential phenomenon of the “call” can be compared to “ordinary” notions of conscience, 
Heidegger notes that only one benefit can result from completing this task: his analysis will 
reveal “the ways in which they miss the phenomenon and in the reasons why they conceal 
it.”603  
To facilitate this comparison, Heidegger derives four objections to his existential 
conscience that reflect the “essential” differences between his notion and the “everyday” 
way of understanding conscience.  
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In this ordinary interpretation there are four objections which might be 
brought up against our interpretation of conscience as the summons of care 
to Being-guilty: 1) that the function of conscience is essentially critical; 2) 
that conscience always speaks in a way that is relative to some definite deed 
which has been performed or willed; 3) that when the ‘voice’ is experienced, 
it is never so radically related to Dasein’s Being; 4) that our interpretation 
takes no account of the basic forms of the phenomenon—‘evil’ conscience 
and ‘good,’ that which ‘reproves’ and that which ‘warns.’604 
We have already considered in detail each of these four objections and the way that 
Heidegger responds to them in our preceding analysis of his criticism of Stoker’s 
interpretation of conscience. Given this fact, we will not repeat that task again here. Let it 
suffice to say that Heidegger flatly dismisses all four objections, arguing that they all 
reflect an understanding of Dasein’s guilt as something “present-at-hand” and related to 
“‘practical’ injunctions.”605 This is evident when Heidegger alludes to Schopenhauer’s 
“ledger book” notion of conscience as he describes the way the existential phenomenon is 
debased in “everydayness.”  
But must the ontological interpretation [of conscience] agree with the 
ordinary interpretation at all? Should not the latter be, in principle, 
ontologically suspect? … Everydayness takes Dasein as…something that 
gets managed and reckoned up. ‘Life’ is a ‘business,’ whether or not it 
covers its costs. And so with regard to the ordinary kind of Being of Dasein 
itself, there is no guarantee that the way of interpreting conscience which 
springs from it or the theories of conscience which are thus oriented, have 
arrived at the right ontological horizon for its interpretation.606 
At the same time, Heidegger recognizes that his rejection of these “ontologically 
inadequate [ways] of understanding the conscience” means that he has still not shown how 
his existential interpretation of conscience can serve as an “attestation” of Dasein’s 
authentic mode of existence.607 While his existential approach seems to point to 
“possibilities for a more primordial existentiell understanding,” Heidegger warns that his 
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investigation must guard against “[letting] itself get cut off from ontical experience (sich 
nicht von der ontischen Erfahrung abschnüren läßt).”608  
Resoluteness and the Problematic Attestation of Conscience (§60)   
Having completed his review of how the conscience is “ordinarily interpreted,” 
Heidegger returns in §60 to the primary objective of his existential interpretation of the 
phenomenon: “to exhibit an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being—an 
attestation which is in Dasein itself.”609 As Frank Schalow notes in his essay “The 
Topography of Heidegger’s Concept of Conscience,” Heidegger must show how 
conscience can perform its special methodological role of “[serving] as a marker within the 
destructive landscape.”610 Yet at the opening of this last section of the chapter on 
conscience, Heidegger has not yet taken up this task. Concretely, Heidegger must still 
disclose how Dasein “[summons] us to Being-guilty”:611 it remains to be demonstrated how 
Dasein can call itself out from the “they” and back to one’s authentic understanding of 
existential guilt. The attestation of this possibility is the required thread that Heidegger 
needs in order to connect his existential analysis with existentiell experience.  
To exhibit the existential structure of this “experience” of attestation, Heidegger 
proceeds by describing the “way in which Dasein has been disclosed” when it understands 
itself as “wanting to have a conscience.”612 In other words, he considers the kind of 
disclosedness that is implied when Dasein “understands the call undisguisedly in the sense 
it has itself intended.”613 To accomplish this, Heidegger takes up his previous analysis of 
the three basic structures of Dasein’s disclosedness—understanding, state-of-mind and 
discourse—and then determines the “manner” in which each of them could correspond to 
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“wanting-to-have-a-conscience.” In understanding the “call of conscience,” Heidegger sees 
Dasein coming into a transparent understanding of itself as a thrown entity that must exist 
as  the Being-the-basis of a basis it has neither created nor has any power over. Such an 
understanding implies that one “[projects] oneself in each case upon one’s ownmost 
factical possibility” as the Being-guilty that is thrown into the world.614 Since this 
understanding discloses “one’s own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individualization,” 
Heidegger identifies the state-of-mind of conscience as anxiety: “Wanting-to-have-a-
conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety (Gewissenhabenwollen wird Bereitschaft zur 
Angst)” because this basic “kind of mood” brings Dasein “face to face with its own 
uncanniness.”615   
As the “third essential item in disclosedness,” discourse plays a double role in 
Heidegger’s existential interpretation of the attesting “experience” of conscience.616 We 
have seen that the call itself is described as a “mode of discourse” that “summons” Dasein. 
But this call must also be properly “received” by Dasein: the call must be authentically 
heard so that Dasein can be “called back into the stillness of itself…as something that is to 
become still.”617 This “articulative” mode of discourse characteristic of Dasein’s authentic 
understanding of the silent “call of conscience” is what Heidegger calls “reticence 
(Verschwiegenheit).” As Heidegger explains: “In hearing the call understandingly, one 
denies oneself any counter-discourse… Only in reticence…is this silent discourse 
understood appropriately in wanting to have a conscience.”618 Through the symbiosis of 
silent calling and reticent hearing, conscience “takes the words away from…the ‘they.’”619 
Dasein responds authentically to Heidegger’s silent “call of conscience” by replicating this 
keeping silent in the mode of reticence. There is no counter-proposal to the “call of 
conscience” because when Dasein understands this call, it is overcome by it: Dasein can 
neither argue with conscience nor refuse its command precisely because there is no 
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command. The return to one’s self, marked by the sudden muting of the noisy “they,” 
brings Dasein into the opening of its own authentic disclosedness. In this experience of the 
immediate quieting that interrupts Dasein’s public way of existing, Being-in-the-world 
recognizes its nature as Being-guilty and can resolutely assume responsibility for its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 
The existential interpretation of Dasein’s authentic mode of disclosedness in 
hearing the “call of conscience” is completed by grasping these elements together as a 
“whole” phenomenon: they are the constitutive elements of Dasein’s possibility of existing 
authentically.  
The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus 
constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of 
oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. 
This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein 
itself by its conscience—this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost 
Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call “resoluteness 
(Entschlossenheit).”620 
Heidegger explicitly links this “distinctive mode of Dasein’s disclosedness” with his earlier 
interpretation of disclosedness as “primordial truth” in §44.621 Whereas his earlier 
“proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’…called attention to the primordial disclosedness 
of this entity as the truth of existence,” Heidegger insists that resoluteness represents an 
even more basic mode of Dasein’s truth.622  
In resoluteness we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most 
primordial because it is authentic. Whenever a “there” is disclosed, its whole 
Being-in-the-world—that is to say, the world, Being-in, and the self which, 
as an ‘I am,’ this entity is—is disclosed with equal primordiality.623  
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In this “experience” of attestation through conscience, Dasein is made fully transparent to 
itself. “Thrown into its ‘there’…[and] factically submitted to a definite ‘world,’”624 Dasein 
doesn’t lift itself out of its world when it hears conscience and understands authentically; 
rather Dasein sees its world differently in understanding the significance of what is 
disclosed to it according to the “for-the-sake-of-which” of the ownmost and authentic 
possibility that it has chosen for itself. Dasein sees through the obscurity of what is said by 
the “they”; when Dasein understands itself and its world clearly, its mode of Being-with 
(Mitsein) is modified so that it becomes possible for people to “authentically be with one 
another.”625  
Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concernful Being-alongside 
what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with others 
(fürsorgende Mitsein mit den Anderen). In the light of the “for-the-sake-of-
which” of one’s self-chosen potentiality-for-Being (Worumwillen des 
selbstgewählten Seinkönnens), resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. 
Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the 
others who are with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to 
co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates 
(vorspringend-befreienden Fürsorge). When Dasein is resolute, it can 
become the “conscience” of others.626  
As with the “call of conscience,” the phenomenon of resoluteness is described by 
Heidegger as an indefinite concept in existential terms: it must be understood as the unique 
experience of each individual Dasein at a specific moment, i.e. the authentic appropriation 
of one’s existence. The existentiell “content” of resoluteness is utterly dependent on what is 
possible for Dasein as the entity thrown into its particular “there.”  
Resoluteness, by its ontological essence, is always the resoluteness of some 
factical Dasein at a particular time. Resoluteness ‘exists’ only as a resolution 
(Entschluss) which understandingly projects itself. … The resolution is 
precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically 
possible at the time.627 
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This authentic disclosedness doesn’t eliminate the “they,” but it does imply that Dasein 
sees through the “they” and understands itself and its world in terms of its own “decision” 
rather than accepting the public way the world is understood. In the mode of authentic 
disclosedness, Dasein also recognizes that it is always threatened by the “untruth” of 
publicness: when it hears the “call of conscience,” Dasein knows that it “is already in 
irresoluteness (Unentschlossenheit), and soon, perhaps, will be in it again.”628   
To further clarify the distinct character of resoluteness, Heidegger describes a 
specific mode of the “there” of Dasein when it exists in the “authentic transparency” of 
resoluteness: this authentic “there” is the “existential phenomenon which we call a 
‘situation.’”629 For Heidegger, the concept of the “situation” conveys the special 
“spatiality” of Dasein, a “spatiality” that is quite unlike the present-at-hand notions of space 
and time in the “natural world.” In the “situation,” Dasein understands itself and the 
“current factical involvement-character of the circumstances” disclosed to it in terms of its 
resoluteness.630 This authentic “there” is the “place” where Dasein finds itself when it hears 
the “call of conscience” and exists in a possibility it has chosen, even if it has not “created” 
this possibility and certainly does not have an unrestricted set of options. What is unique 
about the “situation” of resoluteness compared to Dasein’s other possibilities is that the 
voice of the “they” is silenced in this authentic possibility: while the “they” still shape the 
world, Dasein’s understanding of its possibilities is authentically based on its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being rather than what the “they” has to say. As Heidegger notes: “For the 
‘they’…the situation is essentially something that has been closed off (verschlossen).”631  
In this special “spatiality” shaped by the authentic understanding of Dasein’s 
possibilities, Heidegger observes that the notion of resoluteness as “taking action” must be 
taken in a very broad sense: resoluteness implies the “action” of resolving upon a specific 
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possibility for one’s existence.632 Dasein does not come into the “situation” and then decide 
upon an action; rather, “Dasein is already taking action” in resoluteness because “action” is 
essential to “wanting-to-have-a-conscience.”633 In other words, the existential “action” of 
resoluteness is the authentic experience of one’s Being in care.  
Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object 
of care (in der Sorge gesorgte), and which is possible as care—the 
authenticity of care itself.634  
By interpreting resoluteness as the “experience” of Dasein’s authentic “there,” Heidegger 
establishes the connection between the “call of conscience” and “the existential structure of 
that authentic potentiality-for-Being which the conscience attests—wanting to have a 
conscience.”635 As the “event” of Dasein’s freeing itself from the “they,” the moment of 
resoluteness is what Greisch describes as the “fruit” produced by the “call of 
conscience”636:  
From a methodological point of view, we must remark that the notion of 
resoluteness links together two planes that Heidegger had clearly 
distinguished up to this point: that of existential structures and that of 
existentiell possibilities.637   
Heidegger’s interpretation of the “appeal” of conscience reveals that Dasein is not called to 
“some empty ideal of existence”; rather, Dasein calls itself to a specific and possible 
“situation” where it authentically comes into the concrete “current 
factical…circumstances” of its existence.638 As Heidegger will state explicitly in §61, this 
“situation” of resoluteness exhibits “Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being…in its 
                                                 
632
 SZ §60, 300 / 347. 
633
 SZ §60, 300 / 347. 
634
 SZ §60, 301 / 348. 
635
 SZ §60, 300 / 347. 
636
 Greisch. Ontologie et temporalité : esquisse d'une interprétation intégrale de Sein und Zeit. p. 301. In 
French: « Du point de vue méthodologique, on remarquera que la notion de résolution opère la jonction de 
deux plans que jusqu’alors Heidegger avait clairement distingués : celui des structures existentiales et celui 
des options existentielles. » 
637
 Ibid. p. 301.  
638
 SZ §60, 300 / 347. 
 193 
 
 
existentiell attestation” and thus represents Heidegger’s solution to the problem of 
attestation announced at the opening of §54.  
Heidegger admits, however, that this interpretation of the existential structures of 
resoluteness is insufficient for his investigation: it remains to be shown how Dasein’s 
“authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole” can be attested. While Heidegger claims this 
will be accomplished on the basis of his exhibition of resoluteness, the status of 
resoluteness as an “existentiell attestation” will remain highly questionable right through 
the end of Being and Time. Despite Heidegger’s apparent satisfaction at having attested 
Dasein’s possible authenticity at the end of §60, this “attestation” appears to fall well short 
of the objective set at the beginning of §54. As Greisch remarks: 
Just when we once again could have thought that the long quest for Dasein’s 
wholeness was coming to an end, it turns out that this is not the case: we 
must still search for an existentiell attestation of what for the moment is 
nothing more than a purely existential project.639  
Rather than demonstrating the possible connection between his existential concept of 
authenticity and Dasein’s factical experience, Heidegger now contends that “it is enough if 
that authentic potentiality-for-Being which conscience attests for Dasein itself in terms of 
Dasein itself is defined existentially.”640 This claim is problematic because without 
disclosing a possibility of how Dasein can experience its conscience, Heidegger’s 
existential analysis remains “[hanging] in mid-air.”641 As we have seen, Heidegger 
introduced conscience—with its unique methodological role—precisely in order to show 
how Dasein’s attestation of this “authentic potentiality-for-Being” can be found “in its 
existentiell possibility by Dasein itself.”642  
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The identification of the allegedly “concrete situation” of resoluteness as the 
“attestation” of conscience proves dubious because the exhibition of resoluteness is 
accomplished strictly on the basis of existential concepts and is never revealed—not even 
indicatively—to be a possible experience of Being-in-the-world. In keeping with his 
“destructive” phenomenological approach, Heidegger in §59 has eliminated any connection 
between his existential phenomenon of conscience and how it is ordinarily interpreted. 
While Heidegger may be correct in dismissing such deficient notions, he never indicates an 
alternative way of experiencing conscience authentically. The essential structures of 
authentic disclosedness as they are described by Heidegger only compound this problem 
because they are shown to be exclusively existential concepts. According to Heidegger, the 
resoluteness of Dasein “in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by anxiety as 
state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-
guilty, and by discourse as reticence.”643 None of these three key phenomena of Dasein’s 
possible authenticity are demonstrated in Being and Time to be ontically possible; indeed, 
the case appears to be quite the opposite. For example, Heidegger goes to great lengths in 
Division One to distinguish the phenomenon of anxiety from that of the “ontical” 
experience of fear.644 As Heidegger makes clear in his existential analysis, anxiety “makes 
manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”645 While the 
existential role assigned to anxiety is clear, it remains “unattested” from an existentiell 
standpoint: this is precisely why Heidegger needs the attestation of conscience to confirm 
the “existentiell possibility” of Dasein’s authenticity. Similarly, the purely “transparent” 
understanding of one’s authentic Being-guilty as an entity thrown into the world and the 
absolutely “silent” discourse of reticent Dasein remain “purely existential” notions at the 
close of §60. With minimal elaboration, Heidegger merely implies that the “existentiell 
attestation” of Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being is satisfactorily achieved because 
resoluteness “brings the Being of the ‘there’ into the existence of its situation,” where the 
“current factical involvement-character” of one’s existence is disclosed.  
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[When] the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-Being, it 
does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into 
the situation (in die Situation vorruft). … When our understanding of the 
appeal is interpreted existentially as resoluteness, the conscience is revealed 
as that kind of Being—included in the very basis of Dasein—in which 
Dasein makes possible for itself its factical existence, thus attesting its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being (das eigenste Seinkönnen bezeugend).646 
Heidegger thus confirms that his “existentiell attestation” of conscience in §60 is 
obtained strictly on the grounds of the existential interpretation of resoluteness. Rather than 
being revealed in terms of “factical existence,” conscience is presupposed as a “kind of 
Being” that “makes possible…its factical existence.” This modified approach to attestation 
contradicts the reason why Heidegger introduced conscience in the first place: the 
“attestation…[that] authentic existence is possible”647 was required to reveal the connection 
between ontical experience and Heidegger’s ontological project. In this regard, it is 
significant that Heidegger explicitly acknowledges that his interpretation of resoluteness 
has not revealed any way of understanding authenticity as a “factical existentiell 
possibility” of Dasein.648 Reprising his strategy concerning the problematic “everyday” 
notions of conscience in §59, Heidegger seems here to dismiss the relevance of this 
apparent difficulty: 
To present the factical existentiell possibilities in their chief features and 
interconnections, and to interpret them according to their existential 
structure, falls among the tasks of a thematic existential anthropology (fällt 
in den Aufgabenkreis der thematischen existenzialen Anthropologie). For the 
purposes of the present investigation as a study of fundamental ontology, it 
is enough if that authentic potentiality-for-Being which conscience attests 
for Dasein itself in terms of Dasein itself, is defined existentially.649 
Such a dismissal might be justified if resoluteness were sufficient for demonstrating how it 
is possible for Dasein to experience its authenticity in factical existentiell terms. But we 
have seen that the “situation” of resoluteness is highly suspect as a basis for providing the 
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required “existentiell” attestation of conscience. Is it possible that this attestation remains 
“missing” at the end of §60? 
This appears to be the case when we consider the final lines of this section 
concerning “Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole”650 and the next two 
sections (§§61-62) describing the phenomenon of Dasein’s “anticipatory resoluteness.” For 
as soon as Heidegger completes the exhibition of resoluteness, he returns to the 
phenomenon of Being-towards-death and recognizes that the attestation of Dasein’s 
wholeness remains outstanding and must be produced. On the basis of the existential 
phenomenon of resoluteness, Heidegger must show how the specific attestation of Dasein’s 
Being-towards-death is possible:  
[As] an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, the authentic Being-
towards-death which we have deduced existentially still remains a purely 
existential project for which Dasein’s attestation is missing (dem dies 
daseinsmäßige Bezeugung fehlt). Only when such attestation has been found 
will our investigation suffice to exhibit (as its problematic requires) an 
authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, existentially confirmed and 
clarified—a potentiality which belongs to Dasein.651 
To accomplish this task, Heidegger demands that we investigate whether the phenomenon 
of anticipatory Being-towards-death is somehow contained in resoluteness as a specific 
possibility of Dasein’s authentic existence. He asks: “What if resoluteness, in accordance 
with its meaning, should bring itself into authenticity only when it projects itself…upon 
[the] uttermost possibility [of its own death?]” When Heidegger later affirmatively declares 
that this is indeed the case, his conclusion carries significant implications for the 
“attestation” of conscience produced in §60. 
Resoluteness does not just ‘have’ a connection with anticipation, as with 
something other than itself. It harbours in itself authentic Being-towards-
death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity.652 
                                                 
650
 SZ §60, 301 / 348. 
651
 SZ §60, 301 / 348. 
652
 SZ §62, 305 / 353. 
 197 
 
 
This “clarification” confirms the problem regarding the initial interpretation of 
resoluteness as the “existentiell attestation” of Dasein’s possible authenticity: while 
resoluteness may encompass such a possibility, the “existential” definition provided in §60 
does not describe the specifically authentic “situation” where Dasein is summoned by the 
“call of conscience.” As Heidegger affirms: “Resoluteness is authentically and wholly what 
it can be, only as anticipatory resoluteness (nur als vorlaufende Entschlossenheit).”653 
Absent the essential “anticipation” of Dasein’s wholeness as Being-towards-death, the 
exhibition of resoluteness merely reveals the “purely existential” structures of Dasein’s 
potentiality-for-Being—which could just as well be authentic or inauthentic. This 
preliminary and “unspecific” description of resoluteness sans anticipation is, however, 
essentially inadequate for attesting Dasein’s possible authenticity as required by 
Heidegger’s project.   
When the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the “they” is revealed 
(Das Verstehen des Gewissensrufes enthüllt die Verlorenheit in das Man). 
Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-
self. When one has an understanding Being-towards-death—towards death 
as one’s ownmost possibility—one’s potentiality-for-Being becomes 
authentic and wholly transparent (eigentlich und ganz durchsichtig).654 
By correcting the “insufficient” attestation of §60 with his concept of “anticipatory 
resoluteness,” Heidegger seems to invite a renewal of his search for a way to connect the 
existential-ontological project with ontical experience. Describing how Dasein “holds itself 
free constantly” by anticipating its “constantly certain…death,” Heidegger appears intent 
on revealing an ontical possibility of how Dasein can exist authentically. On the basis of 
the authentic “certainty” of “anticipatory resoluteness,” he seems ready to show how 
Dasein can experience the “call of conscience” that produces this attestation. As Heidegger 
states: “Authentic ‘thinking about death’ is a wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has 
become transparent to itself in an existentiell manner.”655 At the close of §62, Heidegger 
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explicitly addresses the importance of confirming the connection between this “attestation” 
of the phenomenon of conscience and the possible ontical experience of Dasein.  
Is there not…a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical 
ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological interpretation of Dasein’s 
existence? That is so indeed. But not only is this fact one which must not be 
denied and which we are forced to grant; it must also be conceived as a 
positive necessity (positiven Notwendigkeit), in terms of the object which we 
have taken as the theme of our investigation.656    
Given Heidegger’s evident concern for demonstrating how Dasein experiences this 
possibility of authentic existence through “wanting-to-have-a-conscience,” it is remarkable 
for our study that he will never again elaborate on the phenomenon of conscience in the 
remainder of Being and Time, nor will he again raise the matter of this “positive necessity.” 
The word “Gewissen” will only be mentioned in passing on five occasions in the remaining 
127 pages following the conclusion of §62 and the question of how conscience is 
experienced will never again be raised. Moreover, after the publication of Being and Time, 
Heidegger virtually banishes the concept of existential conscience from his work 
altogether. Other than a few reprises of his critique of the “moral conscience,” Heidegger 
ceases using the term “conscience” as a philosophical concept. By never showing how 
Dasein’s authenticity is made “phenomenally accessible” through the possible experience 
of conscience, Heidegger never produces the “missing” attestation clearly promised at the 
opening of the conscience chapter in §54. Ultimately, Heidegger never shows how his 
existential interpretation of conscience passes his own phenomenological “test.”657 
3.2. The Methodological Problem of Heidegger’s “Missing” Attestation  
Two major points have been made clear in our preceding analysis of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of conscience:  
                                                 
656
 SZ §62, 310 / 358. 
657
 SZ §60, 301 / 348. 
 199 
 
 
Firstly, conscience is assigned a pivotal role in the methodology of Being and Time 
as the proposed “attestation” that Dasein’s authenticity is ontically possible. Heidegger 
presents conscience as the de facto final constitutive “phenomenon” of Dasein’s existential 
structures and as the means through which he has been able to access these phenomena 
from the very start. Moreover, Heidegger intends to use the phenomenon of conscience to 
demonstrate that Dasein can authentically understand its existence without recourse to an 
“alien power” or other metaphysical absolute that would supply the basis for its 
existence.658 In this sense, Heidegger’s conscience is required both to “complete” the 
existential investigation of Dasein’s structures and to provide the necessary attesting 
“evidence” that Dasein is “phenomenally accessible” in its authentic mode.659 As Courtine 
states:  
[Clearly] defined at the outset [of §54], are the function and import of the 
analysis of Gewissen: to show phenomenologically how, through the call of 
conscience, is constituted the ipseity of Dasein, in the attesting of its 
authentic Being-able-to-be. … But the interpretation of conscience—
Heidegger emphasizes this—does not simply extend the existential analytics, 
but aims to take hold again more originally of it, bringing it back to the 
possibility of a Being-there proper.660 
In the methodological strategy of Being and Time, this “attestation” of conscience is 
required in order to make it possible to raise the question of the meaning of Being through 
an investigation of how anticipatory Being-towards-death is related to temporality.  
Secondly, given the fact that conscience is so important to the methodology of 
Being and Time, Heidegger’s recognition that the required attestation is still “missing” at 
the conclusion of §60 holds potentially devastating implications for his entire project. With 
his interpretation of resoluteness as Dasein’s authentic mode of disclosedness, Heidegger 
reveals that the “call of conscience” has been effective throughout the existential analytic 
of Dasein. All the existential structures described from the beginning of his work to this 
point have been made transparent on the basis of the authentically disclosing conscience. 
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The investigation itself requires that one “hears” the “call of conscience.” Indeed, Feldman 
even contends that the text of Being and Time implies the “performance” of the summoning 
call by Heidegger himself and represents “an attestation of Dasein’s ownmost ability to be 
itself”: the “profoundly figurative and specifically catachrestic” text represents a disturbing 
call that must be heard and re-enacted by each reader.661 Yet as Heidegger himself clearly 
states, his project “will stand the test only if it can cling to a possible authenticity of its 
Being which is attested by Dasein itself.”662 Without this attestation, Heidegger implicitly 
recognizes that his investigation would remain a “purely existential project” and thus could 
be considered to be as “free-floating” as any of the traditional theories of presence-at-hand 
that he condemns.663 Despite the major methodological setback at the end of §60, 
Heidegger continues his project and clearly intends to produce this attestation in the 
process of investigating the phenomenon of temporality: the investigation of the 
“anticipatory resoluteness” of “authentic Being-towards-death” in §62 seeks to “[elucidate] 
phenomenally” what Heidegger calls “the possible existentiell modality of [Dasein’s] own 
authenticity.”664 As we have noted above, however, Heidegger will never return to the 
problem of the “missing” attestation of conscience in the remaining pages of his interrupted 
and ultimately abandoned ontological project based on the existential analysis of Dasein.    
Recognizing these facts—that conscience plays a vital methodological role in Being 
and Time and that the project as a whole appears jeopardized by the “insufficiency” of its 
attestation—we will now consider in greater depth the relationship between the problematic 
attestation of conscience and Heidegger’s phenomenological method of investigation. This 
requires that we first attempt to describe the methodology of Being and Time and make 
explicit the basic principles of Heidegger’s approach. Only then will we be in position to 
more precisely explain how conscience is related to his problem of “method.” To guide this 
analysis, we will emphasize the “how” of revealing the “missing” attestation of conscience. 
In other words, how might Heidegger’s methodology allow for the discovery of a possible 
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way of experiencing the phenomenon of conscience? Furthermore, what conditions are 
methodologically necessary for such an attestation to be produced? Based on what we 
discover, we will then consider why the attestation of conscience still proves problematic in 
Being and Time and seek to identify clues in the text itself that could indicate solutions to 
this methodological impasse.  
It is no longer a secret that the methodology of Being and Time cannot be exhibited 
simply by reading the text closely. In Heidegger’s personal correspondence with his former 
graduate student Karl Löwith shortly after the work was published, the young professor 
states explicitly that these principles are not explained in Being and Time itself.665 As 
Dahlstrom reports: “By his own account, Heidegger does not exactly have a methodology, 
but he certainly does have a method.”666 This is not to say that the work lacks methodical 
rigor; on the contrary, the deliberate structure of the project reflects the painstaking 
development of Heidegger’s phenomenological approach over more than a decade. On this 
point, we can only echo Walter Schulz’s remark that Being and Time, with its ever 
tightening “spiral” of interpretive force, is a “methodologically sophisticated work”667 and 
concur with Courtine’s observation that this assessment “could never be taken too 
seriously.”668 Yet despite the evident deployment of an innovative “phenomenological 
method” in Being and Time, Heidegger for the most part kept his preparatory analytic of 
Dasein free of details regarding his methodology. While Heidegger addresses 
methodological questions directly in a few university courses and public talks during his 
so-called “phenomenological decade” leading up to Being and Time, his strategy for 
addressing matters of methodology within the book itself is one of minimalism if not 
mutism. 
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Notwithstanding the preliminary “definition” of “phenomenology” provided in §7 
and some occasional “asides” about interpretation that mark the progression of his analysis, 
Heidegger resists the urge to provide the reader of Being and Time with an explicit 
description of his innovative “method” for investigating Dasein. In this work, Heidegger 
proceeds to “leap” into the “hermeneutic circle” and “positively” go about his interpretative 
task of identifying the essential ontological-existential phenomena, inviting his reader to 
follow along and analyze the “how” of existence based on his or her own experience. 
Heidegger neither explains the “how” of this “leap” nor the basic principles underlying his 
interpretative “techniques.” Reflecting his stated intention in Being and Time to analyze 
existence without separating Dasein from its world, Heidegger demands of his reader an 
immediate commitment: he or she must participatively re-enact this self-interpretation of 
existence structured upon the disclosed phenomena. It is thus that conscience can be said to 
have been effective from the very start of Being and Time: it is the primordial phenomenon 
at the source of authentic disclosedness that has effectively made the analysis of Dasein 
possible even if this role is left unmentioned by Heidegger right up to the threshold of the 
ontological investigation of temporality in Division Two. 
Conscience and the “Method” of Formal Indication in Being and Time  
Based on his correspondence with Löwith, we know that the concept of “formal 
indication” represents the key to the method that Heidegger uses to conduct his preparatory 
investigation of Dasein and its constitutive elements in Being and Time.669 While he hardly 
mentions the term “formal indication” in the text, this innovative concept had explicitly 
served as the basis of his phenomenological approach for most of the decade leading up to 
this breakthrough work. Indeed, his remarks to Löwith reveal that Heidegger had 
consciously chosen to downplay the methodological principles upon which his analysis of 
existence are based.670 Reacting to Löwith’s claims that the “ontological” project of 
analyzing Dasein’s structures had failed to uphold the “hermeneutics of facticity” 
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developed by Heidegger in Freiburg, the young professor testily points out his former 
student’s failure to recognize the methodological continuity between his earlier work 
focused on the interpretation of factical life and his subsequent ontological-existential 
focus.   
The problems of facticity persist for me with the same intensity as they did 
in my Freiburg beginnings, only much more radically now, and still in the 
perspectives that were guiding me even in Freiburg. That I was constantly 
occupied with Duns Scotus and the Middle Ages, then back to Aristotle, is 
by no means a matter of chance. … Formal indications, critique of the 
customary doctrine of the a priori, formalization and the like: all of this is 
still there for me even if I do not speak of them now.671  
While Being and Time contains some expositions regarding the etymological origins and 
genealogies of specific concepts, such as phenomenology and truth, Heidegger shuns the 
complexities related to the “how” of his interpretive work. Heidegger evidently wants to 
emphasize the “experience” of Dasein’s authentic understanding rather than to describe the 
technical aspects of his approach. For Heidegger, treatises on method are of secondary 
interest compared to the experience of phenomenological revealing itself, i.e. the 
actualizing of what is formally indicated. Another letter addressed to Löwith three years 
prior to the completion of Being and Time provides further evidence regarding his evolving 
approach and his conscious decision to downplay methodological matters: 
You’ll be getting an offprint when the essay [“The Concept of Time”672] 
comes out in January. Unfortunately, I had to leave out some important 
topics, in particular the ‘formal indication,’ which is indispensable for an 
ultimate understanding—I have worked essentially on this topic.673 
In developing the concept of “formal indication,” Heidegger sought to provide 
phenomenological research with a means of overcoming the “problem of the theoretical” 
and philosophy’s traditional insistence on separating the observing subject from its world 
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or breaking the “real” world into distinct regions of study.674 We find Heidegger’s most 
sustained attempt to explain the concept of formal indication in his 1920-21 winter 
semester course at Freiburg entitled “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” 
where he attempts to build on Husserl’s “breakthrough” work on formalism in the final 
chapter of the Prolegomena to his Logical Investigations. In this course, formal indication 
is proposed by Heidegger as a methodological procedure for advancing the hermeneutic 
study of factical life while guarding against the dangerous presuppositions inherent to the 
theoretical attitude. Through his innovative approach to the interpretation of existence, 
Heidegger envisions a way of accessing phenomenological “truth” that aims to show how 
language emerges out of the discovery of the world by what he calls the “I am.” Heidegger 
contrasts this “discovering” form of truth with the traditional concept of truth, which values 
only the objective “facts” that are “possessed” by the knowledgeable “I am.”  
While Heidegger recognizes that the traditional notion of truth has shaped the 
history of philosophy since the pre-Socratic period, he contends that this prioritizing of 
logos-based evidence fundamentally distorts the “how” of the encounter of the “I am” with 
its world. Seeking to recover the question of this “how” of existence, Heidegger proposes 
his new phenomenological concept of “formal indication” as a way of investigating 
existence on the basis of Dasein’s genuine discovery of factical life. This “method” 
demands a way of overcoming the “prejudice” of “everyday” life and the “preconceived 
opinions” of science so that the factical basis of existence can be retrieved. For this reversal 
of the natural attitude to succeed, authentic interpretation must be able to cut through the 
accumulated sedimentation of objective certainty that has blocked off access to the original 
truth of existence. As Heidegger states at the opening of his lecture on “Formalization and 
Formal Indication”: 
We will name the methodical use of a sense that becomes a guiding one for 
phenomenological explication, a “formal indication.” The phenomena will 
be examined according to what the formally indicative sense carries within 
itself. Through the methodological consideration, it must become clear how 
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it can be that the formal indication, although guiding the consideration, 
nevertheless brings no preconceived opinion into the problems.675  
Parallels Between Formal Indication and the “Call of Conscience” 
By examining the transcripts of Heidegger’s lectures on formal indication during 
his “phenomenological decade,” we discover important parallels between his innovative 
“method” of philosophical investigation and the role assigned to the “call of conscience” in 
Being and Time’s existential analysis of Dasein.676 As in the case of the “attestation” of 
conscience, Heidegger states that formal indication must deliver a means of access to the 
“truth” of existence that makes it possible for any individual investigator to adopt and enact 
the proposed approach. Hent de Vries describes Heidegger’s formally indicative concepts 
as “stepping stones” towards authentic understanding: 
[They] target or touch upon the phenomenon—lived experience—yet do not 
lead us to the very heart of it. In a sense, they lead up to a way that still 
remains to be followed all the way and first of all in a genuine way. … It is, 
it seems, only when they disclose the access to the fundamental meaning of 
the phenomenon that they allow certain methodological principles and 
procedures to be deduced in the first place.677 
Reflecting the academic context of his philosophical work, Heidegger develops formal 
indication explicitly as a methodological concept and describes in detail how this approach 
to phenomenology arises out of his critical assessment of Husserl’s formalism. If the merit 
of phenomenological research is that it promises to uncover the “things themselves” upon 
which factical experience is structured, then Heidegger insists that phenomenology’s first 
task must be to determine “how” this search can proceed without losing touch with the 
world. While the methodology for accomplishing this task is not explicitly described in 
Being and Time, the fundamental question of “how” it is possible to conduct this search is 
precisely what the “attestation” of conscience is supposed to answer.  
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The similarities between what Heidegger demands of formal indication in his 
phenomenological investigation of facticity and what Heidegger seeks to achieve with his 
interpretation of Dasein’s conscience in Being and Time are striking. Consider the 
following three examples of similarities between the “roles” assigned to both formal 
indication and conscience. Firstly, Heidegger states that formal indication is essentially 
undetermined by “what-content” (Wasgehalt).678 The formal character of Heidegger’s 
indicating implies that this “method” does not communicate any form of material 
“certainty” that can be shared as “objective” knowledge. Formal indication—like the silent 
call—carries with it an essential “indefiniteness” because the “truth” of what is indicated 
can only be experienced by being “enacted.” As Streeter notes in his essay on formal 
indication in Being and Time: “Formal indication can only point and exhort others to carry 
out the direction in which it points.”679 Secondly, Heidegger stresses in his course 
“Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” that formal indication functions as a 
“defense (Abwehr)” against “the falling tendency of factical life experience (der 
abfallenden Tendenz der faktischen Lebenserfahrung).”680 Just as the “call of conscience” 
breaks off Dasein’s listening to the “they,” the “negative” warning of formal indication 
frees the understanding from the “fatal…prejudice”681 of “sound common sense (gesunden 
Menschenverstandes).”682 Thirdly, Heidegger emphasizes that formal indication requires an 
appropriate mode of reception in order to produce any form of authentic understanding. 
Just as conscience requires a proper kind of hearing, formal indication necessitates the 
enacting of what is indicated. Because the “discourse” of formal indication is itself 
immaterial and empty of content, it discloses nothing if it is not understandingly 
appropriated. To function as the basic means of phenomenological investigation, formal 
indication must be enacted in much the same way as the “call of conscience” must be 
willingly heard in order for Dasein to come into resoluteness. This parallel is further 
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reinforced by the heavy emphasis on the “situation” in both Heidegger’s lectures on formal 
indication and his interpretation of conscience in Being and Time. Where conscience brings 
Dasein into the “situation [of] the ‘there’ which is disclosed in resoluteness,”683 formal 
indication is linked in Heidegger’s course on “Phenomenological Interpretations of 
Aristotle” to the “situation of the original access to the proper ‘what’ and ‘how’ of 
philosophy, …[to] the situation of the primal decision on the actualizations of 
philosophizing (existence).”684 This parallel is seen even more clearly in Heidegger’s 
reading of Paul’s First letter to the Thessalonians: 
The turning-around (Umwendung) from the object-historical to the 
enactment-historical (Vollzugsgeschichtlichen) lies in factical life experience 
itself. It is a turning-around to the situation…[which is] for us something 
that belongs to understanding in the manner of enactment… For the question 
of the unity or the diversity of the situation, it is important that we can gain 
them only in the formal indication. (Für der Frage der Einheit bzw. 
Mannigfaltigkeit der Situation ist es wichtig, daß wir sie nur in der formalen 
Anzeige gewinnen können.)685  
In his lectures on phenomenological method, Heidegger identifies formal indication as the 
only means of conducting philosophical research because it alone provides access to the 
situation of enactment that he equates with authentic existence. Emphasizing the 
“importance” and “methodological, and more than simply methodological, primacy of the 
concept of formal indication” in Heidegger’s early work, de Vries observes that the author 
of Being and Time demands that phenomenology itself must be taken “in a formally 
indicative sense.”686  
The procedure of formal indication gives access to—or reveals the very 
meaning of—phenomenology and of the phenomenon, rather than the other 
way around.687 
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As we have seen, Heidegger in Being and Time assigns this primordial task of formally 
indicating the phenomenal situation to the experience of conscience: the existential call 
allows Dasein to access its “authentic truth” and to attest the possibility of its authenticity, 
thus providing a methodological basis for the investigation conducted in Being and Time.  
If we are justified in making this connection between conscience and formal 
indication, then we also might have opened up a new way of investigating the “missing” 
attestation of conscience through the exhibition of its relation to Heidegger’s “method” of 
phenomenological research. To advance our study, we will first consider how formal 
indication emerged as Heidegger’s “method” of investigation as a result of his critical 
reading of Husserl’s theoretical work on formalism. Based on this analysis, we will then 
examine how the development of Heidegger’s method of formal indication is reflected in 
his interpretation of the “call of conscience” in Being and Time. In so doing, we will also 
make it possible to evaluate the potential parallels between the problems related to the 
“beginning” or phenomenal “source” of formal indication and the “missing” attestation of 
conscience. Using what we gain from this analysis regarding the link between conscience 
and formal indication, we will then turn back to the question of Heidegger’s interpretation 
of conscience as the “attesting” call and search for clues within Being and Time that might 
explain the “insufficiency” of this attestation.  
Heidegger’s Critique of Husserlian Formalism and “Objective Validity”  
In November 1920, more than six years prior to the publication of Being and Time, 
Heidegger warned his students that Husserl’s approach to phenomenology was trapped in 
the “prejudice” of “formal-ontological determinedness” and required a radical correction.688 
He presented a detailed breakdown of Husserl’s work on formalization in the Logical 
Investigations showing how it is “fatal for the relational- and enactment-aspect of the 
phenomenon…because it prescribes…a theoretical relational meaning…[and] hides the 
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enactment-character.”689 To fulfill the promise of phenomenology, Heidegger claimed that 
the prejudiced “formal determination” found in Husserl’s work must be pushed aside in 
order to reconsider the actual “how” of worldly experience. In this sense, Heidegger 
rejected the Husserlian project of “securing” objects on the basis of what is experienced in 
the flow of consciousness and can be possessed as knowledge. Heidegger sought to uproot 
the “objective certainty” championed by Husserl, as seen in the Prolegomena to his Logical 
Investigations: 
The state of affairs comes before us, not merely putatively, but as actually 
before our eyes, and in the object itself, as the object that it is (Der 
Sachverhalt steht uns jetzt nicht bloß vermeintlich, sondern wirklich vor 
Augen und in ihm der Gegenstand selbst, als das, was er ist)… [As] actually 
thus it is given to our knowledge…[and] known to be such. Otherwise put, 
its being thus is a truth actually realized, individualized in the experience of 
the inwardly evident judgment (daß er so ist, ist aktuell gewordene 
Wahrheit, vereinzelt im Erlebnis des evidenten Urteils).690 
For Husserl, formalism was a means of correcting the error of all previous work in the field 
of logic by providing a phenomenological solution for collecting valid data from 
experience. For Heidegger, this approach to formalism—despite its great potential—
remains ensnared in the theoretical way of understanding experience and fails to recognize 
the priority of factical enactment over objective perception and intuitive judgment.  
In the concluding chapter of Husserl’s Prolegomena to his Logical Investigations, 
we see how closely related yet at the same time so far apart were the phenomenological 
projects of Husserl and Heidegger. Seemingly anticipating Heidegger’s “destructive” 
approach to phenomenology, Husserl calls for a rigorous investigation of “the conditions of 
the possibility of theoretical knowledge (den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit theoretischer 
Erkenntnis) in general, or, more generally, of inference in general or knowledge in general, 
and in the case of any possible human being (für ein beliebiges menschliches Wesen).”691 In 
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the mission that he lays out in his Prolegomena, Husserl demands that “the ideal essence of 
theory” be analyzed to determine its “primitive essential concepts (primitiven wesenhaften 
Begriffe),”692 the a priori conditions that account for the constitution of any possible 
“interconnected web of knowledge (Zusammenhang der Erkenntnis).”693 Indeed, Husserl 
appears to encourage initiatives like Heidegger’s existential analysis of Being-in-the-world 
when he urges his followers to faithfully pursue “seemingly trivial, preparatory tasks” such 
as “looking methodologically to the fixation of unambiguous, sharply distinct verbal 
meanings (eindeutiger, scharf unterschiedener Wortbedeutungen).”694 Husserl claims such 
work is vital in order to attain “insight into the essence of the concepts involved” and to 
salvage “the field of pure logic” by eliminating “fatal” equivocation and “confused 
concepts [that have] so hindered the progress of knowledge.”695  
While this implied call for destruction, rigor and concern for “a phenomenological 
origin (phenomenologischen Ursprung)” would seem to confirm the alignment of Husserl 
and Heidegger, the latter openly breaks with his master specifically with regard to the 
question of formalization.696 Despite his criticism of the philosophical tradition, Husserl 
plainly intends to solidify the logical foundations that support theoretical knowledge and to 
secure the “objective validity of the formal structures (objective Geltung der erwachsenden 
Bildungsformen)” required by science.697 Husserl’s attention is focused on the “a priori 
conditions of knowledge, which can be discussed and investigated apart from all relation to 
the thinking subject and to the idea of subjectivity in science.”698 While Heidegger also 
believes that phenomenology must disclose the a priori conditions of experience, he argues 
that Husserl overlooked the problematic status of the subject in his quest to find a “‘pure’ 
foundation” upon which the “validity” of scientific knowledge could rest.699 Heidegger 
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argues that Husserl’s faith in the absolute “definiteness and clearness (Bestimmtheit und 
Klarheit)”700 of experience comes at a cost: factical life is stripped of its original 
“enactment-character” and considered only in terms of its classifiable “content.”701  
Heidegger sees formal indication as a method for correcting the error of Husserl’s 
formalization by recovering the neglected question of the “original ‘how’” of experience.702 
In this regard, Heidegger demands that we “become clear about the meaning of the formal 
indication”703 and recognize that—unlike formalization—“the formal indication has 
nothing to do with…[the ‘general’ and] the attitudinally theoretical.”704 Heidegger claims 
that unless one recognizes that the “meaning of ‘formal’ in the ‘formal indication’ is more 
original (ursprünglicher),”705 one will inevitably “[fall] either into an attitudinal 
consideration or into regional demarcations which one views as absolute.”706 In the specific 
case of Husserl, Heidegger is even more damning: with his theoretical prejudice and his 
concept of absolute consciousness, Husserl is guilty of both errors. For Heidegger, 
phenomenology must be saved from Husserl’s tragic perpetuation of the tradition’s formal-
ontological prejudice. In his notes for a course on “The Philosophical Foundations of 
Medieval Mysticism” that was planned for the 1919-20 winter semester but never given, 
Heidegger remarks:  
[Only] phenomenology can offer rescue in philosophical need (Rettung aus 
der philosophischen Not), but only if it remains pure in its radical moments 
of origin (in ihren radikalen Ursprungsmomenten rein erhalten), if intuition 
is not theorized and the concept of essence is not rationalized according to 
the general idea of universal validity…707  
For Heidegger, Husserl’s abstracting of the “subject”—seen most dramatically in the 
method of phenomenological reduction—continues the philosophical tradition of 
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neglecting the question of how Dasein discovers its world. Despite having criticized the 
modern notion of subjectivity, Husserl did not follow up this criticism with a radical 
questioning of the nature of and conditions for any experience of “consciousness” or of 
supposedly “certain” knowledge. Heidegger contends that the phenomenological project 
will remain a failure unless the investigation of the a priori conditions of experience is 
broadened to include the “how” of the discovering subject’s interpretation of its factical 
experience in the world. Given that Husserl remains faithful to the scientific ideal of 
absolute “definiteness and clearness,”708 Heidegger considers his predecessor’s 
phenomenological insights to be literally problematic in that Husserl exposes vital 
problems but fails to propose sufficiently radical solutions.  
With his concept of formal indication, Heidegger appropriates Husserl’s insights 
regarding formalization and radically transforms the scientifically-oriented theory of forms 
into a methodological tool for interpreting the entity that his master had overlooked: the 
experiencing “subject” or Dasein. As Heidegger notes: 
The point of departure of the path to philosophy is factical life experience 
(Der Ausgangspunkt des Weges zur Philosophie ist die faktische 
Lebenserfahrung). It seems, however, as if philosophy is leading us out of 
factical life experience.709  
Nonetheless, Husserl’s insights regarding the illegitimate domination of logic by the 
principle of generalization inspire Heidegger’s attempt to develop an investigative strategy 
for explicating the conditions of facticity and the Being of the “I am” that discloses the 
world. The key for Heidegger is that phenomenology must guard against the degradation of 
“factical life experience as a matter of secondary importance” and explain how “philosophy 
arises” out of original experience and “springs back into it in a reversal that is entirely 
essential.”710 In the twilight of his career, Husserl will unwittingly see his early work on 
formalization transformed by Heidegger into a radically new approach to phenomenology: 
Originally intended to provide the foundation for universal science, Husserl’s all-
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encompassing theory of pure forms will ironically serve to advance Heidegger’s renegade 
ontological-existential project—a project which explicitly denies the ideal of “certain 
knowledge” necessary in order to even conceive of such a foundation. In his “Introduction 
to the Phenomenology of Religion” course, Heidegger makes it clear that formal indication 
offers a means for recovering the authentic understanding of factical life experience that he 
believes has been deformed by the common notion of history that regards the past as a 
theoretical object. According to Heidegger, the traditional sense of history is a 
“generalization” of factical experience according “to what extent something 
temporal...something becoming and something conscious as past…appears in it.”711 
Heidegger argues that this objectifying approach to history, which can conveniently be 
divided into various domains of knowledge and used as a foundation for theoretical 
activity, has escaped radical questioning. 
For Heidegger, the primary task of formal indication is thus to defend factical 
experience from the corrupting prejudice of the formal-ontological attitude. If 
phenomenology is to succeed in its mission to reestablish an understanding that 
authentically reflects the phenomena of experience rather than falling into the illusions of 
naturalism or idealism, then Heidegger insists that its method must effectively guard 
against the erroneous belief that experience and the relations upon which it is structured can 
be determined with absolute certainty.  
A glance at the history of philosophy shows that formal determination of the 
objective entirely dominates philosophy. How can this prejudice, this pre-
judgment, be prevented? This is just what the formal indication achieves. It 
belongs to the phenomenological explication itself as a methodical moment. 
Why is it called “formal”? The formal is something relational. The 
indication should indicate beforehand the relation of the phenomenon—in 
the negative sense, however, the same as if to warn! … [The] formal 
indication is a defense (Abwehr), a preliminary securing, so that the 
enactment-character still remains free.712 
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By stressing the question of the “how” of enactment, Heidegger aims to recall the utter flux 
of the enactment-character of one’s involvement in factical life. For Heidegger, the ideal of 
certain knowledge is not just a question of improving one’s “seeing” or of adopting an 
artificial attitude towards the world, as he believes is seen in Husserl’s experiments with 
reduction; this ideal is an impossibility that has lured philosophy away from authentically 
“listening” to experience and recognizing the thrown character of existence. With his 
appropriation of the concept of the formal, Heidegger intends to fulfill the promise of what 
he contends is revealed but left unrealized in Husserl’s logical interpretation of 
formalization. This task requires the development of an interpretive means of philosophical 
investigation that overcomes “the falling tendency of factical life experience (der 
abfallenden Tendenz der faktischen Lebenserfahrung), which constantly threatens to slip 
into the objective.”713 To liberate philosophy from its entanglements in the “general 
determination of the objective,” Heidegger calls for a method for ensuring that the 
“relational meaning” of what is indicated is not “[taken] granted” as being “originally 
theoretical.”714 With the concept of formal indication, Heidegger seeks to establish an 
approach for his philosophical project that allows for positive discoveries regarding the 
essence of existence while vigilantly guarding against the prejudice of the theoretical 
attitude. 
Reversing Tradition: From Object-Historical to Enactment-Historical 
Formal indication thus represents a means for correcting the error that has allowed 
thought to become divorced from the lived “truth” of one’s experience: it counters the 
tradition’s faith in “material” knowledge. In this reversal or correction, Heidegger’s “call of 
conscience” complements the “method” of formal indication and serves in Being and Time 
as the means for showing how authentic indicating is possible. As interpreted by 
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Heidegger, conscience is the initiating indication that can bring Dasein into the authentic 
moment of resoluteness: it serves its indicative function by urging Dasein to ignore 
“everyday” worldly concerns and come back to itself. At the beginning of his explication of 
Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians during the 1920-21 winter semester, Heidegger 
connects this reversal with the decisive situation of “enactment,” a notion which he will 
later tie to the “call of conscience”: “The turning-around from the object-historical to the 
enactment-historical lies in factical life experience itself. It is the turning-around to the 
situation.”715  
For Heidegger, this “reversal” is an act of destruction and resistance: it corrects the 
error of traditional philosophy with its theoretical perspective of the world and makes 
possible a more original understanding of experience. While this might seem like a simple 
correction, Heidegger claims it is not easily achieved. Such a reversal requires that Dasein 
overcome the overwhelming tendency to seek some kind of authority or posit a material 
basis for its knowledge. As Heidegger states:  
[Factic] life experience, which is to be the starting point of philosophizing, is 
also the starting point of that which hinders philosophizing. … By making, 
for the very first time, factic life experience itself into a problem, we have 
the possibility of reversing this decadent tendency, finding in experience 
itself the motives for this about-face and the transformation it can 
promote.716 
In this sense, formal indication must resist Dasein’s flight towards the illusory security of 
knowledge and ensure that all interpretation of experience remains authentically exposed to 
potential error: the possibility of deception must be recognized as essential to one’s factical 
experience. The phenomenological project must find within factical life the powerful 
means and motives for recognizing the need to struggle and “stand firm” against the 
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essential tendency of “letting oneself fall”717 into the security of “objective,” worldly 
things.718  
Formal indication involves the commitment to what Heidegger calls the interpretive 
forestructure: one must approach phenomena “purely formally” and allow the meaning of 
factical life experience to reveal the “truth” of one’s involvement with these phenomena.719 
This formal “experiment” of the phenomenological foreconception structures all possibility 
of authentic experience, yet it is no foolproof technique for obtaining the “facts” of 
existence. Even the most earnest endeavor at revealing this “truth” is conditioned by the 
volatility of Dasein’s existence. “It has…never the tendency of determining such a realm 
[of objects in a material complex] with finality, but rather is subordinated to the historical 
situation,” Heidegger claims.720 Through one’s commitment to the interpretive 
foreconception, what is to be gained is the “enactment of the historical situation of the 
phenomenon.”721 The result is not a securing of factual knowledge upon which an 
unshakable “theory of regions” can be constructed.722 Instead, this factical experience is the 
basic phenomenon of history: the enactment of the volatile “original-historical situation”723 
that is the living experience of “temporality as such.”724  
According to Kisiel’s account, Heidegger affirms the ontological significance of 
formal indication by making the “I am” the “prime phenomenon” to be explored through 
his methodology.725 Heidegger emphasizes the individual nature of enactment by focusing 
“on the full facticity of the ‘I am,’ and…[subsequently] on the project of ‘existence’ 
understood as a forward-tending ‘(having)-to-be’ (Zu-sein).”726 In one of his first remarks 
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revealing the importance of formal indication for the question of the “I am,” Heidegger 
states: 
The formal indication is in the “neither-nor”; it is neither something in the 
manner of an order, nor explication of a phenomenological determination. 
We cannot project a situation into a particular field of being, nor onto 
“consciousness (Bewußtsein).” We cannot speak of a “situation of a point A 
between B and C.” Language protests against this. And indeed we cannot do 
this because a point is nothing “like an I (Ichliche).”727 
Formal indication does not indicate a “point” but rather a possibility of the “like an I” that 
can be understood through enactment. Through what is formally indicated, 
phenomenological investigation is able to cautiously access the phenomenon of the “like an 
I” without falling into the fantastic certainty of the pure “I am,” something Heidegger sees 
as characteristic of modern science. The preliminary foreconception that is indicated 
provides an access point for phenomenological interpretation through the non-predicative, 
purely formal “is” that “merely is and does not have.”728 Through the preventive method of 
formal indication, theoretical-objective science is denied its very foundation and the 
derivative nature of traditional ontology is exposed. Ontological regions, verifiable 
knowledge and the “consciousness-point” of the subject are all recognized as secondary 
because formal indication allows factical life to regain its priority as the genuine basis of all 
human experience. As Heidegger proclaims, the “how” of formal indication is only a 
“starting point of a phenomenological study.”729  
One of the basic principles of Heidegger’s formal indication is that this “method” 
must preserve the essential questionability of experience. Only through the enactment of 
what is indicated is any understanding made possible—and this understanding itself never 
yields an “eternal certainty” but rather a fleeting yet personal experience of “truth.” While 
formal indication implies a foreconception of what is indicated, the indication itself is 
“empty” and can only receive its fulfillment through enactment. Thus the direction of what 
                                                 
727
 GA 60, 91 / 63. 
728
 GA 60, 92 / 64. 
729
 GA 60, 92 / 64. 
 218 
 
 
is formally indicated is never random or haphazard but is aimed toward its enactment. In 
his 1929-30 course at Marburg entitled “The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics,” 
Heidegger confirmed in his brief comments on “formally indicative” concepts that they 
essentially “point into a concretion of the individual Dasein in man in each case” even 
though they “never already bring this concretion along with them in their content.”730 For 
Heidegger, “anyone who seeks to understand is called upon by [the] conceptual context” of 
what is formally indicated “to undertake a transformation of themselves into their 
Dasein.”731 Factical experience is the enacted “goal” of formal indication: it is the concrete 
“situation” that the indication is oriented toward. The concreteness of philosophy is not an 
“object” but rather a movement towards the “concrete situation” of enactment. As the 
“method” of indicating this movement, formal indication offers phenomenological 
investigation a means of actualizing the “situation of the original access to the proper 
‘what’ and ‘how’ of philosophy.”732 As Heidegger writes: 
There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says 
that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the 
only way of arriving at what is proper…by following the indication.733 
Since the formal is always indicated in the approach to factical experience, rather than 
imposed upon it, the concept of formal indication can serve as the methodology of proper 
philosophical investigation because it serves strictly as a “way” of proceeding. The 
direction can always be adjusted and the object is never determined once and for all, not 
even after the formal indication has been enacted by the investigator. Due to the 
irremediably uncertain character of existence, the “method” of formal indication must 
constantly return to the beginning and initiate the process of enactment over and over 
again.  
“Formal-indicative” is a unified, inseparable concept in philosophy. The 
formal is not the “form,” and the indication its content; on the contrary, 
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“formal” means “approach toward the determination,” approach-
character.734 
Through formal indication, “the more radical and formal is the understanding of what is 
empty, the richer it becomes, because it leads to the concrete.”735  
Like the “call of conscience,” formal indication serves to counter the basic tendency 
of human beings to interpret experience in objective and material terms. As Heidegger tells 
his students: “How can this prejudice, this pre-judgment, be prevented? This is just what 
the formal indication achieves.”736 Heidegger’s proposed “method” defies the falling 
tendency of human existence and aims to rescue the authentic historicality of factical life.  
One must return ever again to the point of departure (Ansatzpunkt). The 
departure is to be taken from the having-relation of that which is “like an I” 
(von der Habensbeziehung des Ichlichen).737 
In the formal indication, one is directed towards the possibility of authentic understanding 
and, as we have seen, this directing function in Being and Time is performed by the 
phenomenon of conscience.  
The Problematic “How” of Formal Indication and the “Missing” Attestation of 
Conscience 
Beyond the common characteristics we have found in both Heidegger’s concepts of 
formal indication and conscience, our analysis also reveals that the two concepts share the 
same fundamental problem: Heidegger does not show how these authentically disclosive 
phenomena are possible in worldly experience. In the case of the “call of conscience,” the 
required “attestation” remains “missing,” at least in terms of being described as a “factical 
existentiell possibility” of Dasein.738 As for formal indication, Heidegger never shows how 
the “reversal” of the “formal determination of the objective [that] entirely dominates 
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philosophy” is actually possible.739 How can we “return ever again to the point of 
departure”?740 Despite the confidence expressed by Heidegger before his students, his 
presentation of formal indication as a means of philosophical investigation remains strictly 
hypothetical. As in the case of the “call of conscience,” Heidegger will take up the question 
of the “historical” in order to find an “attestation” of how formal indication can be 
“experienced.” But given that this task of “attestation” is never completed by Heidegger—
neither in his numerous courses on phenomenology nor in Being and Time—the problem 
remains unsolved. How is it possible to initiate formal indication and deploy this method of 
phenomenological interpretation? Given the “falling tendency” of experience, how could 
anyone recognize the need for formal indication and actually go about enacting it? Is there 
some kind of initial “call” that makes the method of formal indication possible?  
During his lecture on formalization and formal indication in November 1920, 
Heidegger raised and quickly dismissed this question:    
The turn from the object-historical complex to the enactment-historical 
situation itself derives from connections which can be shown in factical life 
experience. Does one, with this turning-around, at all emerge from history? 
Where does the phenomenological begin? This objection is legitimate, but it 
maintains as its background the conviction that the philosophical has a 
special dimension. This difficulty, therefore, does not burden our study.741 
In this early lecture, Heidegger argues that any concern for the question of “beginning” 
shows itself to be already tainted by the prejudice of the “formal-ontological” way of 
thinking.742 What this implies is that worldly experience is essentially structured on the 
“reversal” of the enactment of formal indication prior to any philosophizing or 
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phenomenological investigating, e.g. prior to any phenomenological reduction. This 
question only comes up, Heidegger tells his Freiburg students, because the “dominating” 
mode of “theoretical” understanding covers up the original “reversal” process.743 While 
Heidegger’s rhetoric is forceful, he never shows how one can actually emerge from the 
obscurity of traditional conventions concerning our experience of the world and initiate this 
illuminating “reversal.” In one of his lectures on formal indication during the 1921-22 
winter semester, Heidegger’s attempt to “define” his phenomenological approach through 
the use of a metaphor appears to confirm the impossibility of authentic understanding.744  
The situation in question does not correspond to a safe harbor but to a leap 
into a drifting boat (nicht die rettende Küste sondern der Sprung ins 
treibende Boot), and it all depends on getting the mainsheet in hand and 
looking to the wind. … To grasp philosophy authentically means to 
encounter absolute questionability (absolute Fragwürdigkeit) and to possess 
this questionability in full awareness.745 
Resoluteness appears to be an a priori condition for the “performance” of formal indication 
that itself is supposed to make resoluteness possible. Heidegger’s “heroic” leap seems 
fantastical given his assessment of the world’s essential ambiguity that is demonstrated by 
our “everyday” state of “blindness to one’s own spiritual situation.”746 In his lectures, 
Heidegger nonetheless insists that “absolute questionability” does arise in factical life: 
through the movement of the reversal, one exposes factical life’s ambiguity and then 
inevitably falls back into it. But despite Heidegger’s assurances, the “how” of this 
“process” remains nebulous; given the assessment of the “falling tendency” of Dasein and 
the “necessarily already declined” nature of factical life,747 this experience of “full 
awareness” seems impossible unless someone or something is calling us to “leap.”748 In 
analyzing the possible connection between Heidegger’s notion of “factical” experience and 
Christian faith, de Vries asks: “[What], exactly, justifies this analogy, extrapolation, or 
                                                 
743
 GA 60, 90 / 63. 
744
 GA 61, 37 / 29.  
745
 GA 61, 37 / 29.  
746
 GA 61, 38 / 30. 
747
 GA 61, 32-33 / 26. 
748
 GA 61, 37 / 29.  
 222 
 
 
implication [of enactment], if not, in turn, an act, indeed a leap, of faith?”749 While 
Heidegger claims that the reversal does not imply a movement outside of history, there 
remains the need to explain how this “beginning” can be experienced within history. As 
Schalow points out, Heidegger’s insistence on the “ontic dimention of the call” and the 
need for an “existentiell attestation” is directly related to showing how understanding is 
possible without the Christian “faith-commitment” and its “mythological religious 
elements,” prominently “employed in Kierkegaard’s analysis.”750 But how can this 
authentic reversal be possible given Heidegger’s own conclusion that the factical world is 
already steeped in “prejudice” and defined by the “tendency toward fleeing away”?751  
Heidegger’s concern for the “attestation” of conscience in Being and Time confirms 
that he de facto disavows the earlier stance he had taken in Freiburg when he dismissed the 
question of phenomenological beginning. To fulfill its potential as a means of accessing the 
“things themselves,” phenomenology must explain the “how” of experience and provide 
the attestation of how “authentic” understanding is possible. To simply dismiss the question 
of “beginning” would leave phenomenological investigation completely disconnected from 
the world: it would then be no more than a “free-floating” and “purely existential” 
theoretical approach.752 The necessity of the “attestation” of conscience in Being and Time 
confirms that Heidegger came to realize that he must take on this difficult “burden” of 
demonstrating how Dasein’s “turning-around” is experienced.753 But then how can the 
“movement” of reversal be initiated? Despite the “professed atheism” of Being and Time, 
are formal indication and the “call of conscience” ultimately as dependent as Stoker’s 
synteresis on some sort of metaphysical power, as implied in de Vries’ charge that the 
“destructive” Heideggerian project involves the “re-citation of the verbum internum of 
Christian faith”?754 
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3.3. Investigating the Formally Indicative “Clues” of Conscience 
Our investigation has now confirmed the following three points regarding 
conscience and formal indication: firstly, that conscience must play a key methodological 
role in Being and Time as the attesting “thread” that connects the existential analysis with 
worldly experience; secondly, that conscience is closely related to Heidegger’s “method” of 
formal indication developed in his series of courses on phenomenological investigation; 
and thirdly, that Heidegger in Being and Time recognizes the urgency of addressing the 
attestation “problem” that he had dismissed in his earlier work on formal indication. We 
have also seen that—despite his attempt to solve this problem—Heidegger never produces 
the “missing” attestation in Being and Time. Is it possible that the connection between 
formal indication and conscience might shed light on this problem that threatens to derail 
Heidegger’s entire project? What is certain is that our analysis has opened up a new way of 
examining Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience in Being and Time from a 
methodological perspective. We are in a position to consider how the attestation “problem” 
arises and to evaluate whether an alternative reading of conscience is possible. We are now 
in a position to ask: does Heidegger provide any “clues” that might help us find the 
“missing” attestation required by his project? In other words, do any of the existential 
phenomena explicitly mentioned by Heidegger in his investigation of conscience formally 
indicate the possibility of a solution to be found in Dasein itself? In order for the 
phenomenon of conscience to successfully function as attestation, Heidegger’s 
phenomenological “method” must show how conscience is able to find Dasein who is lost 
in the world. We are therefore looking for evidence of how Heidegger’s authentic “call of 
conscience” can be connected with the existential phenomena that have been previously 
analyzed in Being and Time. When we conduct this search, we find four such “clues” that 
require closer examination: discourse, truth, solicitude and death.  
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Discourse: Silent Calling and the “Voice of the Friend” 
When he introduces the phenomenon of conscience in §54, Heidegger describes it 
as being constituted by two basic modes of discourse: calling and hearing. First, he 
identifies conscience “as a call (Ruf)” that he specifically describes as “a mode of discourse 
(Rede).”755 Then he notes the involvement of a second kind of discourse: “To the call of 
conscience there corresponds a possible hearing (ein mögliches Hören).”756 Through this 
phenomenon of calling-hearing, Dasein experiences the uncanniness of absolute silence 
that enables it to “break off” its listening to the “they” and come into resoluteness:757  
The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into 
words at all… Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of 
keeping silent…[and forces Dasein] into the reticence of itself. … [What] is 
‘called’ is not to be tied up with an expectation of anything like a 
communication (daß das Verstehen des „Gerufenen“ sich nicht an die 
Erwartung einer Mitteilung und dergleichen klammern darf).758 
To clarify his description of this authentic mode of discourse, Heidegger repeatedly points 
his reader back to the existential analysis of discourse and language provided in §34. 
Indeed, Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience even includes two footnotes specifically 
referencing this earlier section where he had analyzed the basic structures of discourse and 
determined its place among the constitutive elements of Dasein’s disclosedness. When we 
reconsider the analysis of §34 from a methodological perspective, however, Heidegger’s 
earlier analysis of discourse proves problematic for his interpretation of conscience: as we 
will see, the “authentic” discourse of conscience proves to be incompatible with his 
description of discourse in §34. As Courtine points out, “it becomes immediately apparent” 
that it is “impossible to translate simply, in terms of call, utterances applicable to Rede 
[discourse] in general” because the logic of common discourse is “basically inadequate” for 
any authentic understanding of conscience.759 Furthermore, the methodology of 
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Heidegger’s analysis of discourse shows itself to be strangely inconsistent with his way of 
investigating the other two “equiprimordial” phenomena that constitute Dasein’s 
disclosedness: state-of-mind and understanding. 
In the opening lines of §34, Heidegger introduces the phenomenon of discourse 
almost apologetically. He has already established that disclosedness consists of the 
“equiprimordial” phenomena of state-of-mind, understanding and discourse, yet his 
analysis of the third phenomenon comes much later than that of the other two. Rather than 
analyzing all three “equiprimordial” phenomena together, Heidegger has delayed the 
analysis of discourse and given priority to the analyses of two other phenomena: 
interpretation and assertion. Why has the discussion of discourse been postponed? 
Heidegger claims that discourse only reveals itself as a constitutive element of 
disclosedness when “language…becomes our theme for the first time (jetzt erst).”760 As 
Heidegger states: 
The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse. This 
phenomenon is one of which we have been making constant use already in 
our foregoing interpretation of state-of-mind, understanding, interpretation, 
and assertion; but we have, as it were, kept it suppressed in our thematic 
analysis (aber gleichsam unterschlagen).761  
This peculiar “suppression” carries with it significant and problematic implications 
for Heidegger’s methodology. For one, Heidegger seems to imply that the basic 
phenomenon of discourse—unlike the “equiprimordial” concepts of state-of-mind and 
understanding—becomes accessible only after the phenomenon of “assertion as 
communication” has been examined.762 Evidently, this methodological sequence is 
incoherent with Heidegger’s interpretation of the silent “call of conscience.” At the opening 
of §34, Heidegger claims that the “concepts of ‘saying’ and ‘speaking’” have led to the 
recognition of discourse as an “equiprimordial” element of disclosedness.763 Yet if the 
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“intelligibility” described in §34 can only arise through communication, then the 
“authentic” phenomenon of conscience cannot be a mode of such discourse. Secondly, the 
delay poses a threat to the entire methodological structure of Being and Time because the 
phenomenon of interpretation is shown to be itself interpreted on the basis of a partial view 
of disclosedness. While Heidegger downplays this apparent neglect of discourse’s 
primordial role on the grounds that “we have been making constant use [of it] already,”764 
his remark does not eliminate the methodological problem. If discourse has been in 
“constant use” but improperly recognized, then the authentic phenomenon has necessarily 
remained in obscurity and the investigation has been advanced illegitimately on the basis of 
a deficient mode of discourse. Thirdly, this “suppression” appears to camouflage a 
remarkable difference between the phenomenon of discourse described in §34 and the 
“double role” assigned to discourse in the “calling-hearing” of conscience. In both §34 and 
§57, Heidegger emphasizes the “hearing” function of discourse that is required for 
disclosedness: in order to understand authentically, Dasein must reticently “hold its tongue” 
so that it can “hear” what is disclosed to it. When we examine how Heidegger speaks of the 
call, “everything becomes a question of listening,” as Courtine observes.765 What is unique 
to Heidegger’s concept of conscience, however, is that no authentic understanding is 
possible without the “summons” that silently calls Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being. This calling function—which is not mentioned explicitly as a possibility in 
§34—represents a “mode of discourse” quite unlike anything that could be discovered 
strictly on the basis of a study of assertive “language.”  
The silent “discourse” of conscience begins with the “calling” that proves to be the 
source of authentic disclosedness, not with the reciprocal “hearing” or “articulating” that 
together with understanding and state-of-mind constitutes the whole of the existential 
structures of disclosedness. As Heidegger subsequently informs us, the “call of conscience” 
is the attesting source of “[the] most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, 
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disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be.”766 What is formally 
indicated by conscience appears to fall outside the limits of what can be signified by 
discourse, at least by discourse as it is described in §34. Due to his delaying of the analysis 
of discourse, Heidegger obscures the problem of categorizing the “call of conscience” as an 
“equiprimordial” phenomenon alongside understanding and state-of-mind. As we have 
seen, it is conscience with its unique and unmediated way of “giving-to-understand” that 
makes these two constitutive phenomena possible.767 Is the “call of conscience” that 
discloses the “most primordial phenomenon of truth”768 properly understood as a mere 
“mode of discourse” through the description found in §34? Must calling rather be 
understood as a radically pre-discursive phenomenon that interrupts the communicative 
chatter of “everydayness” so that Dasein can authentically return to the “there” of 
disclosedness? In analysizing Heidegger’s lectures on Paul and Augustine, Schalow notes 
the difficulty of Heidegger’s attempt to describe the “call of conscience” as a form of 
discourse: 
What life-phenomenon can exhibit the movement of formal indication; what 
basic genre of lived-utterance can mark the transition from ineffability, that 
is, provide the worldly locus for the primeval constellation of meaning? In 
asking this question, we reach the vestige of a prediscursive, practically 
initiated saying, even a non-speaking, where the phenomenon of the “call” 
first announces itself.769 
By exposing the apparent incompatibility of discourse and conscience, Heidegger’s 
“clue” of discourse also leads us to reconsider the methodological importance of his very 
first allusion to the “call of conscience” in Being and Time. For it is in §34 that Heidegger 
first identifies a potential source of the call: “the voice of the friend.”770 
Listening to . . . is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for 
others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which 
Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—as in hearing the 
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voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it (als Hören der Stimme 
des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt). Dasein hears, because it 
understands.771  
Admittedly, Heidegger never explains, at least in his extant work, what is meant by this 
“voice of the friend” so we must avoid the temptation to exaggerate its significance, 
especially given our concern for the “precautionary” method of formal indication. At the 
same time, Heidegger’s acknowledgement that Dasein can be reached by the “voice of the 
friend” is potentially relevant to our methodological question in several ways. Firstly, this 
“voice of the friend” implies that some sort of “call” is presupposed in Heidegger’s analysis 
of discourse even if the phenomenon of “calling” goes unmentioned. Indeed, Heidegger’s 
remark concerning the “voice” confirms that the analysis of the phenomenon of 
“disclosedness” in §34 is incomplete and must be corrected because the “most primordial” 
role of conscience as calling was initially neglected.772 Secondly, the “voice of the friend” 
is directly associated with an authentic possibility of “Being-with for others”: to resolutely 
come into one’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being,” Dasein must adopt the “primary and 
authentic way” of Being-with that involves “hearing the voice.”773 As Heidegger 
subsequently informs us, this “hearing” requires the reciprocal “calling” of conscience: the 
calling of “the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it”774 implies that an 
authentic way of Being-with is essential to Dasein’s “truth of existence (Wahrheit der 
Existenz).”775 In his essay “The Self and Its Witness,” Christopher Fynsk emphasizes how 
this “voice of the friend” confirms Dasein’s essence as Being-with: 
Who is this friend whose voice Dasein always carries with it? Clearly it is 
not the voice of just any other with whom Dasein might come into contact 
and with whom Dasein can come into contact by virtue of the structure of 
hearing. The voice of the friend is always there, just as Dasein itself is 
always there as thrown. Perhaps all we can say…is that when Dasein finds 
and assumes itself in its constancy, it finds that there is always another with 
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it, speaking to it. … Heidegger says that what it hears, from itself and from 
the other, is silence.776 
Heidegger’s description of “keeping silent” as “another essential possibility of 
discourse” in §34 confirms the implication of authentic Being-with in the phenomenon of 
“calling.”777 At the close of §56, Heidegger asserts that the call neither puts “itself into 
words at all” nor represents “anything like a communication”; he emphasizes that 
conscience “discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent.”778 If the “call 
of care” is a “mode of discourse,” then conscience can only be described as a pure or 
absolute form of discourse: uncorrupted by worldly communication with material others, 
“the call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me.”779 Reinforcing the fact that 
the call “has its roots in Dasein’s Being,”780 Heidegger insists that “the call undoubtedly 
does not come from someone else who is with me in the world.”781 When we consider his 
analysis of discourse, however, the phenomenon of “keeping silent” is exhibited in terms of 
communication whereby in “talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can 
‘make one understand.’”782 With this remark, Heidegger opens the door to a way of sharing 
authentic understanding through Dasein’s “keeping silent” and reaffirms that Being-with is 
essentially related to this “primordial” mode of discourse.  
As a mode of discoursing, reticence articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in 
so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which 
is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent.783 
As opposed to the essentially silent call, the phenomenon of “keeping silent” is described in 
§34 as a mode of withdrawal from communicative talking: the “person who keeps silent” is 
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contrasted with the “the person who is never short of words.”784 This “keeping silent” 
appears more closely related to the alternative “kind of hearing” that blocks out the “they” 
than to the phenomenon of “calling” itself. In his essay entitled “Heidegger’s Ear,” Jacques 
Derrida describes the “enigma” of Dasein’s hearing of the voice of the “silent” friend who 
“says nothing”: 
[What] matters here is not what the friend’s voice says. Not its said. Not 
even the saying of its said. Hardly even its voice. Rather what matters is the 
hearing (das Hören) of its voice. Hearing is the principal theme of this 
chapter.785 
Given our focus on the methodological role of conscience, we see that the “keeping silent” 
of discourse in §34 reflects the “reticence” of one “who already understands”:786 the 
discursive possibility of “keeping silent” thus requires that one has already been called by 
conscience. When Heidegger states that “[keeping] silent authentically is possible only in 
genuine discoursing (im echten Reden),” it is implied that conscience has summoned 
Dasein to this possibility.787 “Constant” and absolute, the silence of the “call of 
conscience” must therefore be distinguished from the “keeping silent” of a reticent person 
resisting the urge to communicate.788 The possibility of “[keeping] silent authentically” 
necessarily implies the presupposition that Dasein is “constantly” being called by 
conscience.789 
Truth: Presupposing the “Call of Conscience” 
That the calling of conscience is “presupposed” in Being and Time is confirmed by 
a second methodological “clue” found in §60: the phenomenon of “truth.” In explaining 
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how conscience “summons” Dasein, Heidegger describes resoluteness as the “distinctive 
and authentic…mode of Dasein’s disclosedness” where it has come “back into the stillness 
of itself.”790 In exhibiting the relationship between the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world 
and its authentic mode of resoluteness, Heidegger repeatedly refers to the phenomenon of 
“truth”: two footnotes in §60 specifically direct the reader back to §44 entitled “Dasein, 
Disclosedness, and Truth.” In this final section of Division One, Heidegger observes that 
Dasein’s essence as a disclosing entity implies that “truth” exists whenever Dasein exists: 
all “experience” of Being-in-the-world involves the disclosing of the “truth” of its 
existence.  
We must presuppose truth. Dasein itself, as in each case my Dasein and this 
Dasein, must be; and in the same way the truth, as Dasein’s disclosedness, 
must be. (Wir müssen die Wahrheit voraussetzen, sie muß als 
Erschlossenheit des Daseins sein, so wie dieses selbst als je meines und 
dieses sein muß.) This belongs to Dasein’s essential thrownness into the 
world. … [Truth] already gets presupposed in so far as Dasein is at all.791 
If we keep in mind this description of Dasein as a “truth”-disclosing entity, Heidegger’s 
interpretation of resoluteness in §60 takes on new significance for our methodologically-
focused analysis of the “call of conscience.” When Heidegger characterizes resoluteness as 
“authentic disclosedness,” he recalls that disclosedness is Dasein’s “primordial truth…not 
[as] a quality of ‘judgment’ nor of any definite way of behaving, but [as] something 
essentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world as such.”792 If the “primordial 
disclosedness” of Dasein is “the truth of existence,” then the authentic mode of resoluteness 
represents the authentic mode of Dasein’s existential truth.793  
In resoluteness we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most 
primordial because it is authentic. Whenever a “there” is disclosed, its whole 
Being-in-the-world—that is to say, the world, Being-in, and the self which, 
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as an ‘I am,’ this entity is—is disclosed with equal primordiality 
(gleichursprünglich).794 
Resoluteness represents the “most primordial” truth because it discloses Dasein 
transparently in its “wholeness” constituted by both falling and authentic disclosedness. In 
resoluteness, Dasein enacts its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and sees itself “truthfully” 
for what it is.  
By linking Dasein’s authentic truth and wholeness in his description of the 
phenomenon of resoluteness, Heidegger brings the vital methodological role of the “call of 
conscience” to the fore once again. Dasein can only be secured as a “whole” phenomenon 
if it is called back to itself in resoluteness. At the same time, any disclosing of a “there” 
implies that Dasein has been disclosed as a “whole Being-in-the-world” constituted by its 
full range of existential structures, both authentic and inauthentic.795 
As care…Dasein has been determined by facticity and falling. Disclosed in 
its ‘there,’ it maintains itself both in truth and untruth with equal 
primordiality. This ‘really’ holds in particular for resoluteness as authentic 
truth. Resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically. Dasein is already in 
irresoluteness (Unentschlossenheit), and soon, perhaps, will be in it again.796 
For Heidegger, the “most primordial truth” of resoluteness does not allow Dasein to 
somehow “correct” its essential tendency to flee when faced with its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being. Rather, resoluteness allows Dasein to see itself transparently as existing both in 
“truth” and in “untruth.” Being-in-the-world lost in the “they” can only be called back to 
resoluteness because authentic disclosedness is constitutive for existence; similarly, Dasein 
can only fall from resoluteness because inauthenticity is also constitutive for existence. 
Even when falling Dasein avoids seeing itself for what it truly is, the “authentic truth” of its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being remains essential to its existence. When we presuppose the 
“truth” of disclosedness, both the “authentic truth” of resoluteness and the inauthentic 
“untruth” of the “they” are contained in this presupposition.  
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What does it mean to ‘presuppose’? It is to understand something as the 
ground for the Being of some other entity.797 
However, if we are to understand Dasein in its “essential thrownness” as an entity that 
“must be,” then another vital phenomenon must also be “presupposed”:798 the “call of 
conscience” that Heidegger identifies as the attesting “source” of resoluteness. As Courtine 
observes:  
What, originally, comes before the subject and will always already have 
been ahead of it? … At the origin of the subject is the voice.799 
For Heidegger, this call is the only phenomenon that can bring Dasein back to its “authentic 
truth” and reveal its “wholeness.” 
Thus, the “clue” of “truth” brings us full circle back to the problem of how 
conscience provides the attestation of Dasein’s possibility of authenticity so that the 
phenomenal “wholeness” of Being-in-the-world can be accessed. While a “purely 
existential” investigation might be satisfied with the “presupposing” of conscience, 
Heidegger has set a higher phenomenological standard for his project: conscience must “be 
attested in its existentiell possibility by Dasein itself.”800 While we argue that the required 
attestation remains “missing” in Being and Time, does the formally indicated “clue” that 
resoluteness is Dasein’s “authentic truth” point our search in the right direction? To answer 
this question, we must look more closely at the relation between Heidegger’s existential 
conscience and the phenomenon of resoluteness.  
Heidegger describes the experience of Dasein’s coming into its “most primordial 
truth” as “wanting to have a conscience”: the “resoluteness” of one who hears conscience 
is “constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself 
upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence.”801 Once again, we see 
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that the “whole” phenomenon of conscience as both calling and hearing is not preserved: 
the only discourse to be found in “resoluteness” is reticent hearing. While reticence can in 
turn be interpreted existentially as “keeping silent” and thus as “calling,” we have already 
seen that this is methodologically insufficient for Heidegger: if the call is to provide the 
attestation of Dasein’s possible existence in authenticity, this must be shown to be possible 
as an “existentiell” experience of Being-in-the-world. What Heidegger confirms here is that 
the role of the calling is a special one: it is not constitutive of resoluteness like the other 
“authentic” phenomena but rather is its attesting source. The “structural” phenomena of 
anxiety, Being-guilty and reticence all find their source in the calling of conscience and 
provide “evidence” that conscience must be “presupposed”—but the “call of conscience” 
itself remains unattested. When considered from a “purely existential” perspective, 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the “authentic truth” of resoluteness only confirms the 
problem of producing an “attestation” of the “presupposed” call.  
Solicitude: The Priority of Authentic Being-With  
Fortunately for our investigation, Heidegger opens the door to an alternative way of 
considering the “authentic truth” disclosed by conscience by introducing in §60 what we 
have identified as the third “clue”: “concernful solicitude.”802 Heidegger uses this 
“phenomenon” to convey the experience of encountering the world that arises out of 
authentic disclosedness when Dasein resolutely projects itself upon its chosen possibility 
for Being:  
Resoluteness, by its ontological essence, is always the resoluteness of some 
factical Dasein at a particular time. … The resolution is precisely the 
disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the 
time. … Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself.803 
For Heidegger, “concernful solicitude” represents the schema of how Dasein encounters its 
world and others based on what is determined to be “factically possible.”804 Given that 
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conscience is introduced specifically to provide an “attestation” of Dasein’s possible 
authenticity, it is significant that Heidegger does not consider any “factical existential 
possibilities” of resoluteness, describing such an exercise as one of “the tasks of a thematic 
existential anthropology” and claiming it lies outside the scope of his “study of 
fundamental ontology.”805 Nonetheless, Heidegger is concerned with the “existential 
definiteness” of Dasein’s resoluteness and “concernful solicitude” represents the “form” of 
what is determined in a resolution:806     
What one resolves upon in resoluteness has been prescribed ontologically in 
the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-Being in the 
manner of concernful solicitude.807  
As the authentic “manner” of Being-in-the-world, “concernful solicitude” is presented as 
the existential “form” of the factical possibility upon which Dasein projects itself in 
disclosing its shared world. For Heidegger, “concernful solicitude” is the factical result of 
Dasein’s hearing the “call of conscience” and experiencing the “authentic truth” of one’s 
existence. If an “existentiell possibility” of calling is to be attested, it must be found in this 
experience of the “disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at 
the time.”808 
Considering the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time, however, the 
movement of “concernful solicitude” appears opposed to the existential phenomenon of 
calling that resists Dasein’s inevitable slide into concern for worldly affairs. Rather than 
“attesting” Dasein’s possibility of existing authentically, “concernful solicitude” is a 
composite concept that presupposes the equivalence of Dasein’s concern for other co-
Daseins and its involvement with worldly entities lacking the disclosing character of 
Dasein: this presupposition can be regarded as the way in which Dasein initiates the 
“blocking off” of its “authentic truth” as anticipatory Being-towards-death concerned with 
its authentic possibilities of existence. Two distinct and incompatible modes of disclosing 
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appear to be aggregated in the phenomenon of “concernful solicitude”: the discovering of 
ready-to-hand “entities” and the disclosing of others who share Dasein’s kind of Being. 
This is seen when we examine Heidegger’s description of resoluteness more closely: 
[Authentic] disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way in 
which the ‘world’ is discovered (and this is founded upon that disclosedness) 
and the way in which the Dasein-with of others is disclosed. … [Both] one’s 
Being towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and 
one’s solicitous Being with others, are now given a definite character in 
terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-selves. … Resoluteness 
brings the self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is 
ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with others.809 
As a supposedly authentic possibility for Dasein, “concernful solicitude” is problematic 
because the “wholeness” of Dasein’s “most primordial truth”810 is cleaved into two distinct 
parts in order to accommodate the various kinds of entities that one encounters in the 
world. This “cleavage” is essentially inauthentic because Dasein’s existence is thereby 
interpreted in terms of the objective status of “worldly things” rather than the possibilities 
of Dasein itself as the disclosing entity. In “concernful solicitude,” the “entities” and 
“others” encountered in the world are seen to determine the “form” of Dasein’s “ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being.” In this schema, the “wholeness” of Being-in-the-world is 
inauthentically interpreted as the sum of its parts—a notion that runs counter to the basic 
phenomenological principles established by Heidegger himself. While this fracturing of the 
world powerfully illustrates the essential nature of Dasein’s fallenness, it also confirms the 
seriousness of the problem concerning the “attestation” of conscience. Despite Heidegger’s 
rejection of “present-at-hand” thinking, the schema of “concernful solicitude” replicates the 
“theoretical” way of understanding existence and is fundamentally incoherent with what 
conscience “gives Dasein to understand” when it calls.811  
As we examine Heidegger’s search for the “attestation” of conscience, we find a 
vital lesson concerning this fracture of “concernful solicitude” in §39 entitled “The 
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Question of the Primordial Totality of Dasein’s Structural Whole.” In this section where 
Heidegger identifies “Dasein’s Being…as care,”812 he indicates that the “wholeness” of 
Dasein cannot be grasped on the basis of “average everydayness” alone.813 There exists no 
“architect’s plan” for constructing the “totality of the structural whole” out of the 
constitutive elements of “everyday” experience,814 such as Dasein’s concern in “Being 
alongside [things in] the ‘world’” and its solicitude in “Being-with others.”815 Rather than 
piecing together Dasein’s wholeness, Heidegger claims that his investigation must reveal 
how Dasein provides us with “the only appropriate ontico-ontological way of access to 
itself” as a whole.816 Foreshadowing his introduction to conscience, Heidegger calls us to 
“seek for one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure—one 
that lies in Dasein itself.”817 Initially, Heidegger focuses this search for a legitimate 
methodological basis on the state-of-mind of anxiety; as the investigation advances, 
however, we learn that it is conscience that calls Dasein into this “most far-reaching” 
experience of anxiety. Heidegger emphasizes that the “methodological” aspects concerning 
Dasein’s “way of access to itself” are vital precisely because they protect against the 
“disunity” and “obstructiveness” of Being-in-the-world’s “for the most part inauthentic” 
mode of existence.818  
By pointing to “the voice of the friend,” our first “clue” of discourse revealed an 
essential connection between the calling of conscience and Dasein’s essence as Being-with. 
Does this evidence of “the voice of the friend” allow us—in the spirit of the basic 
principles of Heidegger’s project—to disclose the “most primordial” phenomenon 
underlying the possibility of “concernful solicitude”? In other words, can our third “clue” 
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of “concernful solicitude” be “simplified in a certain manner” and brought “to light in an 
elemental way”?819  
To answer this question, we must turn back to §26 where Heidegger analyzes the 
phenomena of “solicitude” and “everyday Being-with.” In the early stages of this analysis, 
it appears that Heidegger’s interpretation of Being-with will be determined strictly in terms 
of how the world is discovered by “concernfully circumspective Dasein.”820 This reflects 
the fact that the analysis of Being-in precedes the introduction of Being-with in Being and 
Time: Heidegger explicitly notes at the opening of §26 that the “foregoing explication of 
the world” is what allows “the remaining structural items of Being-in-the-world [such as 
Being-with to] become visible.”821 Given Heidegger’s strategy of beginning Being and 
Time by exploring the concept of “world,” it seems appropriate that the answer to “the 
question of the ‘who’” of Dasein822 could only arise out of “an explicit idea of…the ‘world’ 
itself as something constitutive for Dasein.”823 Thus, Heidegger begins by describing the 
encounter with the other as something that is disclosed from “out of the world” and is 
“encountered environmentally” in terms of that “with which [Dasein] is proximally 
concerned.”824 Nonetheless, Heidegger recognizes that these “entities” he calls “others” are 
distinct from other “things.” Others “are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand” 
because they share Dasein’s characteristic of disclosing the world: “they are like the very 
Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it.”825 But even if the 
other is encountered as “Dasein-with in the world (Mitdasein in der Welt)” and never “as a 
human-thing present-at-hand (als vorhandenes Menschending),”826 Heidegger indicates that 
“everyday” Being-with only emerges out of Dasein’s circumspective concern for its 
worldly environment.  
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The tone of Heidegger’s analysis of Being-with changes dramatically, however, 
when he observes that this “concern” for worldly entities actually conceals the true essence 
of Dasein as Being-with. While it may “ontically” appear “obvious”827 that Dasein comes 
into a world of “things” before it can relate to any “others” who may share this world,828 
Heidegger states that this priority is existentially false. For Heidegger, “Dasein in itself is 
essentially Being-with.”829 In other words, Dasein does not become Being-with after 
discovering its world or after realizing that it exists in the presence of another entity that 
shares its disclosing nature. Heidegger’s acknowledgement of Dasein’s existential trait of 
Being-with is significant for our investigation of conscience because it reveals that concern 
for worldly entities actually arises out of Being-with, even though the opposite seems to be 
“obvious” in “everyday” experience. This is seen in Heidegger’s repeated descriptions of 
how Dasein discloses the “significance” of the entities that are “closest to us” as ready-to-
hand equipment: these disclosed entities are understood in terms of their “for-the-sake-of-
which” as oriented by Dasein’s care for its Being.830 Since Dasein is essentially Being-
with, the significance of all entities necessarily refers to the possibility of encountering 
others even if no actual encounter ever occurs.  
Being-with [is] an existential attribute which Dasein, of its own accord, has 
coming to it from its own kind of Being (die dem Dasein von ihm selbst her 
aus seiner Seinsart zukäme). … Being-with is an existential characteristic of 
Dasein even when factically no other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even 
Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. (Das Mitsein bestimmt 
existenzial das Dasein auch dann, wenn ein Anderer faktisch nicht 
vorhanden und wahrgenommen ist. Auch das Alleinsein des Daseins ist 
Mitsein in der Welt.)831 
To illustrate how Being-with essentially determines Dasein’s discovery of worldy entities, 
Heidegger provides some examples, such as clothing that involves “an essential assignment 
or reference to possible wearers,” a “decently kept up field” that belongs “to such-and-such 
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a person,” or a “book…bought at So-and-so’s shop and given by such-and-such a 
person.”832  
The others who are thus ‘encountered’ in a ready-to-hand, environmental 
context of equipment, are not somehow added on in thought to some thing 
which is proximally just present-at-hand; such ‘things’ are encountered from 
out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for others—a world which 
is always mine too in advance.833 
Since Dasein is essentially Being-with, the “world which is always mine too in advance” is 
necessarily a world which is possibly shared with others in advance as well.834 If the calling 
of conscience is to attest Dasein’s authenticity as an existentiell possibility, then this 
possibility that Heidegger seeks must reflect Dasein’s transparent understanding of itself as 
Being-with.   
For our study, it is thus a decisive moment when Heidegger determines that the 
existential phenomenon of Being-with must be distinguished from Dasein’s concern for 
worldly entities discovered alongside it.   
Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, 
even though Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities 
encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as 
Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to 
equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not 
objects of concern, but rather of solicitude.835 
To describe this phenomenon, Heidegger presents what he calls the “two extreme 
possibilities (zwei extreme Möglichkeiten)” for solicitude in its positive modes, which can 
be seen to represent its inauthentic and authentic poles.836 The adjective “extreme” used by 
Heidegger is very significant here: these opposing possibilities of solicitude are 
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distinguished precisely in terms of Dasein’s “concern” for worldly entities as opposed to its 
“authentic Being towards itself.”837  
The inauthentic solicitude that “leaps in (für ihn einspringen)” for the other is the 
“extreme” case wherein Dasein usurps his or her “position in concern”: in this 
“dominating” mode of solicitude, Dasein inhibitively “takes over (übernimmt) for the other 
that with which he is to concern himself.”838 For Heidegger, this mode of inauthentic 
solicitude “pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand” and 
exemplifies how authentic Being-with can be perverted by Dasein’s “concern” for worldly 
affairs.839 While he regards this “domination” of the other to be an “extreme” mode of 
Being-with, Heidegger indicates that it is “to a large extent determinative for Being with 
one another” and closely related to the various modes of deficient “everyday” Being-with-
one-another, ranging from utter disinterestedness to deceitful manipulation.840  
In contrast to this “dominating” kind of solicitude, the authentic “positive mode” of 
solicitude “helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free 
for it.”841 This “extreme” of authentic solicitude is possible because Dasein through 
resoluteness “experiences” the full transparency of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and 
understands itself essentially as Being-with. Since authentic solicitude is only possible 
when Dasein is resolute, it is Dasein’s silence in the authentic resoluteness described in §60 
that makes possible the “sharing” of its transparency by solicitously “[leaping] ahead of 
[the other] in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but 
rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time (sondern erst eigentliche 
als solche zurückzugeben).”842 Very significantly, Heidegger does not once refer to 
“concern” when he describes this authentic “extreme” of solicitude: “This kind of 
solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care—that it, to the existence of the other, not to 
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a ‘what’ with which he is concerned…”843 On the basis of Dasein’s authentic 
understanding of its own Being, the liberating form of solicitude reveals to others the 
possibility of a “world” defined neither in terms of “things” nor of personal interests. In 
place of this, authentic solicitude helps to “free” the other so he or she can come 
“back…authentically” to understanding existence on the basis of his or her ownmost “for-
the-sake-of-which.”844 For Heidegger, this sharing of “transparency” and “freedom” is what 
makes it possible for Dasein to “become authentically bound together (eigentliche 
Verbundenheit)” with others: in authentic solicitude, Dasein “frees the other in his freedom 
for himself (die den Anderen in seiner Freiheit für ihn selbst freigibt).”845 
Especially when considered in light of our investigation of conscience, we can see 
that this form of liberating solicitude represents the “extreme” authentic mode of Dasein 
fully disclosed to itself as Being-with. However, Heidegger provides no guidance as to how 
this mode of existence can actually be experienced. While he will go on to describe the 
inauthentic “who” of the “they-self” in detail, Heidegger restricts his analysis of authentic 
solicitude in this chapter to a four-sentence sketch that primarily serves to contrast it with 
inauthentic forms of Being-with.  
Much like the “call of conscience,” authentic solicitude is a methodological 
prerequisite for any investigation of the constitutive structures of Dasein as a “whole” yet 
this phenomenon of “transparent” Being-with proves difficult—if not impossible—to 
describe as an existentiell possibility. While Heidegger never provides a thoroughgoing 
interpretation of authentic solicitude, his most explicit remarks tellingly come in §60 when 
he describes the connection between solicitude, conscience and resoluteness. Here, 
Heidegger recalls that in resoluteness, Dasein both becomes free for its own authentic 
ownmost possibility of Being and serves—through its silent decisiveness—to bring the 
other to recognize his or her own possibility of “hearing” the “call of conscience” as well:  
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In the light of the “for-the-sake-of-which” of one’s self-chosen potentiality-
for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein’s resoluteness 
towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it 
‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this 
potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is 
resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others. (Das erschlossene Dasein 
kann zum „Gewissen“ der Anderen werden.) Only by authentically Being-
their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another 
(eigentliche Miteinander)—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and 
talkative fraternizing in the “they” and in what “they” want to undertake.846 
With this remark, Heidegger provides an explicit and direct answer to the question we 
raised earlier regarding “concernful solicitude (besorgenden Fürsorge)”: his interpretation 
of resolute Being-with implies “authentic solicitude” and reveals the derivative nature of 
Dasein’s “everyday” experience grasped mainly in terms of “concern” for worldly 
entities.847 “Concernful solicitude” is a necessarily deficient mode of authentic Being-with: 
it artificially aggregates Dasein’s concern for the “world” and its “solicitous” relations with 
others. Any “concernful” experience indicates that Dasein’s transparent understanding of 
itself as Being-with has been distorted: when Dasein is “concerned,” it is not able to 
understand itself authentically in care and transparently as care. Preoccupied with the 
“things” discovered in its “world” rather than its own authentic possibilities, Dasein cannot 
experience its existence in terms of the “common devotion” that “authentically [binds] 
together” Being-with-one-another and frees both Dasein and “the other in his freedom for 
himself.”848 When we reconsider the methodological significance of the connection 
between calling and solicitude, what we discover is that “concernful solicitude” for 
“worldly things” and for one’s “worldly relations” with others is precisely what must be 
“broken off” by the “call of conscience” when Dasein is summoned to “return” to caring 
for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.  
                                                 
846
 SZ §60, 298 / 344-5.  
847
 SZ §26, 124 / 161. 
848
 SZ §26, 122 / 159.  
 244 
 
 
Anticipation: Attesting the Wholeness of Being-Towards-Death 
Our final “clue” related to the methodological role of conscience is the “anticipation 
(Vorlaufen)” of Dasein as Being-towards-death, which is the primary topic that opens 
Division Two of Being and Time as Heidegger considers the meaning of Dasein’s 
“totality.” As we have seen, the attestation that Heidegger seeks to obtain from conscience 
is directly related to the preceding existential interpretation of death. Heidegger’s strategy 
for investigating the concept of temporality on the basis of Dasein’s anticipation of its end 
demands that he demonstate how “Dasein ever factically [throws] itself into such a Being-
towards-death.”849 At the end of §53, Heidegger reveals that the “ultimate” objective of the 
existential analysis of Dasein is to raise the question of  
…whether the anticipation of death, which we have hitherto projected only 
in its ontological possibility, has an essential connection with that authentic 
potentiality-for-Being which [remains to be] attested.850  
The next step is thus to show how “Dasein gives testimony (Zeugnis gibt), from its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being, as to a possible authenticity of its experience.”851 If 
conscience can produce this “attestation,” then it will be possible to examine how 
“anticipation” is related to Dasein’s authenticity. At the conclusion of §60, Heidegger 
reaffirms this focus on the relation between death and conscience as he recognizes the 
seriousness of the situation regarding the “missing” attestation of Dasein’s wholeness. 
[As] an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, the authentic Being-
towards-death which we have deduced existentially still remains a purely 
existential project for which Dasein’s attestation is missing (dem die 
daseinsmäßige Bezeugung fehlt).852 
As we have seen, Heidegger never produces the required attestation of the “call of 
conscience” in Being and Time so the problem regarding the disclosing of an “ontical 
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potentiality-for-Being…determined by anticipation” also remains unsolved.853 Nonetheless, 
Heidegger has certainly “worked out...[his] idea” of how conscience might be related to the 
question of “Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole”—even if both the concepts 
of conscience and death remain confined within what “remains a purely existential 
project.”854 In this sense, our final “clue” of anticipation also represents Heidegger’s “last 
word” regarding conscience: when he focuses on “anticipatory resoluteness (vorlaufen 
Entschlossenheit)” in §61, Heidegger points his search for the “attesting call” back to the 
phenomenon of Being-towards-death. Is there an “existentiell possibility” that can attest an 
“authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole” in anticipatory resoluteness?855 In other words, 
is there a way that we can understand the “call of conscience” as a call to anticipation that 
can be ontically experienced?856 
When we look back attentively at Heidegger’s interpretation of Being-towards-
death, we find a remarkable confirmation that the clue of authentic “solicitude” is essential 
to what is supposedly disclosed to Dasein by the “call of conscience.” In revealing the 
essential connection between death and “Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being,” 
Heidegger indicates a kind of understanding of existence that can only be founded in a 
“pure” and “transparent” experience of one’s essence as Being-with:  
We may now summarize our characterization of authentic Being-towards-
death as we have projected it existentially: anticipation reveals to Dasein its 
lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of 
being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude (auf die 
besorgende Fürsorge primär ungestützt), but of being itself, rather, in an 
impassioned freedom towards death (Freiheit zum Tode)—a freedom which 
has been released from the illusions of the “they,” and which is factical, 
certain of itself, and anxious.857  
When Dasein recognizes its essence as Being-towards-death, it is “primarily unsupported 
by concernful solicitude” because this deficient mode of Being-in-the-world reveals that 
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Dasein has understood its existence—and the existence of others—principally in terms of 
“substantial things.”858 In contrast to “concernful solicitude,” the authentic “freedom 
towards death” that is described by Heidegger matches up perfectly with the phenomenon 
of resoluteness that arises in one’s hearing the “call of conscience.”859 As we have seen, 
this resoluteness implies that Dasein transparently understands itself as Being-with, which 
explains how when “Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others.”860 The 
dynamic nature of the existential call that summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being is reflected in both the “leaping forth” of authentic solicitude that liberates and the 
anticipation of one’s own fate as Being-towards-death. In his subsequent interpretation of 
historicality in Being and Time, Heidegger specifies in §74 how being summoned to 
resoluteness represents a “repetition”—a coming back to one’s “authentic truth” as Being-
with who resolutely exists for the sake of a common “destiny” (Geschick):861 
The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then 
becomes the repetition (Wiederholung) of a possibility of existence that has 
come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly—that is to say, 
going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. The 
authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been—the 
possibility that Dasein may choose its hero—is grounded existentially in 
anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the 
choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the 
footsteps of that which can be repeated.862 
When Dasein authentically understands its essence in resoluteness, it recognizes that its 
“authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole” as Being-towards-death863 is an existential 
characteristic that it shares with all possible others in its essential Being-with. This is why 
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Dasein, in the reticence of its transparent understanding of itself as Being-with-towards-
death, “can become the ‘conscience’ of others” and “co-disclose this potentiality in the 
solicitude which leaps forth and liberates.”864 
As Heidegger explains, this possibility of anticipatory “Being-with-towards-death” 
is not an obvious one from an “everyday” perspective;865 indeed, it even seems incongruous 
with some of the previous analyses of Dasein’s existential structures in Being and Time. 
Authentic Being-with is usually obscured by Dasein’s jealous monitoring and deceitful 
manipulation of others; similarly, authentic Being-towards-death is distorted by the 
constant efforts of the “they” to transform the “dying of others” into something that can be 
made “‘objectively’ accessible.”866 By establishing anticipatory resoluteness as the basis of 
Dasein’s wholeness, Heidegger reveals the essential link between the “authentic solicitude” 
of Being-with and the genuine anticipation of Being-towards-death. When Being-with and 
Being-towards-death are understood authentically, they show themselves to be essentially 
compatible with Heidegger’s description of anticipation in §53:  
The ownmost possibility, which is non-relational, not to be outstripped, and 
certain, is indefinite as regards its certainty. (Die eigenste, unbezügliche, 
unüberholbare und gewisse Möglichkeit ist hinsichtlich der Gewißheit 
unbestimmt.) … Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in 
this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its 
potentiality-for-Being.867  
The primordial wholeness of Dasein revealed in the transparency of anticipatory 
resoluteness “contains” both the possibility of authentic Being-with and the radical 
individualization of Being-towards-death. Given that the “attestation (Bezeugung)” of the 
“call of conscience” is intended to reveal Dasein’s “authentic truth,” it is remarkable to 
note that the “clue” of Being-towards-death also points us to the possibility of “authentic” 
witnessing through “conviction (Überzeugung).”868 As Ricoeur poignantly asks: “Must we 
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recall that in German ‘conviction’ is called Überzeugung, a term from the same family as 
witness (Zeuge) and as attestation (Bezeugung)?”869 Whereas Heidegger roundly criticizes 
the traditional notion of “objective” certainty, he finds in the authentic understanding of 
one’s Being-towards-death a genuine form of certainty that is founded etymologically on 
the same root as attestation:  
One mode of certainty is conviction (Überzeugung). In conviction, Dasein 
lets the testimony of the thing itself which has been uncovered (the true 
thing itself) be the sole determinant for its Being towards that thing 
understandingly (durch das Zeugnis der entdeckten (wahren) Sache selbst 
sein verstehendes Sein zu dieser bestimmen). Holding something for true 
(für-wahr-halten) is adequate as a way of maintaining oneself in the truth 
(Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten), if it is grounded in the uncovered entity itself, 
and if, as Being toward the entity so uncovered, it has become transparent to 
itself as regards its appropriateness to that entity. In any arbitrary fiction or 
in merely having some ‘view (Ansicht)’ about an entity, this sort of thing is 
lacking.870 
As we have seen, the “existential definition” of resoluteness provided in §60 is 
inadequate as the attestation of this authentic mode of certainty because it lacks the 
transparency required for Dasein to be able to recognize itself as Being-towards-death. Any 
notion of resoluteness that ignores Dasein’s “ownmost certainty” as Being-towards-death 
remains, “from an existentiell point of view, a fantastical exaction,” to use Heidegger’s 
own words.871 When conscience calls Dasein back to where it becomes “transparent to 
itself,” the “situation” of resoluteness is conditioned by the only authentic “certainty” that 
Dasein can experience: the anticipation of its end.872 As Heidegger notes, resoluteness is 
authentic “only as anticipatory resoluteness” because only in anticipation is Dasein 
“constantly certain of death…thus attaining a certainty which is authentic and whole.”873 
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The “call of conscience” reaches out to Dasein with what Heidegger calls “unwavering 
precision (ungebrochene Schärfe)”: 
[It] essentially [individualizes Dasein] down [to] its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being [and] discloses the anticipation of death as the possibility which is 
non-relational (Vorlaufen zum Tode als der unbezüglichen Möglichkeit). 
Anticipatory resoluteness lets the potentiality-for-Being-guilty, as one’s 
ownmost non-relational possibility, be struck wholly into the conscience 
(ganz ins Gewissen schlagen).874   
As Heidegger reveals in his interpretation of “anticipatory resoluteness,” the “call of 
conscience” brings Dasein back to its specifically authentic potentiality-for-Being by 
making it acknowledge the constant certainty of its impending death. Only through the 
“[authentic] ‘thinking about death’” of Dasein when it hears the call of conscience can this 
disclosing entity “become transparent to itself in an existentiell manner.”875 If we are 
looking for “a definite ontical way” of understanding the “call of conscience” as Heidegger 
demands, then it is not the “purely existential” concept of resoluteness presented in §60 that 
can point us to a possible solution. Rather, the “existentiell attestation” of conscience must 
specifically indicate the unique and ownmost potentiality-for-Being of Dasein that is 
disclosed in anticipatory resoluteness and demonstrate how this authentic form of 
anticipation is possible. If the “call of conscience” can be experienced, then it must be 
experienceable as the call to the certainty of Dasein’s own death.   
The “Positive Necessity” of Experiencing the Call  
As Heidegger stresses repeatedly in Being and Time, his phenomenological 
investigation of Dasein must demonstrate “a possible authenticity of its existence…in an 
existentiell manner.”876 Without this thread of a possibility that can connect ontical 
experience with the existential analysis, Heidegger’s entire existential-ontological project 
cannot “stand the test” that he himself insists upon.877 As we have seen, it is the “call of 
                                                 
874
 SZ §62, 307 / 354. 
875
 SZ §62, 309 / 357. 
876
 SZ §53, 267 / 311. 
877
 SZ §53, 267 / 311. 
 250 
 
 
conscience” that Heidegger tasks with producing the required “attestation” of Dasein’s 
possible authenticity as something that it can find in its own Being. Our analysis has 
shown, however, that this attestation of Dasein’s transparency as an authentic and whole 
phenomenon is never produced “in an existentiell manner” as required. The initial attempt 
to provide this “attestation” of conscience through the interpretation of resoluteness 
produces an “insufficient” attestation: it cannot be demonstrated to be possible as 
experience. In §60, resoluteness is only “defined existentially” and this initial interpretation 
does not specify that resoluteness is only authentic if Dasein anticipates its “ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being” as Being-towards-death.878 Even after Heidegger specifies 
“anticipatory resoluteness” as the unique “authentic” mode of Dasein’s existence in the 
subsequent sections,879 this concept is never “worked out” as a “factical existentiell 
possibility.”880 Ultimately, we are never shown in Being and Time how it is possible for 
Dasein to actually experience conscience: neither Dasein’s understanding of the “call of 
conscience” nor the special mode of “discourse” of calling are shown to be factically 
possible in ontical experience. At the end of §62, Heidegger states that a “definite ontical 
way” of understanding how Dasein can experience “authentic existence” is a “positive 
necessity (positiven Notwendigkeit)” for his investigation.881 This “way” is needed in order 
for Heidegger to maintain his independence from traditional ontology and its reliance on 
metaphysical absolutes. When it comes to the existential concept of conscience, Heidegger 
must demonstrate that his phenomenon of calling is not dependent on an external power, 
such as the divine “light” of Stoker’s synteresis. Yet as we have seen, Heidegger never 
explicitly describes an experience that conveys how Dasein can be called by conscience in 
Being and Time. Given Heidegger’s abandonment of the concept of conscience following 
the publication of Being and Time, we are left without an “answer” from Heidegger 
regarding the possibility of experiencing this call. In order to continue the search for this 
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“missing” attestation, we are forced to look beyond what is explicitly provided by 
Heidegger in his published texts and extant manuscripts.  
In this regard, our analysis has opened up a new way of pressing on with this 
search: by considering the problem of attestation in light of Heidegger’s “method” of 
formal indication, we have attempted to follow the formally indicated “clues” which the 
thinker provides in the course of interpreting the phenomenon of conscience. Having 
identified the vital methodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we established 
that there is a close relation between the “call of conscience” and Heidegger’s “method” of 
formal indication developed during his “phenomenological decade” in Freiburg and 
Marburg. Our examination of Heidegger’s four formally indicated “clues” regarding 
authentic existence—discourse, truth, solicitude and anticipation—allowed us to identify 
some of the essential characteristics of any possible “experience” of the “call of 
conscience.” However, we have not yet been able to point to way of “demonstrating” how 
Dasein can ontically experience its self-attestation. Through our analysis of the connection 
between discourse and conscience, we learned that any “existentiell attestation” of the call 
must account for how one experiences both the hearing and the calling required for 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the phenomenon. In examining the phenomenon of “authentic 
truth,” we discovered that Heidegger’s existential analysis presupposes the calling of 
conscience because all existence depends upon the possible transparency of Dasein to 
itself. Our investigation of solicitude showed that “concernful solicitude” is incompatible 
with Dasein’s authentic truth: conscience calls Dasein away from its “concern” for worldly 
things to the transparent understanding of its essential Being-with, which is what allows it 
to serve as the “liberating” conscience of others. Finally, the phenomenon of anticipation 
revealed that any experience of the “call of conscience” necessarily implies bringing 
Dasein back to its authentic “certainty” as Being-towards-death. What we continue to seek 
is the way that conscience can be seen to “bridge” the gap between the existential 
interpretation of the silent call and the revealing of an “existentiell possibility” whereby 
Dasein can actually come into its “authentic truth.” As we have seen, existence presupposes 
the “call of conscience”: on a purely existential level, the call must be. What remains 
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problematic is the how of this call. How can we experience this calling and this hearing? 
Where are we to find the tether that connects the existential project to the “there” of Being-
in-the-world?  
Having reviewed these formally indicated “clues,” our investigation is now in a 
position to examine how the required “attestation” in Being and Time might be conceived 
as a “factical possibility” that Dasein can experience. However, there is one last formal 
indication provided by Heidegger in his interpretation of conscience that we must first 
consider: the word “conscience” itself, more specifically the German term “Gewissen” 
employed by Heidegger. Based on Heidegger’s criticism of the “ordinary interpretation” of 
conscience, it is evident that he regards the notion of “moral conscience” to be a deficient 
way of understanding an original phenomenon signified by the word “Gewissen.” Is it 
possible that Heidegger’s understanding of this term might point back to a source of the 
German word that is quite different from the patently moral sense of the Latin conscientia? 
  
4. Heidegger’s Conscience as the Testimony of Being-
Towards-Death   
 
On the basis of the formally indicated phenomena that Heidegger links to Gewissen 
in Being and Time, we have assigned ourselves the task of showing how Dasein might 
experience the “call of conscience” and thereby produce the attestation of its own authentic 
potentiality-for-Being—an attestation upon which rests the success of Heidegger’s entire 
existential-ontological project. In the previous chapter, we closely examined Heidegger’s 
interpretation of conscience and attempted to understand how Dasein can experience this 
“attesting call” by considering four formally indicated phenomena identified by Heidegger 
as being essential to Dasein’s authenticity: discourse, truth, solicitude and anticipation. 
While these phenomena are shown by Heidegger to constitute Dasein’s authentic mode of 
existence, they do not allow us to point to a possible way of understanding how Being-in-
the-world can experience the “call of conscience.” As Heidegger himself notes, Being and 
Time requires this “demonstration” of how authentic existence can be an “existentiell 
possibility” of Dasein in order to prove that his existential project is not merely “a 
fantastical exaction (eine phantastische Zumuntung).”882 In this final chapter of our 
investigation, we will continue our search for this “attesting” experience by considering the 
most “direct” of the formally indicated clues related to the “call of conscience” that 
Heidegger proffers in Being and Time: the German word Gewissen itself.  
Our analysis of what is formally indicated by Heidegger’s existential concept of 
Gewissen will follow the basic steps of the “method” of phenomenological investigation 
that he elaborated in Marburg and Freiburg prior to writing Being and Time. Firstly, we 
will approach the problem of Heidegger’s conscience by “means of the phenomenological-
critical destruction,” which involves the “cleaning-up…of ambiguity (Reinemachen…der 
Vieldeutigkeit)” and the elimination of “conventional” and “ordinary” biases that block off 
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the primordial “enactment” sense of any phenomenon.883 As we will see, this initial step 
will emphasize the historical error that led to Gewissen becoming equated with the Latin 
notion of conscientia and moral conscience, an error that obscures the German word’s 
distinct history and original meaning. Secondly, on the basis of what is disclosed by our 
preliminary “destructive” review, we will determine what can be positively exhibited with 
regard to the meaning of the formally indicated concept of conscience—a step that 
Heidegger described as the “first bringing-out (erste Hebung)” of the phenomenon.884 As 
we search for a way of experiencing Heidegger’s “call of conscience,” we will discover 
that the earliest recorded meaning of the German word Gewissen was “testimony”—a 
meaning that is echoed with remarkable fidelity by Heidegger’s interpretation of 
conscience as the means of providing an “attestation” of Dasein’s possible authenticity. 
Thirdly, we will constructively attempt to “preconceive” the sense of Heidegger’s 
Gewissen as a phenomenon whose meaning can only be “fulfilled” through its “enactment” 
as a possible experience of Being-in-the-world.885 Recognizing the special methodological 
role of conscience in Being and Time as the attestation of Dasein’s possible authenticity, 
we will attempt to describe a way that Dasein can experience its being “summoned” to care 
for its authentic potentiality-for-Being and to reveal the conditions essential to such an 
experience. As we will show, this possibility—which reflects Dasein’s genuine essence as 
Being-towards-death and Being-amidst in a world shared with others—can be conceived as 
the experience of Being-in-the-world’s hearing the silent resoluteness of the martyr.  
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4.1. Gewissen Not Conscientia: Exposing the Historical Ambiguity of 
Conscience 
With his interpretation of the experience of one’s being called to authenticity, 
Heidegger proposes conscience as the “means” whereby Dasein can interrupt its falling into 
“everydayness” characterized by the ambiguity of assertive language. The “call of 
conscience “invites Dasein to counter this ambiguity and resolutely seize its ownmost 
possibility: it offers to Being-in-the-world the unique possibility of making an 
unambiguous choice, indeed this choice is precisely what allows Dasein to overcome the 
ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) of its “everyday,” inauthentic way of existing among the 
“they.” Coming at the pivotal moment in Being and Time where Heidegger transitions from 
the analysis of Dasein’s constitutive elements to his interpretation of time, Heidegger’s 
interpretation of conscience reveals how the “illuminating” experience of authentic 
disclosedness is possible and therefore can provide the “attestation” required in order to 
legitimize the foregoing analysis of Dasein’s constitutive phenomena. In exhibiting how 
Dasein can be “called back” from its dispersal in worldly affairs, Heidegger confirms the 
methodological role of conscience as the unique phenomenon that allows Dasein to 
recognize the “equiprimordial” structures of its existence and to produce the “attestation” 
that it can actually experience its authentic mode of Being.  
Heidegger’s “choice” of conscience as the antidote to ambiguity is a significant—
yet highly ironic—one: this “phenomenon” that he identifies as essential to Dasein’s 
authenticity is itself one of the most ambiguous and controversial terms of the Western 
philosophical and theological traditions. From its earliest recordings in ancient Greek and 
Christian texts, conscience has been associated with the problem of moral authority and the 
possible relation between humankind and a metaphysical “source” of all existence. The 
notion of conscience has fueled endless disputes—in both philosophy and theology—
regarding the limits of human reason, the nature of existence, the power of the divine, the 
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possibility of certain knowledge, the freedom of the will and the validity of morals, among 
countless other topics.886 In the Scholastic period, conscientia was increasingly 
characterized as a “function” of human reason; this semantic evolution contributed to the 
emergence of the modern notion of consciousness, one of the primary targets of 
Heidegger’s “destructive” phenomenology. 
Answers regarding “why” and “how” Heidegger came to see conscience as the 
initiating phenomenon of Dasein’s authentic disclosedness are not explicitly provided in 
Being and Time—and this problem cannot be remedied simply by reviewing Heidegger’s 
earlier texts, as we have seen above. Furthermore, the term “Gewissen” virtually disappears 
from Heidegger’s vocabulary following its dramatic appearance in his 1927 work. Given 
the importance of conscience for the investigation of Being and Time, it is remarkable how 
little Heidegger develops this existential concept. The mystery of Heidegger’s virtual 
silence regarding his “discovery” of conscience only deepens when we consider that he was 
well aware both of the monumental controversy regarding the term’s use as a philosophical 
concept and of its significant role in the emergence of the modern notion of consciousness.  
What then might the word Gewissen itself tell us about Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenon that is described as the means for attesting to Dasein’s possibility of authentic 
existence? Is it possible that the origins of the German concept of “conscience” might 
indicate how Dasein can experience its authentic “self-attestation”?  
Conscientia and the Confused Notion of Moral Conscience 
Although our investigation of Heidegger’s concept of conscience in Being and Time 
has proven to be challenging due to the rarity of relevant primary and even secondary 
sources, the opposite is the case when we consider the topic of conscience in philosophical 
and, especially, theological literature. Conscience and related moral phenomena have 
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ranked among the most common subjects of religious and philosophical study since the 
earliest moments of recorded history: countless and varied accounts found in the Egyptian, 
Jewish, Greek and Roman traditions speak of “taboos,” divine reprimands, and advising 
“voices” that are attributed to spirits, gods or God.887 Such authoritative “voices” of 
conscience were commonly considered as “evidence” for the establishment of behavioral 
norms or explicit laws and penalties.888  
Considered a “popular” rather than philosophical concept in ancient Greek 
society,889 the notion of suneidesis—with its explicit connections to public shame and 
dishonor—is seen to emerge as a central feature of Christian morality and its notions of sin 
and one’s personal relationship with God. The emphasis of the New Testament on the 
painful experience of sinners in recognizing their guilt and acknowledging their 
dependence on God’s grace for salvation (which is vividly conveyed in the Pauline letters) 
has been the topic of sustained theological study from the times of the Church Fathers (e.g. 
Augustine) through the Scholastic era (e.g. Bonaventura, Aquinas) and up to the present 
day (e.g. Scheler, Stoker, Stelzenberger). In the course of its evolution, the concept of 
conscience has been constantly dogged by skepticism regarding its status as a legitimate 
source of moral guidance and concerns about its ambiguity as a term. With the 
accumulation of rival theories describing its origin and its nature, the meaning of 
“conscience” became increasingly fractured over time, especially after the Protestant 
Reformation and the appropriation of the notion of “individual conscience” by modern 
philosophy. As Michael Despland observed, the “Protestant Reformation fostered a new 
Western assurance of conscience. Conscience became safe, certain,” which was reflected in 
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the “many moves toward certainty” seen in the 16th century in fields ranging from 
astronomy to religion.890  
For Heidegger, this scientific quest for “certainty” is closely tied to the dominant 
tradition of conscientia and the moral “ought” that has concealed the fundamentally 
uncertain character of existence. Itself influenced by the growing tensions within 
Christianity, the scientific movement of the Enlightenment found in conscience a means for 
emancipating subjective experience and validating “knowledge” as certain. By valorizing 
the idea of an “inner” conscience possessed by each person, the burgeoning rationalist 
movement made possible the subsequent “discovery” that this phenomenon could itself be 
accessed by science as a psychological entity. Already splintered as a theological concept 
by the Scholastics, the notion of conscience fell deeper into ambiguity with the emergence 
of the concept of consciousness in modern philosophy, notably as a result of what Lewis 
describes as a historical failure to clarify the distinction between consciousness and the 
phenomenon of conscience.891 From the Heideggerian perspective, this lack of clarity is an 
essential characteristic of conscientia; arguably, a “clear” distinction between 
consciousness and conscientia would be essentially impossible to establish due to the 
ambiguity of Dasein’s inauthentic “everyday” mode of existence, as Heidegger contends in 
Being and Time’s Division One.    
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In the German intellectual community of the 19th and 20th centuries, discussion 
regarding the terms conscientia and Gewissen was particularly effervescent and the 
boundary separating the philosophical from the theological was porous: commentaries on 
conscience arrived in great quantity from all quarters, especially as scientists from 
emerging fields such as psychology and sociology began to contribute with increasing 
regularity to the debate over the “source” of moral authority.892 This general preoccupation 
with the question of conscience in Germany only increased following the First World War, 
as the nation was forced not only to concede a humiliating military defeat but also to 
formally accept its “guilt” for having been the “sole instigator” of the hostilities.893 From a 
historical standpoint, the timing of Heidegger’s deployment of his “existential” concept of 
conscience in Being and Time is thus quite peculiar: almost a decade after the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles, German anger continued to simmer at having been forced to assume 
complete responsibility for the devastation and horrors of the First World War and to pay 
staggering reparations to the Allies. Since December 1918, for example, the German 
Foreign Ministry had funded a “War Guilt Office (Kriegsschuldreferat)” to conduct 
research, prepare studies and produce propaganda countering the Allies’ claims that 
Germany was solely to blame for the outbreak of war in 1914.894 From 1919 through the 
mid-1920’s, the Berlin based Juni-Klub—a radical anti-democratic organization named in 
bitter remembrance of the June 28, 1919 signing of the Treaty of Versailles—published a 
widely read journal entitled Das Gewissen devoted to correcting what it described as:  
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Lack of conscience is the most conspicuous feature of our age; this lack of 
conscience dominates us; it dominates Europe; it dominates the world. 
Everywhere conscience has fallen silent.895  
In 1925 and 1926, following his release from prison for his participation in the failed Beer 
Hall Putsch in Munich, Adolf Hitler published the two volumes of Mein Kampf, 
proclaiming the urgent need to “clear up” the question of “war guilt.”896 Under the 
circumstances, what Heidegger proposed in Being and Time represented a radical yet 
resonant philosophical concept: a content-free, God-less, amoral and “silent call” that 
summons the individual to accept his or her “existential” guilt and to reject “common” 
human values in favor of one’s authentic and ownmost possibility.  
It should be noted that scholarly interest in the concept of Gewissen persists in the 
middle and late 20th century in Germany, however the volume of contributions is greatly 
reduced and the tone noticeably changes from one of “effervescent enthusiasm” to 
solemnity following the Second World War. This difficult historical context may explain in 
large part why relatively few philosophical texts written by German commentators since 
1945 have focused on Heidegger’s concept of conscience. 
Given the sheer volume of texts that have been produced on moral conscience, our 
study is forced to forego a comprehensive review of the evolving historical theories 
regarding conscience and how they relate to Heidegger’s concept and its methodological 
role in Being and Time. Here we heed the counsel of notable theologians including Kähler, 
Jewett and Stelzenberger, among others, who conclude that a satisfactory definition of 
conscience—or even a comprehensive survey of the various proposed notions of 
conscience restricted to the domains of philosophy or theology—would be impossible to 
produce. In Being and Time, Heidegger’s criticism of Stoker conveys the hopelessness of 
such an attempt: whatever its qualities, the “wide-ranging investigation” of Das Gewissen 
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 261 
 
 
is nonetheless judged by Heidegger to be incomplete.897 Given Stelzenberger’s conclusion 
a few decades later that the concept of conscience has become so confused that any thought 
of defining the term should be abandoned, one can only concede that Heidegger’s ideal of a 
“complete” study of theories concerning conscience could never be satisfied. Fortunately, 
our examination of the existential concept of Gewissen in Being and Time does not 
necessitate an exhaustive review of the historical evolution of philosophical and theological 
theories of conscience.898 In keeping with Heidegger’s phenomenological approach, our 
investigation of how the “attestation” of the existential “call of conscience” can be 
experienced will instead focus on revealing what the concept of Gewissen formally 
indicates about the “enactment-sense” of this phenomenon. 
The Problematic Equation of Suneidesis and Conscientia 
The first “destructive” task that must be undertaken as we consider what is formally 
indicated by Heidegger’s notion of conscience is to examine the relation of the Latin 
conscientia to the ancient Greek term suneidesis, the word which is almost universally 
recognized as its etymological source. In light of its importance for the development of the 
modern concept of conscience, a clear understanding of this relation is vital for our study: 
only on the basis of such an understanding of the historical roots of moral conscience can 
we hope to identify a possible way of experiencing Heidegger’s phenomenon of Gewissen. 
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For most philosophers, theologians and linguists who have studied the origins of 
conscientia, the equivalence of the ancient Greek and Latin terms is considered a given. 
Assurances abound that suneidesis and conscientia are synonymous terms and that the 
concept of conscience passed down by ancient Greek civilization to the early Christian 
church: the latter simply “refined” the “primitive” Greek understanding of the 
phenomenon.899 Based on our study of literature concerning the historical development of 
conscience, the scales are heavily weighted in favor of those claiming the equivalence of 
the Greek and Latin terms. 
However, this hypothesis of a “smooth” transition from one language to the next is 
faced with a major problem as soon as one takes even a cursory look at the root terms that 
make up these words. Not only are the Greek eidesis and the Latin scientia not equivalent, 
they are not even related. The term scientia is believed to be derived from the Latin verb 
scire meaning “to know,” based on the metaphoric notion that one can know by 
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conscio is found in Schinkel. Conscience and Conscientious Objections. p. 79. It accurately summarizes 
Lewis’s claims found in Studies in Words, p. 181. 
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distinguishing between two objects or separating one thing from another900; this word 
would be directly related to the Latin scindere (“to cut, divide”).901 The knowledge of 
scientia is thus knowledge acquired by division and separation: produced by the activity of 
the human mind, it can be collected, possessed, and split into various branches. These Latin 
terms share the Proto Indo-European base skei- and have an altogether different Greek 
“equivalent” than the verb oida at the heart of suneidesis: the parent of the Latin scientia is 
believed to be the Greek verb schizo meaning “to split” or “to cleave.”902 The concept of 
knowledge that emerges from such “dividing” is fundamentally different from the 
experience of “having seen” conveyed by the verb oida and which is essential to the 
original meaning of suneidesis.  
The exposure of this fault in the traditionally recognized lineage that directly 
connects conscientia to the Greek suneidesis is vital to our investigation of Heidegger’s 
Gewissen and his insistence on its independence from the Latin conscientia. The German 
word Gewissen—unlike conscientia—is not subject to any such doubts concerning its 
etymological “bloodline,” to paraphrase Stoker’s expression903: the relation between the 
German verb wissen—upon which Gewissen is founded—and the ancient Greek oida is a 
direct one. As we will see, the sense of “having seen” conveyed by the Greek verb oida is 
essential to the original meaning—and the unique history—of the German word Gewissen 
used by Heidegger.  
Notwithstanding the fact that Gewissen and suneidesis share an etymological root, 
there is no question that the meaning of Heidegger’s existential conscience must be 
distinguished from that of suneidesis, as much as it must be from that of conscientia. 
Indeed, the inherently moral sense of the Greek suneidesis can arguably be even more 
strongly associated with Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s inauthentic way of “fearfully” 
following the public “they.” Prior to the emergence of the reflexive sense of the word as 
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“self-conscience,” the Greek verb sunoida reflected one’s concern for the knowledge 
shared with others—particularly the members of one’s community. Its moral role was 
understood in a very practical sense: one should avoid acting in ways that would allow 
others to have knowledge of one’s misdeeds or forbidden thoughts.904 Concern for 
conscience was a matter of protecting one’s honor, of keeping one’s name clean, and of 
preserving one’s status, well-being, property and freedom. The verb sunoida conveys no 
explicit concern for the “inner” motivations of specific acts but rather expresses one’s 
concern for the knowledge that others might have regarding such acts. The others implied 
in the prefix sun- are the witnesses of one’s behavior or statements: the “power” of 
suneidesis as a moral concept thus arises out of one’s fear of the potentially terrible 
consequences that could result from the disclosure of any shared knowledge. As the 
theologian Pierce notes in his study of Conscience in the New Testament:    
The word, from which all the words and phrases in this group spring, is 
sunoida. … This very common word means basically, as its composition 
shows, I know in common with. Its most frequent general use is to indicate 
knowledge about another person as a potential witness for or against him. 
Reasonably there develops from this the sense of, simply, I bear witness.905 
In his essay on the words “conscience” and “conscious,” C.S. Lewis contends that the 
“moral clout” of conscience reflects the fact that the divulgations of one’s fellow witnesses 
might lead to negative consequences for oneself. “Since secrets often are, and are always 
suspected of being, guilty secrets, the normal implications of [conscience] are bad,” Lewis 
writes.906 Conscience serves as a reminder of the looming threat of condemnation (e.g. 
shame, dishonor, stigmatization, punishment) that cannot be disassociated from such secret 
“knowledge”: what is known through the shared “having seen” of sunoida can lead to one’s 
being cast out of the community, physically punished or even killed. In one’s anxious state 
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of concern regarding what is known by others, all acts of intimacy and transparency are 
seen as essentially dangerous because the one “who shares my secret, who can give 
evidence about something I have done, is usually the fellow-conspirator; therefore the 
possible witness against me, the possible blackmailer...”907  
For our study of the Heideggerian notion of conscience, there is a final significant 
characteristic of sunoida that must also be pointed out: the “knowledge” that is held jointly 
in “moral” conscience is related to the past but known in the present. This is conveyed in 
the aorist verb form of oida, which expresses the notion that one “has already seen.” As a 
moral concept, conscience involves seeing that can be remembered—and thus can be 
known—by those who share this knowledge through “having seen together.”  
Yet very early in the preserved evidence of the Greek word, we see its original 
meaning of “joint knowledge” altered in a variety of ways as sunoida splinters into a 
homonymous collection of distinct, and increasingly incompatible, meanings. Most 
notably—in a way that presages the emergence of the notion of subjective “consciousness” 
almost two millennia later—sunoida is “dis-jointed” by eliminating the necessity of one’s 
relation to others with whom the inner knowledge is shared. Rather than what Pierce 
describes as “being privy with another” or having “a shared secret,”908 sunoida 
metaphorically takes on the sense of a “reflexive” relation of the self with its own 
knowledge. One of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions of conscience conveys how 
the original notion of conscience as “shared” was overtaken by its “subjective” derivative: 
“privity of knowledge (with another), knowledge within oneself.”909 Τhe original sense of 
“shared ‘having-seen’” thus came to be eclipsed by the individual’s own “awareness” of 
inner “knowledge” that it possesses and can concern itself with. In this modified sense of 
one’s conscious “self-awareness,” the reflexive conscience assumes the principal role and 
one’s involvement of “others” is forgotten. Pierce notes that the new meaning of sunoida 
that arose in ancient Greece was “simply, awareness, or consciousness and thence… I 
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know well.”910 The word sunoida was increasingly used in the oxymoronic expression 
“emauto sunoida”: through the neutering of the prefix sun-, conscience becomes self-
conscience.911 As Pierce notes:  
The colloquial phrase, …hos an suneides, meaning please yourself or it’s up 
to you leads us directly, by way of the absolute usage, to a particular 
construction of this word which is far commoner than any other use of it—
the construction hauto suneidenai. … In itself this phrase suggests a variety 
of ideas—which might appear singly or in combination: to share knowledge 
with one’s self—to be privy…with one’s self—to hug a (possibly guilty) 
secret to one’s self—to be a witness for or against one’s self or to bear 
witness to one’s self.912  
Gewissen’s Obscured Origin and History 
We must not forget that the word used by Heidegger is the German Gewissen, 
which has a different root and history than the Latin conscientia with which it is commonly 
identified. While the Latin word may be vital to the development of German philosophy 
and theology, Heidegger’s use of Gewissen demands that we recognize this German term as 
being distinct from all foreign and ancient notions. Indeed, despite his familiarity with the 
Scholastic debate over conscientia, Heidegger himself never once refers to conscientia in 
his interpretation of Gewissen in §§54-60 of Being and Time,913 nor does he mention the 
Greek words sunoida and suneidesis. Given Heidegger’s tacit rejection of the prevalent 
equation of conscientia and Gewissen, our study faces several key questions: does the 
translation of the term Gewissen by words based upon the Latin conscientia (e.g., 
conscience in English or conscience morale in French) conceal an original meaning of the 
German word? Has the authentic phenomenon of Gewissen that Heidegger seeks to reveal 
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been neglected due to the obscuring or corrupting influence of the foreign term 
conscientia?  
The Anonymous Translation of Conscientia as “Mînero Geuuízzeni” 
Virtually all philological research into the etymological development and history of 
Gewissen has emphasized the determinative role of the first extant document that explicitly 
connected the German word to conscientia. This connection is found in the gloss of a 
Psalmic commentary by Notker Labeo of Saint Gall produced at the turn of the first 
millennium. While Heidegger does not raise the question of the origin of the German word 
Gewissen in Being and Time, Stoker summarizes the generally accepted theory concerning 
its emergence with a single line in Das Gewissen: “This imitation of the Latin ‘conscientia’ 
is first seen in the work of Notker of Saint Gall (circa 1000) through the term’s 
appropriation from the Christian-Latin vocabulary.”914 Like virtually all the philosophical 
and theological commentators who have studied the term Gewissen since Notker’s time, 
neither Stoker nor any of the other sources mentioned in Heidegger’s footnote to §55 
seriously consider the possibility of a distinct “original meaning” of the German word. 
Even the few texts (such as the lengthy entry on Gewissen in the Grimm brothers’ 
Deutsches Wörterbuch915) that explicitly document the etymological development of 
Gewissen prior to Notker’s era have highlighted the determinative influence of the Latin 
conscientia and the earlier Greek suneidesis for the German word’s signification, paying 
much less heed to the possibility that Gewissen might have originally signified something 
else.916  
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Given that so little attention has been paid to the possibility that Gewissen may have 
had an earlier and distinct meaning, the “fact” that the German word can be equated with 
conscientia has gained nearly universal acceptance. The standard account of Gewissen’s 
development is exemplified in Edward Engelberg’s observations regarding the relation 
between consciousness and conscience: 
In German, as Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud have noted, the 
cognates are obvious: conscience is Gewissen; knowledge is Wissen; to be 
certain (with conviction) is to be gewiss; and consciousness is Bewusstsein. 
… Schopenhauer commented that [the origin of Gewissen] lay with both the 
Latin conscientia…and the Greek word suneidesis which means conscience-
consciousness. Dictionaries since his time have made these and further 
connections. The Gothic miþwissei, literally “with knowledge,” was a direct 
translation of con scientia. This became gewizzeni (also giwizzani and 
gawizani), again from Latin but beginning to resemble the modern German. 
Around 1000 the Monk of St. Gallen, Notker “Teutonicus,” used gewizzen 
as a translation of the Latin conscious, “so that conscience originally also 
meant consciousness in the religious-moral sense.917 
As we will see, the Gothic miþwissein has completely different etymological roots than the 
Latin conscientia. Moreover, the first recorded appearances of this word miþwissein, found 
in the 4th Century Gothic Bible of Wulfila, show that it was used to translate the word 
suneidesis from the original Greek manuscripts directly—without the supposed mediation 
of the Latin conscientia. Wilhelm Streitberg, a renowned 19th and 20th century Germanic 
language specialist and the editor of the 1910 edition of the Gothic Bible, reports that 
“almost every verse of the Gothic Bible teaches us that Wulfila translated the Bible directly 
from the Greek” and that the translation, produced prior to Saint Jerome’s initial work on 
the Vulgate, is not based on an “authorized” Latin version.918 Once fully exposed, the error 
of the “obvious” account of Gewissen’s historical development shows that Heidegger’s 
attempt to pull Gewissen free from the grip of conscientia is actually justified by the fact 
these two words have distinct histories and very different original meanings.  
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Let us complete our review of the “standard” history of Gewissen as the German 
equivalent of conscientia before we examine in greater detail the “error” upon which it is 
based. While the Benedictine monk Notker Labeo is generally credited with the “birth” of 
the German concept of Gewissen, the first usage of this word as a translation of the Latin 
conscientia cannot actually be attributed to him.919 The first trace of the linking of these 
terms is found not in the biblical commentary signed by Notker himself, but rather in the 
annotations that an anonymous glossator added to Notker’s commentaries on the Old 
Testament psalms. The earliest appearance of Gewissen as a translation of conscientia is 
found in the gloss of Notker’s commentary on Psalm 68 of the Old Testament, wherein 
David asks God to help him to resist the persecutors who “reproach” him for his religious 
faith and to allow him to overcome what he calls “my confusion and my shame.”920 
Discussing line 20 of the Psalm, Notker’s commentary in Old High German describes the 
confusion and inner torment of David as “what bites the conscience,” which he describes 
not in German but in Latin with the expression: “quae mordet conscientiam,” an expression 
lifted directly from Augustine’s own commentary on this same passage.921 To facilitate the 
reading of Notker’s commentary by German readers, the anonymous glossator furnished 
the following translation in Old High German of these three Latin words: “diu mich pîzzet 
in mînero geuuízzeni”—“which bites me in my conscience.”922  
Notwithstanding this fateful choice of terminology by Notker’s anonymous 
glossator, the idea that the German term Gewissen can be simply equated with conscientia 
and traced back to sunoida is evidently problematic. A fracture very similar to the one that 
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we observed between the Latin scientia and the Greek oida is seen when we compare the 
former term with the German wissen: the “knowledge” of conscientia is essentially 
different from the experience of the German Gewissen. Unlike the skei- of scientia with its 
emphasis on “dividing,” the German verb wissen that serves as the base of the word 
Gewissen descends from the family of words springing from the early Gothic witan and 
whose Proto-Indo European root is ueid-, meaning to “see.” This ueid- is directly linked to 
the Greek sunoida: it is the oida, i.e. the “to have seen” of the eidos. Plainly put, as 
opposed to the Latin conscientia, the German Gewissen is legitimately related to the oida. 
Where scientia involves the production of knowledge through separating oneself from the 
world and then dissecting it, the German wissen conveys the Greek concept’s sense of 
one’s remembered “seeing.” 
Given that the standard equating of conscientia and Gewissen is evidently 
misleading, our primary question regarding the original sense of Gewissen remains 
outstanding. If the notion of conscientia did not spawn the German term, then what is the 
original sense of Gewissen and how might it inform our study of Heidegger’s interpretation 
proposed in Being and Time?  
Three Different Translations of Suneidesis in the Fourth Century Gothic Bible  
The earliest and most significant evidence of a Germanic “translation” of suneidesis 
is found in the Gothic Bible, which was produced in the fourth century by Bishop Ulfilas 
(or Wulfila) of Moesia (now Bulgaria) and represents the oldest extant text written in a 
Germanic language. In the Gothic manuscripts of the Pauline Epistles,923 the Greek term 
suneidesis—which is uniformly translated as conscientia in the Latin Vulgate—is 
translated using not one but three different Gothic words: miþwissein, gahugdai and 
                                                 
923
 The Gothic Bible manuscripts of the letters of Paul are found in the Codexes Ambrosianus and Carolinus 
(today conserved in Milan, Italy, and Wolfenbüttel, Germany, respectively). Cf. "The Gothic Bible."  
Antwerp: Wulfila Project, University of Antwerp. Last Update: March 30, 2006. Accessed: February 16, 
2011. <http://www.wulfila.be/gothic/browse/>. 
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þuhtus.924 Similarly to what we have seen in the case of the German Gewissen, none of the 
meanings of these three Gothic terms can be reconciled with the Latin concept of 
conscientia: none expresses the sense of knowledge obtained through division or separation 
which is conveyed by the Latin word scientia.  
Let us briefly consider the meanings and roots of each of these three terms to 
consider how they might inform our search for a possible experience of what is formally 
indicated by Heidegger’s phenomenon of Gewissen. 
a) Þuhtus:  
Although the least used of the three Gothic words that appear as translations of the 
Greek suneidesis, the term þuhtus exerts the most influence on contemporary German and 
English language: this term is derived from the Proto Indo-European root tong- meaning 
“to think” or “to feel,” which is the root of both the German verb “denken” and the English 
words “think” and “thought.”925 While this may appear to confirm an authentic link 
between the Pauline suneidesis and the Latin conscientia as a way of describing shared 
“knowledge,” the etymology of þuhtus actually points in a very different direction: the 
“sensing” conveyed by the Gothic þuhtus is the active “reception” of thought rather than 
any kind of possessive “knowing.” This participative or enacted “thinking” is reflected in 
the fact that tong- is also the root of the German verb “danken” and its English equivalent 
“to thank”926: the activity of “thinking” or “feeling” in þuhtus reflects the idea of preserving 
“grateful thought” in one’s memory. Thus understood, “thinking” is not “knowing” but 
rather the faithful reception and caring for what has been given to the mind to think upon, a 
meaning echoed by the German verb gedenken, meaning “to commemorate, to remember.” 
The remembrance conveyed by the Gothic þuhtus is not related to “material facts” which 
must be retained as knowledge but rather to one’s “spiritual”—or “existential”—
                                                 
924
 The incomplete Gothic manuscripts of the Bible that have been preserved contain passages of the Pauline 
letters where the word suneidesis occurs 18 times in the Greek original. Of these 18 occurrences, the word is 
translated three times as þuhtus, four times as gahugdai, and 11 times as miþwissein. 
925
 Pokorny. Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. p. 1088. 
926
 Ibid. p. 1088. 
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responsibility to gratefully receive the gift of thought. Like the Heideggerian notion of 
“wanting-to-have-a-conscience,” the “thinking” of þuhtus is possible only when one 
accepts this responsibility to remember: in this sense, it must be distinguished from modern 
philosophical notions such Cartesian “certainty” and Husserlian “absolute consciousness” 
which Heidegger associates with conscientia.  
b) Gahugdai: 
Appearing four times in the fragments of the Gothic Bible as a translation of 
suneidesis, the composite word gahugdai is composed of the prefix ga-, which implies 
production or activity, and the base Gothic verb hugjan, which Lehmann defines as “to 
think” and relates to the Greek words phronein, meaning “to have an understanding, to feel, 
to think,” and nomizein, meaning “to hold by custom or usage, to deem, think, suppose.”927 
Attempts to define hugjan and its cognates prove problematic, however, because there is no 
consensus regarding the etymology of these Gothic terms. Indeed, Lehmann reports matter-
of-factly: “No etymology.”928  The composite form gahugds is defined by Lehmann as 
“dianoia, mind” or “suneidesis, conscience”—but he again concedes that this word remains 
etymologically undetermined.929 Fortunately, evidence of this term in other early Germanic 
texts allows us to paint a clearer picture of its meaning and its relation to both the Pauline 
notion of suneidesis and Heidegger’s Gewissen. 
The first German text containing this word is the Heliand, the oldest extant work of 
Germanic literature, which was written in Old Low German (also known as Plattdeutsch or 
Old Saxon) by an unknown author in the early part of the 9th century.930 Importantly for 
                                                 
927
 Winfred P. Lehmann, Sigmund Feist and Helen-Jo J. Hewitt. A Gothic Etymological Dictionary: Based on 
the Third Edition of Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Gotischen Sprache by Sigmund Feist. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1986). p. 192. The English “definitions” of the Greek words which Lehmann mentions as being related to the 
meaning of hugjan are those of Thayer and Smith. 
928
 Ibid. p. 192. 
929
 Ibid. p. 139.  
930
 G. Ronald Murphy. The Heliand; The Saxon Gospel; A Translation and Commentary. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). p. xiii. While the Heliand doesn’t allow for the direct comparison of the Old Low 
German, also widely known as Old Saxon, to an original Greek or Latin text, as is the case with the Gothic 
Bible, the text was intended to convey the anonymous author’s interpretation of the Christian message and 
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our study of the roots of Heidegger’s Gewissen, the Heliand features 21 appearances of the 
composite word gihugd or one of its variants. In all of these appearances, the word is used 
to convey the meaning of “to remember” or “to keep in mind” one’s faith in God. The 
significance of gihugd is perhaps most strongly indicated by its central role in the Heliand’s 
account of the Last Supper, where the Savior conveys to his followers the importance of 
remembering his sacrifice. In this retelling, the Heliand modifies the Gospel accounts 
(Mark 14:22-25, Matthew 26:26-29 and Luke 22:17-20) by emphasizing the personal 
responsibility of listeners to keep the message of God secure in their hearts and to preserve 
the purity of their faith:  
… Always remember (gihuggeat) to continue to do what I am doing at this 
supper, tell the story of it to many men. This body and blood is a thing which 
possesses power: with it you will give honor to your Chieftain. It is a holy 
image: keep it in order to remember Me (mîn te gihugdiun), so that the sons 
of men will do it after you and preserve it in this world, and thus everyone 
all over this middle world will know what I am doing out of love to give 
honor to the Lord.931 
In a manner that recalls the Heideggerian interpretation of “authentic” solicitude, the 
Heliand indicates how each believer’s care for his or her faith both preserves the memory 
of God’s word and produces a loving “brotherhood” united in mutual devotion to God.  
This responsibility to remember in the Heliand is also a source of tragedy: just as 
Heidegger’s Dasein is essentially guilty as a “thrown” entity, the follower of God in the 
“middle world” is essentially tainted by impurity and cannot live up to this duty to 
faithfully “remember.” The painful remorse resulting from this failure is vividly described 
                                                                                                                                                     
does employ much of the same vocabulary found in the Gospels; indeed, the text is often called “The Saxon 
Gospel.” As Murphy writes: “The Low German language remained the exclusive vernacular of the peoples of 
Northern Germany and many neighboring regions of Northern Europe until the early 19th century when 
standard German (modeled upon the grammar of Middle High German, largely due to the influence of Martin 
Luther’s translation of the Bible in this language) began take root throughout the Germanic territories. A 
remarkable example of popular religious literature, Heliand (the “Savior” in English) retells the story of the 
Christian Gospels in the form of a heroic poem of nearly 6,000 alliterative lines. The author imagines “the 
events and words of the gospel as if they have taken place and been spoken in his own country and time, in 
the chieftain society of a defeated people…forcibly Christianized by Charlemagne” and offers “a unique 
cultural synthesis between Christianity and Germanic warrior-society.” 
931
 Ibid. p. 153. (Fitt 56, 4643-4656.) 
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in the retelling of Peter’s denial of Christ on the night of his arrest. Here, the Heliand 
conveys the physical suffering and emotional turmoil that floods Peter’s heart and mind 
when he hears the rooster crow and sees his persecuted Lord looking at him. Peter feels 
himself overcome with such profound regret that he cries “tears of blood” that gush directly 
“from his heart.”  
Peter immediately felt pain within him, there was hurt in his heart [and] 
confusion in his mind (harm an is hertan endi is hugi drôbi). He was deeply 
concerned about what he had just said. He remembered the words (gihugde 
thero uuordo) which Christ the Ruler had Himself said to him before, that in 
the dark of the night, before cockcrow, he would deny his Lord three times. 
The memory swelled up within him, a bitter feeling in his breast, and he 
walked out of the place in a rage, …went off from the crowd because of his 
deep concern and feelings of sorrow. He was crying over his own words, his 
own failure. He was so worried that hot and bloody tears came pouring up 
from his heart. He thought he could never again make up in the slightest for 
his deceitful deeds and return to his Lord and be in His favor.932 
Remarkably, none of the details of Peter’s tormented “conscience” that we find in the 
Heliand appears in the original Gospel texts; furthermore, the word conscientia is not 
present in any of the Vulgate’s three accounts of Peter’s denial of Christ.933 In the Heliand, 
the reports found in the Gospels are supplemented with an account of the physical and 
emotional pain of guilt suffered internally by Peter. The remembering of the Heliand’s 
gihugd brings Peter into what Heidegger might describe as a state of unmitigated anxiety: 
“awakened” to the fact that he has denied Christ, he recognizes that the wholeness of his 
relationship with God has been lost.934 In both the Heliand’s retelling of the Gospel and 
                                                 
932
 Ibid. pp. 164-165. (Fitt 59, 4993-5008.) 
933
 The Gospel of John 18:15-27 summarily describes Peter’s three denials but mentions nothing of his 
reaction at the sound of the cock’s crow. The Gospel of Mark 14:66-72 adds only that Peter broke down and 
wept. The most detailed accounts come in the Gospels of Luke 22:54-62 and Matthew 26:69-75 where it is 
simply added that Peter went out from the courtyard and wept bitterly. 
934
 Variants of the Old Saxon gihugh also appear in two of the earliest Old High German accounts of Peter’s 
denial of Christ found in the Codex Sangallensis 56, which contains the translation of Tatian’s Diatessaron 
produced in the first half of the 9th century, and in Otfrid’s Evangelienbuch, a poetic rendition of the Gospel 
believed to have been completed between the years 863-871. In both of these texts, the word is used to 
describe Peter’s failure to remember the word of God and is associated with his experience of pain when he is 
“reawakened” by the cock’s crow. Tatian and Eduard Sievers. Tatian; Lateinisch und altdeutsch mit 
ausführlichem Glossar. (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1966). p. 257 (§188, 6). English translation by Hogg: 
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Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein, we see this “awakening” of the individual to his 
or her responsibility of remembering—a responsibility that counters one’s tendency to 
“fall” into the confusion, deceit, failure and regret that characterizes human existence in the 
“middle” world. In the Heliand, the remembering of gihugd at once provides the key for 
understanding one’s authentic experience of the world by cherishing God’s word and the 
means for recognizing one’s sinfulness for having become dispersed in worldly concerns.  
c) Miþwissein: 
As the most common of the three Gothic words used to translate the Pauline word 
suneidesis, miþwissein seems easily translatable into English as “having seen in common 
with” if we follow the convention of translating the German prefix “mit-” as “with.” 
However, this understanding of the prefix “mit-” covers up a significant difference between 
the German and English concepts. The miþ- of miþwissein finds its roots in the Proto Indo-
European base medhi-, meaning “in the middle of,” “amidst,” “between,” “intermediate”; 
Pokorny relates it to the Greek word mesos.935 In contrast, the English “with” finds its roots 
in the Proto Indo-European ueidh- meaning “apart,” “separate from,” “in two”—the same 
root as the German word Witwe meaning “widow” and wider meaning “against.”936  
If we recuperate the original sense of the prefix miþ-, then our preliminary 
translation of miþwissein becomes not “seeing-with” but rather “seeing-amidst.”937 This 
distinction between the “in the middle of” of miþ- and the separation of “with” is 
exemplified by the composite Gothic word for “meanwhile”: miþþan. Sharing the sense of 
the Heideggerian interpretation of temporality, miþþan conveys the notion of time as an 
indefinite but concrete temporal “between”: it represents the “amidst” of time that 
                                                                                                                                                     
Tatian. The Diatessaron. trans. Hope W. Hogg. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1896).  
Otfrid. Evangelienbuch. (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1965). p. 182 (IV. 13, 38) and p. 190 (IV. 18, 37-42). 
935
 Pokorny. Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. pp. 706-707. 
936
 Ibid. pp. 1127-1128. 
937
 To reflect this important distinction between the English “with” and the German “mit,” we will use from 
this point onward the more appropriate expression “Being-amidst” in place of the conventional English 
translation of “Being-with” when we refer to Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein. For purposes of comparison, 
however, we will not modify the other “mit” words used by Heidegger, such as Dasein-with (Mitdasein) and 
Being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein). 
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Heidegger might have called the “authentic moment” of existence. In this sense, the miþ- 
signifies the “intermediate” that unifies time and serves as the basis of Dasein’s experience.  
When it is fused with the sense of ”amidst” conveyed by the prefix miþ-, the 
“having seen” of the verb wissen cannot be considered a distinct faculty or standpoint that 
one can possess: the Gothic miþwissein conveys neither the “certainty” of an impartial 
subject nor the “objectivity” validated by confirming the details of one’s experience with 
others. It is rather the experience of finding oneself “amidst” the world and infused in 
existence. Although the meaning of miþwissein—like that of Heidegger’s Mitsein—cannot 
simply be equated with Heidegger’s notion of Gewissen, this original Gothic word for 
conscience provides additional evidence that Gewissen developed independently of the 
Latin conscientia and emerged directly from the Greek oida with its original sense of “to 
have seen.” More importantly, it reveals that the meaning of conscience—at this early point 
in its historical development—was understood not only as a sharing of “knowledge” or 
moral rules but as a way of “seeing the world” and existing “amidst” others. While the miþ- 
implies that plurality is a condition of existence, it does not convey that one is “separated” 
from the world and others who co-exist in it but rather that one “sees amidst” a world that 
is essentially shared. Thus the Heideggerian notion of Mitsein should not be understood 
merely as “Being-with” but also—and primarily—as “Being-amidst” in this shared world. 
Like the Heideggerian “call of conscience” that summons Dasein to recognize its essence 
as a thrown entity, miþwissein points to a way of understanding Paul’s concept of 
conscience as a reminder that the Christian believer must remain faithful despite the trials 
of existing “amidst” a hostile world.  
Results of the “Phenomenological Destruction” of Conscience 
Our destructive review of what is formally indicated by Heidegger’s Gewissen has 
allowed for two major discoveries confirming that the original meaning of the German term 
must be distinguished from the Latin conscientia and the “ordinary” interpretation of moral 
conscience. Firstly, we have shown that the German word is etymologically distinct from 
the Latin concept of conscientia and emerged from a different source. Indeed, the earliest 
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“equation” of the words Gewissen and conscientia by the anonymous glossator of Notker’s 
commentary of Psalm 68 comes approximately six centuries after the earliest preserved 
Germanic texts were produced. Secondly, we have seen that Gewissen is not to be found 
among the three words that served as the earliest Germanic “translations” of the Pauline 
term suneidesis that appear in the Gothic Bible. Furthermore, all three of these Gothic 
words— miþwissein, gahugdai and þuhtus—reveal that the initial conception of Germanic 
“conscience” emphasized the “existential” sense of experiencing the “remembering” of 
one’s spiritual purity rather than the notion of “possessing” knowledge. If the much more 
recent “translation” of conscientia as Gewissen represents an ulterior appropriation of the 
German term, then what might have been the “original” meaning of this word Gewissen? In 
seeking to understand how the “phenomenon” of Gewissen proposed by Heidegger can be 
experienced, can we identify an earlier meaning that this word was used to convey?  
4.2. Conscience as the “Self-Attestation” of Being-Amidst (Mitsein) 
Testimonium: Evidence of Gewissen’s “Original Meaning”  
As we seek to demonstrate how Heidegger’s phenomenon of conscience can be 
understood as a possible ontical experience of Being-in-the-world, our search for an 
“original” meaning of the German term Gewissen leads us to take up the oldest extant 
bound book produced in a Germanic language: the eighth century Latin-Old High German 
“word book” known as the Codex Abrogans, which contains the earliest known evidence of 
the German word Gewissen.938 In this manuscript glossary of religious terms, we find 
inscribed the first Germanic word based upon the same linguistic components that make up 
the later German term Gewissen: the Old High German kiuuizzitha. This word is formed by 
                                                 
938
 The Codex Abrogans is part of the collection of the Library of the Abbey of St. Gallen in Switzerland. The 
entire manuscript is available online on the website of the Virtual Manuscript Library of Switzerland. "Codex 
Abrogans (St. Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. Sang. 911)."  St. Gallen: Virtual Manuscript Library of 
Switzerland (St. Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek). Last Update: December 31, 2005. Accessed: December 30, 2010. 
<http://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/en/list/one/csg/0911>. 
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the early Old High German prefix ki-, the precursor to the later German ge- meaning “to 
produce” or “to show,” and uuizzitha, one of the earliest variants of the verb wissen for 
“having seen” or “knowing.” The “meaning” of this composite word proposed in this 
ancient manuscript is remarkable given Heidegger’s interpretation of the “call of 
conscience” as the way Dasein produces an attestation of its authenticity: kiuuizzatha is 
identified as the translation of the Latin testimonium,939 meaning “witness, evidence, 
attestation, testimony.”940  
The evidence of the Codex Abrogans reveals that the first documented meaning of 
the German word Gewissen is not the judging faculty of conscientia but rather the act of 
attestation, the enactment of witnessing and producing testimony. What we have discovered 
through our exhibiting of what is formally indicated by Heidegger’s Gewissen—the 
concept he introduces in the chapter of Being and Time bearing the title “Dasein’s 
Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-Being”—is that the earliest recorded meaning 
of Gewissen was indeed “attestation.” Tellingly for our study of the Heideggerian concept, 
the Old High German kiuuizzitha does not convey testimony in terms of a capacity or a 
habit that can be possessed but rather as the “attestation” produced through an act of 
bearing witness that one performs: in the experience of kiuuizzitha—as in that of 
testimonium—one gives testimony and bears witness.941  
                                                 
939
 This definition of “testimonium” as “kiuuizzitha” appears twice in the Codex Abrogans. Ibid. pp. 120, 189. 
With the authorization of the Library of the Abbey of St. Gall, the images of these two pages have been 
reproduced as Appendices A and B of this thesis. Also, the expression “testimonium dat” is translated as 
“cauuizzidha gipit.” Ibid. p. 29. It should be noted that no other alternative translations of “testimonium” 
appear and that—interestingly—the Latin word “conscientia” is not found in the glossary. 
940
 Lewis. An Elementary Latin Dictionary. p. 856. 
941
 While the Codex Abrogans clearly indicates the original sense of the German concept of Gewissen as 
testimonium, it also presents us with additional evidence of what Heidegger has described as Dasein’s 
tendency to fall into the illusion of “certainty” based on its possession of “objective knowledge.” For in this 
earliest extant German text, several early forms of the German verb wissen are related directly to the 
“knowing” of the Latin scio, the root of scientia. For example, the Latin adjectives sciens (meaning “known”) 
and inscius (meaning “unknowing” or “ignorant”) are translated respectively in Old High German using the 
words uuizzendi and unuuizzo. "Codex Abrogans (St. Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. Sang. 911)." pp. 75, 165. 
Furthermore, we find explicit evidence of the association between testimonium and the act of passing 
judgment or condemning in the proposed “definitions” of the Old High German words cauuizzinot and 
unkiuuizzinot, which are identified respectively as equivalents of the Latin terms damnabitur (meaning “he 
will be condemned”) and inuindicatum (meaning “to no longer indicate or accuse,” that is to say “to acquit”). 
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As we have seen, the “attestation” required in Being and Time is the demonstration 
that Dasein can find—in its own experience—a possible way of authentically “disclosing 
itself in resoluteness.”942 The unearthing of Gewissen’s original meaning as “testimony” 
represents the first “positive” result of our “destructive” investigation of what is formally 
indicated by Heidegger’s concept. Yet if the experience of Heidegger’s conscience is the 
experience of “attestation” as “testimony,” then we still must reveal a possible way of 
experiencing this testimony ontically. In other words, we must still show how Being-in-the-
world is able to “break off” its listening to the “they” by experiencing the “call of 
conscience,” a task requiring that we reconsider Heidegger’s interpretation of Being-amidst 
and the inauthentic “who” of Dasein proposed in Being and Time’s Division One.  
Recovering Dasein’s Authentic Sense of Being-Amidst 
In §§25-27 of Being and Time, Heidegger describes “everyday” Being-amidst 
(Mitsein) in terms of Being-in-the-world’s concern for that “which lies closest to us” in 
terms of the environmentality of its world.943 Examining the most common ways in which 
Dasein concerns itself with its world, Heidegger determines that the “who” of “everyday” 
Dasein fails to recognize its own radically individualized possibilities and instead allows 
itself to become captivated by public affairs. The authentic “self-testimony” of the “call of 
conscience” is thus drowned out by the roar of the crowd: Dasein adopts the “disguise” of 
anonymity and shuns its own authentic possibilities.  
One’s own Dasein, like the Dasein-with of others (das Mitdasein Anderer), 
is encountered proximally and for the most part in terms of the with-world 
with which we are environmentally concerned (der unweltlich besorgten 
Mitwelt). When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern—that is, at 
the same time, in its Being-amidst among others (das heißt zugleich im 
                                                                                                                                                     
Ibid. pp. 27, 156. Even more significantly for Heidegger’s approach to phenomenological investigation, the 
Latin adjective legale—whose meaning is rooted in the “choosing” of the Greek logos—is translated by the 
Old High German uuizzodlih. Ibid. p. 179. Thus what Heidegger describes in Being and Time as the essential 
ambiguity of logos—the tendency of assertive language to cover up the original phenomenon—can be seen in 
the very first text expressing the original meaning of Gewissen as “testimony,” which represents the unique 
phenomenon that Dasein can “break off” its listening to the public “they.” 
942
 SZ §60, 298 / 345. 
943
 SZ §27, 126 / 164. 
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Mitsein zu den Anderen)—it is not itself. Who is it, then, who has taken over 
Being as everyday Being-with-one-another (alltägliches 
Miteinandersein)?944  
The answer of the “who” is to be found in the “publicness” of Dasein’s most common form 
of Being-with-one-another in which it ignores its own individual possibilities and devotes 
itself to keeping up with others. Rather than pursuing its own course of action, Dasein 
accepts the “disguise” of the general public, dons the cloak of anonymity and abdicates its 
responsibility for making its own decisions regarding its existence.  
The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self (Man-selbst), which we 
distinguish from the authentic self—that is, from the self which has been 
taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been 
dispersed (zerstreut) into the “they,” and must first find itself.945  
Heidegger insists, however, that Dasein’s abandonment of its authentic self in favor of its 
subjection by the “they” of the public is not a diminishing of Dasein’s Being, but rather the 
factical “reality” of Dasein’s existence as Being-in-the-world.  
When it falls into the “they,” Dasein doesn’t lose its existential characteristic of 
concern for its world but rather puts this concern under the cloak of the “they.” The “self-
testimony” of conscience is forgotten as Dasein pursues the common objective of 
anonymous public Being-with-one-another. Dasein in the “they” is obsessed with 
maintaining this anonymity: in its relations with others, inauthentic Dasein jealously guards 
against any threat to its “averageness,” constantly monitoring others in order to avoid 
falling behind. By acting in this way, Dasein unwittingly participates in the common 
campaign to undermine any individual initiatives of others and contributes to enforcing the 
obligatory but ever-changing codes of the “they.” For Heidegger, the “they” is not a 
“genus” or “type” that Dasein can positively choose: it is rather a constitutive phenomenon 
of Dasein that describes its most common state as Being-in-the-world failing “to stand by 
one’s self” and conforming to “leveled down” public standards.  
                                                 
944
 SZ §26, 125 / 163. In this citation, we have modified the English translation from “Being-with with 
others” to “Being-amidst among others.” 
945
 SZ §27, 129 / 167. 
 281 
 
 
The “dictatorship” of publicness implies both the loss of any recognition of one’s 
individual possibilities and the exacting requirement to always participate and “know” what 
the “they” considers to be valid at any given moment. Though exhausting, this way of 
existing nonetheless serves to comfort Dasein: it can remain anonymously unaccountable 
rather than having to take responsibility for making choices concerning its ownmost 
possibilities. In its flight from “wanting-to-have-a-conscience,” Dasein avoids hearing the 
“self-testimony” of conscience and consequently spares itself the “trouble” of having to 
face itself and its “true” possibilities. Dasein’s existence becomes one of following along 
and participating in the approved form of public discourse rather than “reticently” standing 
apart in silence: 
The “they”…can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not 
someone who needs to vouch for anything. It ‘was’ always the “they” who 
did it, and yet it can be said that it has been ‘no one (keiner).’946  
Numbed by its concern for the world of the “they,” Dasein loses touch both with itself and 
with others as individuals; the possibility of authentically encountering the other fades as 
Dasein slips into ambiguous anonymity. When Dasein falls into the “they,” it loses not only 
itself but also the other.  
By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up 
gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.947 
As it abandons itself to the “they,” Dasein “disburdens” itself of the responsibility to make 
its own choices and becomes alienated from itself: the “self-testimony” of conscience goes 
unheard. Yet as Heidegger makes clear in §54, it is this “call of conscience”—the 
experience of “self-testimony” that “comes from me and yet from beyond me and over 
me”
948
—that allows for the possibility of Dasein’s return to an authentic, transparent 
understanding of itself, its world and the others with whom Dasein shares this world.  
                                                 
946
 SZ §27, 127 / 165. 
947
 SZ §27, 127 / 165. 
948
 SZ §57, 275 / 320. 
 282 
 
 
As we search for how to understand this positive experience that can serve as the 
“attestation” of Dasein’s authenticity, we see that the “self-testimony” of the “call of 
conscience” requires the possibility of encountering others: if Dasein’s “attestation” of 
conscience is experienced through “testimony,” then it must be produced as an attestation 
that can be shared. Dasein’s silence can only be characterized as “reticence” if this silent 
discourse is the testimony of Being-amidst that can be communicated—without recourse to 
assertive language—with others in a shared world.  
In Heidegger’s account of Being-amidst, the other is characterized as being unlike 
all “material” things or creatures disclosed in Dasein’s environment because the other 
shares Dasein’s disclosing kind of Being: for this reason, Heidegger claims, the other can 
never be encountered as present-at-hand. Thus when Dasein comes into its world, it 
necessarily comes into a world that is shared with others who contribute to its disclosure as 
a meaningful totality. Disclosed amidst the meaningful relations that unite itself, others and 
worldly things, Dasein is dependent upon this shared web of “involvement,” which can be 
understood both authentically and inauthentically. Notwithstanding how Dasein 
understands its world, this “totality” of “involvement” reflects the disclosive interaction of 
all co-Daseins who exist in and thus contribute to the significance of Dasein’s existence. 
“Dasein in itself is essentially Being-amidst (Mitsein),” notes Heidegger, and thus always 
understands its world as a landscape of meaning shaped by itself and others.949 In this 
sense, Dasein’s existential structures are thoroughly “permeated” by the possible encounter 
with the other. From an existential standpoint, the possibility of encountering the other is 
constitutive for Dasein as Being-in-the-world because anything disclosed in the world can 
necessarily be shared. From an existentiell standpoint, the encounter of the other is 
therefore a condition of authentic disclosedness: the attestation of one’ authenticity 
demands a way of experiencing reticent silence as “self-testimony” that “breaks off” one’s 
inauthentic dispersal among the “they” and makes possible the hearing of conscience. 
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Absent the possible encounter with the other, Dasein would have no world: 
existence would be meaningless, shapeless and unintelligible. Moreover, there would be no 
way of hearing the “call of conscience” if Dasein was unable to experience an authentic 
encounter of the other: its “self-testimony” could neither be produced nor heard without the 
possibility of a mutual experience of authenticity and a sharing of the world. In other 
words, it would be impossible to produce an attestation of Dasein’s authenticity in an 
unshared world. A universe emptied of any possibility of genuinely encountering the other 
as co-Dasein could not include a “call of conscience.”  
[As] Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of others. … In Being-
with, as the existential “for-the-sake-of” of others, these have already been 
disclosed in their Dasein. With their Being-with, their disclosedness has 
been constituted beforehand; accordingly, this disclosedness also goes to 
make up significance—that is to say, worldhood.950  
Our investigation of the “call of conscience” reveals that Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenon of Being-amidst implies that involvement with the other is necessary in order 
for Dasein to experience the “disclosedness” of such a shared world. In turn, this potential 
link between Dasein and the other holds implications for the relation between Dasein’s 
authentic “disclosedness” and Heidegger’s analysis of the “broader phenomenal domain of 
Dasein’s everydayness”: on the grounds of what is “formally indicated” by Being-amidst, 
the other may serve to bridge the seemingly problematic gap between conscience and the 
“public world,” thus preserving the “worldly” orientation of Heidegger’s ontological 
project and avoiding the threat of solipsism. If the “call of conscience” indeed discloses 
Dasein’s authentic possibility of existence, then Heidegger’s exhibition of Being-amidst 
points to a necessary role for the other in the revealing of the world. Although Heidegger 
never explicitly describes how the other performs its co-disclosing role, he clearly 
establishes that the existential possibility of encountering others is constitutive for the 
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world’s “totality of significance” revealed to Dasein in the moment of resoluteness—a 
moment that depends entirely on Dasein’s experiencing the “self-testimony” of conscience.  
Heidegger emphasizes that the contingent nature of any specific worldly encounter 
with a given other in no way diminishes the fact that the possibility of this encounter is 
essential to Dasein’s existential character of Being-amidst. Any attempt to reduce Dasein’s 
encounter with others to an “event” of mere presence misconstrues the meaning of Being-
amidst as constitutive for Dasein, Heidegger insists.951 Such a misunderstanding of 
Dasein’s existential structures is considered by Heidegger to be evidence of the present-at-
hand thinking of the philosophical tradition that seeks to impose the requirement of 
substantiality upon Dasein and the others who share its world.  
Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-amidst in the world. The other can be 
missing only in and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of 
Being-amidst; its very possibility is the proof of this.952 
In liberating his existential concept of Being-amidst from any requirement of the presence, 
Heidegger confirms the irrelevance of any present-at-hand-like conception of Dasein’s 
involvement with others who share its kind of Being. Even when surrounded by others, 
Dasein can remain in solitude if it allows the “they” to dictate its understanding and to 
refuse to acknowledge others as co-Daseins who contribute to the meaning to the shared 
world. As Heidegger observes, “failed encounters” of this sort are commonplace and don’t 
diminish the Being of others or affect their status as co-Daseins. Rather, the existential 
structure of Being-amidst is what serves as the basis of both the encounter of the other as 
Dasein-with in the world and the “failure” of Dasein to experience this encounter 
authentically: whether or not this encounter is experienced in a genuine way depends on the 
mode of Being-amidst that characterizes Dasein at any given moment of its existence.  
Being-amidst is in every case a characteristic of one’s own Dasein (Mitsein 
ist eine Bestimmtheit des je eigenen Daseins); Dasein-with characterizes the 
Dasein of others to the extent that it is freed by the world for a Being-amidst. 
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Only so far as one’s own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-amidst, 
is it Dasein-with as encounterable for others.953 
When it falls into inauthenticity, Dasein fails to recognize the “other” authentically as 
Dasein-with in deference to the intolerant “they” and its ideal of anonymity. In indifferently 
“passing one another by,”954 Dasein condemns itself to an impoverished understanding of 
the shared world because it is blind to the possibility of any individual and unique 
contribution by the other to the world’s significance. The less Dasein takes into 
consideration the Dasein-with of others, the less it understands its environment as one 
whose meaning is shaped by the authentic possibilities of both itself and others. In what 
Heidegger terms the “deficient” experience of “Being-alone,” Dasein stifles its authentic 
understanding of the world as Being-amidst. When Dasein allows itself to be drawn into 
the concerns of the “they,” it is exposed to a fascinating but superficial world with the 
appearance of great diversity: all depth of understanding is flattened out in a seemingly 
limitless landscape where Dasein as “they-self” roams freely. In this ambiguous mode of 
“everydayness,” Dasein’s understanding can become so limited that it even fails to 
acknowledge others of its own kind. For Heidegger, it is the ultimate “perversion” of 
philosophy that such superficiality is precisely what is granted the status of substantiality 
by the ontological tradition through its prioritizing of presence-at-hand.  
If the “call of conscience” can renew Dasein’s authentic understanding of its world 
as one that is shared, then any demonstration of how conscience can be experienced 
necessitates the possibility of authentically encountering the other. The transparency 
implied by Heidegger’s concept of authenticity requires that the world’s meaning be 
revealed in terms of the “for-the-sake-of-which” of Dasein itself and of others as co-
Daseins who mutually free one another through the phenomenon of positive solicitude. 
Heidegger’s attestation of Dasein’s authenticity must show how the mirage of an infinite 
world of present-at-hand entities can be replaced by Being-amidst’s experience of the 
meaningful totality of a world it shares with others. 
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Calling Dasein to Disclosedness: The Implications of Positive Solicitude 
While our analysis of authentic Being-amidst has revealed that an encounter with 
the other is existentially essential to hearing the “call of conscience,” we still face a 
dilemma when it comes to understanding how this attesting phenomenon can be 
demonstrated as an ontical, existentiell and “non-theoretical” possibility of Being-in-the-
world. Heidegger contends that Being-amidst as an existential phenomenon structures both 
the authentic and deficient ways of encountering others, including the experience of the 
absence of others. Understood existentially, Being-amidst thus represents a structural 
characteristic of Dasein that does not imply the necessary presence of others or Dasein’s 
factical encounter with them. But while the possibility of encountering the other may 
appear to be contingent when Heidegger interprets the existential concept of Being-amidst 
in Division One, can this still be the case in Division Two when an attestation of Dasein’s 
possibility of being “called” to authenticity is required? If the “self-testimony” of Dasein is 
defined as a “solitary” experience, have we lost the potential link between the ontical world 
that Dasein shares with others and Heidegger’s existential-ontological project? Can the “the 
voice of the friend” indeed be a phenomenon that Dasein “carries with it” in absolute 
solitude, requiring no existentiell experience in order to be heard?955 Is this silent call that 
comes “from me and yet from beyond me and over me”956 nothing but a case of 
“solipsism,” as Scheler has alleged?957  
If it can be said that Heidegger points to a possible solution to this problem in Being 
and Time, this “answer” must arise in the “bridge” that he appears to propose between his 
description of Being-amidst’s mode of authentic solicitude and the experience of 
conscience when he acknowledges in §60 that resolute Dasein “can become the 
‘conscience’ of others (kann zum „Gewissen“ der Anderen werden).”958 Through 
Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience as Dasein’s attesting “self-testimony,” we are 
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informed that “everyday” Being-amidst can potentially recover from its dispersal in 
worldly concerns and that it can influence the destiny of co-Daseins encountered in its 
shared world, both authentically and inauthentically. This experience of authentic “self-
testimony” proves to be the key to understanding how Dasein anticipatively “leaps ahead” 
of the other “not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him 
authentically as such for the first time.”959  
In examining the way this disclosing solicitude is described in Being and Time, we 
see Heidegger exposing at least five parallels between the phenomenon of the attesting 
“call of conscience” and Dasein’s capacity to bring the other into its own disclosedness: 1) 
The solicitude of authentic Dasein is one that is content-free and silent, recalling his 
description of the summoning call as one that “discloses nothing which could be either 
positive or negative as something with which we can concern ourselves.”960 The influence 
of Dasein on the other’s coming into his or her own disclosedness is not achieved by 
“pressuring” the other, but rather by exposing a disturbing breach in the “they.” Dasein 
makes space for the other, pointing towards a clearing where he or she can come into his or 
her own “authentic truth.” 2) Authentic solicitude is oriented towards possibilities and can 
reveal to the other the “care” that all co-Daseins share as the essence of their Being. In 
“leaping ahead” of the other, solicitous Dasein reveals their similarity as projected co-
Daseins who share a mutual responsibility for choosing their ownmost possibility of Being. 
The silent “self-testimony” of authentic Dasein interrupts the “static” of the “they” and can 
incite the other to take responsibility for his or her Being. 3) Heidegger’s linking of 
conscience with liberating solicitude confirms both that the call is essential to Dasein’s 
experience of authenticity and that all existence is based on the possibility of the authentic 
encounter with others as Dasein-with. To have the possibility of liberating others, Dasein 
itself must have factically achieved its own disclosedness whereby Dasein “frees the other 
in his freedom for himself.”961 The call reveals that Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-
Being underlies all existence but has become covered up by the “they.” As the attestation of 
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Dasein’s authenticity, the “call of conscience” shatters the illusion of the dominant “they” 
and reveals the possibility of encountering others as individuals with their own 
potentialities-for-Being. 4) In his assessment of solicitude, Heidegger describes the 
liberating of the other as revealing its disclosedness “authentically as such for the first 
time.”962 Dasein’s freeing the other doesn’t pull him or her back to some “previous” 
situation and isn’t dependent upon a past encounter of the other. Any encounter of the other 
is always a “new” one as Dasein comes back into its authentic mode of Being by projecting 
itself upon new possibilities: since no situation of “resolution” is ever the same, this is also 
the case of any possibility of encountering the other. The “call of conscience” does not 
recall Dasein to a former time of disclosedness, but rather “summons us” forth to Dasein’s 
responsibility for its ownmost possibility of Being.963 5) As the authentic mode of Being-
amidst, liberating solicitude is necessarily founded upon a transparent understanding of the 
world as shared and made significant for Dasein through to its co-involvement in the world 
amidst others as Dasein-with. The implication of others is essential to the authentic 
disclosedness of the world because its meaning is shaped both by others and by Dasein as 
mutually disclosing co-Daseins.  
When Dasein liberates others, its own authentic understanding of the world is 
enriched by its recognition of the relations of significance that others contribute to the 
meaning of one’s existence. In other words, an authentic understanding of the world 
implies Dasein’s openness to the other: mutual disclosedness represents the essence of 
authentic Being-amidst and provides the foundation of all ways of understanding existence, 
even the inauthentic way of understanding the world that results from Dasein’s “falling” 
into the “they.” Heidegger’s presentation of the “call of conscience” implies a necessary 
connection between Dasein and others in the experience of collaboratively disclosing the 
totality of significance that constitutes the shared world. In describing the resoluteness of 
Dasein who has heard the “call,” Heidegger relates “the solicitude which leaps forth and 
liberates” to the co-disclosing by Dasein and others of their respective “self-chosen…[and] 
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ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”964 As it frees the other for its ownmost possibility of 
Being, Dasein opens itself up to the other and understands its existence to be inextricably 
intertwined with others in a shared world.  
Based on this analysis of Dasein’s capacity to liberate others, can we now conceive 
of a “possible experience” of the attesting “call of conscience” by Being-in-the-world? Can 
this relation between authentic solicitude and conscience be linked to an experience that 
demonstrates how Dasein can “initiate” its authentic disclosedness? More specifically, can 
the phenomenon of authentic solicitude described in Heidegger’s existential interpretation 
of Being-amidst contribute to our understanding of the “voice of the friend” and its relation 
to the experience of conscience?965  
For Dasein to follow the liberating other’s “example” and accept responsibility for 
its own authentic possibilities, it must recognize the reticent silence of the other as “self-
testimony” that cuts off the “they.” Such an experience would imply that the other—as 
autonomous, individual Dasein-with—must confront Dasein and force it to come face-to-
face with its own authentic possibilities. In his account, Heidegger doesn’t explicitly state 
that Dasein will seize the opportunity afforded by such a “liberation” and invariably choose 
to join the solicitous other in authentic resoluteness: there is no existential or ontical 
“obligation” that binds Dasein to such “wanting-to-have-a-conscience.” However, 
Heidegger’s description of the primordial experience of anxiety that cuts through the “they” 
and strips Dasein of its shelter shows that Dasein cannot ignore this silence. As “they-self,” 
Dasein has many ways that it can respond: it can refuse to acknowledge the silence of the 
authentic other, denigrate it, seek to instrumentalize it, prod it to rejoin the public chatter, 
just pass by it, etc. But whatever it does, Dasein must respond to this disturbing “self-
testimony” of the other—either by sliding back into the non-choice of existing amongst the 
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“they” or by assuming responsibility for its authentic potentiality-for-Being. In the former 
case, the “they-self” recovers from its anxious moment of silence (“it was really nothing”) 
and returns busily to its eternal activity of “catching up” with the crowd,966 thereby never 
catching a glimpse of the depth of significance of its shared world. Its eyes immediately 
turn back to the superficial landscape of its public world. However, the latter possibility 
produces a different “outcome”: interrupted by the “call of conscience,” the “they-self” 
pains to catch its breath and Dasein—at least for a moment—authentically recognizes its 
“failure to stand by one’s self.” Exposed to its essential guilt, Dasein joins the other in the 
disturbing silence of “self-testimony,”967 an experience in which they can become 
“authentically bound together (eigentliche Verbundenheit).”968   
As Heidegger makes clear, there is no specific “what” that is communicated to 
Dasein by the other (or vice versa) when it enters this silent “space” of disclosedness as 
liberated Being-amidst.969 Instead, Dasein comes into authentic understanding of the 
“disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time.”970 The 
factical possibilities of action can only be determined by what Dasein discovers when it 
finds itself authentically oriented in its world. While the formal indication of Being-amidst 
does not allow us to specify the “content” of Dasein’s possibilities of action, Heidegger’s 
exhibition of the “amidst” of existence does confirm the constitutive role of the other for 
the possible experience of an authentically shared world. Revealed as the meaningful 
matrix structured by projective co-Daseins, this shared world is essentially a “togetherness” 
where Dasein’s ownmost possibilities are woven into its shared worldly environment.  Yet 
Heidegger insists that there is a necessary condition for this mutual disclosedness to be 
possible: Dasein and the other must quiet the “they” by meeting in reticence. This mutual 
experience of authenticity requires a reducing of all public discourse to absolute silence.    
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With our exhibition of this experience of shared silence, our analysis of Being-
amidst and the attesting “self-testimony” of Heidegger’s notion of Gewissen has allowed us 
to identify an important connection between Dasein’s experience of the “call of 
conscience” and the phenomenon of authentic solicitude. Since “everydayness” is 
characterized by the public’s denial of any individual potentiality-for-Being, authentic 
Being-amidst requires an experience that reveals to Dasein that its world is one that is 
shared with others and not possessed by the “they.” In addition to contributing to the 
relations of meaning that “shape” Dasein’s world, the other is essential to Being-in-the-
world’s experience of “self-testimony” and thus plays a necessarily role in its experience of 
the attesting phenomenon of the “call of conscience.” Since any authentic conception of 
Dasein’s world requires that it be recognized as shared, the attesting call that makes 
authenticity possible can only be heard if existence is characterized by plurality. The 
“hearing” of conscience is necessarily a communicable phenomenon. As we continue our 
search for a way of understanding how Being-in-the-world can experience the “call of 
conscience,” we have identified the principal condition that is implied by Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Gewissen as “attestation”: the demonstration of Dasein’s possibility of 
authentic existence—understood as the unity of Dasein’s equiprimordial structures of 
Being-in-the-world, Being-amidst and Being-towards-death—necessarily involves the 
experience of encountering the other. 
4.3. Experiencing Conscience as the Silence of Martyrdom 
The Call Without Conscience: Heidegger’s Abandonment of Gewissen 
Despite its pivotal role in Being and Time as the attestation of Dasein’s possibility 
of authentic existence, the notion of conscience is barely even mentioned by Heidegger in 
his subsequent philosophical writings and talks. What Heidegger retains from his 
interpretation of the “call of conscience” is not the concept of Gewissen itself but the 
experience of being “called”: the initiating “summons,” the “call of being (Zuruf des 
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Seyns)” that opens up the question of Being.971 As Inwood reports, Heidegger’s subsequent 
ways of describing the “call” reveal that this phenomenon has been uncoupled from the 
existential concept of Gewissen:  
Later, Heidegger still speaks of the call, especially the silent call (Ruf, Zuruf, 
etc.): the call of beyng, the call of men, gods, earth and world to each other, 
the call to us of poetry and the call involved in naming things. But 
conscience and guilt play little part in Heidegger’s work after Being and 
Time.972 
Although Heidegger will insist on the continuity in the development of his thought, his 
decision to abandon the investigation of Dasein in order to pursue other approaches to the 
question of Being marks a point of rupture for our study: the concept of conscience is 
sentenced to oblivion. After what Kisiel describes as Heidegger’s recognition that “Being 
and Time was a failed project,”973 the morally-charged term of Gewissen will be virtually 
eliminated from his vocabulary. Heidegger offers, at least in the extant texts, neither a 
retraction nor an explanation: the question of Gewissen is simply left hanging, suspended in 
silence.  
In recuperating his notion of the “call,” however, Heidegger continues to assert the 
connection established in Being and Time between the phenomenon of calling or 
summoning and the concept of death. In his University of Freiburg course during 1942-43 
winter semester, for example, Heidegger bluntly asserts that the phenomenon of “calling” 
and the experience of one’s “mortality” cannot be divorced from one another. Reflecting on 
the various ways in which the ancient Greeks understood “truth (aletheia),” Heidegger 
replaces his former notion of Dasein’s “hearing” the “call of conscience” with a “purer” 
experience of being called to an experience of “sacrifice” in the name of truth. As 
Heidegger writes:  
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The highest form of suffering is the dying of death as a sacrifice for the 
preservation of the truth of Being. This sacrifice is the purest experience of 
the voice of Being.974  
In a later reading of the poem by Parmenides, Heidegger confirms this essential connection 
between the “call of aletheia (Ruf der aletheia)” and the essence of the hearer as a “mortal 
(Sterblichen).”975 Without reprising his existential interpretation of Being-towards-death 
proposed in Being and Time, Heidegger nonetheless emphasizes the relation between 
calling and death as he queries the “mystery” of Being, reaffirming the essential uncertainty 
of thought and the impossibility of grasping Being as knowledge:  
[Anyone] who only expects thinking to give assurances, and awaits the day 
when we can go beyond it as unnecessary, is demanding that thought 
annihilate itself. That demand appears in a strange light if we consider that 
the essence of mortals calls upon them to heed the call which beckons them 
toward death. As the outermost possibility of mortal Dasein, death is not the 
end of the possible but the highest shelter (the gathering sheltering) of the 
mystery of calling disclosure.976  
With his post-Being and Time redeployment of the call sans conscience, Heidegger thus 
indicates that this problem of “attestation”—unlike the phenomenon of conscience initially 
proposed as the solution to this problem—remains essential to his approach to the 
investigation of Being.  
Perhaps due in part to Heidegger’s immediate abandonment of the existential 
concept of conscience proposed in Being and Time, relatively few commentators have 
focused on Heidegger’s Gewissen with an eye either to further developing this specific 
concept, to identifying the origins of its meaning (which may be formally indicated by 
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Heidegger’s “radical” interpretation of the term), or to considering the methodological 
importance of the concept for Heidegger’s hermeneutical approach to phenomenology. 
Perhaps the most significant legacy of Heidegger’s Gewissen to date has been its 
contribution to the philosophical problem of testimony.977 Indeed, several commentators 
have pointed critically to Heidegger’s silent “call of conscience” as evidence of the 
impossibility of attestation in Being and Time—or of any experience of testimony 
whatsoever—in the absence of a validating “experience of the absolute”978 or some 
“metaphysical power” that can produce or authorize such testimony. For many critics of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience, the insufficiency of Dasein’s “self-attestation” 
demonstrates that any attempt to “understand” existence requires the recognition of a 
metaphysical “source” that authorizes testimony and thus provides the basis for experience. 
Ricœur’s Call to Again “Take Up the Problem” of Heideggerian Conscience  
In the writings of Paul Ricœur, we find one of the most provocative—and 
insightful—analyses of the problem of how Dasein can experience the attesting “call of 
conscience.” Significantly for our study, Ricœur specifically considered how the “self-
testimony” of Heidegger’s Gewissen might inform the metaphysical problems of alterity 
and of the absolute. In his 1989 essay entitled “Emmanuel Lévinas, Thinker of Testimony 
(Penseur du témoignage),” Ricœur explored how the experience of testimony can be 
understood by positioning Heidegger and Lévinas in extreme opposition to one another 
with regard to their concepts related to this phenomenon of attestation. Ricœur proposes 
that their approaches can be compared on the basis of two criteria that he considers 
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978
 Paul Ricœur. "L'herméneutique du témoignage." Lectures 3 : Aux Frontières De La Philosophie. (Paris: 
Seuil, [1972] 1994). p. 107. 
 295 
 
 
essential to any “philosophy that merits the title ‘philosophy of testimony’”: “superiority 
(supériorité)” and “exteriority (extériorité).”979 Based on his schema, Ricœur claims that: 
[Superiority] and/or exteriority don’t just constitute the characteristic traits 
of philosophies of testimony through their intersection, but also furnish the 
criterion of their difference, in the sense that, as I will show, from 
Heidegger…to Lévinas, the gradient of superiority increases with that of 
exteriority.980 
On the “superiority” axis, Ricœur sees Heidegger denying the attesting “call of conscience” 
even the slightest degree of transcendence with his description of the call as being content-
free and originating in Dasein itself. On the “exteriority” scale, Ricœur believes that 
Heidegger’s call—which supposedly reveals the utter inauthenticity of the “they-world”—
eliminates the possibility of Dasein’s being able to authentically engage with anything 
“external” to it. For Ricœur, the call reveals that Dasein cannot authentically interact with 
any “other” because externality is essentially “strangeness (êtrang(èr)eté)”—indeed, 
authenticity is experienced as “strangeness without strangers (êtrang(èr)eté sans 
étranger).”981 
It is with regards to the “strangeness” of exteriority that Ricœur sees the greatest 
distance between Heidegger and Lévinas when it comes to their concepts of testimony. As 
Ricœur writes:  
It is in regard [to externality] that Heidegger and Lévinas seem the closest 
and are in fact the furthest apart. The closest in terms of their descriptions of 
the passivity, of the non-mastery, of the sensibility of the Being-summoned. 
The furthest apart when it comes to (Heidegger’s) reduction of the stranger 
that parallels that of transcendence… (In Heidegger’s case,) strangeness is 
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understood as a structure of the (worldly) Being-towards that is dissociated 
from Being-with (whose analysis is restricted due to Heidegger’s quasi-
exclusive focus on the “they”). Thus the recourse to the neutral expression: 
es ruft, “it calls.”982 
For Ricœur, Heidegger’s stifling of both the “superiority” and the “exteriority” of his 
existential call is reflected in the fact that “Heidegger’s conscience is as little…moral as 
possible! (le Gewissen de Heidegger est aussi peu… moral que possible !)”983 Rather than 
recognizing the other’s identity—let alone acknowledging the “absolutely superior ‘Other’” 
advocated by Lévinas—Heidegger is seen by Ricœur to be concerned solely with the 
question of impersonal Being and the “ontological conditions of nothingness (conditions 
ontologiques de la néantité),” thus effectively denying “the primacy of ethics.”984 
What conscience attests is the potentiality-for-Being itself, both as an 
existential and as an existentiell phenomenon, rather than some kind of 
difference between good and evil; we see in this approach one of the effects 
of Heidegger’s struggle against the “value” systems of the neo-Kantians, and 
even more so that of Max Scheler, in the name of fundamental ontology: the 
more we emphasize the sein in Dasein, the less we are disposed to recognize 
any kind of ethical power in the call, in the ad-vocation...985 
Emphasizing the problem of how one can experience Heideggerian conscience, de 
Vries echoes what is implied in Ricœur’s analysis when he describes the attestation of 
Dasein in Being and Time as an impossibility. When Dasein’s essential thrownness is 
paired with the allegedly “solipsistic” phenomenon of the existential call, the requirement 
of attestation set by Heidegger at the opening of Being and Time is exposed as 
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quelque force éthique à l’appel, à l’ad-vocation…” 
 297 
 
 
unachievable. De Vries follows Ricœur in pointing out an apparent similarity in the 
interpretations of testimony proposed by Heidegger and Lévinas that actually confirms a 
radical difference between their two approaches.  
In an almost circular mode…—and this reveals the aporetic—[Heidegger’s] 
attestation is made possible by what it makes possible. In other words, this 
prescriptivity manifests itself only in the mode of a quasi-, if not un- or anti-
phenomenological gesture of testimony, which does not lend itself to any 
descriptive or constative rendering, and has for that reason to be affirmed 
and assumed by a singular performative. This performative, moreover, is 
absolute in the etymological sense of the Latin absolvere: it loosens itself 
from every context, from every horizon, from every dimension, even from 
the situation that Heidegger characterizes as “thrownness.” Otherwise than 
being possible, then, and otherwise than the “otherwise than being” to which 
it testifies, it resembles the very structure of [Lévinas’s] à dieu.986 
On these grounds, de Vries seconds Ricœur’s claim that Heidegger seeks to “profit from 
the superior force of authentification of the Gewissen” without acknowledging its 
transcendent and absolute nature.987 
Seen from the critical perspective adopted by both Ricœur and de Vries, the 
“attestation” described in Being and Time appears “impossible,” or at least “otherwise than 
being possible,” and thus can be considered as evidence that Heidegger’s interpretation of 
conscience is flawed. Moreover, Ricœur claims this “problematic” situation faced by 
Heidegger highlights the urgency of positing an “absolute” that can provide the orientation 
required for any phenomenological or hermeneutical investigation of existence. Having 
concluded his analysis of the Heideggerian conscience, Ricœur asks:  
[Is it] possible, on the basis [of a] hermeneutics of testimony, to return to the 
problematic of Gewissen, of the moral conscience, of the injunction, to again 
take up the problem at the point where Heidegger left off?988  
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This question is one that Heidegger seems to invite with his sudden abandonment of 
the concept of Gewissen following the publication of Being and Time. As our study of 
Stoker’s impact on the development of Being and Time has shown, Heidegger was fully 
aware of the problem of the “absolute” and the implications of this problem for his 
existential interpretation of Gewissen. Indeed, Heidegger’s later recuperation of the 
enigmatic “call” to disclosedness—stripped of any reference to conscience—indicates that 
the German thinker continued to struggle with the problem of how philosophy can produce 
testimony without positing an “absolute.” In responding to Ricœur’s challenge regarding 
the possibility of picking up the problem of conscience where Heidegger left off, however, 
we must keep in mind what our study has already revealed: the existential interpretation of 
Gewissen in Being and Time reflects a deliberate attempt to avoid any speculation about the 
call’s “absolute” source, which is a restriction rejected out of hand by Ricœur.  
Of course, Ricœur’s presentation of the Heideggerian Gewissen is primarily 
intended to serve as a foil for a concept of testimony that he considers to be its extreme—
and more attractive—opposite: the “ultimate” philosophy of testimony proposed by 
Lévinas. When examined according Ricœur’s schema, the testimony of the infinitely 
responsible self proposed by Lévinas is seen to be characterized both by the absolute 
superiority of God over the self and by the utter dependence of the self on the encountered 
other. In his 1981 essay “Bad Conscience and the Inexorable,” Lévinas delivers his most 
direct response to the Heideggerian notion of the attesting “call of conscience,” which he 
characterizes as a “pre-reflexive,” “non-intentional” and “detestable” concept.989 For 
Lévinas, Heidegger’s existential call both spurns God and forsakes the other: 
The call of God does not establish between me and the One who has spoken 
to me a relation; it does not establish something that, on any account, would 
be a conjunction—a co-existence, a synchrony, even if ideal—between 
terms. Infinity would have no meaning for a thought that goes to the limit, 
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and the à-Dieu is not a finality. It is perhaps this irreducibility of the à-Dieu 
or of the fear of God to eschatology, this irreducibility that interrupts with 
the human the consciousness that was on its way toward being in its 
ontological perseverance or toward death which it takes as the ultimate 
thought, that is signified, beyond being, by the word “glory.” The alternative 
between being and nothingness is not ultimate. The à-Dieu is not a process 
of Being: in the call, I am referred back to the other human being through 
whom this call signifies, to the neighbor for whom I fear.990  
After Ricœur makes his overture regarding a possible recovery of Heidegger’s Gewissen, 
what he ultimately recommends is not so much the recuperation as it is the surpassing of 
the “call of conscience” proposed in Being and Time, a surpassing which he considers to be 
already underway in the Lévinassian approach to testimony. In the aftermath of what he 
regards as the failure of Heidegger’s existential-ontological project, Ricœur seeks to 
remove the existential limitations placed upon conscience by Heidegger and to thereby 
initiate the hermeneutical investigation of an “absolute” source of the phenomenon of 
testimony.  
However, is this really the only way that one can “take up the problem” of 
conscience where Heidegger “left off”? Must we necessarily discard the methodological 
principles of Being and Time in order to reconsider the experience of Gewissen? Does the 
alleged inadequacy of Heidegger’s “attestation” of conscience leave us with no alternative 
but to accept the positing of a metaphysical “absolute” and the imposition of the traditional 
internal/external divide as mandatory for any kind of philosophical inquiry regarding 
conscience? Or can we—informed by what is indicated by the original meaning of the 
German word Gewissen—point to an alternative way of understanding conscience as a 
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possible experience of Being-amidst’s “self-testimony” that respects the principles of 
Heidegger’s existential approach? This is the possibility which we will now explore. 
Existence as the Hermeneutic Struggle of the Witness 
As we attempt to identify a possible experience of the “call of conscience” formally 
indicated by Heidegger’s existential concept of Gewissen, we will turn our attention back to 
a concept of the “absolute” that we know Heidegger encountered and ultimately rejected as 
he developed his own existential phenomenon of the call: the concept of divine synteresis 
as it is interpreted phenomenologically by Stoker. More precisely, we will consider a clue 
found within the word of synteresis itself. Emphasizing the connection between the 
symbolic eagle in Ezekiel’s vision and the ancient Greek roots of the word found in St. 
Jerome’s commentary, Stoker describes synteresis as the “caring” and “preserving” spirit 
that oversees the other “faculties” of the person991: what is key to Stoker’s interpretation is 
the sense of the Greek verb tereo, meaning “to take care of, to watch over closely, to 
guard.”992 He insists that the eagle metaphorically matches the meaning of the word 
synteresis and conveys the phenomenon of “guarding” that is essential to the experience of 
conscience. The phenomenon of care which Heidegger will interpret existentially is 
described by Stoker as the absolute caring of the spirit placed in each person’s soul by 
God—the light of this “divine spark” is what discloses existence to man. Both from the 
semantic and philosophical perspectives, we find a remarkable link between synteresis and 
Heidegger’s conclusion that the essence of Dasein can be understood as the enactment of 
“care.” In Being and Time, authentic care is revealed as the meaning of Dasein’s Being and 
the “call of conscience”—which is assigned by Heidegger the methodological role of 
producing the required attestation of Dasein’s possible authenticity—is characterized as the 
“call of care.” Care is revealed as both the essence of and the required condition for any 
hermeneutical search for meaning. We are faced again with the aporia of Dasein’s 
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testimony described by de Vries: it appears that the Heideggerian “attestation is made 
possible by what it makes possible.”993 
By Heidegger’s own account, his existential interpretation of Gewissen demands the 
indication of a possible way of experiencing “self-testimony” without requiring the positing 
of an “absolute” source of this experience. The aporia of this hermeneutical circle that de 
Vries describes is problematic for Heidegger not because the “call of conscience” defies 
traditional logic but because its “circular movement” is interrupted due to the apparent 
“impossibility” of “self-testimony”: as Scheler had noticed immediately upon reading 
Being and Time, the “call of conscience” appears to cause a “short circuit” that dooms 
Dasein to solipsism. When he promises in §54 to demonstrate how authentic Dasein’s self-
attestation can be experienced by Being-in-the-world, Heidegger reveals that this potential 
problem remained a major concern for him. To be plausible, Heidegger’s denial of the 
“certainty” of metaphysical tradition must be complemented with a way of understanding 
how Dasein—despite its “everyday” existence as an Earth-bound mortal “falling” into self-
oblivion—can hear the “call of care” in its own worldly experience without having 
recourse to an “imaginary” or “external” metaphysical power. To successfully close the 
hermeneutic circle of conscience and meet the established criteria of his existential-
ontological project, Heidegger’s call from “beyond” and “above” must nonetheless be 
revealed as a possible experience of Being-in-the-world itself.  
Dasein as Martyr: Being-Towards-Death’s “Self-Testimony” 
In exhibiting the vital role of conscience in Being and Time as “self-testimony” and 
emphasizing that Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein conveys the sense of Being-amidst, our 
study of the Heideggerian notion of Gewissen indeed points to a possible way that Being-
in-the-world can experience its “attesting call”: what is formally indicated in Being and 
Time can be understood as the possibility of Dasein bearing witness to itself as authentic 
“Being-towards-death-amidst-the-world.” Unlike the traditional notion of the witness who 
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observes an “external” event and reports on it “objectively” with “distance” and “reserve,” 
Dasein as a witness of its own “projected” existence must assume responsibility for its own 
possibilities as Being-towards-death thrown amidst a shared world.  The success of the 
existential-ontological project of Being and Time depends ultimately on the demonstration 
by Dasein itself that such witnessing can be experienced: the phenomenon of conscience 
must be exhibited as the experience of Dasein’s responding to what Jean Grondin describes 
as an “invitation to self-appropriation that is issued to every Dasein.”994 In her analysis of 
Being and Time’s performative hermeneutics, Tanya Staehler observes that Heidegger’s 
“attestation” implies an experience of “witnessing”: 
[What] we ordinarily describe as ‘call of conscience’ can provide [an 
attestation of authentic existence]. The term ‘attestation’ appears suitable 
here as it points to an indirect approach. The ‘who’ of Dasein cannot be 
accessed in a direct fashion: we need a witness. Although it will not be 
possible to point to a witness in the flesh, the prospect of a testifying voice 
seems quite promising.995 
However, what Staehler calls the “testifying voice” in Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Dasein’s structures cannot be grasped as some kind of external authority that illuminates 
existence and reveals the presence of a material world surrounding the person. What 
remains outstanding for Heidegger’s project is a way of understanding this witnessing of 
Dasein’s struggle as a possibility that can be experienced authentically. Can the acts of 
“self-preserving” and “guarding” conveyed in Stoker’s account of synteresis be assigned to 
Dasein itself without recourse to an external “absolute”? Is there a way that Heidegger’s 
concept of authentic “care”—the fundamental sense of Dasein’s Being—can be 
experienced as the “self-testimony” of conscience by Being-in-the-world? Can we reveal 
an experience of what Courtine calls the “ontico-phenomenal witnessing” of conscience 
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that might inform our question concerning Dasein’s “constitutive ipseity” as Being-amidst 
in a shared world?996 
Just as Heidegger salvages the primordial sense of Gewissen by exposing the 
inauthenticity of the tradition’s conscientia, his formal indication of Gewissen as 
“attestation” allows us to exhibit the existential problem underlying all “ordinary” 
interpretations of the Latin tradition’s testimonium. The most common account of the 
original meaning of testimonium is that the word is rooted in the Latin noun testis for 
“witness,” and that the literal meaning of this term is “the third”: this theory is based on the 
supposition that testis originated out of the Proto Indo-European root trei- for “three.”997 
From a semantic standpoint, this account would seem to confirm the “common sense” 
notion that testimony proffered by a “third” party is more credible than that of individuals 
directly implicated in a dispute: the “value” of one’s testimony is thus seen to depend on 
one’s perceived neutrality. However, this account of the origins of testimonium is disputed: 
even many of its proponents concede that it is supported by little textual evidence998 and 
cannot be reconciled with the fact that the primary “witnesses” listed in most ancient Greek 
and Roman contracts are the contracting parties.  
Moreover, the priority traditionally accorded to the observations of the “neutral” 
third-party fails to acknowledge that testimony—since the earliest recorded moments of 
history—has been associated with a threat to one’s existence: both the Athenian and 
Roman legal systems employed torture specifically because the “testimony” of one whose 
life and limb are threatened was considered more credible than an “impartial” observer. In 
ancient Athens, the testimony of tortured slaves (who were often tortured to death) even 
“appears to have been considered of more value than that of freemen” because the latter 
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were protected by decree from being subjected to such “efficient” techniques.999 The 
ancient Greek word for “torture”—basanos—takes its name directly from the concept of 
the “touchstone” or basanites lapis: a stone that was “rubbed” or “scraped” against 
precious metals and stones in order to determine their authenticity or purity.1000 
Significantly for our study of the attestation of existential conscience, another procedure 
was also used in the classical era for determining the authenticity of precious metals: the 
piece of metal in question would be placed in a crucible and heated to its melting point for 
analysis. Based on the early Latin word testum for the shell, skull or earthen pot used as the 
crucible for conducting such tests, this procedure came to be called a test and its meaning 
eventually expanded to include various “means” of testing persons to determine their 
worth.1001 Consistent with the evidence that the Gothic kiuuizzitha was initially used as the 
translation of testimonium, Heidegger’s notion of Gewissen as the authentic “self-
attestation” of Being-towards-death implies a critique of the priority accorded by modern 
philosophy to “third-party” testimony of the detached observer. For Heidegger, the 
primordial sense of testimony arises out of the implied threat to the witness’s existence.1002 
In Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s resoluteness as Being-towards-death, we see the 
antithesis of the traditional notion of neutral “testimony” that exclusively values 
“objective” statements. 
Having established how Heidegger interpreted Gewissen as Dasein’s unique way of 
experiencing authenticity, our study points to a possibility of attesting that reflects Dasein’s 
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essential structures of Being-amidst and Being-towards-death unified in the primordial 
experience of witnessing: the bearing witness of the martyr. Through the formal indication 
of the martyr’s testimony, the existential phenomenon of Dasein’s “wanting-to-have-a-
conscience” described by Heidegger can be understood in an “ontical” sense as the 
authentic experience of “willingness-to-bear-witness.” In calling Dasein to its ownmost 
possibility, conscience summons Dasein to authentic unity as both Being-towards-death 
and Being-amidst: in other words, it calls Dasein to assume its destiny as Being-a-martyr—
the experience of producing testimony that places the very existence of the witness “at 
risk.”  
In light of the fact that Heidegger characterizes Gewissen as the attesting 
phenomenon of Dasein’s bearing witness to its possibility of authentic existence, it is not 
without significance for our study that the etymological root of the Christian concept of 
martyrdom is the ancient Greek word martus, meaning “witness.” In his study of the 
origins of martyrdom and its relation to testimony, Raymond Panikkar proposes an 
etymological account of martus that emphasizes the “existential” character of the ancient 
concept of witnessing and squares with our analysis of the phenomena of conscience and 
attestation as interpreted by Heidegger in Being and Time. Most importantly, Panikkar links 
the meaning of the Greek term to be the experience of anxious remembering that is 
essential to the Heideggerian concept of authentic resoluteness. Panikkar writes: 
The Greek word martus… does not give primacy to the juridical aspect, but 
rather to the anthropological dimension. Martus comes from the Sanskrit 
mrtu, from which arise the Greek words mermera, anxiety, care, concern and 
mermerizo, to be preoccupied, full of worries, to fret… In following the 
etymology and history of the word, we arrive at the following description: 
marturia, testimony, is the act or the result of witnessing, that is to say of 
attesting, of producing a deposition of a conviction that we hold within us, 
that we worry about, that we remember, and about which we are anxious. 
The witness is conscious of, knows, remembers, is anxious and concerned, 
he thinks, considers, is preoccupied with what he will manifest to the other 
in his testimony.1003   
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In emphasizing the phenomena of anxiety, memory and care, Panikkar reveals in the Greek 
martus what can be interpreted as the essential relation between the original sense of 
witnessing and Heidegger’s existential notion of Being-towards-death. However, Panikkar 
immediately goes on to relate the recovered phenomenon of the Greek martus to the 
traditional notion of knowledge as something that can be possessed in the subject’s mind. 
Interestingly, Panikkar notes the relation between the Proto Indo-European roots smer- 
(mourning, remembering, caring) and men- (memory, mind),1004 but does not point out that 
the remembering of smer- is more directly related to the root mer- (to die)—a relation that 
is of greater significance for our study of the Heideggerian “call of conscience” which 
reveals Dasein’s essence as Being-towards-death.1005  
Martyrdom and the Certainty of Sum Moribundus 
Many commentators of Being and Time, including Ricœur, Lévinas and Derrida, 
have explicitly noted that Heidegger’s concept of conscience in Being and Time seems to 
require that Dasein—as resolute Being-towards-death—assume the stance of a martyr in 
order to produce the required “attestation” of authenticity as described in §54 of Being and 
Time. In Ricœur’s reading of the Heideggerian concept of Being-towards-death, this 
testimony of Dasein remains essentially unreliable and contingent. More importantly, the 
self-attestation of the martyr cannot convey the phenomenological “truth” of death: in 
Ricœur’s words, “the trial (l’épreuve)” of death in martyrdom cannot be equated with 
                                                                                                                                                     
Enrico Castelli. (Paris: Aubier, 1972). pp. 372-374. From Enrico Castelli, ed. Le Témoignage; actes du 
colloque organisé par le Centre international d'études humanistes et par l'Institut d'études philosophiques de 
Rome, 5-11 janvier 1972. Paris: Aubier, 1972. In French: “Le mot grec martus…ne donne pas la primauté à 
l’aspect juridique, mais à la dimension anthropologique. Martus vient de mrtu [en sanscrit], d’où mermera 
angoisse, soin, souci et mermerizo être préoccupé, plein de soucis, se soucier… En suivant l’étymologie et 
l’histoire du mot on arrive à la description suivante : marturia, le témoignage, est l’acte ou le résultat de 
témoigner, c’est-à-dire d’attester, de déposer une conviction qu’on porte en soi, dont on se soucie, qu’on se 
rappelle, et pour laquelle on est anxieux. Le témoin connaît, sait, se rappelle, est anxieux et soucieux, il pense, 
considère, se préoccupe de ce qu’il manifestera à l’autre dans son témoignage.” 
1004
 Panikkar. "Témoignage et dialogue." pp. 372-374. In French: “La racine indo-européenne sous-jacente est 
smer qui signifie réfléchir, penser, se souvenir, prendre soin de, se soucier, se rappeler (cf. smrti, en sanscrit : 
ce qui est rappelé, ce qu’on confie à la mémoire, c’est-à-dire la tradition). Cette racine est aussi apparentée à 
men- (cf. meno) penser, rester (cf. manas en sanscrit, mens et manere en latin). Le mot-saxon witness relève 
aussi de l’ordre de la connaissance (wit, wisdom).” 
1005
 Pokorny. Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. p. 735. 
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“proof (une preuve)” regarding truth.1006 Siding with Lévinas against Heidegger on this 
point that is determinative for each of these thinkers’ philosophies, Ricœur insists that 
existence can only be understood by assigning priority to the encounter with an absolute 
source of life rather than to the “limit situation” of death. Ricœur writes: 
The witness is capable of suffering and of dying for what he believes. When 
the trial of conviction becomes the price of life, the witness changes names: 
he becomes a martyr. But does the name change? martus, in Greek, means 
“witness.” Certainly it isn’t without danger that we evoke this terrible 
relation between witness and martyr; the argument of the martyr is always 
suspect; the cause of a martyr isn’t necessarily a just one. But this is 
precisely the point: martyrdom isn’t an argument, even less a form of proof. 
It’s a trial, a limit situation. A man becomes a martyr because he is first of 
all a witness.1007 
For his part, Derrida questions the supposed relevance of Heidegger’s notion of 
“unexperienceable” death to any attempt to disclose the meaning of existence. To justify 
his charge, Derrida illustrates how Heidegger’s interpretation of authentic Dasein—with its 
emphasis on Being-towards-death—appears to have definitely dissociated existence from 
life. Derrida asks:  
But does Dasein have an experience of death as such, even through 
anticipation? What would this mean? What is Being-towards-death? What is 
death for a Dasein who is never defined in an essential way as living? Here 
we are not opposing death to life, but are asking what meaningful content we 
can give to death in a discourse for which the relation to death—the 
experience of death—remains unrelated to the life of the living.1008 
                                                 
1006
 Ricœur. "L'herméneutique du témoignage." p. 116. 
1007
 Ibid. p. 116. In French: “Le témoin est capable de souffrir et de mourir pour ce qu’il croit. Quand 
l’épreuve de la conviction devient le prix de la vie, le témoin change de nom : il s’appelle un martyr. Mais le 
nom change-t-il ? martus, en grec, c’est « témoin ». Certes, ce n’est pas sans danger que l’on évoque ce lien 
terrible entre témoin et martyr ; l’argument du martyre est toujours suspect ; une cause qui a des martyrs n’est 
pas nécessairement une cause juste. Mais précisément, le martyre n’est pas un argument, encore moins une 
preuve. C’est une épreuve, une situation limite. Un homme devient un martyr parce que d’abord il est un 
témoin.” 
1008
 Jacques Derrida. Heidegger et la question : De l'esprit, Différence sexuelle, différence ontologique 
(Geschlecht I), La Main de Heidegger (Geschlecht II). (Paris: Flammarion, 1990). p. 70, footnote 2. In 
French: “Mais le Dasein a-t-il l’expérience de la mort comme telle, fût-ce par anticipation ? Qu’est-ce que 
cela voudrait dire ? Qu’est-ce que l’être-pour-la-mort ? Qu’est-ce que la mort pour un Dasein qui n’est jamais 
défini de façon essentielle comme un vivant ? Il ne s’agit pas ici d’opposer la mort à la vie, mais de se 
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The criticisms of the Heideggerian project made by Ricœur, Lévinas and Derrida reflect 
their common refusal to accept Heidegger’s claim that “attestation (Bezeugung)” should 
itself be considered formally indicative, i.e. an existential concept that can only point to a 
possibility for Dasein. With his interpretation of conscience as the “testimony” of Being-
towards-death, Heidegger is seen by these three French thinkers to be illegitimately basing 
the meaning of existence or “life” on the phenomenon of “death.” There are, indeed, good 
reasons for raising this objection. As we have seen, many commentators contend—as do 
we—that Heidegger was unsuccessful in his attempt to demonstrate how the wholeness of 
Dasein can be attested by the “call of conscience” in Being and Time, thus placing his 
entire existential-ontological project in doubt. In the absence of a legitimate account of how 
this testimony of “authentic” Being-towards-death can be produced, Heidegger’s critics can 
justifiably claim that his description of Dasein’s “everydayness” maligns worldly 
experience—notably all concern for common morality—without cause.  
Notwithstanding the relevance of these concerns regarding the “ethics” (or “non-
ethics”) of Being and Time, our study has exposed an alternative way of understanding the 
Heideggerian notion of Gewissen that both respects the existential spirit of his project and 
attests to the possibility of experiencing Dasein authentically as a whole. However, to 
consider how Being and Time might disclose a primordial phenomenon of witnessing or 
producing “testimony” demands that we remain open to Heidegger’s existential 
interpretation of “death.” In other words, we must neither allow ourselves to immediately 
give priority to the notion of “life” nor rashly dismiss Heidegger’s approach to Dasein’s 
“death” as being utterly nihilistic. In his Prolegomena course given in Marburg two years 
prior to the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger preempts those critics who would 
read his existential analysis as a “metaphysics of death”:  
[The] phenomenological explication of death does not prejudge any attitudes 
towards death, it makes no decision about whether there is anything after 
death or what that may be, or whether there is nothing at all. Nothing is 
decided about immortality and the beyond, the “other side,” nor for that 
                                                                                                                                                     
demander quel contenu sémantique on peut donner à la mort dans un discours pour lequel le rapport à la mort, 
l’expérience de la mort reste sans rapport à la vie du vivant.” 
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matter about “this side,” as if to say how one is to comport oneself toward 
death and how not. Nevertheless it can be stated that the explication 
maintains the most radical orientation to “this side,” specifically in regard to 
what the death of an entity, of the Dasein at its time, can be. … As long as I 
have not asked about Dasein in its structure and as long as I have not defined 
death in what it is, I cannot even rightly ask what could come after Dasein in 
connection with its death.1009  
With these comments on death during the summer semester of 1925 in Marburg, Heidegger 
also indicates a way of testifying to what he describes as Dasein’s “utmost, though 
indefinite, yet certain possibility.”1010 Indeed, he considers such testimony to be the only 
experience of certainty that is possible for Dasein.  
This certainty (Gewißheit), that “I myself am in that I will die,” is the basic 
certainty of Dasein itself (die Grungegewißheit des Daseins selbst). It is a 
genuine statement of Dasein, while cogito sum is only the semblance of such 
a statement. If such pointed formulations mean anything at all, then the 
appropriate statement pertaining to Dasein in its being would have to be sum 
moribundus (“I am in dying”), moribundus not as someone gravely ill or 
wounded, but insofar as I am, I am moribundus. The moribundus first gives 
the sum its sense.1011 
For Heidegger, “certainty (Gewißheit)” is the essence of Dasein’s witnessing of itself: the 
producing of “testimony” in the face of death is the act of Dasein authentically bearing 
witness to itself. This “statement” that “I am moribundus” is neither a communication 
regarding the “everyday” concept of death nor a form of discourse that is produced for the 
                                                 
1009
 GA 20, §34, 434 / 314. In German: “Zweitens aber ist mit der phänomenologischen Explikation des 
Todes einer Stellungnahme zum Tode nicht vorgegriffen, es fällt keine Entscheidung darüber, ob noch etwas 
nach dem Tode kommt oder gar was oder, ob nichts kommt. Über Jenseits und Unsterblichkeit wird nichts 
entschieden, sowenig wie über das Diesseits, als ob gesagt würde, wie man sich zum Tode verhalten soll und 
wie nicht. Trotzdem kann gesagt werden: Die Explikation vollzieht sich in der radikalsten Diesseitigkeit, 
nämlich im Blick darauf, was der Tod eines Seienden, des jeweiligen Daseins, sein kann. … Solange ich nicht 
dem Dasein in seiner Struktur nachgefragt habe und solange ich nicht den Tod in dem, was er ist, bestimmt 
habe, kann ich mit Recht nicht einmal fragen, was nach dem Dasein bezüglich seines Todes kommen könnte.” 
1010
 GA 20, §34, 438 / 317. In German: “Der Tod ist die äußerste, obzwar unbestimmte, aber gewisse 
Möglichkeit...” Emphasis is Heidegger’s. 
1011
 GA 20, §34, 437-438 / 317. In German: “Diese Gewißheit, daß ich es selbst bin in meinem 
Sterbenwerden, ist die Grundgewißheit des Daseins selbst und ist eine echte Daseinsaussage, während das 
cogito sum nur der Schein einer solchen ist. Wenn solche zugespitzten Formeln überhaupt etwas besagen, 
müßte die angemessene und das Dasein in seinem Sein betreffende Aussage lauten: sum moribundus, und 
zwar nicht moribundus als Schwerkranker oder Verwundeter, sondern sofern ich bin, bin ich moribundus—
das moribundus gibt dem sum allererst seinen Sinn.” 
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benefit of another: it is rather the resolution of the witness engaged in an existential 
“struggle” amidst the world. The unspoken “self-testimony” of “sum moribundus” provides 
Dasein with its only “certainty” because it reveals that one’s ownmost potentiality-for-
Being is the basis of all possible existence, even if this authentic “truth” is most commonly 
denied by the “they-self”.  What is experienced in hearing the “call of conscience” is the 
attestation of Dasein’s essence as Being-towards-death, which can only be recognized 
through the enacted “fusion” of authentic calling and listening that reveals Being-in-the-
world to itself as a “whole.” While Heidegger’s analysis reveals existentially that Being-
towards-death is a constitutive phenomenon of Dasein, the experience of one’s authentic 
mode of existence requires that Dasein recognize its potentiality-for-Being as a “self-
attesting” martyr amidst fellow martyrs. In this stance of martyrdom, it can embrace its 
anxiety and willingly bear witness to its own authentic existence—as demonstrated by its 
caring for the authenticity of itself and of others—in the face of “death.” 
The Disclosive Force of Gewissen as “Self-Testimony”  
How are we then to understand the possibility of an authentic form of witnessing 
and producing testimony that can expose the inauthenticity of public “everydayness”? The 
existential concept of attestation—which Heidegger introduces in Being and Time using the 
verb bezeugen—must be distinguished from the contemporary “legalistic” concept of 
witness, which has come to convey the sense of the supposedly neutral “third-party” of the 
Latin testis. Our analysis of the “ordinary” interpretation of testimony—which reduces the 
act of “witnessing” to a possessing of “knowledge”—has confirmed the tendency of 
“everyday” Dasein to obscure the existential priority of “self-testimony” conveyed by the 
Heideggerian bezeugen. In valuing testimony that is mediated by “objective” detachment 
and reserve, the tradition of conscientia covers up the primordial sense of remembering that 
was originally conveyed by both the Greek martus and the German Gewissen: the 
producing of testimony that attests to one’s care for authenticity and refuses to submit to 
the “they.”  
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In interpreting the experience of Gewissen as the martyr’s “self-testimony,” our 
investigation also shows how the “attestation” of Heidegger’s bezeugen can be understood 
as the disclosing experience of Dasein’s bearing witness to authentic existence. The 
experience of attesting is constituted by the existential phenomena of remembering and 
indicating: the enactment of Dasein’s “attestation” as Being-towards-death reveals their 
authentic unity. In his article “The Self and Its Witness,” Christopher Fynsk attempts to 
disclose the original sense of “witness” that he finds in Being and Time: 
[If] in Being-with [or Being-amidst] Dasein is already guilty towards 
another, this means that Dasein is something like the cause of another’s 
Being as guilty, and is thus fundamentally bound up in the other’s essence. 
And it is perhaps here that the term “witness” appears most appropriate, for 
in German, the first meaning of “zeugen” (the word used to describe the 
caller’s act of attestation), before “witness,” is “engender.”1012 
With his insight regarding the relation between Being-amidst and bezeugen, Fynsk 
contributes positively to our effort to understand the experience of Gewissen as “self-
testimony,” but he unfortunately does not follow through on this point in his essay. Fynsk 
concludes his analysis without proposing a way of understanding the “first meaning” or 
“origin” of Heidegger’s “attestation.”  
Let us immediately take up this unfinished task to see if Heidegger’s notion of 
bezeugen might indeed confirm how “witnessing” can be understood as the “productive” 
act of Dasein’s coming into existence as “guilty” Being-amidst. The literal meaning of the 
Proto Indo-European root dewk- of Heidegger’s bezeugen is “to pull,” whose meaning 
expanded over time to other notions of power and authority: “to lead,” “to engender,” and 
“to produce.”1013 The meaning of the German “witness,” Zeuge, thus finds its origin in the 
sense of producing testimony, of “disclosing” by “pulling” into view. Heidegger’s 
bezeugen literally represents the act of bearing witness, of “disclosing” by “pulling” into 
view, of leading Dasein back the authentic place of its “struggle” as Being-amidst projected 
                                                 
1012
 Fynsk. "The Self and Its Witness: On Heidegger's Being and Time." p. 198.  
1013
 Pokorny. Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. pp. 220-221. 
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into the world and burdened with essential guilt.1014 In this experience of bearing witness, 
Dasein bears responsibility for itself and for others “amidst” the world: the resolute silence 
of authentic Being-in-the-world is the testimony of one who has chosen to accept the “self-
sacrifice” of Being-a-martyr.   
When we recognize Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience as the way of enacting 
Dasein’s authentic “self-testimony,” we find ourselves in the position of being able to 
indicate the possibility of an “experience” that can overcome Being-in-the-world’s 
tendency to disperse itself in the ambiguity of public discourse. By searching for a way to 
“formally indicate” such a possibility, our study has—on the basis of the original sense of 
Gewissen rooted in the act of witnessing—revealed a way of understanding this call to 
authenticity as an ontical “experience”: Dasein’s encounter with the silent other facing 
martyrdom.  
As Heidegger notes in Being and Time, the event of the other’s “passing” cannot 
inform Dasein in any way about one’s own death. However, can we not understand the 
silent resoluteness of the martyr facing death as something quite different than the factual 
“death” of another person? The “hearing” of the “silent call” that is essential to Heidegger’s 
interpretation of conscience cannot be related to the mere fact that a martyr’s lifeless corpse 
can be “objectively” described as “silent.” From the existential perspective of Being and 
Time, the authentic “silence” of Being-towards-death is communicated instead by the 
reticent martyr’s choosing to face death and accept the sentence of “silence” rather than 
acquiescing to the profane discourse of the “they.” The existential “silence” of the martyr 
                                                 
1014
 The meaning of “to pull, to lead, to engender” conveyed by the PIE root dewk- at the heart of the German 
words bezeugen and Zeuge recalls the sense of the verb tragen, “to carry,” which Derrida notably focused on 
in his analysis of Heidegger’s description of “hearing voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it 
(als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, der jedes Dasein bei sich trägt).” SZ §34, 163 / 206. Reflecting on the 
French translation of tragen as porter, Derrida notes several implications of Heidegger’s describing the 
“friend’s voice” as something Dasein “carries” in it. Cf. Jacques Derrida. "L'oreille de Heidegger : 
Philopolémologie (Geschlecht IV) " Politiques de l'amitié ; suivi de L'oreille de Heidegger. (Paris: Galilée, 
1994). pp. 347ff. Most notably, Derrida observes that Heidegger’s schema (or choice of words) seems to 
eliminate the possibility of an encounter with the friend because 1) this friend is reduced to just a voice and 2) 
this voice only exists because it is carried within Dasein itself. While Derrida offers a very extensive 
“semantic” interpretation of tragen in his analysis of Heidegger’s phrase, he does not mention that its Proto 
Indo-European root is tragh-, meaning “to pull, to drag on the ground, to bear.”  (Indeed, this root is also that 
of the English word “drag.”) Cf. Pokorny. Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch. pp. 1089-1090. 
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does not originate in—nor even require—the event of the “physical death” of the other. 
What is essential for Dasein’s experience of the “call of conscience” is the martyr’s active 
refusal to heed the authority of the “they”—a decision that can potentially free others for 
their own martyrdom. In hearing the martyr’s “call,” Dasein recognizes the other’s stance 
as the resoluteness of Being-towards-death willing to risk the utmost penalty in order to 
preserve his or her authenticity. In this sense, can we not conceive of the silence of the 
witness who willingly faces “death” as a privileged form of the “call of conscience” which 
can pull Dasein out of the rhetorical banter of the “they” and back to one’s ownmost 
possibilities? While the death of the other may appear “meaningless” to Dasein when 
observed in the mode of “everydayness,” the “resoluteness” of the martyr represents a very 
different phenomenon and can be understood otherwise: the martyr’s stance can be 
interpreted as testimony of one’s possibility of authentic Being-amidst. If conscience is 
indeed related to what Heidegger describes as “hearing the voice of the friend whom every 
Dasein carries with it,”1015 then this “friend” can be understood as the authentic witness of 
one’s Being-towards-death. In hearing the friend’s “voice,” what Dasein hears is the 
“indefinite (unbestimmt)” yet “incontestable (unbestreitbar)”1016 echo of the martyr’s silent 
testimony. 
Understood existentially, the “voice of the friend” represents the call of Being-
amidst that finds its source in a possibility of Dasein itself. The “call of conscience” can be 
described to be simultaneously calling from beyond, from afar and from within because it 
calls from the shared world to Being-amidst.1017 This existential call indicates the 
possibility of an authentic encounter with the other through one’s own resoluteness: it 
invites Dasein to experience the amidst of this shared world. The attestation of Being-
towards-death through which Dasein experiences its own wholeness also represents the 
unique way of experiencing an authentic encounter with the other.  
                                                 
1015
 SZ §34, 163 / 206. 
1016
 SZ §56, 272 / 317. 
1017
 SZ §57, 275 / 320. 
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With this paradoxical interpretation of Dasein’s authentic “care” enacted through 
the experience of the martyr’s silent “self-attestation,” our study of Heidegger’s “call of 
conscience” has arrived at the limits of communicable discourse that formal indication 
ultimately cannot overcome. As stressed by Heidegger in his interpretation of the essential 
ambiguity of logos,1018 there is no “absolute” source of meaning that can be assertively 
established using worldly language to convey the experience of conscience. Furthermore, 
the act of martyrdom itself inevitably depends upon—and falls back into—the 
interpretation of existence understood in “public” and “assertive” terms. While we can 
interpret the “silence” of the martyr as a sublime “call” to authenticity, the conviction of the 
martyr is necessarily founded on his or her relative understanding of worldly existence that 
cannot be severed from “everydayness.” As Ricoeur observes, “the argument of the martyr 
is always suspect” because the basis for his or her “absolute” confidence cannot be 
shared.1019 How then can Dasein experience conscience authentically if it is unable to 
recognize the other as a “legitimate” martyr who has resolved to keep “silent” in the face of 
death? While the “call of conscience” may be assigned the pivotal role of “attesting” 
Dasein’s possible authenticity, there can be no assurance that Dasein—mired in the worldly 
concerns of the “they”—will correctly identify the authentic “silence” of the martyr. 
Moreover, Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world clearly indicates that Dasein will 
revert to its “assertive” ways of understanding the martyr’s sacrifice as it attempts to plug 
the disturbing void of “silent reticence” with judgmental statements regarding the martyr’s 
“cause” and the “value” of such acts of “self-sacrifice.”1020  
                                                 
1018
 SZ §33, 159-160 / 201-203. 
1019
 Ricœur. "L'herméneutique du témoignage." p. 116. 
1020
 Six years after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger himself—in his role as newly appointed 
Rector of the University of Freiburg—would demonstrate how the “experience” of martyrdom is essentially 
mediated by rhetoric. On May 26, 1933, Heidegger participated in a commemorative ceremony marking the 
tenth anniversary of the execution of Albert Leo Schlageter, a young veteran of the First World War, former 
Freiburg student and radical nationalist who was killed near Düsseldorf by a French firing squad for his 
involvement in acts of sabotage against the occupying forces. After Hitler was appointed Chancellor of 
Germany in January 1933, Nazi officials had mounted a major propaganda effort to capitalize on Schlageter’s 
fate as “the first Nazi martyr.” At the Freiburg event, Heidegger proclaimed to the students and faculty: “As 
he stood defenseless facing the rifles, the hero’s inner gaze (der innere Blick des Helden) soared above the 
muzzles to the daylight and mountains of his home that he might die for the German people and its Reich 
with the Alemanic countryside before his eyes. With a hard will and a clear heart, Albert Leo Schlageter died 
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Notwithstanding the paradox of the necessarily “assertive” character of any worldly 
experience of martyrdom, our investigation has exhibited how Heidegger’s existential “call 
of conscience” can be understood as the experience of witnessing the martyr’s “silence,” 
thereby providing an attestation of Dasein’s possible authenticity. While Heidegger’s 
phenomenological approach does not allow for the production of a fixed “definition” of 
conscience, the enactment of one’s hearing the disturbing “self-testimony” of the martyr 
reveals a way for the existential phenomena constitutive of authentic Dasein to come 
together as a “whole”: the possibility of this hearing allows Dasein to return from its 
dispersal amidst the “they” in experiencing the silence of authentic Being-towards-death.  
As our study has documented, Heidegger struggles at various points in Being and 
Time to preserve the wholeness of Dasein while continuing to respect his principle 
regarding the equiprimordiality of Dasein’s existential structures. In taking up the problem 
of conscience where Heidegger “left off,” we have attempted to show how Heidegger’s 
“call of conscience” can be understood to produce the required attestation of Dasein’s 
authentic wholeness that grounds his existential investigation. As we have shown, the “call 
of conscience” can be seen to provide such an attestation but only if we accept (or 
“remember”) that Dasein is both Being-amidst and Being-towards-death in a world it 
shares with others. With his interpretation of conscience as Dasein’s experience of “self-
testimony,” Heidegger resists the need to posit a metaphysical “absolute” and thus avoids 
adopting the kind of speculative, theological solution to the problem of conscience that is 
exemplified by Stoker’s notion of synteresis in Das Gewissen. Yet in denying the 
involvement of a divine or external power such as that proposed by Stoker, Heidegger finds 
                                                                                                                                                     
his death, the most difficult and the greatest of all. (Harten Willens und klaren Herzens starb Albert Leo 
Schlageter seinen Tod, den schwersten und größten.) Student of Freiburg, let the strength of this hero’s native 
mountains flow into your will! Student of Freiburg, let the strength of the autumn sun of this hero’s native 
valley shine into your heart!” Martin Heidegger. "Political Texts, 1933-1934." trans. William S. Lewis. The 
Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader. ed. Richard Wolin. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). pp. 40-
41. While the existential “silence” of martyrdom may provide an attestation of Dasein’s possibility of 
authentic experience, as our study has attempted to show, this “experience” of martyrdom also reveals the 
essentially rhetorical—ethical and also problematical—character of “understanding the appeal” which 
Heidegger identifies with “wanting to have a conscience.” SZ §58, 288 / 334. For more regarding the 
appropriation of Schlageter’s “martyrdom” by the Nazi movement, cf. Jay W. Baird. To Die for Germany: 
Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). pp. 13-40.  
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himself confronted with the basic problem facing any “philosophy of testimony”: based on 
what “authority” can one determine the source and sense of any attestation of experience? 
As Heidegger states in §54 of Being and Time, his interpretation of authentic existence 
requires a way of understanding how the “call of conscience” can be experienced as an 
attestation by Being-in-the-world. In exhibiting Dasein’s possibility of experiencing the 
silent resoluteness of the martyr, our study has attempted to indicate just such a way. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Our study has focused on the methodological role that Heidegger assigns to the 
“call of conscience” in Being and Time and attempted to understand how he came to 
interpret this phenomenon as the means of providing an “attestation” of Dasein’s possible 
experience of authenticity. Our first task was to examine how the phenomenon of 
conscience emerged as a concept in Heidegger’s work leading up to the existential-
ontological investigation of Being and Time. We showed that Heidegger’s references to the 
concept of Gewissen in his published texts and course transcripts prior to the publication of 
Being and Time reveal what he consistently sought to distinguish a primordial phenomenon 
of conscience from the moral notion of conscientia, which he associated with the 
presupposed “ought” underlying traditional metaphysics. While there are only eight 
references to conscience in Heidegger’s extant work produced prior to his completion of 
the manuscript of Being and Time, these remarks regarding this phenomenon—all very 
brief and undeveloped—nonetheless indicate a progression in his understanding of its 
importance for his approach to phenomenological investigation. By the summer of 1925, 
Heidegger had complemented his criticism of the traditional notion of conscientia with a 
sketch of Gewissen as an existential concept: “the phenomenon of willing to have a 
conscience” was identified as essential to Dasein’s “choosing itself” and coming into 
“absolute resoluteness” in “running forward toward its death.”1021 Yet while Heidegger had 
determined conscience to be essential for his existential approach, our review showed that 
it was not until Being and Time that he heralded the pivotal methodological role of 
conscience as the “attesting” phenomenon that confirms Dasein’s possibility of authentic 
existence. In this regard, we showed that it was only after Heidegger had completed the 
first full draft of Being and Time that we find conscience described in his work as a “call.”   
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Seeking to identify the potential influences that might have led Heidegger to 
understand conscience as an existential “call,” we examined the philosophical sources that 
Heidegger mentioned with regard to his interpretation of conscience in Being and Time. 
This allowed us to reveal the significance of Heidegger’s encounter with a 1925 book 
entitled Das Gewissen that was written by Hendrik G. Stoker, a South African philosopher 
and theologian who completed his doctoral studies at Cologne under the direction of Max 
Scheler. Our analysis showed that Stoker’s book—the only source that Heidegger 
acknowledges as having positively contributed to his own understanding of 
conscience1022—influenced the existential interpretation of the “call of conscience” in a 
variety of ways. From a practical standpoint, Stoker advanced Heidegger’s project by 
providing the author of Being and Time with a “destructive” review of a wide range of 
philosophical and theological theories of conscience that had been proposed since the pre-
Socratic era. While Heidegger explicitly criticized the historical review found in Das 
Gewissen for its incompleteness, our analysis showed that his interpretation of conscience 
in Being and Time relied strictly on sources that Stoker had already examined in his thesis 
dedicated to exposing the “artificial” notion of the judging conscientia,1023 a notion which 
the South African felt had corrupted all “genuine” understanding of the phenomenon of 
conscience “in its true depth.”1024 Our analysis highlighted the importance of Stoker’s 
description of the experience of conscience as a “call-of-duty (Pflichtruf)”1025 for the 
emergence of Heidegger’s own existential description of the “call of conscience 
(Gewissensruf).”1026 Although the Heideggerian approach implies a rejection of the 
theological content of Stoker’s interpretation, we established evident similarities between 
Stoker’s description of the “call-of-duty” that concerns the preservation of the wholeness of 
a person’s faith and Heidegger’s existential “call of care”1027: most notably, both thinkers 
insisted that the “call” conveys no “worldly” content and relates strictly to the existential 
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unity and wholeness of the one to whom the call is addressed. We also pointed out the 
significance of Stoker’s interpretation of the phenomenon of synteresis—the Christian 
notion of a “divine spark” placed in each person’s soul—for our study of the Heideggerian 
concept of conscience. Although Heidegger never mentioned the term synteresis and its 
important place in the Scholastic debates regarding conscientia, we argued that Stoker’s 
identification of synteresis as the phenomenological key to understanding conscience 
served to highlight the problem of the “absolute” in Being and Time. Our comparison of 
Stoker’s account of synteresis with Heidegger’s existential interpretation of conscience 
illustrated how the problematic “attestation” of Dasein’s authenticity at the heart of Being 
and Time seems to require an “absolute source,” notwithstanding Heidegger’s refusal to 
posit one. In exploring this question, we observed that Scheler—who was the editor of 
Stoker’s Das Gewissen—was one of the first thinkers to point out this problem of the 
“absolute” in Heidegger’s work when he argued that the “call of conscience” involves an 
evident solipsism because Dasein is presented as the “source” of its own “attestation.”1028  
Based on our review of the evolution of Heidegger’s understanding of conscience 
prior to Being and Time, we considered the pivotal role of the “call of conscience” in the 
methodological structure of Being and Time and exhibited how it serves the means of 
producing the necessary “attestation” of authentic existence. Conducting a section-by-
section review of §§54-60 (the so-called “conscience chapter”) of Being and Time, we 
showed that his recognition of conscience as the experience of hearing a “call” allowed 
Heidegger to explain how Dasein—despite its “everyday” tendency of “falling” into the 
concerns of the anonymous “they”—has the possibility of “recovering” its unity and 
existing authentically, thus making it accessible for existential investigation as a “whole” 
phenomenon. As Heidegger himself noted, however, his strictly existential interpretation of 
conscience as a “call” was not enough: the phenomenological investigation of Being and 
Time must also furnish a demonstration of how Dasein can experience the “call of 
conscience.” In other words, the “attestation” of Dasein’s authentic mode of existence must 
be shown to be a possible experience of Being-in-the-world. Our study confirmed that 
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Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience—which focused on distinguishing his “call of 
conscience” from the ordinary notion of conscience as a moral phenomenon—does not 
fulfill this requirement of “demonstrating” how Dasein can possibly experience the 
“summons”
1029
 that “comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me.”1030 However, 
our insistence on the methodological role of conscience in Being and Time also allowed us 
to identify a way of reconsidering this problem of the missing “attestation”: we established 
a possible link between the “call of conscience” and Heidegger’s notion of formal 
indication, the innovative phenomenological “method” that the young philosopher had 
developed in Freiburg and Marburg prior to writing Being and Time. To test this 
relationship between conscience and formal indication, we considered how the experience 
of Heidegger’s existential call was informed by what is formally indicated by four 
phenomena that he identifies as being essential to Dasein’s authentic mode of existence: 
discourse, truth, solicitude and anticipation. While our review of these existential concepts 
failed to disclose how the “attestation” of conscience can be experienced, these four “clues” 
allowed us to identify a number of conditions that are necessary for any such experience of 
Dasein’s authentic “wholeness”: 1) conscience implies an experience of “silent” discourse, 
2) the “truth” conveyed by conscience implies an experience of enactment in resoluteness, 
3) the relation between conscience and the phenomenon of “positive solicitude” implies an 
experience of authentically encountering the other, and 4) the association of anticipation 
and conscience implies that the “call” authentically exposes Dasein to itself as Being-
towards-death.  
Guided by these necessary conditions of authentic existence, we finally examined 
the most “direct” of the formal indication’s of Heidegger’s concept of conscience: the 
German word Gewissen. Adopting the methodological principles espoused by the early 
Heidegger, we showed how the etymology of the German term for conscience can allow us 
to point to a way that Dasein can experience the existential call and thereby produce the 
necessary “attestation” of its authenticity. Following what Heidegger described as the basic 
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steps of phenomenological investigation,1031 we conducted a “phenomenological-critical 
destruction”1032 of the “ordinary” notion of conscience defined as a moral concept that 
exposed the historical error underlying the widespread belief that Gewissen is simply a 
German translation of the word conscientia. Our research revealed that the etymological 
roots of conscientia are unrelated to those of the German word: Gewissen has a history that 
dates back well beyond the 10th century when an anonymous monk at St. Gall first used 
this term as a translation of conscientia. Moreover, our research identified an “original” and 
very different meaning of the word Gewissen that is found in the oldest preserved text 
produced in the German language: the 8th century Codex Abrogans. In this manuscript, the 
earliest appearance of Gewissen is identified as the translation of the Latin word 
testimonium, which literally means “attestation.” With this discovery, our investigation 
revealed that the first extant document containing evidence of the German term for 
conscience indicates that its original meaning is directly related to the function of 
“attestation”—the very function that Heidegger assigned to his existential “call of 
conscience” in Being and Time. Of course, the discovery of this ancient “definition” of 
Gewissen remains insufficient: Heidegger’s phenomenological “method” demands a way of 
understanding how Dasein can enact this “attestation” in its experience as Being-in-the-
world. Examining the connection between testimonium and the experience of Heideggerian 
conscience, we responded to this requirement by showing how the formal indication of the 
attesting “call of conscience” implied an experience of encountering the other as Being-
towards-death. This experience can be understood as Dasein’s hearing the “silence” of the 
other who faces martyrdom.  
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Appendix A:  
Vortrag gehalten von Prof. Martin Heidegger am Pfingstmontag 1926 in 
Marburg vor der Akademischen Vereinigung 
The following 11 pages contain a reproduction of the typescript prepared by Ernst Fuchs of 
Heidegger’s address on the topic of “truth” to the Marburg Academic Association on May 
24, 1926. This document represents the first extant record of Heidegger publicly describing 
the phenomenon of conscience in terms of “calling” (see pages 8-9 of the transcript).  
We were provided access to this document—which has not yet been published in 
German—by the Stevenson Library of Bard College (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY), holder 
of the Hannah Arendt Collection. This copy of the transcript was found among the pages 
contained in one of Arendt’s personal folders which also includes the transcript of 
Heidegger's course “Interpretationen Aus Der Antiken Philosophie: Aristoteles. 
Metaphysik. Buch Theta. Zweistündige Vorlesung im Sommer-Semester 1931.” 
We have reproduced the high-quality scans of this transcript with the express authorization 
of the Stevenson Library of Bard College. Following our request to access this document, 
the library decided to make the full content of this folder available via the website of the 
Hannah Arendt Collection.   
(<http://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Heidegger-Interpretations2.pdf>.) 
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Appendix B:  
Image of Page 120 of the Codex Abrogans 
 
The following page contains a reproduction of page 120 of the Codex Abrogans, the oldest 
extant book in the German language. Slightly more than halfway down the page, the Latin 
word “testimoniu” (sic) is translated using the early Old High German term “kiuuizzitha.”  
We have reproduced this image with the express authorization of the Library of the Abbey 
of St. Gall.  
(St. Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. Sang. 911, p. 120 <http://www.e-
codices.unifr.ch/en/csg/0911/120/medium>.) 
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Appendix C:  
Image of Page 189 of the Codex Abrogans 
 
The following page contains a reproduction of page 189 of the Codex Abrogans. At the 
very bottom of the page, the Latin word “testimonium” is translated using the early Old 
High German term “kiuuizzitha.” In the preceding entry on this very same page of this 
wordbook, the Latin “martirium” is translated as “martartoam.”  
We have reproduced this image with the express authorization of the Library of the Abbey 
of St. Gall.  
 (St. Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. Sang. 911, p. 189 <http://www.e-
codices.unifr.ch/en/csg/0911/189/medium>.) 
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